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 For Ravishing Devi and Devilish Ravi,
my mother and father

 In my childhood I was a fervent worshiper of the tiger . . . . 
I used to linger endlessly before one of the cages at the zoo; 
I judged vast encyclopedias and books of natural history by 
the splendor of their tigers. . . . Childhood passed away, and 
the tigers and my passion for them grew old, but still they are 
in my dreams. At that submerged or chaotic level they keep 
prevailing. And so, as I sleep, some dream beguiles me, and 
suddenly I know I am dreaming. Then I think: this is a dream, 
a pure diversion of my will; and now that I have unlimited 
power, I am going to cause a tiger.
Oh, incompetence! Never can my dreams engender the 
wild beast I long for. The tiger indeed appears, but stuffed or 
fl imsy, or with impure variations of shape, or of an implausi-
ble size, or all too fl eeting, or with a touch of the dog or the 
bird.
— Jorge Luis Borges
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3Prologue
In the old days I had too much respect for nature. I put my-
self in front of things and landscapes and let them alone.
No more of that, now I will intervene.
I was then at Honfl eur and was getting bored. So I reso-
lutely brought in some camel. [Alors résolument j’y mis du 
chameau.]
— Henri Michaux
There was a time not so long ago when the presence of animals in a 
story made its world appear more compelling and complete, more like 
our own. There were the bullock- carts and horse- drawn carriages, the 
cattle and fowl, the hunting dogs and running prey, the horses that 
shared men’s fate in battle, the ominous or auspicious bird, the occa-
sional ferocious beast. Such authenticating references to a known world 
would have worked rather like what Roland Barthes memorably called 
the reality effect: so whole and uncontroversial that those places in the 
text seemed to draw their substance from reality itself, as if dispensing 
with the operations of language or “meaning.” “We are the real,” such 
elements seemed to say; in them a certain danger (of what derives its 
certitude precisely by excepting itself from analysis) vied with a certain 
laziness.1 At these points, the text claimed to be connecting with— even 
directly borrowing from— the very fl esh of the world, apparently with-
out need (and therefore beyond suspicion) of mediation or construc-
tion. True, Barthes was writing about how Flaubert’s and Balzac’s prose 
registered the material texture of, say, Western, urban, bourgeois life, 
then served it up as sheer (or mere) reality. But the assumption and 
confi dence he described— namely, that words in a text can point directly 
at real things and lives— encapsulate more fundamentally the wager of 
literary realism itself. “The ‘real’ is supposed to be self- suffi cient,” wrote 
4 ❘ Prologue
Barthes, it is thus “brandished like a weapon against meaning, as if, by 
some statutory exclusion, what is alive cannot signify, and vice- versa” 
(146; my emphasis).
This book was born of the unnerving sense that, today, animals— or 
“what is alive”— are no longer the self- evident assurances of a story’s 
realism but, rather, riddled entities, “vague” places where literature most 
self- consciously admits the weirdness of its commerce with the world. 
Time and again I noticed this in recent French novels (these being the 
books I most often read and teach). Almost invariably, when an animal 
appeared, rather than attesting to the referential “well- meaningness” 
of a text— rather than montrer patte blanche (showing its hand), as a 
good animal should2— it tended to be hard to read or clearly “see.” An 
undecidedness blurred the text in these places, so that it was not easy 
to say where the animal started or ended; what in its ostensible vicinity 
was in relation with it; how, once it was there, its presence could be dis-
tinguished from its absence; or what precisely was at stake in supposing 
it to be a bit of life or a bit of meaning. Weren’t animals supposed to 
be vouched for by “real life”? Here they posed rather, as if by an in-
verse logic, the enigma of what literature itself was in relation to world. 
Somewhere along the way they had turned into the tokens of litera-
ture’s unrealness— far from being transparent, self- standing indices of 
the world, they were a reminder that literature’s objects had never been 
entirely, or only, or properly, those of earthly reality.
The reality effect is a trompe l’oeil, of course— this had been Barthes’s 
whole point, and there is no better testament to the power of the “refer-
ential illusion” he was describing than the fact that we persist in reading 
(or in remembering) his 1968 essay as saying the opposite: that this 
was, essentially, how literature’s realism worked. Rather, Barthes sin-
gled out “useless details” such as the barometer mentioned in Flaubert’s 
“Un cœur simple” because he deemed “realist” only such details, while 
insisting that literature itself was “fundamentally, constitutively unre-
alistic.” Indeed, he would write: “Literature is unreality itself, or more 
exactly, far from being an analogical copy of reality, literature is on the 
contrary the very consciousness of the unreality of language: the ‘truest’ 
literature is the one which knows itself as the most unreal, to the degree 
that it knows itself as essentially language; is that search for an interme-
diary state between things and words; is that tension of a consciousness 
which is at once carried and limited by the words, which wields through 
them a power both absolute and improbable.”3 Regarding realist narra-
tive in particular, he would clarify: “Realistic literature is narrative, of 
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course, but that is because its realism is fragmentary, erratic, confi ned 
to ‘details,’ and because the most realistic narrative imaginable develops 
along unrealistic lines” (The Rustle, 147– 48; my emphasis).
If this book’s focus is not on realism or unrealism (so that this open-
ing is itself a trompe l’oeil  . . .), one of its earliest and deepest intu-
itions does concern that distribution, and where it has tended to leave 
animals. My working hypothesis, long before I could articulate it in 
such terms, has been that animals only seem to be literature’s realest 
“details.” In fact, when one looks more closely, tentatively resisting the 
assumption that “[they] are the real,” they turn out on the contrary to 
describe rather the unrealistic lines (to stay with Barthes’s term) along 
which a narrative’s thinking may be developing. This is not to say the 
creatures considered here are fantastical or allegorical, far from it— they 
are of identifi able species, their presence is easily explained, they move 
on the same plane as the human characters; indeed, in each case this 
contact is what brings them into the story. Yet “the animal” in these 
novels is never a simple, positive, or accountable entity. In each case, 
it is as if it were at the same time something overdetermined— shaped 
and preceded and overlaid by everything we think we know about that 
animal, its natural and unnatural history, its various inscriptions (its 
“bio- graphy”) in literature and philosophy— and something continually 
underdetermined— for what on earth (let alone in a text), in the end, is 
an animal? Both forms of lack/excess consign it to a potentially inter-
minable reading, arrested typically by the assumption that the animal is 
being cast, precisely (or rather imprecisely), as that animal, that it is in 
that capacity somehow self- identical and self- evident, and that therefore 
what it is is not at issue. In fact, it may well owe the gist of its legibility 
to this way it has of preceding itself. Recall Nietzsche on this: “If I create 
the defi nition of a mammal and then, having inspected a camel, declare, 
‘Behold, a mammal,’ then a truth has certainly been brought to light, 
but it is of limited value, by which I mean that it is anthropomorphic 
through and through and contains not a single point which could be 
said to be ‘true in itself,’ really, and in a generally valid sense, regardless 
of mankind.”4
What do (we think) we see when (we think) we see an animal in a 
text? Is it innocence, affection, anxiety, or melancholy that leads us to 
believe— or pretend to believe— that we recognize it from prior knowl-
edge or from the “real world”? Behold, an animal. In these moments 
we readily suppose that literature is drawing its life and truth from 
the real. Or perhaps we are comforted to conclude from literature that 
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animals still share lived space with us. (So that there must have been a 
moment, not easy to locate, when the burden of proof shifted, and liter-
ature started vouching for the world.) Considerations of vulnerability, 
suffering, empathy, justice, interspecies relation and difference brought 
to bear on literature’s animals entail especially earnest versions of this 
naturalist assumption. Here lies a quandary: with each ethical reading 
we reinstate and renaturalize “the animal” even as, in our lives, animals 
assume increasingly unnatural and mediated forms, from endangered or 
artifi cially preserved populations to the multi- million- dollar pet indus-
try, to the colossal, largely invisible, daily “rendering” of fl esh into meat 
and (“innocent”) sign that Nicole Shukin investigates with devastating 
clarity in Animal Capital.5 With each realist reading we ourselves un-
wittingly supply animals’ missing limbs, presence, perspective, blood, 
breath, so that their unwholeness, their unworldliness, made systemati-
cally unthinkable in our world, also goes unprocessed in our stories. A 
kind of retinal persistence— what in the brain- eye collaboration leads 
us to see things in the gaps— becomes the hallucinatory principle for 
reading animal life (endlessly back) into literature.
An altogether more unsettling experience of reading opens up when 
we resist the naturalist temptation and defer “recognition.” What we 
then face when we “behold an animal” is a place in a text where two 
mirrors face each other (the creature and the fi gure, life and literature, 
fl esh and intertext). And as would happen when two mirrors face each 
other, there is an endless multiplication of the image. The refl ection is 
so infi nite that, technically speaking, we could continue to see the image 
long after the thing itself has vanished. (In this way, the animal is not 
altogether unlike a star.)

Animals are vehicles of literature’s signifying and fi gurational powers, 
writes critic and essayist Tiphaine Samoyault, noting that “the catalog 
of fi gures and forms of meaning attached to a given animal can strip it 
of all literality— not to say of all existence, to situate the statement on 
another plane.”6 Intrigued by literality’s (or existence’s) way of missing 
in such instances, Samoyault considers how the sheer meaningfulness of 
the animal may be blocking, precisely, any encounter with its “impos-
sible” realness. This she demonstrates by means of a reading of rats in 
literature (Shakespeare, Hofmannsthal, Freud, Montale, Bataille): the 
repulsion the rodent elicits animates its work as a fi gure; at the same 
time the fi gure when pressed may reawaken the rat’s intolerable fl esh-
Prologue ❘ 7
liness. In the case of Hofmannsthal’s Letter of Lord Chandos, where 
Chandos experiences a crisis of meaning— and specifi cally of writing—
 by imagining the agony of the rats in his cellar where he has laid poi-
son, Samoyault notes that, in the throes of death, the rat offers an 
unbearable— dis- fi gured— image of the human. Thus we are faced with 
a curious chiasmus, for if “literally, the rat’s life is untenable, fi gura-
tively, its death too is untenable” (236).
Meditating on the enigma of Hofmannsthal’s Letter, namely, on 
what the mortal agony of rats might mean for writing, Samoyault ven-
tures that the rat, repeatedly cast as “a limit case” in literature, is the 
“place of a confl ict between the letter and the fi gure” (237). Written in 
response to the question “Why the animal?,” this short essay, in treating 
the rat as a sort of boundary condition, in fact makes legible a truth 
about literature’s animals, a truth hidden in plain sight, and only fur-
ther dramatized by contemporary literature’s generation of vanishing 
(or faint or fl ickering) creatures. This truth concerns, in the end, the 
irreducible literariness of animals, the way an animal pulls discreetly 
yet insistently at the line “between literality and fi gurality” (231)— or 
between what deconstructive analysis would call the thematic level of 
the text (what it says) and its rhetorical level (what it does). Perhaps it is 
simply that the animal confi gures— or reveals— these two as intimately, 
chiasmatically connected, where one keeps turning into the other or, 
more trickily, concealing or passing for the other. Beyond a point, pre-
sumably, the “literal” (thematic, referential, and by extension material, 
historical, narrative, affective, ethical) animal is too literal to bear— 
beyond predator, prey, food, captive, commodity, curiosity, or vermin, it 
mirrors our automotor and heteroaffective life, including its “fl esh and 
fi nitude,”7 its drama, its insignifi cance. The animal as animal is experi-
enced as burdensome or unbearably light. It vied with our ancestors for 
habitat and resources— humans responded by destroying the forest. It 
still vies with us, arguably, in the ultimate frame, for meaning (Who and 
what survived? Under what conditions? What mattered in the end?). 
We fl ee from unseemly promiscuities (or vague disquiet) to a more fi g-
ural realm, where the animal, gathered in new confi gurations, merges 
with the forms of our thought, detaches itself from the breathing body, 
yields more abstractable meanings. But neither is this a “clean” opera-
tion. The fi gure never uses the whole of the animal, so that something 
is left unsubsumed and protrudes— an extra limb, incongruous fl esh, an 
unseemly gait. A repressed literality remains, to compromise the fi gure, 
reconnect it to the world, or betray the costs of its severance from the 
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world. It is not a confl ict between the literal (or material) and the fi gural 
that in the end fascinates me in literature’s animals, but the continual 
communication between the two, and what it means for an entity to be 
irreducibly, and from the very beginning, both— that is, the most real 
thing and the least real. In its extreme unreality, as we shall see, the 
animal can reveal also how fabulous (in the sense of fable) the relations 
and transactions forming reality are, in its thinking, its making, its un-
making, how unworldly the world.
That the animal marks a place in stories where meaning chases its 
own tail (or the human its tail), I can only suggest in somewhat elusive, 
metaphorical terms here, but will proceed to demonstrate in the detail 
of slow, exorbitant readings. My teachers through this refl ection have 
been a poet, a novelist, and a philosopher— Francis Ponge, Éric Chevil-
lard, and Jacques Derrida— all writers for whom the animal is insepara-
bly and originarily (as Derrida would say) word and thing, the live joint 
between the two realms. All three model a radical exposedness— which 
is at the same time essential insight and embarrassment— when it comes 
to writing’s relation to (or mode of contact with) animals. Each admits 
in some way that, where it seriously approaches the animal, writing— 
not to say thinking— may be diffi cult to mark off from “the animal’s 
own” movements and forms. In these places, it is just possible to imag-
ine that the animal is eluding capture, objectifi cation or, indeed, falsifi -
cation, by “itself” supplying the forms and writing its way. Such a fi ction 
operates not on a thematic level; it is a radical meta- fable by which writ-
ing and thinking allegorize their own essential estrangement. As Cary 
Wolfe writes, in a striking formulation of deconstruction’s fundamental 
insight, “what we too hastily think of as ‘our’ concepts, our readings, 
our histories, [are] in an important sense not ours at all.”8
An animal may appear at fi rst glance to be the discrete object of 
a (“our”) sentence or story; in fact its “presence”— its “work”— is 
more thoroughly described in the exorbitance with which it affects 
the entirety of a text’s meanings. A thickness— the vast archive of our 
sightings and citings over time, the intricate network of neural and in-
tertextual pathways by which we have thought it and by which it has 
entered (imprinted, oriented, opposed, obsessed, riddled, merged with, 
ex- orbited) our thinking— comes to separate a story from (and tie it 
interminably to) itself. What Ponge— with whose work Derrida’s and 
Chevillard’s share a deep affi nity— called the “parti pris des choses” (the 
commitment to things)— inspiring Jean- Christophe Bailly’s “parti pris 
des animaux”9— names an attentiveness to that which, paradoxically, 
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lends itself perfectly to language, calls for ever more elaborate, exacting 
acts of language— but precisely because words reach it through thick-
ness and homonymy (writing’s “biomimicry,” one could say). Writing 
gets closer to the thing not through transparency or referential clarity 
but by producing more of itself; it feels the contours and texture of the 
thing through its own concretions. Thus, with Ponge, at the same time 
as the text described the object, as the poet and critic Gérard Farasse 
put it once so insightfully, the object described the text.10 Similarly, in 
the pages that follow, I consider the animal insofar as it may describe 
the text, that is to say, for what it might teach us about meaning’s ways 
of working in our texts. Rather than supposing the creatures beheld— a 
horse, an orangutan/wolf, dogs, (bits of) hedgehogs— to be fl esh- and- 
blood emissaries from the earthly real, or, conversely, explicable, inter-
pretable motifs or themes, I approach them as totems of the unending 
co- implicatedness of fl esh and thought. In doing so, I have been inspired 
by writerly insights and theoretical propositions alive to the uncanny 
unequality— the nonpositive, nonaccountable, non- self- identical charac-
ter— of the animal in our texts and minds. These include John Berger’s 
observation of the fact that an animal in a zoo is always visually dis-
appointing, out of focus; Derrida’s insistence on refl exives, double ne-
gations, chiasmuses, catachreses when discussing the animal; Thomas 
Keenan’s hypothesis that every fable is about a “passing” (toward “hu-
man” subjecthood); Jean Rolin’s suggestion, as he rereads nineteenth- 
century travel writings, that there are places where a stray dog should 
have been present but is missing. I have been drawn to subplots and 
incongruous scenes themselves seemingly out of focus within novels, 
where an animal appeared to be present but was in effect being inter-
cepted on the verge of appearance or disappearance, and through whose 
fl ickering something important found expression (but also, precisely, 
was spared expression, compressed) which otherwise, by properly nar-
rative, thematic or conceptual means, might have been ungraspable, or 
taken an inordinate amount of time or conceptual work to unfold.
Telltales of a tricky sort, these animals may yet be taken for coher-
ent, meaningful fi ctional avatars or “emanations” of “real” animals. An 
experimental homonymy— that is, resisting realism as “truth” while 
welcoming it as alibi— may even be the key to these “exorbitant read-
ings”: the condition of such tellings (mine, here) being that the animal 
narrated be indistinguishable from its “real” counterpart, or at least, 
be suffi ciently like it to look/sound like a plausible being of the world. 
This persistent likelihood of (mere) homonymy does not exactly disrupt 
10 ❘ Prologue
a thinking that would carry ontological or ethical dimensions— on the 
contrary. This book’s vital assumption is that literature, when it thinks 
(through the names, forms, alibis of) animals, is always also rehears-
ing decisions and confessing quandaries to do with allotments of fl esh, 
place, thought, with what it means to mean, to be embodied, to die, 
and that to this extent it is in its animals— locations of deep riddles 
and ironies— that literature is most philosophical. We know this from 
powerful readings of fables (Louis Marin, Paul de Man, Marc Escola, 
Keenan) and from the provocations to reading that philosophers have 
consistently found in literature’s animals (Deleuze, Blanchot, Kofman, 
Derrida, de Fontenay, Bailly). To consider animals in contemporary 
novels as bits of fable is to remember that animals have always been 
complicated places of passings and turnings and borrowings. In classi-
cal fables they spoke despite muteness, lived on borrowed human prop-
erties (yet died as animals). Contemporary animals may be disinclined 
to speak and generally less anthropomorphized; complicated conver-
sions and paradoxes are nonetheless at work in them. One of these has 
loomed through the time I have spent writing this book: that of animals 
vanishing— an unthinkable horizon hanging over world and thought. 
Arguably, when it happens, given our “fabulous” thinking— animals are 
a fabulous complication, no less than the human— we might not bear 
it, or not believe it.
The defeated predicament of animals in our world today lends a 
gravity to every step of my refl ection here. Yet it seems to me that, if 
we are to continue to believe it is possible to think, and to ensure that 
there is a place from which to think, we must learn again what we 
have forgotten about poetico- philosophical thinking: that where it is 
catachrestic, or borrows from other realms (Derrida’s argument since 
the beginning about philosophical concepts, wherein he anticipated the 
animal long before naming it), it is hardly inconsistent or lacking rigor. 
Rather, that is where it is most refl exive and vigilant in admitting that 
certain things be named improperly so as not to be left altogether un-
named or unthought. It is as if, in animals, thinking were compelled to 
be most attentive to its own tangled scene.
I have made every effort through this book to refuse, or at least to 
continually defer, playfully but also gravely, any presumed divergence 
between “deconstructionist” and materialist/“biopolitical”/“ethics”- 
based approaches.11 In doing so, I have been moved by the personal 
conviction that a kind of uneasy collaboration between these perspec-
tives was demanded by the particular object that is the animal. Hence 
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my practice of periodically feeding back into a philosophico- literary re-
fl ection a “scientifi c- realist” fact about the animal under consideration. 
I have intended this as an ongoing experimentation, a deliberate im-
purity and restlessness in method, a challenge to myself to continually 
keep each method’s “represseds” in play, to see how far this could be 
taken and what insights it might yield. It is this wager— and the very 
real question of how I might bring my mind closest to thinking what an 
animal is, while contending honestly with the reality of having “lived 
with” animals most intensely through reading— that has formed the sus-
tained challenge of this book.
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Melancholy of Horsepower
Jean- Philippe Toussaint, with Eadweard Muybridge
Just as every photographic instant has taken place
in an eternity from which it must be detached in order to be,
every instant of every fl ight [ . . . ]
takes place a little further away in an open that is still
opening and that is more than time.
— Jean- Christophe Bailly, The Animal Side
Art was born in [man’s] attempt to delineate an animal in 
motion.
— Eadweard Muybridge, Animals in Motion
The Sound of Hooves
In an untitled novella by Patrick Modiano, the third of a triptych pub-
lished in 1999 under the title Des inconnues, a nineteen- year- old female 
narrator, having lost her job in London, accepts an acquaintance’s of-
fer to stay in his studio near the Porte de Vanves, in Paris’s fourteenth 
arrondissement, only to wake in the early hours of the morning to the 
sound of marching hooves. “Certainly I have forgotten a lot of the de-
tails,” reads the opening sentence, “but when I think back to that time 
I can still hear the sound of those hooves.”1 Crystallizing anxieties of 
her own, the sound of the hooves gnaws at her consciousness. With the 
eerie persistence of a mirage at the city’s frontier, it seems to expose an 
unspeakable secret about the world. In the course of her wanderings 
she comes upon the sound’s source: on the rue Brancion is the horse ab-
attoir of Vaugirard. Rising early one morning she catches a procession 
of horses being led in the dark: “I saw them emerge from the night and 
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walk down the deserted boulevard Lefebvre. The same sound of hooves, 
at the same cadence, that I usually heard in my half- sleep, but lighter. 
There were only ten or so of them. This time, I could see them. On one 
side, almost leading the line, a man was pulling one of the horses by the 
halter” (126– 27). These particular horses, she learns, were from Neuilly 
(“Horses that had known pretty neighborhoods and rich people”), fair-
ground horses being disposed of (“This would happen from time to 
time”). But on most mornings, horses arrived “by truck, by train, and 
the sound of hooves one heard in the morning was also the animals 
being led out from the stables of the quartier. Those stables where the 
horses waited, they were out there, all around. The traffi c started as 
early as four o’clock in the morning” (130– 31). These matinal marches 
to the slaughterhouse are not given any explicit sentimental or ethical 
tenor in the story. We do learn in passing that while growing up the 
protagonist had had a weakness for dogs and horses. But in the way 
that the narrative is set up, its objective is simply “to understand what 
the sound of the hooves meant” (155), and this is achieved a few pages 
in. What remains and continues to haunt the (otherwise centerless, and 
somewhat unfi nished- seeming) story is the fact itself in its irreducibil-
ity. Looking at a house facing the street, the narrator wonders: “From 
that lit window, the sound had to be heard even more distinctly, and 
one would see the horses pass. For years, the person who lived there 
and all the others whose windows faced the boulevard had seen, as I 
did now, the horses at dawn. I would have liked them to tell me what 
they thought about it. We were only a few to know it, from the mil-
lions of people who lived in this city” (129– 30). What might others 
have said? What sort of feeling expressed by them might have echoed 
her own? What sort of knowledge precisely is being designated by the 
indefi nite “it” of “know it [le savoir]”? One person the narrator meets 
does say something, notably void of any judgment or sentiment: “Well, 
for a hundred years they’ve been taking care of [s’occupe de] horses 
here” (145). “Always that calm voice,” thinks the narrator, “And even 
a smile as if the thing spoke for itself: taking care of horses.” A little 
further on she muses: “For a hundred years, he had said. So it had 
been hundreds and hundreds of thousands of horses that had passed 
through the boulevard and the rue Brancion.” (At this point her inter-
locutor fi nds her pale.)
If this story seems largely unmoored from historical circumstance, it 
is a well- known fact, emphasized in his 2014 Nobel Prize citation, that 
most of Modiano’s writings are directly or indirectly about occupied 
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France and the Holocaust.2 We may remember here by way of prec-
edent Georges Franju’s disturbing fi lm Sang des bêtes (1949), which, 
documenting the graphic slaughter of animals within the interiors of 
abattoirs— located, as they have been historically, at the “portes de 
Paris,” the old city gates— also inscribed the vastness and hiddenness 
of a violence which, with the unfolding of the century, would come to 
be seen as constitutive of the modern. The horror of hundreds of thou-
sands of horses being walked to their deaths is indeed compounded for 
Modiano’s unnamed protagonist by that of being the only person to 
really think it, of being the only consciousness in which it assumes its 
full proportions. Reluctant to stay on in the neighborhood, she hardly 
knows where to go, realizing simply that there is no escape: “In any 
case, even if I lived in a different neighborhood, far from here, that 
wouldn’t change anything. There would still/always [toujours] be in my 
head a line of horses walking on in the night, and turning at the corner, 
and that guy in cowboy pants, pulling one of them by its halter— a black 
horse. It didn’t want to walk and would certainly have fl ed, if it could” 
(128). Only in this recalling of the scene, at a good page’s distance from 
the actual sighting of the horses, does one get a glimpse of the fi rst horse 
being led by “that guy in cowboy pants.” In this replay of the proces-
sion in the narrator’s mind (“in my head”), this black horse singled out 
from the others that follow it— and the hundreds of thousands that 
precede it— in being ascribed the individual (if hopeless) will to escape 
its deathly fate, fl eetingly breaks their numberlessness and facelessness, 
rescales their impending fate as that, industrially multiplied, of a single, 
sentient, captive creature.
Francis Bacon, painter of crucifi xions and carcasses, had confessed in 
an interview to being “moved” by “extraordinary photographs which 
have been done of animals [ . . . ] before they were slaughtered,” where 
it seems clear “that they’re so aware of what is going to happen to 
them, they do everything to attempt to escape.”3 As it happens, the ref-
erence to photography is appropriate here (and part of a larger point 
to which I will return), as this scene— the replay of the procession “in 
my head”— also seals the somehow hypnotic space- time that the horses’ 
march toward their slaughter opens and keeps open within that of the 
narrative. They walk in an endless time (“toujours”; still or always), in 
an indeterminate space (“dans ma tête”; in my head / “dans la nuit”; 
in the night). Even when directly witnessed, the horses “sort[aient] de 
la nuit” (emerged from the night) (126); the narrator imagines other 
inhabitants of the quartier who would have seen, like her, “the horses at 
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dawn” (130). The point is that the horses pass as if interminably on the 
boulevard Lefebvre in the night (strictly at dawn), walking to the corner 
where they turn into the rue Brancion, street of the abattoir. Then it is 
the sound of the hooves that, ghostlike, outlives awhile the sight of the 
animals: “I could no longer see them but I could still hear the sound of 
the[ir] hooves and stood still, waiting for the moment when I would 
no longer hear them” (127). The marching horses, heard nightly in the 
uncertainty of a “half- sleep,” in this liminal zone that is the “portes 
de Paris,” seem to walk the very edge of the real, toward an end that 
lies outside the story’s fi eld of view and sound. In this sense, it is as if 
the stomping hooves in the night marked the outer border of the story, 
where it meets its own insomnia, its untranquil night. “We live, it is 
said, like sleepwalkers,” the narrator reads later, in a pamphlet she types 
up for a group committed to “work on the self.” “we were living in 
our sleep [ . . . ]. We therefore had to come out of this state and this 
could be done only by the ‘remembrance of self.’ But even though I kept 
stopping to type to reread each sentence, I couldn’t understand very well 
what this exercise involved” (154).
What the narrator professes not to understand, the narrative itself 
does, consummately, in the way it smuggles into its space these sequences 
of cadenced movement in the night, where agency (walking) and pas-
sivity (being led) conspire incomprehensibly, in a temporality somehow 
mythical, fatal, as if the horses were being endlessly sleepwalked to their 
deaths. And why? The absence of any allusion to a horse meat industry 
or to another reason for the disposing of the horses, the reference to 
the trucks and trains that transport them, to the neighborhood stables 
where they stand waiting to be taken to the boulevard, suggest a scene 
of reasonless, systematic slaughter, as if that border of the story and of 
the city were being sinisterly maintained by the continual extermina-
tion of horses. Leaving no carcasses, only sawdust, traces of blood, and 
wads of money in the hands of massive men the narrator assumes to be 
horse traders (126), the horses march from the hiddenness of stables 
and unnamed places far away to the hiddenness of the slaughterhouse, 
ghostly not least because they are momentarily drawn from this night 
(“I saw them emerge from the night”) into the somnambulic march 
toward their vanishing.
But then the ghostliness of the horses also tells of a real and histor-
ical disappearance of horses from the streets of France, and from the 
urbanized world at large.4 At one point, in a quiet street lined with low 
houses, the narrator thinks: “One could have imagined this were a small 
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garrison town where every morning one hears the sound of hooves, but 
it is a squadron passing and the horses are not going to the abattoir” 
(152). The mythical despair of this story is in the unvarying direction of 
the horses’ march, in the ineluctable singularity of their destination. The 
only resolution that can be wished for in this symbolic space so wrought 
is that the hooves could sound a path not toward the slaughterhouse. 
But this, precisely, cannot happen in the space of the story, whose in-
scription is inseparable from the frayage, the path traced and retraced 
by the horses toward the “abattoirs de Vaugirard.” If we do learn that 
years later “the abattoirs have disappeared” (164), we must imagine this 
matched by the obverse fact that from the waking, diurnal, everyday life 
of humans, horses too have largely disappeared.
Exodus
“Frankly, three hundred grams per person per year,” wrote Jean- Louis 
Aragon in a supplement to Le Monde in 2010, “that is, less than one 
gram per day, that is really nothing to make a big fuss about [il n’y a 
vraiment pas de quoi fouetter un chat].”5 He was alluding to contempo-
rary French consumption of horsemeat, a dying taste if one is to believe 
Yannick Dubois, one of eight hundred remaining butchers still trading in 
it, and who, interviewed by Aragon, admitted to eating horsemeat twice 
a week himself, essentially to support the trade. “We are the victims 
of much disinformation with these campaigns against hippophagia,” 
laments Dubois, “but I have to say there is a lack of culture, people are 
not accustomed to eating horse.” At the time at which he was speaking, 
France was importing 80 percent of its horsemeat, exporting (mainly 
to Italy) most of its own young horsemeat, a “unique genetic heritage 
in the world,” as Aragon points out, derived from “nine species of draft 
horses.” For the French prefer not to eat their own horses: “Serving [foal 
meat] here, I tell you, one would be killed, even the habitués don’t want 
it,” says Dubois. Most of his own meat comes from horses “living in 
semi- freedom in the United States” and slaughtered in Mexico or Canada. 
The meat is then transported by air, for consumption within a week 
after slaughter. His produce is thus fresher, Dubois assures Le Monde, 
than Argentinian horsemeat that might be imported as sea freight.
The dramatic decline of hippophagie is balanced out, in Le Monde’s 
supplement, by the “return of the horse” in urban space, through col-
lectively owned stables, a renewed enthusiasm for competitive eques-
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trian sports, and even an initiative by the city council of Saint- Prix, 
Val- d’Oise to henceforth collect biodegradable waste from residential 
neighborhoods in a vehicle drawn by “Leone,” a Comtois mare. A coun-
cil spokesperson confi rmed that the shift from motorized transport to 
the “ancestral solutions” of horse- drawn locomotion had saved the city 
seventy euros per ton of green waste (iv– v). If all of this amounts to an 
ambiguous picture of the horse’s place in today’s France (and beyond), 
it moves me to refl ect on the historical vanishing from which it so sup-
plementally returns. In an article written in 1956 Étienne Souriau had 
pointed out that “the sixty years”— now more than a hundred— “of 
development of cinema coincide[d] with a technological fact of extreme 
importance in the history of humanity [. . . ,] the sudden and almost 
total cessation of the use of the horse as a motor force, as a practical 
mode of locomotion and as a means of combat.”6 John Berger, in his 
oft- quoted essay “Why Look at Animals?,” wrote more broadly of the 
marginalization of animals as a result of numerous inventions of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, including the “railway, electricity, 
the conveyor belt, the canning industry, the motor car, chemical fer-
tilisers.”7 If draft animals were disappearing from streets and factories, 
the technologies that were replacing them also symbolically or phan-
tomatically incorporated them, as Akira Lippit has for his part persua-
sively shown:
When horse- drawn carriages gave way to steam engines, 
plaster horses were mounted on tramcar fronts in an effort 
to simulate continuity with the older, animal- driven vehicles. 
Once considered a metonymy of nature, animals came to be 
seen as emblems of the new, industrial environment. Animals 
appeared to merge with the new technological bodies replac-
ing them. The idioms and histories of numerous technologi-
cal innovations from the steam engine to quantum mechanics 
bear the traces of an incorporated animality. James Watt and 
later Henry Ford, Thomas Edison, Alexander Graham Bell, 
Walt Disney, and Erwin Schrödinger, among other key fi g-
ures in the industrial and esthetic shifts of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, found uses for animal spirits 
in developing their respective machines, creating in the pro-
cess a series of fantastic hybrids. Cinema, communication, 
transportation and electricity drew from the actual and fan-
tasmatic resources of dead animals. Technology, and more 
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precisely the technological instruments and media of that 
time, began to serve as virtual shelters for displaced animals. 
In this manner, technology and ultimately the cinema came 
to determine a vast mausoleum for animal being.8
Indeed, fascinating endnotes detailing the complicity of this period’s key 
inventors in the exploitation of “actual and fantasmatic resources of 
dead animals” recall, for instance, the countless public animal electro-
cutions by which, in 1887, Thomas Edison and his assistant persistently 
attempted to demonstrate the dangers of alternating current, thereby 
threatening the canine and feline pets of the West Orange neighborhood 
with decimation, as noted by Edison’s biographer. The famously fi lmed 
1904 electrocution of Topsy, an elephant that Coney Island’s Luna Park 
had decided to put down after an untoward incident, would have early 
“cinema” symptomatically coincide with an instance of literal electri-
cal animation— of animals “fuel[ing] the phantom thermodynamic en-
gines” of modernity— to which Lippit devotes the last page of his book 
(187; 248n73). Another note describes the curious quantum experiment 
of Austrian physicist Erwin Schrödinger in 1925, consisting in placing a 
cat in a black box “along with a decaying radioactive nucleus, a trigger 
mechanism and a cyanide capsule.” The question “Is the cat dead or 
alive?” accrued increasing uncertainty past the fi rst minute (at which 
point there was a 50 percent chance that the nucleus had decayed and 
the device was automatically switched off). Till the box was opened 
and the answer to the question could be empirically ascertained, the 
cat was both dead and alive (or “kept alive so as to be left for dead” to 
quote Derrida on the crypt, a topology privileged here by Lippit [189]), 
in “suspended animation,” thus “allow[ing] for the conceptualization 
of alternative, parallel worlds” (249 n75) but also aptly emblematizing 
animals’ fate in modernity, that is, in Lippit’s terms, as the “undead” (1).
To return to our horses, the most interesting of Lippit’s notes recalls 
how new means of power at the dawn of the Industrial Revolution were 
gauged and represented in precisely the terms of the capacities of the 
henceforth supplanted animal. Thus “a French ‘cheval- vapeur’ was esti-
mated at the ability of a horse to lift seventy- fi ve kilograms one meter in 
one second” (248). In England, “horsepower” referred no less literally 
to the units of a horse’s physical endurance. Lippit quotes Richard Lew-
insohn, the author of Animals, Men, and Myths, in relating how James 
Watt, having built the fi rst steam engine, had conducted experiments to 
compare its output with what a horse could lift in a minute. The fi gure 
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arrived at for the horse— 22,000 foot- pounds— was subsequently “arbi-
trarily increased to 33,000 foot- pounds per minute and called a horse- 
power” (quoted in Lippit, Electric Animal, 248 n72). The arbitrariness 
of the increase is in itself interesting, of course, as, even while phan-
tomatically incorporating the horse as its standard, as its originary unit 
of measure, steam technology inscribed within it a difference (a lie), and 
an oddly counterproductive one at that (since not increasing the fi gure 
would have assured the steam engine a more impressive output), whose 
main consequence was to even more effectively displace the horse from 
the very place that it was being commemoratively reserved. This hon-
orary place in the new regime would be graced with its name, while 
the horse itself as it were would lag eleven thousand foot- pounds be-
hind. “Horsepower,” then, gauges the power of a superhorse, an impos-
sible horse, a horse already transfi gured, transcended, technologically 
prosthetized (whence Lippit’s term “fantastic hybrids”), treacherously 
hypostasized to signify henceforth its own obliteration, by the always 
already superior strength of mechanical force over the muscular. It is in 
such a context, where actual horses had become discarded shells, their 
strength drawn from them and infl ated to run the new machines, that 
the “plaster horses” on the tramways assume their poignancy as monu-
ments to a massive vanishing.
“Modernity,” writes Lippit, “can be defi ned by the disappearance of 
wildlife from humanity’s habitat and by the reappearance of the same 
in humanity’s refl ections on itself: in philosophy, psychoanalysis and 
technological media” (2– 3). The lucidity of Lippit’s demonstration lies, 
however, in the crucial insight that “animals never entirely vanish.” 
“Rather,” as he writes in the opening lines of the work, “they exist in a 
state of perpetual vanishing” (1). Indeed, it is the endlessness of such a 
present continuous that haunts Modiano’s novella, where the marching 
horses confi ned to the night and to that stretch of boulevard, in their 
“perpetual vanishing,” come to fi gure the fl ickering edge of conscious-
ness, the outer (or is it the inner?) limit of the phenomenal world. In 
this sense, they continually reinscribe the exilic movement of animals 
toward the periphery of human experience and perception. Berger ac-
counts in just such terms for “the unprofessional, unexpressed” disap-
pointment one cannot help feeling when watching animals in a zoo: 
“In the zoo the view is always wrong,” he writes, “like an image out of 
focus” (23). This is because “you are looking at something that has been 
rendered absolutely marginal; and all the concentration you can muster 
will never be enough to centralise it” (24). The utter marginalization of 
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animals, their removal from the space of the world, from their instincts, 
from interactions, from movement, from the vitality of habitat and nat-
ural survival, results in “their tendency to bundle towards the edge of 
[their cage]. (Beyond its edges there may be real space.)” (25). The same 
may be said, in its essential implications, for the place the animal has 
increasingly come to occupy in the world— that is to say, “bundle[d] 
towards [its] edge,” disquietingly “out of focus.” This would account for 
why, whenever and wherever animals appear, they seem to occasion an 
unsettling of phenomenality itself, as the ghostly survivors of a world 
which, for something like modern time and space to occur, had to be 
written over. “It was as though the world itself were growing less sub-
stantial,” writes Rebecca Solnit about the last decades of the nineteenth 
century, when places, proximity, wilderness, landscape, materiality, 
bodily experience were lost and regained as “information and images.”9 
In Lippit’s account, animals entered around this time “a new economy 
of being [ . . . ] no longer sacrifi cial in the traditional sense of the term 
but [ . . . ] spectral” (1). The analogy he draws between the animal and 
the unconscious— and modern technological media— as struck- through 
supplemental dimensions to the phenomenal world is both remarkably 
productive and in places too neat.10 I must remind myself to be careful, 
and take my cue from Berger (“all the concentration you can muster 
will never be enough to centralise it”) as I prepare to follow horses in 
the night.
Split Second
An impressive study by Raymond Bellour traces photography back to a 
“principle of invisibility” shared by the guillotine.11 Integrating the Fou-
cauldian thesis of modernity as entailing an altered relationship between 
the visible and the invisible, and thereby also a new proximity between 
life and death, Bellour points out that in the same year— 1791— were in-
vented in England the panopticon and the panorama, both constructed 
around the idealized all- seeing position of the spectator (24– 25). A year 
later, however, something different would occur with the invention of 
the guillotine in revolutionary France. “The executioner,” writes Bel-
lour, “released from [soustrait à] the old logic of torture [des supplices], 
becomes a mere executor, even a sort of projectionist— it is indeed an 
image, but the difference with the older spectacles is that [now] the pub-
lic sees nothing, the blade moves too quickly for one to grasp its effect 
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otherwise than by pure subtraction.” In these conditions, he writes, “the 
invisible is what is to be seen [ce qu’il faut voir],” and further, quoting a 
contemporary: “The instant of the guillotine produces a real temporal 
divergence where the unity of the subject breaks [éclate]” (26). Indeed, 
the event of death, by guillotine, was located in the progression from a 
visible presence (that is, to be blunt, of a head) to a sudden absence, with 
no visible transition. In this sense, “the instant of the guillotine” was not 
an instant in a positive, perceptible sense, but rather a missing instant, a 
robbed, infi nitesimal slice of time, in which life instantaneously turned to 
death. The event of death itself, then, could only be negatively perceived, 
in other words, as what could not be perceived, as an active production 
of invisibility at the heart of the spectacle. For Bellour, the evolution of 
society and visual culture at this time was thus premised on “a contrast 
internal to visibility: on the one hand a sort of omni- visibility is shared 
by the panopticon, the panorama and fantasmagoria; bursts forth on the 
other hand the invisibility of the pure instant of the guillotine, through 
which a hyper- consciousness of material vision is shot through with the 
effect of a sort of machinic unconscious [ . . . ] as if the machine took 
away in one sense what it provided in others” (28– 29).
The constitutive tension in the modern regime of the visible found its 
most natural form in the instantaneous snapshot, capturing moments of 
stillness subtracted from movement, such that, in the words of Michel 
Frizot (quoted by Bellour), “any moving object, whatever its own speed, 
appears in total and rigid stillness.” “Seized faster and faster from life,” 
writes Bellour, “these instants produce a serial image by which time 
divides up onto itself” (34). The slicing up of time that the guillotine 
had occasioned (and somehow made irreducible, irreversible) was ex-
tended by photography to affect the social and subjective body at large. 
The fascination with this newly revealed discontinuity in the world of 
appearances would be confi rmed by the obsessive work done years later 
on the photo spirite, in which the fastness of exposure coincided with 
the evanescence of ghosts both to supplement absence and to further 
dispossess the human eye of its command over the visible. Through the 
coming to light of what Walter Benjamin would call the “optical un-
conscious,” that is, the evidence of a layer of the visible that showed 
itself not to the human eye but only to that of the machine, the world 
of appearances had become, one could say, intermittent. Photography 
and later cinema would both work on the basis of this “interruption 
of movement,” capturing life, writes Bellour, by producing death. Of 
course, cinema restores seeming continuity to movement, thus effect-
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ing a denial of “the interruptions on which it is founded”; nonetheless, 
Bellour insists (contra Deleuze), the still, the “arrêt sur image” (freeze 
frame) continues to be “its secret core, always waiting to reveal itself” 
(40– 41). Cinema is haunted by an immobility— the stillness of the “ca-
daver or [the] sculpture”— exposed in the materiality of the still (“pho-
togramme”) to be its hidden mechanical truth (43).
Nowhere perhaps is this haunting by stillness, this immobility at the 
heart of movement more patent than in the horse photographs Ead-
weard Muybridge took in the 1870s (with which, inexplicably, both 
Lippit and Bellour deal only in passing). As fascinating as the pictures 
is the story behind the series of experiments that led to the publication, 
in 1887, of Animals in Motion. Here is how Muybridge himself, in an 
original preface to the 1898 edition, summarized the polemic that he 
had resolved to settle through this work:
In the spring of the year 1872, while the author was direct-
ing the photographic surveys of the United States Govern-
ment on the Pacifi c Coast, there was revived in the city of 
San Francisco a controversy in regard to animal locomotion, 
which we may infer, on the authority of Plato, was warmly 
argued by the ancient Egyptians, and which probably had its 
origin in the studio of the primitive artist when he submitted 
to a group of critical friends his fi rst etching of a mammoth 
crushing through the forest, or of a reindeer grazing on the 
plains.
In this modern instance, the principal subject of dispute 
was the possibility of a horse, while trotting— even at the 
height of his speed— having all four of his feet, at any por-
tion of his stride, simultaneously free from contact with the 
ground.
The attention of the author was directed to this contro-
versy, and he immediately resolved to attempt its settlement.12
The debate to which Muybridge here lends vast historical perspective 
formed, by some accounts, the substance of a $25,000 bet with Central 
Pacifi c Railroad mogul and horse breeder and trainer Leland Stanford 
(who had served as governor of California in 1862– 63). In any case it 
was Stanford who funded Muybridge’s experiments, which would be 
pursued in their second stage at his stock farm at Palo Alto (later the site 
of the university), and which would feature some of the horse breeder’s 
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own “fi rst- class trotting horses” (14). The “controversy,” itself quickly 
resolved, became the pretext, for Muybridge, for conducting a series of 
detailed photographic studies of horses— and later, of various animals at 
the Philadelphia zoo, and fi nally of humans (athletes and faculty) at the 
University of Pennsylvania— while engaged in various forms and speeds 
of movement. To this purpose, at Palo Alto, Muybridge had devised a 
system that involved positioning a series of twenty- four stereoscopic 
cameras parallel to the horse’s progressive movement, with exposures 
automatically regulated by the use of a motor- clock that made and 
broke an electric circuit at determined time and distance intervals as the 
horse advanced. The result was plates of successive stills of the horse 
taken at what for this time were impressively short time intervals— that 
is, from a 0.126- second interval (or an eighth of a second) for a walking 
horse (“Elberon with rider,” plate 14) to a 0.023- second interval (ap-
proximately a fi ftieth of second) for a galloping horse (“Annie G. with 
jockey,” plate 72), and even 0.019 seconds (a hundredth of a second) for 
a trotting horse (“Lizzie M. with Sulky,” plate 50).13 The distance inter-
val for a galloping horse could be, for instance, 13.75 inches between 
one “phase” of movement and the next, as seen in illustration 14 (“The 
Gallop”) (see fi g. 1.1).
Eighty- fi ve photographic plates break down in this manner vari-
ous types of horse movements organized under the categories “The 
Walk,” “The Amble,” “The Trot,” “The Rack (or Pace),” “The Canter,” 
“The Gallop,” “The Ricochet,” “The Leap,” “The Buck and Kick,” and 
“Change of Gait,” to each of which Muybridge devotes a few pages 
of text. The “Analyses” are interesting in their hybridity of purpose, 
being as much about the mechanics of equestrian movement as they are 
about a history of representation— lexical, locomotional, artistic— of 
the horse. Most noteworthy in this regard is the chapter on “the gallop,” 
a term “now almost universally employed to designate the most rapid of 
all quadruped movements,” and “adopted by nearly all animals, in one 
or the other of its methods, when, from caprice, persuasion, or necessity, 
they exercise their utmost power for the attainment of their greatest 
speed” (49). In these pages Muybridge comments on the controversial 
“period of unsupported transit” (13), indeed shown in illustration 14 
of a galloping horse to start at the point at which its right foot leaves 
the ground in the second of the frames (phase 2): “In this stride, the 
spring is effected from [the right foot], and we soon fi nd the horse with 
all his legs more or less fl exed under the body, affording no support 
thereto until a period that occurs between 6 and 7; the exact phase of 
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fi rst contact did not happen to be photographed” (49). Nevertheless, the 
illustration clearly demonstrates that for “about seventy- eight inches” 
and “a little more than the tenth of a second” the horse galloped, as it 
were, with all four of its feet off the ground (51).
The proof is not the main point of the chapter on “The Gallop,” 
however, presumably because by the time the book was published Muy-
bridge’s fi rst photographs taken on the Sacramento racetrack in 1872 
of the “celebrated horse named Occident” (13) were already known, 
and the debate thereby resolved. More than half the chapter is devoted, 
rather, to a discussion of the “history of the artistic delineation of the 
gallop,” sketched in three stages (53). The fi rst he names “the Primitive; 
suggested to the artist by keen observation, and expressed by him with 
entire freedom from conventionality” and which, depicting the gallop-
ing horse with all legs in fl exure and “more or less under the body, with 
one or both the hind feet free from contact with the ground,” neatly cor-
responds to phases recorded through photography. The second classifi -
cation, covering the Egyptian, Assyrian, Grecian, Roman, and Byzantine 
conventions, is called “the Ancient[, i]n which the support is rendered 
by the two hind feet, the anterior legs are more or less fl exed [ . . . ] at 
various elevations above the ground” and which also fi nds correspond-
ing substantiation in Muybridge’s own illustrations. As for the third, 
termed “the Modern,” it “exhibits an entire absence of careful obser-
vation, unprejudiced impression, or serious reasoning,” portraying “a 
body, neck and head, all of abnormal length, and arranged in a nearly 
Figure 1.1. Eadweard Muybridge, “The Gallop,” illustration 14 from Animal 
Locomotion (1887).
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horizontal line” with the anterior legs ending far in advance of the head 
and the hind legs similarly “thrust far to the rear, with their shoes turned 
upwards,” resembling, writes Muybridge, less any verifi able phase in 
the gallop of a horse than “the leap of a cat.” Proceeding to survey an 
impressive range of iconographic and sculptural treatments of the horse 
through the ages and in different parts of the world, he then writes:
About a hundred a years ago, the artists of Europe, appar-
ently with one accord, came to the conclusion that the rising 
body, with the bent, uplifted anteriors, and the contact of 
the hind feet with the ground, as indulged in by the ancient 
sculptors, was inconsistent with the correct interpretation 
of speed, and, as if by preconcerted agreement, there sud-
denly appeared from their various schools the conventional 
phase which attained the zenith of its absurdity in a well- 
known picture, by a celebrated animal painter, representing 
ten horses, each a replica of the other, with limbs extended 
fore- and- aft, and gliding through the air, distinguishable 
from each other only by the colours of their riders. (56– 57)
Muybridge’s utter disapproval of the horizontally extended and spread- 
eagled limbs in the work of the unnamed painter moves him to emphat-
ically defend the fl eshly referent over the arbitrary sign:14
“And yet,” it is sometimes remarked, “the phase gives one 
an impression of rapid motion.” Possibly, but in precisely the 
same way as a printed word unconsciously suggests, through 
long usage, the sound or the substance of that which it 
represents.
If it is impressed upon our minds in infancy that a certain 
arbitrary symbol indicates an existing fact; if this same asso-
ciation of emblem and reality is reiterated at the preparatory 
school, insisted upon at college, and pronounced correct at 
the university; symbol and fact— or supposed fact— becomes 
so intimately blended that it is extremely diffi cult to dis-
sociate them, even when reason and personal observation 
teaches us they have no true relationship.
So it is with the conventional galloping horse [ . . . ]
During the past few years the artist has become convinced 
that this defi nition of the horse’s gallop does not harmonize 
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with his own unbiased impression, and he is making rapid 
progress in his efforts to sweep away prejudice, and effect 
the complete reform that is gradually but surely coming. (57)
At no point in the volume does Muybridge wax as passionate as 
when pledging to “sweep away [the] prejudice” that leaves the horse 
suspended in a posture unnatural to it. The belabored semiotic anal-
ogy is striking, premised as it is on the conviction that while symbolic 
language might content itself with an arbitrary, constructed system 
of correspondences to the real, pictorial representation is not simply 
bound by the conventions of realism, but somehow almost ontologi-
cally obligated to accurately register worldly movements and forms. If 
Muybridge, on painting, appears here to align himself with an age- old 
school of thought on mimesis, and against fi ction, his position, in being 
signifi cantly mediated by photography, in fact effects a crucial epistemo-
logical shift, displacing the truth of the horse from the Platonic realm 
of ideas onto the “wet collodion plate” (13) on which the traces of the 
moving body of a real horse are chemically captured. Intending pho-
tography to correct popular misrepresentations of the galloping horse, 
Muybridge in his reverence for collodion truth prefi gures what writers 
like André Bazin or Roland Barthes would some decades later sense 
about the ontology of the photographic image: that is, that unlike other 
media, “[it] always carries its referent with itself, both affected by the 
same amorous or funereal immobility, at the very heart of the moving 
world.”15 The photograph, in preserving the material, bodily contours 
of a being standing (or, as it were, galloping) in the light, “is literally 
an emanation of the referent,” would write Barthes. “From a real body, 
which was there, proceed radiations which ultimately touch me, who 
am here” (80– 81). The pains taken by Muybridge to critically review 
numerous depictions of horses through the ages, and the vehemence 
with which he decries the “absurdity” of “the conventional phase” may 
appear excessive, until one considers that, unwittingly extending the 
ontology of the photographic image to that of all images, the studious 
photographer now saw in the “limbs extended fore- and- aft” a form of 
representational violence. What he called “the Modern,” and ascribed 
to deplorable observation and an abandonment of reason, was a painful 
contortion infl icted on the very being of the horse.
Thereby emerges a defi nition of modernity as good as any, it would 
seem, and more oddly poignant than most. The Modern error, while 
historical, measures a lost proximity from the empirical reality of the 
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horse that, if one is to believe Muybridge, catches up (ontogeny repeat-
ing phylogeny, etc.) with each human as he or she leaves the Primitive 
and Ancient and enters the age of “conventional representation.” Thus, 
after noting the correct depiction of horses with “all their legs fl exed 
under their bodies” in sculptures and engravings of the Hittite, prehis-
toric Scandinavian, Mycenaean, and contemporary Alaskan and North 
American Indian traditions, he evokes “an intelligent child, known to 
the author, who, having a talent for drawing, and, happily, not famil-
iar with the conventional representation of the gallop, [when] asked to 
sketch her idea of a runaway horse, which she had seen, produced a sim-
ilar phase [i.e., legs correctly fl exed under body] as her impression of the 
action” (54). With a similar wistfulness, only inspired by the primitive 
drawing of a human, poet Henri Michaux had eloquently lamented the 
loss, in normativized adult perception, of archaic wisdom:
Louis XIII, at eight years, does a drawing similar to that of 
the son of a New Caledonian cannibal. At eight years, he is of 
the age of humanity, he is at least two hundred and fi fty thou-
sand years old. A few years later, he has lost this, he is now 
merely thirty one, he has become an individual, he is merely 
a king of France, an impasse from which he would never get 
out. What is worse than to be fi nished/complete [achevé]?16
A Time without Humans
While not acknowledged as such, a rarefi ed intactness, a certain purity 
of form is preserved in that tenth of a second during which, in the study 
already referred to and others, “the [horse’s] body was hurled through 
the air” (51). One wonders whether Muybridge’s intolerance of liberties 
taken in representing the horse in this “period of unsupported transit” 
was not a displaced anxiety concerning, more essentially, the fragility of 
that split second, its exposure to a corruption not merely symbolic but 
real. For as it happens, for “the attraction of gravity [not] to have much 
effect,” as specifi ed in the “Prelude to Analyses,” requires “very rapid 
motion by a good horse” (27; emphasis added). While “good” easily 
describes Stanford’s “fi rst- class” thoroughbred trotting and racehorses 
(whose speed could not be emulated by, say, the “powerful, heavily built 
mastiff” of plate 118, whose “weight[ . . . ] is against him” [52]), behind 
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this qualitative distinction the epithet more consequentially marks a di-
vide between animals endowed with the freedom of maximal movement 
(because required to be so by their use, or because living in a natural 
habit where “caprice, persuasion or necessity” could afford to come 
into play) and those living in artifi cial confi nement. So it is that plate 
151 (fi g. 1.2), which “leaves much to be desired,” recording “the stride 
of a fallow- deer in captivity, followed by its frightened fawn,” illustrates 
a missing period of unsupported transit: “Had not long confi nement in 
a small park impaired the elasticity which the deer would have exhib-
ited in its natural state, a phase would have occurred between those of 
[frames] 6 and 7, in which all the feet would have been off the ground” 
(52; emphasis added). Stanford’s racehorses, it turned out, were dream- 
worthy subjects. With most other animals studied, Muybridge’s photo-
graphic work inevitably came up against a sort of doubly constitutive 
limit: constitutive in the fi rst instance because, since they called for elab-
orate arrangements— a series of cameras set up in a row anticipating the 
direction of the animal’s movement— he had to seek controlled spaces 
in which to conduct his experiments, namely the Sacramento race-
course, the farm in Palo Alto, and the Philadelphia zoo, thus restricting 
himself to the alternative of racehorses or confi ned animals; and dou-
bly constitutive because photography was a medium born of an age 
of industrialization and technology that was concomitantly— that is, 
consequently— characterized by the receding of wild animals. In a fi nal 
chapter, titled “Records of Movements from Observation,” Muybridge 
thus admits that “it would have been desirable [ . . . ] to have photo-
graphed many of the animals while they were enjoying more freedom of 
movement than that afforded by the gardens of a Zoological Society, but 
the diffi culties attending a satisfactory investigation under their natural 
conditions of life were, at the time, too great to be surmounted” (67). 
One can understand why Bazin confessed admiration for the fi lmmaker 
who would not succeed in returning safely from the encounter with that 
which he had gone out to fi lm (see Bellour, Le corps du cinéma, 539). 
Photography and cinema, when it came to their fascination with the 
animal, placed themselves in the paradoxical position of pursuing an 
object which, when it was not in captivity (thereby removed from its full 
capacities) and not fl eeing from the photographer (for what better and 
worse situation can one imagine in which to catch an animal galloping 
in the wild?), could always run toward him, thereby marking the point 
of no return, the point of its own annulment with which, perhaps, the 
camera always fl irts, phantasmatically and/or disingenuously.17
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All this to suggest that Muybridge’s instant of “unsupported transit” 
carries a content somehow otherworldly, literally a slice of time of an 
other world, in which animals would run freely— while a camera’s eye 
would capture their freedom from constraints and from gravity. The 
terrible contradiction of photography, in this sense, is that the “optical 
unconscious” reveals a prehistoric time, that is, a time without humans. 
This is all too evident, negatively as it were, in Muybridge’s eighty- fi ve 
plates of horses engaged in various motions. Only four of these (plates 
12, 28, 32, and 33) depict a horse walking or trotting “free,” that is, 
without a rider and without a specifi c task. Sixty- six of them show a 
horse with a rider or jockey, or pulling a sulky. This leaves fi fteen plates, 
eleven of which (plates 1 to 11) feature horses “hauling a heavy weight,” 
and in one of them, a man is “pulling at [the horse’s] head” (plate 11). 
These plates portraying horses as industrial beasts, signifi cantly, open 
the series, as if to illustrate, in all- too- human, mechanical terms, the 
speed of “horsepower.” The four remaining plates portray horses en-
gaged in a range of extraordinary acts: plate 29 shows a horse carrying 
a bucket in its mouth, plate 30 a horse rolling a box, and plate 84 fi rst a 
horse rocking on a teeterboard and then a different horse rolling a bar-
rel; plate 85 shows different horses, one with a rider, “rearing, pivoting, 
etc.”18 There could not be a more apt reminder of how “domesticated” 
the (photographed, photographable) horse is at this point of human 
history; indeed, the next section is titled “Other Domesticated Animals” 
Figure 1.2. Eadweard Muybridge, “Doe Galloping and Fawn Jumping,” 
plate 151 from Animal Locomotion (1887).
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(comprising a mule, an ass, an ox, a sow, a goat, a camel, a guanaco 
[galloping!], an elephant, a dog, and a cat). Perhaps the fi rst half of plate 
84 is the most interesting series of them all, featuring as it does a horse 
named Hornet, who, teetering good- humoredly on said teeterboard, 
succeeds in perfectly resembling, in “life size” (but this hardly matters in 
a photograph without a human to indicate what the scale of “life” is), 
a rocking horse (fi g. 1.3). For Berger, we might recall, this object exem-
plifi ed a “new demand for verisimilitude” in children’s toys, in contrast 
with the “traditional hobby horse”: “The fi rst was merely a stick with 
a rudimentary head which children rode like a broom handle: the sec-
ond was an elaborate ‘reproduction’ of a horse, painted realistically, 
with real reins of leather, a real mane of hair, and designed movement 
to resemble that of a horse galloping. The rocking horse was a 19th 
century invention” (“Why Look at Animals?,” 22). It is remarkable that 
the penultimate of Muybridge’s horse plates should feature a real horse 
simulating a rocking horse, in a reversal of the direction of resemblance 
that offers a telling picture of the fate of animals in the folds of humans’ 
“modernity.”
Zahir the Invisible
It is time to move to another story and to another horse (if only to better 
return, later, to Muybridge’s). Jean- Philippe Toussaint’s La vérité sur 
Marie, published in 2009 (ten years after Modiano’s novella), is the third 
of a tetralogy of novels relating, over sixteen months or so, the strained 
Figure 1.3. Eadweard Muybridge, “‘Hornet’ Rocking; ‘Eagle’ Rolling a 
Barrel,” plate 649 from Animal Locomotion (1887).
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love between an unnamed narrator and the classy, moody, dreamy “Ma-
rie.” The four books enroll a quadrangle of spatial coordinates— Tokyo/
Kyoto in Faire l’amour (2002; Making Love); Shanghai/Beijing, Paris, 
and Elba in Fuir (2005; Running Away); Tokyo, Paris, and Elba in La 
vérité sur Marie (The Truth about Marie); Paris and Elba (with a short 
Tokyo fl ashback) in Nue (2013; Naked)— to write the uneven, hypnotic 
temporality, the ruptures and rapprochements, of a fraught intimacy. 
We might quickly recall here the chronology of the main events in the 
overall plotline: in January, the narrator accompanies Marie to Tokyo 
for the opening of an exhibition of some of her fashion design pieces. 
Making Love recounts the insomnia and estrangement of the time spent 
together in Tokyo, interrupted by the narrator’s decision to exile himself 
in Kyoto, from which he returns at the end of the novel. In Running 
Away we are taken back a few months to the preceding summer, where 
the narrator, in China, supposedly on a business trip, learns from Marie 
in Paris of the death of her father. The news leaves the narrator reeling 
through a senseless journey into the impenetrable opacity of Beijing. 
In the third section he joins Marie in Elba, the home of her deceased 
father, with ambiguous results. As to the third novel, The Truth about 
Marie, the one that will occupy me here— and whose title, suspect in its 
(characteristically Toussaint- ian) grandiloquence, might give us equally 
spurious grounds to expect the truth, the key to the series— it chrono-
logically both prolongs the other two and interleaves them, set as it is, 
in its fi rst section, in the early summer of the second year (where a night 
that Marie spends with a certain Jean- Christophe de G. ends in his un-
expected death by cardiac arrest and the narrator’s arrival on the scene), 
to then swing back to January of that year (when, in the days of the 
narrator’s disappearance from Tokyo, Marie had started to spend more 
time with Jean- Christophe) to fi nally, in its last section, unite the two 
again in Elba, in the late summer, a year after the death of Marie’s father. 
The last novel, Naked, picks the story up at the end of the summer after 
the couple’s return to Paris from Elba, and includes a section that writes 
the narrator back into important Tokyo days (of the preceding January) 
from which we might otherwise have assumed him to be missing. After 
a two- month separation the narrator learns something signifi cant from 
Marie and accompanies her to yet another funeral in Elba.
Chronology matters, in this story where things— entire scenes, 
events— are regularly withheld from knowledge or “view” to be pieced 
together only much later (and with a dark, stylized intensity, an inti-
mate extravagance— not unlike a slow- motion scene in a Wong Kar 
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Wai romance— that seems to also lay bare the narrative’s hallucinatory 
heart). The long middle section of The Truth about Marie is the se-
quence that ventures furthest in this regard, fi lling in a gap in narrative 
knowledge discreetly preserved in Making Love, when the story had 
followed the narrator through his wanderings (leading him eventually 
to Kyoto and back), during which time Marie’s experience was left un-
written, that is, lying outside the frame. Reconstructed here from what 
the narrator has since learned from Marie and extended through tender 
and vivid imagination, this sequence thus inscribes a space of supple-
mentarity within the architecture of the completed story. Now, what 
better fi gure to phantasmatically ride this supplementarity but a horse? 
In the space of the narrator’s vanishing, Marie had grown closer to 
Jean- Christophe de G., the owner of a magnifi cent thoroughbred named 
Zahir who, after being disqualifi ed from a prestigious race in Tokyo, 
had to be quickly escorted back to France on a plane. Jean- Christophe 
invites Marie to accompany himself and the horse on a dark and rainy 
evening. Such are the premises of what follows, earning Bernard Pivot’s 
admiring review in Le Journal du Dimanche: “One- fi fth of this novel— 
from page 84 to page 138— is occupied by an anthology- worthy scene 
that no reader will be able to forget. The embarkation, at Tokyo’s Na-
rita airport, aboard a Lufthansa Boeing 747 cargo, of a thoroughbred. 
[  . . .  ] Epic and exhilarating. [  . . .  ] There is ancient fatality in this 
literature so modern in its writing and in its resources. [ . . . ] Yes, Jean- 
Philippe Toussaint is a god of the Olympus who, with benevolence or 
with fury, manipulates a few well- chosen creatures and projects them 
into planetary adventures under the auspices of Eros and Lufthansa.”19
The epic and exhilarating horse is fi rst alluded to more than sixty 
pages into the novel, where he gives his name to the scandal (“the Za-
hir Affair,” referring to his disgrace due to suspicions that he had been 
administered a performance- enhancing drug) that cost him his future 
on the racecourse and his owner much anxiety— not to say, perhaps, a 
few months later, his life.20 But Zahir’s fi rst bodily appearance is dra-
matically delayed, insinuating itself in the text through metonymies and 
displacements by which he slowly assumes fl esh. This is permitted by 
a narration loosely anchored in Marie’s point of view, extended some-
times in her absence by her companion’s, so that the fi rst appearance of 
Zahir is of what Jean- Christophe sees (or could see) as he awaits her at 
the hotel: “The horse trailer was parked at the hotel’s entrance, its long 
and still silhouette could be seen through the lobby’s bay windows, its 
aluminum body just the same as a rock star’s trailer, with two concealed 
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and barred windows on each side, the whole grooved mass gleaming un-
der the golden lights of the hotel’s entrance. The trailer’s back door was 
open and its ramp lowered to air out the rear and let the thoroughbred 
breathe” (84/67; translation slightly modifi ed). In this fi rst appearance 
that is not one, the horse’s presence can only be inferred from contigu-
ous elements: the trailer, its barred windows, the imagined exhalations 
by which an invisible body comes into material contact with the sur-
rounding air. The descriptive detail concerning the panoply of the van 
and the uniforms and accessories of the three Japanese men attending to 
it, which continues in the following pages (84– 85/67), further displaces 
and diffuses the presence of the horse. Indeed, as the travelers and van 
set out on the road, ambiguous syntax makes the van seem to prosthet-
ically stand in, in its diffi cult progression, for what it transports: “The 
imposing aluminum horse trailer [ . . . ] struggled around the bends and 
made wide turns with infi nite precaution” (87/69). If the insistence of 
adjectives like “long,” “still,” and “imposing” in these pages seems a 
little suspect, in that they might apply equally, or more pertinently, to 
what is concealed, a passage further on confi rms the subtle logic by 
which, in effect, epithets describing the van tantalizingly seem to drill 
through the aluminum and trace a lexical path toward the immobilized 
body contained within it:
Through the foggy rear window, Marie saw [apercevait] 
the aluminum trailer’s monumental silhouette, its power-
ful headlights on in the rain by the day’s waning light— the 
trailer at a near stop, majestic, rocking slightly [chancelant] 
on the wet pavement, its tires and axles creaking. Marie 
looked at [regardait] the trailer immobile behind her in the 
rain, this immense and incongruous vehicle, dark and myste-
rious, run aground in the Tokyo traffi c, with its two barred 
windows on each side, behind which one sensed the living, 
quivering, hot presence of an invisible thoroughbred. (88/70; 
my emphasis; translation slightly modifi ed)
Several formal strategies now easily identifi ed as the signature gestures 
of Toussaint’s prose fi nd their ideal object, through this passage, in 
the ciphered motif of the horse in transit. They include the dislocating 
work of hypallage (hippolage?) by which the qualities of the invisible 
horse appear to seep through its encasing; the dominance of the imper-
fect tense and the recurrence of the name (“Marie apercevait,” “Marie 
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regardait”) serving to repeatedly restart time, ordering as a proces-
sion of perpetual presents a temporality of fascination; and the rein-
scription of certain details already known (the aluminum trailer, the 
small barred windows, previously mentioned word for word on 84/67) 
which, generally in keeping with Toussaint’s anxious, cinematic treat-
ment of time— wherein the repetition of details seems almost necessary 
for the recomposing of each successive frame— here earns diegetic jus-
tifi cation in the sealedness of the van, which obstructs vision, forcing 
it to mark and re- mark the contours of what it cannot penetrate. The 
breach, when it is made at the end of the passage, is a breach in the 
rational bodywork of appearances, as description slips into a sort of 
hypnosis, an out- of- body projection toward what is hidden from view. 
The invisible beast, divined in its aliveness, its warmth and trembling, 
can only be phantasmatically imagined into the sealed space of the 
van, there being no other path into it but the supplemental. Here too, 
coalescing around the present- absent fi gure of the horse, we may recog-
nize an obsession that has long haunted Toussaint’s prose, namely the 
problem of Schrödinger’s cat. Is the cat alive or dead inside the black 
box? Can we even be sure that it is there? Years ago such questions had 
preoccupied the eccentric protagonist of Monsieur (1986). In their fas-
cination with closed spaces (bathrooms, telephone cabins, automatic 
photo booths— L’appareil- photo [1989; The Camera] was replete with 
them) and the death- driving possibility that in them time itself might 
come to a standstill, Toussaint’s characters have, in a sense, not ceased 
to themselves be drawn toward the “struck- through” place marked by 
Schrödinger’s cat, as that far side of the visible, of the known, as that 
which cannot be absorbed into the continuum of a recordable real. 
Here a horse occupies and emblematizes that space, to which after an 
interval it will again retreat when it is placed in the hold of the cargo 
plane. In the meantime, the aluminum trailer carrying it on the road 
toward the airport carves out a moving block of sealed opacity in the 
space of Tokyo. This animal that is diegetically quite real— the reason 
for the journey, for its urgency and diffi culty, and for the decline of 
Jean- Christophe de G.— is thus also a highly abstract body, a body 
subtracted from the visible, to which the term le pur- sang (“the thor-
oughbred,” literally “the pure- blood”), used throughout to refer to it, 
only adds further quasi- mythological ethereality. The thoroughbred 
has yet to be seen, it has yet, in the space of the narrative, in this tran-
sit supported by aluminum and wheels, to touch the ground with its 
feet.
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As the cavalcade (to use a thoroughly inappropriate term) approaches 
Narita airport, there is much concern that they might arrive too late to 
fulfi ll customs requirements:
Jean- Christophe de G. knew the customs offi ce at the cargo 
zone at Narita closed at seven and there would be no possi-
bility of extending their hours (theirs were infl exible hours, 
Japanese hours), arriving late wasn’t an option, the slightest 
dispensation was out of question. In other words, either they 
get the horse to the airport before seven and board the plane, 
or they arrive late and the horse remains stuck in customs 
in the cargo zone of Narita Airport with all the attendant 
consequences.
Jean- Christophe de G. knew the horse’s papers were in 
order, its vaccinations records updated, its permission for 
transport validated, but he feared a fi nal complication with 
customs, some required document of which he was perhaps 
unaware. (89/70– 71; translation slightly modifi ed)
The passage, with its many references to regulations and protocols, con-
veys the incongruity of the administrative procedures incumbent on an 
animal which, left to its own resources, would have had no use for 
national borders and customs (and would presumably not have consid-
ered crossing the Pacifi c). But the anxiety building up around the horse’s 
passage could be equally seen to formulate, as if through an elaborate 
play on words, the uncertainty of another, ancient enigma, by which 
administrative and technological possibility spill into the mythological: 
Can the horse fl y?
We are thus momentarily led back to the very question that had per-
haps, secretly, driven Muybridge’s experimentations. Recall that they 
were provoked by a query from Leland Stanford, a wealthy owner of 
thoroughbreds (a plausible model, incidentally, for Toussaint’s “Jean- 
Christophe de G.”). While accounts vary of the precise circumstances of 
the challenge put to Muybridge, the question as to “the possibility of a 
horse, while trotting— even at the height of his speed— having all four 
of his feet, at any portion of his stride, simultaneously free from contact 
with the ground” (Muybridge, Animals in Motion, 13) seems less than 
completely pertinent to the interests of a horse breeder and trainer.21 
What would he gain from knowing that a horse could have all four of 
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its feet off the ground? Or that it could not? Muybridge’s allusion in his 
preface to the “primitive artist” depicting a “mammoth crushing through 
the forest” at any rate casts the question in its grandest world- historical 
scope and as primarily relevant to artists. How should one understand, 
then, the fact that the question came from someone like Stanford, and 
with signifi cant fi nancial support in tow? Whatever explanation might 
be hidden from view here for this curious circumstance, one might be 
justifi ed, given the revelatory character that photography had at this 
time, in opting for a hypothesis no more fanciful than the truth revealed 
through the series of stills. For to show the period of a horse’s “unsup-
ported transit” Muybridge had to still movement, fragment it, divide 
it into infi nitesimal intervals, extract from the moving real its chrono- 
micro- scopic unconscious. Thereby it transpired that the joints of the 
visible, as it were, escape us: the human eye cannot— was not destined 
to?— see with certainty, at certain instants of a horse’s gallop, that its 
progressive motion is shot through with split- second moments of fl ight. 
The points of “unsupported transit” appeared as so many loose stitches 
in the real, moments which, if they were to stand on their own, would 
be unthinkable, defying reason, and which can only exist because move-
ment is inscribed in time, whence the paradox: immobilized and exposed 
to light, those tenths of a second are minuscule shards of myth imper-
ceptibly sewn into the texture of the real— Pegasus. A supplement to the 
Boston Daily Globe on October 21, 1882, had understood this perhaps, 
to report as it did Muybridge’s fi ndings under the competing headlines: 
“Animals in Motion— Science Upsetting the Theories of Observation— 
Instantaneous Photography Finds Horses in the Air.” Rebecca Solnit 
more recently described it in equally vivid terms: on a racetrack in 1877, 
she writes, and from the owner’s and trainer’s point of view, the horse 
was striving “to defeat the limits that nature places on the movement of 
bodies, to dissolve the weight of matter and the binding force of gravity, 
to fl y, to become instantaneous, to annihilate time and space” (179).
In the Night
When Zahir at last makes a visible entry in Toussaint’s text, after more 
synecdoches have played at prying open his “black box” (98– 100), he 
forms a gigantic, inconsolable mass of nervous, “brute force” against 
the darkness of Narita’s cargo clearance zone:
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Alors, lentement, apparut la croupe du pur- sang— sa croupe 
noire, luisante, rebondie— , à reculons, les sabots arrière 
cherchant leurs appuis sur le pont, battant bruyamment sur 
le métal et trépignant sur place, très nerveux, faisant un écart 
sur le côté, et repartant en avant. Il ne portait pour tout har-
nachement qu’un licol et une longe, une courte couverture en 
luxueux velours pourpre sur le dos, et les membres fi nement 
enveloppés de bandages protecteurs et de guêtres de trans-
port fermées par des velcros, les glomes et les tendons mo-
mifi és de bandelettes pour éviter les coups ou les blessures. 
C’était cinq cents kilos de nervosité, d’irritabilité et de fureur 
qui venaient d’apparaître dans la nuit. Le pelage noir et lus-
tré, la musculature apparente, il descendait à reculons, les 
deux Japonais en blazer bleu marine collés contre son corps 
à la hauteur de l’épaule pour essayer de le contenir, s’agrip-
pant à la longe, le tirant et le retenant. Le cheval ne se laissait 
pas faire, rétif, tournait la tête pour se dégager, s’ébrouait, se 
débattait, des frémissements spontanés couraient le long de 
sa crinière comme des ondes visibles de tension et de ner-
vosité. Sa puissance physique était impressionnante, il éma-
nait de lui une énergie animale électrique. Les deux Japonais 
semblaient dépassés par les événements, ils perdaient pied, 
leurs blazers défaits et les cravates en bataille, ils lançaient 
de vaines injonctions dans le vide pour qu’on leur vînt en 
aide, on sentait leur émotivité, leurs mains et leurs visages 
tremblaient. Immobile sur le pont, le pur- sang ne bougeait 
plus, n’avançait plus, ne reculait plus . . . personne ne bou-
geait plus, ni le cheval, arrêté à mi- pont— immobile, furieux, 
impérial— ni les spectateurs, fascinés par la force brute de 
cet étalon immobile, ses muscles, longs et puissants, saillants, 
tendus, qui contrastaient avec le tracé gracieux des pattes, 
la fi nesse des paturons, minces, étroits, délicats comme des 
poignets de femme. (100– 101)
Then, slowly, the thoroughbred’s croup emerged— its black 
croup, smooth and shiny— as it stepped backward, its back 
hooves seeking holds on the ramp, loudly clinking on the 
metal and stamping in place, wildly nervous, shying to the 
side before being brought back on track. [ . . . ] Eleven hun-
dred pounds of fury, of strained nerves, and of excitement had 
Melancholy of Horsepower ❘ 39
just appeared in the night. Its coat black with a fi ne sheen, its 
muscles pronounced, it was descending the ramp backward, 
the two Japanese men in navy- blue blazers pushing all their 
weight into its shoulders lest it slip, holding on to the lead, 
tugging it and keeping it taut. The horse wasn’t cooperating, 
the stubborn beast, turning its head in an attempt to break 
loose, snorting, fi ghting, shivers spontaneously shaking its 
mane like visible waves of tension and excitement. Its phys-
ical strength was astonishing, a beastly electric energy ema-
nated from its body. The two Japanese men [ . . . ] grunted 
and groaned out stifl ed and vain calls for help, their hands 
and faces trembling, their emotions on edge. Immobile on 
the ramp, the thoroughbred stood stock still, stepping nei-
ther forward nor backward in spite of the men’s efforts, who 
continued to pull on the lead to no avail. Lufthansa’s sta-
tion manager, walkie- talkie in hand, walked up to the trailer 
and no one moved, not the horse, stationed in mid- ramp— 
immobile, furious, imperial— nor the onlookers, entranced 
by the sheer force of this unfl inching stallion, its long and 
powerful muscles, tense, bulging, and the contrast marked by 
the graceful step of its legs, the fi nesse of its pasterns, skinny 
and narrow, delicate like a woman’s wrists. (79– 80)
It is a magnifi cent piece of writing, the very fl esh of the horse made 
prose. A stealthy infi ltration of terms occurring nowhere before or after 
in the text graphically transcribes the anatomy and “electric animal en-
ergy” of a body silhouetted against the night (“croupe,” “battant bru-
yamment,” “trépignant,” “glomes,” “tendons,” “pelage,” “musculature,” 
“s’ébrouait,” “se débattait,” “frémissements,” “criniere,” “muscles, longs 
et puissants, saillants, tendus,” “pattes,” “paturons, minces, étroits, déli-
cats”). Through repetitions and derivatives (noire/noir; nerveux/nervo-
sité/nervosité; fureur/furieux; puissance/puissants; immobile/immobile/
immobile; musculature/muscles; tendons/tension/tendus), the lexical 
fi eld thickens around the patent evidence of a tense “nervous system,”22 
a live foreign presence that has occupied language. Dismembered and 
recomposed, caught in the fascinated time of the imperfect, the horse 
draws its immense, throbbing, hallucinatory silhouette into the frame 
of the text.
It is a short- lived emergence into full visibility. A few pages further, as 
a brewing storm bodes an extraordinary event that will break the nat-
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ural order, the thoroughbred suddenly breaks loose. The hypnotic spell 
of the imperfect, the near- exclusive tense of the novel, is at this point 
ruptured by a string of fi ve verbs in a rare passé simple (the tense of the 
event, of history and the epic)— “se raidit,” “se braqua,” “pivota,” “re-
cula,” “s’emballa” (“tensed up,” “bucked,” “pivoted,” “jumped back,” 
“took off”)— that register the sudden, irrepressible movements of a 
body become somehow alien to the prose, whose strength and intent the 
narrative cannot sedate nor foresee. Neighing furiously and “baring its 
teeth in the night,” the horse rather than the storm (“thunder rumbled 
in the distance, lightning slashed the sky” [103– 4/81– 82]) metaphori-
cally tears the night. This novel, evidently different in its thrust and af-
fect from Modiano’s story, yet shares something of the phenomenology 
of the latter, something that is crystallized in the repeated occurrence, 
in both texts, when they evoke their horse(s), of the phrase dans la nuit 
(in/into the night). In a summary count, I found a good twelve instances 
of this phrase in forty pages of Toussaint’s novel, there were proba-
bly more. Zahir’s fi rst emergence (“Eleven hundred pounds of fury, 
of strained nerves, and of excitement had just appeared in the night” 
[100/79]), his anger (“its mouth open as if ready to bite, baring its teeth 
in the night” [104/82]), his escape (“The thoroughbred had escaped, had 
vanished into the night” [104/82]), his gallop (“Zahir galloped off into 
the night, already disappearing in the distance” [104– 5/83]), his pur-
suit (“three vehicles had already sped off in the night in pursuit of the 
horse” [105/83]; “for a more patient pursuit in the night” [107/85]) all 
occur against the referentially elusive backdrop of the night. Elementary 
French grammar would call “dans la nuit” a complément circonstanciel 
de temps/espace, or an adverbial locution denoting time/space. But it is 
increasingly clear in the novel, with each occurrence, that “la nuit” does 
not describe only a milieu or a time. Rather, through its repeated men-
tions the night accrues a mythic depth, of space itself returned to dark-
ness, to its unbounded “outside,” with which the horse comes to merge, 
signifi cantly reassuming its name as it is swallowed: “There wasn’t the 
slightest trace of Zahir in the lot, he’d dissolved into the night, he’d 
evaporated, melted, black on black, into the shadows. The darkness of 
the night was impenetrable, as though the thoroughbred had managed 
to slip into its very substance, and the night had swallowed the horse 
up and consumed it immediately” (106/84). Likewise, when the horse 
materializes again, it is as if tearing back its fl esh from the very night: 
“Suddenly, charging out of nowhere, with the same unexpectedness as 
when he’d disappeared, Zahir’s black and powerful body materialized 
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in the beam of the headlights, at once galloping and at rest, mad, his 
eyes gleaming with terror, his coat black and wet, as if suddenly defi ned 
against the night into which he had, just moments before, dissolved” 
(108/85– 86). The passage is fascinating in its implications. Where was 
the horse during this time, concealed “in the night” when there was no 
place, amid this vast fl atness, in which to hide? In this mysterious time 
interval, in which the animal had vanished from rational space, could it 
have been in that other world outside the frame, the “real space” “be-
yond its edges” (Berger)? Representation has but a loose hold on this 
creature, it would seem, which has the ability to “evaporate,” to vanish 
into thin air. Another way of saying that it was fl ying, with all of its 
feet off the ground (of representation, of phenomena), unlocatable be-
cause “unsupported” by rational ground, ungrounded. Its irreconcilable 
posture when it reappears, “at once galloping and at rest,” can oddly 
be made sense of only in photographic terms: stilled in his gallop, in 
the immobility that is at the heart of movement. Indeed, the chase cul-
minates in an extraordinary scene, shortly before it is fi nally captured, 
where the horse is seen galloping “as though ready to leave the ground, 
to take fl ight into the sky, a winged Pegasus vanishing into the darkness 
to join the thunder and lightning” (110/87).
“Zahir,” the novel tells us, in Arabic means visible— “the name comes 
from Borges, and even further back, from the myths of the Orient, in 
which legend has it that Allah created the fi rst thoroughbreds with a 
fi stful of wind. And, in Borges’ eponymous story, Zahir is a being who, 
once perceived, cannot be forgotten, nor can he rid himself of this ter-
rible virtue” (106/84). The narrator of the cited Borges story descends 
into madness after having come into contact with a coin called the za-
hir.23 The word, as he discovers to his horror in an old manuscript, 
“means visible, manifest, evident; in that sense it is one of the ninety- 
nine names of God; in Muslim countries, the masses use the word for 
‘beings or things which have the terrible power to be unforgettable, and 
whose image eventually drives people mad’” (246). While in its sense of 
“visible” “Zahir” might seem an ironic appellation for a being so prone 
to vanishing, it does dramatize the border zone at which Toussaint’s 
thoroughbred stands, negotiating as it does a back- and- forth commerce 
between the visible world and the invisible. Zahir is that passage, evap-
orating and rematerializing as he crosses the border. He alone fi nds the 
seams in the real, wherein to “dissolve into the night.” But he is also 
“evident” and “unforgettable”— because, even in his concealedness, in 
his visual intermittence, it is his erased body that orders the disposition 
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of the gaze and thereby of the visible. His is a trace, a frayage “in the 
night” of the text and of the human world. Toussaint’s, Modiano’s, and 
Muybridge’s horses indeed all share the quality of being both invisible 
and hypervisible. In this sense they are the volatile fi gures of the diver-
gence at the heart of seeing that Bellour recorded as being the deep truth 
to modernity.
Horse in the Air
“To preserve artifi cially bodily appearance is to snatch it from the fl ow 
of time, to stow it away neatly, so to speak, in the hold of life,” wrote 
Bazin. “If the plastic arts were put under psychoanalysis, the practice of 
embalming the dead might turn out to be a fundamental factor in their 
creation.”24 If Muybridge was undoubtedly one of the pioneer contribu-
tors to the development of cinema, it was because he had a keen sense of 
the ghost in the horse. The cameras used in the Palo Alto studies, we re-
member, were stereoscopic, which meant they photographed the horses 
from both sides. In his fi rst protocinematographic experiment, after 
selecting a suffi cient number of stereographs to compose a full stride, 
Muybridge had “placed the appropriate halves of each, respectively, in 
one of the scientifi c toys called the zoetrope, or the wheel of life— an 
instrument originated by the Belgian physicist Plateau, to demonstrate 
the persistency of vision.” With the two zoetropes operating at the same 
time and at identical speed (and with said stride complete so as to form 
an endless loop), “the respective halves of the stereographs were made 
simultaneously visible, by means of mirrors [ . . . ] with the result of a 
very satisfactory reproduction of an apparently solid miniature horse 
trotting, and another galloping” (14). Several incarnations later, and 
with some improvements credited to contemporaries Étienne- Jules 
Marey and Thomas Edison, the device had become the zoöpraxiscope, 
thus baptized by Muybridge, and described by him as “the fi rst appa-
ratus ever used, or constructed, for synthetically demonstrating move-
ments analytically photographed from life” (15)— that is, reconstituting 
(praxis) life (zoon) from recorded vision (skopein). “Professor Muy-
bridge and His Queer Zoopraxiscope” is how the Boston Daily Globe 
supplement put it (October 21, 1882). Here was an early technology of 
animation, which, working with Bellour’s “principle of invisibility” (the 
necessarily missing instants) repaired by the phenomenological princi-
ple of the “persistence of vision,” created a nearer- to- life- size illusion of 
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continuous movement from a quickly rotating succession of stills. Muy-
bridge anticipated a day when the zoöpraxiscope could integrate sound 
to produce an even more complete simulation of life:
In the— perhaps not far distant— future, instruments will be 
constructed that will not only reproduce visible actions si-
multaneously with audible words, but an entire opera, with 
the gestures, facial expressions, and songs of the performers, 
with all the accompanying music, will be recorded and re-
produced by an apparatus, combining the principles of the 
zoöpraxiscope and the phonograph, for the instruction or 
entertainment of an audience long after the original partic-
ipants shall have passed away; and if the photographs shall 
have been made stereoscopically, and projections from each 
series be independently and synchronously projected on a 
screen, a perfectly realistic imitation of the original perfor-
mance will be seen, in the apparent “round,” by the use of 
properly constructed binocular glasses. (16)
The hallucinatory reanimation (“long after the original participants 
shall have passed away”) of the “entire opera” that Muybridge imagines 
thus projected “in the apparent ‘round’” (no doubt prefi guring VR 3D 
animation of the sort one can view today) gives elaborate form to the 
ghost that, by these early experimentations in recording technologies, 
was at this time entering the real. Photography and phonography had 
made possible the continued presence of beings in reality absent in time 
and/or in space. But then the ghostliness is also a function of the retinal 
“persistence of vision” that fi lls the invisible instants and thus sutures 
discontinued life as if from the outside— that is, from the side of the 
spectator (of seeing) rather than that of the recorded subject (of being). 
The slippage is perhaps imperceptible in its effects, and would become 
increasingly so with the shortening of exposure times and reduction of 
time intervals; still, to not lose an instant, to evacuate the “principle of 
invisibility” and thus restore being in its ontological wholeness would, 
strictly speaking, require dividing the second into an infi nite number of 
intervals, an inconceivable task, or one that would, paradoxically, take 
an infi nite amount of time. In the moving image, a version of Zeno’s 
paradox (another of Toussaint’s long- standing obsessions)25 is inelucta-
bly at work, guaranteeing that however minutely one reconstructs the 
optical unconscious, however laboriously one slices each time interval 
44 ❘ Chapter 1
composing a sequence of life, the truth of the moving body will always 
lie in a receding phenomenal beyond, at the end of an unending line of 
vanishing— or what in pictorial perspective is called a line of fl ight.
Immortally captured in those eighty- fi ve plates of decomposed move-
ments that seal the beginnings of chronophotography, the horse stands 
exposed at the place of production of modern visuality, as if immemori-
ally galloping “in the round” behind every moving picture, “fl ying” on 
the secret horizons of the visible— as if turning the very wheels of life 
(zoe- trope). No wonder, then, that a story about a horse can become 
a story about seeing, about that trembling horizon between the seen 
and the unseen, between light and dark, what is recordable and what is 
not. Zahir will fl y, but standing and tethered (and likely sedated) in the 
dark hold of the Lufthansa cargo plane. As Toussaint’s prose continues 
to seek consummation in the continually receding picture of a horse in 
fl ight (in this novel written like a fi lm which in turn phantasmatically 
wants to “freeze” on its disavowed “photogramme”), Jean- Christophe 
de G. and Marie climb the stairs to the plane to see, at eye level, “the 
horse’s travel stall fl oating weightlessly in the air [en apesanteur dans 
les airs], with the living thoroughbred inside, slowly rising in the night 
[dans la nuit] up to the fuselage of the Boeing 747 cargo plane. Reaching 
the cargo hold, the lift, after a brutal jolt, shook the stall violently, was 
pushed horizontally into the dark opening of the hold, and then the stall 
disappeared into the bowels of the plane” (122– 23/96– 97). By elaborate 
mechanical and electrical means the defi ance of gravity is here achieved 
(blessed by the ceremonial “in the night”), but at the cost of the horse’s 
visibility, as it moves toward further erasure in the gaping darkness of 
the plane’s entrails. The living horse must settle for levitation between 
the dashes (lost in English: “— avec le pur- sang vivant à l’intérieur— ”/ 
“with the living thoroughbred inside”) of its prosthetic conveyance. 
The plane’s takeoff only confi rms the triumph of metal technology over 
mythological weightlessness in the “clinking and straining of chains 
and straps, hooks, hoop irons, bungee cords, and clasps” (127/100). In 
the ensuing “[zone of] turbulence” (131/103)— aptly named, given the 
veritable turbulence of forms, not to say of being— the horse, growing 
nervous, attempts action through a disempowered passé simple and a 
renewed fl ash of white in the dark: “The horse wanted [voulut] to turn 
around, and it reared up [se cabra] in the stall, stood [se redressa] on 
its hind legs, and began neighing [se mit à hennir], its long mouth open, 
suddenly baring its teeth and gums in the dark” (132/104) to then, in its 
agitated stomping, crush the fl ashlight Jean- Christophe de G. had left 
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at his side in an aborted effort to calm it. “The stall was impenetrably 
dark [plongé dans les ténèbres] now, hiding the horse’s black fi gure, its 
shifting [mobile], invisible body, raging noisily in its narrow compart-
ment, locked in on all sides” (133/105). All the tense threads carrying 
the horse through the narrative converge in this saturated black “box” 
(as the stall is designated in the French), fi lled by Zahir’s silhouette. Si-
multaneously “invisible” and “mobile,” in its mobility unseen, this horse 
is the optical opposite of Muybridge’s subjects frozen in motion and in 
stereoscopic light, their dark other, re- equated with the night. Zahir fi lls 
out a space lost to human vision, a loss dramatized as Jean- Christophe 
de G. and Marie disorientedly stumble through the hold of the buffeted 
aircraft. Reaching the door, they intuit with a sense of terror that “no 
more than ten, twenty centimeters, the mere width of the plane’s hull, 
separated them from the defi nitive night [on entrait de plain- pied dans la 
nuit défi nitive]” (134/106; translation modifi ed). But could this really be 
the night that was being referred to all along, the “real space” “beyond 
[the] edges”? Is the defi nitive night, counterintuitively, the native or ulti-
mate space of the animal? Modernist writings like Apollinaire’s “Zone” 
had of course testifi ed to the analogy likening planes, as they fi rst en-
tered human skies, to large birds. But the empyrion sensed outside the 
hold, too high, too cold, too dark for a bird, is no easily signifying space. 
Mythical, prehistoric (that is, preceding the human, and/or indifferent 
to it), or technological (technology’s concomitant production of a dark 
inhuman night), it easily confl ates with its contrary, a space marking the 
outer limit of technology and the inner limit of myth. No Pegasus can fl y 
its rider through this night. By the same thrust, the lie of “horsepower” 
stands defi nitively undone in the melancholic tableau of this racehorse 
encapsulated within the narrow cargo hold of the airborne plane, not its 
engine and its dynamic force but its frightened, deadweight load.26 It is 
at this place of disempowerment that the novel pierces through for the 
fi rst time to something like the horse’s point of view:
Zahir was aware of nothing but the certainty of being then 
and there, he had that certainty shared by all animals, si-
lent, tacit, infallible. What lay outside his stall remained un-
known to him, the sky, the night, the universe. The power 
of his imagination stretched no farther than the space in 
which he stood, his mind was stopped at the walls of his 
stall and could only return to the confusion of his own hazy 
consciousness. It was as if mental blinders prevented Zahir 
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from imagining the world beyond his fi eld of vision, cut 
off in every direction, dark, sightless, metallic. He was in-
capable of conceiving anything beyond the material limits 
of his stall, of mentally moving into the night [dans la nuit] 
through which the plane was fl ying, he didn’t feel any irre-
pressible urge [ce désir immémorial] to stretch these limits 
or go beyond them, and, supposing he were able to accom-
plish this, supposing he could cross the walls of the plane in 
thought— leaving his skin [sa peau rivetée], passing through 
the fuselage— he would have leaped blindly into the sky, 
four horseshoes splayed in the air, Icarus burning his wings 
in an attempt to wake from a dream of his own making. 
(136– 37/107– 8)
Can one call this a point of view? It draws, rather, a relation of cotermi-
nousness, located in Zahir, between the real and imaginary worlds. For 
“him” (the French lui not distinguishing between human and horse) 
there is no elsewhere, only a here and now, the plane’s dark hold and 
his confi nement in it is all there is. His feet can leave the ground (“four 
horseshoes splayed in the air”) only at the cost of tragedy or farce, 
where Pegasus trades his fate for Icarus’s, and in a transport of imagi-
nation clearly not his own. Marking a heterogeneous space in this sec-
tion of the novel otherwise entirely (and phantasmatically) composed 
around the impenetrable spaces successively occupied by Zahir (the 
van, the night, the conveyance stall, the hold), the passage gives voice 
to the view from inside the black box, abandoned by fantasy, a space 
without remainder, as it were. Is this Toussaint’s conclusion regarding 
Schrödinger’s cat? We have arrived in any case at the other pole of the 
narrative, that “animal” space thus far barred to it, where imagination 
reaches the place it must end. If it fi nds a way out nonetheless, it is 
through an elaborate subterfuge:
For Zahir was as much in the real world as he was in an 
imaginary one, as much in this plane as in the haze of con-
sciousness, or a dream, unknown, dark, troubled, where the 
turbulence of the sky mirrors the intensity [sont les fulgu-
rances] of our language, and, if in reality horses never vomit, 
are unable to vomit (it’s physically impossible for them to 
vomit, their physiognomy won’t allow it, even when they’re 
nauseated, even when their stomachs are full of toxic sub-
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stances), Zahir, on this night, spent, stumbling in his stall, 
falling on his knees in the hay, his mane stuck to his head, 
matted with dirt and dried sweat, his jaws slack, his tongue 
pasty, chewing air, a bitter drool dribbling from his mouth, 
sweating, feeling horrible, trying to stand up in his stall, 
[ . . . ] his stomach heavy, bloated from fermentation, feeling 
food rise up his stomach, now breaking into a cold sweat 
and suddenly feeling the concrete, physical nearness of 
death, that sensation you feel when about to vomit, the sour 
saliva that fi lls your mouth and forecasts the vomiting to 
come [annonce l’imminence des vomissements], when your 
intestines contract and food shoots up your throat and enters 
your mouth, Zahir, on this night, irrespective of [indifférent 
à] his own nature, betraying [traître à] his species, began to 
vomit in the sky in the hold of a Boeing 747 cargo plane 
fl ying in the night [dans la nuit]. (137– 38/108– 9; translation 
modifi ed)
In a single sentence (truncated here) exceeding the length of a page, the 
most “metadiegetic” moment in Toussaint’s oeuvre thus gathers around 
the unseemly allegory of a vomiting horse. What was given as the horse’s 
consciousness starting in the preceding paragraph and continuing here 
(its animal certainty of being there, its imagination hugging the confi nes 
of its box, its nausea, its sense of proximity with death) turns out to be 
but a screen for the now- unmasked narrator (“les turbulences du ciel 
sont des fulgurances de la langue”: the turbulence of the sky mirrors— 
but also is, expresses, issues forth from— the intensity of our language). 
It is a complicated allegory, exposing the artifi ce of fi ction by means of 
the pure fi ctionality of the horse. As if to suggest that fi ction too, like 
steam engines and cinema, ran on horsepower, were secretly fueled by 
a horse in the night, which to occupy this position must violate the 
physiology of its species (“betraying his species”), transcending its na-
ture (“irrespective of— or indifferent to— his own nature”) through the 
inscription of a supplemental difference— the eleven thousand fi ctional 
foot- pounds, the tenth of a second of fl ight, and, here, the pure fi ction 
of a vomiting.
But vomiting? Why sacrifi ce zoological realism at this late stage 
only to make a horse vomit (and when there is so much more beauty 
in fl ying)? The riddle is somewhat resolved in three stages. For one, 
the framing of the scene is supported by a consistent spatio- symbolic 
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confi guration. Zahir does not simply vomit, he vomits “in the sky in 
the hold of the Boeing 747 cargo fl ying in the night.” The mediations 
forming concentric circles in the night place the horse at the remotest 
point from any fantasy of its fl ight. There is nothing “natural” in the 
horse’s overdetermined location— it has been multiply incorporated in 
the night, the “outside” turned into so many “insides,” calling for an 
action from it equally “unnatural” that might turn the world, to the 
wretchedly limited extent that it could, inside out. Recall the baggage 
hold of the plane likened to entrails (123) and, further back, the night 
in which Zahir had been swallowed and digested (“englouti et digéré” / 
“swallowed and digested” [106/84]), and the concentricity makes an 
obscure sort of sense. What seems to happen— and this is the second 
stage— is that the vomiting occurs as the exact negative image of fl ying, 
as per a chiasmic correspondence between on the one hand the inside of 
the world and a body’s outside (fl ight, the weightless absorption of the 
body into the surrounding night), and, on the other, the body’s inside 
and the world’s outside (vomiting, the expulsion of inner matter out-
ward).27 The mirroring is further assured by the fact that neither fl ying 
nor vomiting are acts of which a horse is anatomically capable; they 
form, rather, two polar gravity- defying impossibilities, the two pessimal 
thresholds of its being (i.e., thresholds at which it ceases to be)— one its 
outer horizon, one its inner.
But then there is a third orbit of meaning to the unraveling of the 
riddle of the vomiting horse (I too can be concentric), whose clues are 
in the numerous words the passage writes off to Zahir’s gastroenter-
ological turbulence— nauseated  . . . stomach [  . . .  ] full of toxic sub-
stances . . . his tongue pasty, chewing air, a bitter drool dribbling from 
his mouth  . . . his stomach heavy, bloated from fermentation, feeling 
food rise up . . . the sour saliva that fi lls your mouth and forecasts the 
vomiting to come, when your intestines contract and food shoots up 
your throat and enters your mouth. In this remarkable ebullience of 
words describing the “imminent” antigravitational refl ux of nausea one 
word is glaringly omitted, yet with every other word hollowly signifi ed, 
as if the passage were but a long periphrasis. This word is “bile,” in 
Greek cholia, which, united with the blackness of the night, gives mel-
ancholia. There is perhaps no term that better writes the fate of animals 
as they recede in the world (Lippit, Electric Animal, 18– 19). Another 
theme that haunts Toussaint’s prose, from the melancholy of The Bath-
room to “the Saturnine infl uences” moving Zidane, here it is literalized 
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by means of the invisible, unforgettable horse, in “an overfl ow of black 
bile into the solitary night.”28
Icarus
Technology has surely always, whether knowingly or subconsciously, 
given expression to humans’ secret wish to transcend their grounded 
fate and fl y. Succeeding through the millennia in taking two of their 
feet off the ground,29 yet humans could not surrender the terra fi rma 
beneath the remaining two, their bipedalism a frozen station on the 
way to fl ight. While the innovations of aeronautics (literally “sailing 
through the air”) and space travel have offered numerous prostheses 
and supplements to human winglessness, photography and cinema re-
corded in their beginnings a more archaic fascination with fl ight. Muy-
bridge’s Animals in Motion, opening with its “fl ying” horses, closed 
with a chapter called “The Flight of Birds” (66), with corresponding 
plates titled “Pigeon[s] in Flight,” “Cockatoo[s] in Flight,” a “Hawk in 
Flight,” “Vulture[s] in Flight,” and an “Eagle in Flight,” followed by 
“Eagle[s] in Flight near the Ground,” an “Adjutant,” and an “Ostrich” 
respectively “Walking” and then “in a Flying Run” (plates 169– 83). The 
work of Étienne- Jules Marey, carried out at the Station Physiologique 
of the Bois de Boulogne and featuring numerous horses, likewise signifi -
cantly privileged fl ying creatures, which we see in short strips of black- 
and- white fi lm (his [chrono]photographic gun taking twelve images per 
second, later his fi lms up to sixty images per second): so ancient and 
silent they now seem in their eight- second fl ickering, in the silent paths 
the birds draw across the frame, that we wonder if we are seeing traced 
out on the screen someone’s buried dream.30 Even a stingray, pinned 
so that it could only wave its fi ns, seems to have been fi lmed in imita-
tion of a bird in fl ight.31 The tenacity of the fascination with fl ight no 
doubt found its match in the constitutive diffi culty the subject posed to 
the camera. “The subjects of fl ight and soaring,” wrote Muybridge in 
his analysis titled “The Flight of Birds” (the briefest of the “Analyses”) 
“present so many intricate problems that the author is reluctantly com-
pelled to relinquish his attempt to elucidate them” (66). He didn’t need 
to state the nature of these “problems”: an airborne creature is diffi cult 
to see for the human eye naturally positioned “near the ground”; and 
what sort of device could make a camera— that mechanical, chemical, 
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phantasmatic extension of the human eye— soar so far up as to catch 
the detail of birds’ fl ight? The extent of the diffi culty is illustrated in 
the elaborateness of a way found around it, in 2001, by Jacques Perrin 
and Jacques Cluzaud, the unseen cameramen of Winged Migration (Le 
peuple migrateur). For it was not enough to have devised tall tripods 
and mobile cameras, nor to have positioned oneself in trees or on moun-
taintops. To watch birds as they fl ew, to record visually the fl apping 
and span of their wings, the muscular craning of their necks— a kind 
of vertical unconscious to the human real, if you like, what unfolds so 
far above us that it is lost to view32— the only way was to somehow 
make Icarus’s wager work, and to fl y with them. The wings were not the 
problem: modern man knew materials less vulnerable than wax. The 
diffi culty would lie, rather, in the fact that birds are not likely to want 
to fl y with a human. A limit is thereby reached that photography and 
cinema could not and cannot solve technologically, because its nature is 
morphological, not to say ontological, that of a threshold constitutive 
of the difference between species. What was needed was for an eye to 
fl y without a human (which was possible, no doubt, by attaching a mi-
nuscule camera to a bird, but this would mean relinquishing all control 
on the frame, and fi nally, perhaps, the loss of the captured footage)33 
or to surrender humanity and become a bird. The astonishing solution 
Perrin and Cluzaud opted for was of the second order, a becoming- bird. 
In a process called “imprinting” which took several years and was car-
ried out simultaneously by teams stationed in different places, fl ocks of 
various bird species were habituated from an early age to the continual 
company of humans, and particularly of one human who would, in 
a fl ying contraption worthy of Leonardo da Vinci, “learn to fl y” with 
them. It was a Deleuzian wager to the letter, premised both on the hu-
mans’ becoming bird and on the birds’ becoming human (in seeing in 
the human a mirror of themselves), with no actual term to either becom-
ing but a projected zone of indistinction. Amazingly, the birds were per-
suaded that this huge human- with- fl ying- machine(- plus- camera) was 
simply another bird, an overgrown sibling perhaps, who, when the time 
came to migrate hundreds of miles to the other end of the earth, would 
naturally be fl ying with them. So the human infi ltrated the ranks of the 
birds to fi lm hours of their silent soaring weightlessness. Winged Migra-
tion, whose unsuspectable secret is in its blind spot (the editing- out of 
the “bird” that “sees”), is made of breathtaking footage, capturing birds 
as never before seen (that is, tautologically, by humans), unbelievable, 
otherworldly, like sculptures in movement. The implications cannot be 
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overstated; it is as if photographic sight had broken free of its human 
coordinates and were recording momentous journeys in an empyrion 
before or after, in any case without, man. The truth is ultimately more 
startling, in that it is the human himself who has broken free of his last 
fetters to literally fl y— that is, we now understand, broken through to 
his own vast unconscious, his limitless in- humanity, his night.
Not so with Toussaint’s horses, alas. The last section of The Truth 
about Marie, set in Elba, mourns its share of fl ightless horses, when 
a fi re breaks out near Marie’s father’s property. Destroying much of 
the horse club nearby where Marie had left her father’s own horses 
following his death, it does not miss the stables, where tortured animal 
shadows and cries, both seemingly human and terribly inhuman, are all 
we will ever perceive of the dying horses (who perhaps thus die for the 
eternally marching horses of Modiano): “Screams could be heard here 
and there, there was great confusion around the stables, locked, inacces-
sible, where the silhouettes of animals stamped and writhed, whinnying 
hoarsely and desperately, human in their intonation and inhuman to 
the ear” (191– 92/150; translation modifi ed). A few pages further, Marie 
and the narrator return to the site to fi nd “three makeshift shrouds cov-
ering forms whose dimensions were unclear in the silent gray light of 
dawn, not human forms but clearly dead bodies of some sort, charred 
carcasses of animals” (202/158). Too close to the fi re, the three horses, 
wings melting, could not fl y. The trembling of the line, once again, be-
tween human and nonhuman (“not human forms but clearly dead bod-
ies [cadavres]”) here only confi rms that the animals have been robbed in 
death of their mythical ancestry. They die the deaths of fallen humans: 
as Julia Kristeva recalls in Powers of Horror, the word “cadaver” comes 
from cadere, that is, “to fall.”34
A fourth horse survives the fi re but has sustained such grave burns 
that they would “probably have to put her down” (203/159). The horse 
in question is Marie’s favorite, a “mare with beautiful eyes” named 
Nocciola, whom she had fi rst ridden on the day of her father’s burial, 
escorting the hearse to the cemetery (160/126– 27). In her time in Elba 
before the fi re, Marie had often mounted Nocciola, as we learn in a pas-
sage that brings us back in its own way to Muybridge: “It wasn’t long 
before Marie needed no help in riding Nocciola, she saddled the mare 
herself when she arrived at the club, leading her by the bridle, mounting 
the saddle, and riding around the paddock at a slow pace [au pas], then, 
fi rmly kicking the horse’s sides, riding at a trot [au trot], and, after a 
week, at a gallop [au galop]” (161/127– 28). In hindsight, when it tran-
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spires that Nocciola is destined for slaughter, her progression through 
the various phases (the walk, the trot, the gallop) of horse motion is 
invested with all the more ill- fated poignancy— for, having reached the 
gallop, should she not have known to fl y?35
If the “sound of hooves” was the sound of sentenced footfalls, of feet 
that could leave the ground only in death, Toussaint’s novel, read from 
the struck- through place of the horse, assuredly seals a fall from fl ight. 
One should not be surprised, perhaps, to count so many horses fatally 
impeded in their fl ight. A failed attempt by paramedics to revive Jean- 
Christophe de G. in the fi rst pages of the novel had in a sense already 
suggested that electric (re)animation of the dead body (zoopraxiscopy?) 
had lost its magical powers. Receiving a “brutal electric shock, causing 
[its] chest to shake on the fl oor,” the body had fallen lifelessly to the 
ground, appearing then to Marie’s eyes as “white inanimate fl esh dotted 
with electrodes, skin like a fi sh, cod or fl ounder, [ . . . ] this objectifi ed, 
medicalized body, this shaved, intravenoused, ventilated body— this 
body reduced to its bare substance” (33– 34/27; translation modifi ed). 
This human body turned into the inanimate white fl esh of fi sh pierced 
with electrodes cannot but bring to mind Marey’s stingray, immobilized, 
with only its fi ns free to move in a pathetic tableau vivant of a bird fl ap-
ping its wings but covering no distance: the fate, one might imagine, of 
the Elba horses.
So, at the convergence of technology and myth, a long dream of fl y-
ing horses seems to come to an end, or to be “troubled” if one remem-
bers how Zahir is last seen— vomiting in the hold in the plane in the 
night but also in the narrator’s “dream, unknown, dark, troubled [rêve, 
inconnu, sombre, agité]” (137/108– 9; my emphasis). Fortuitously per-
haps, we fi nd in this rêve agité (troubled dream) two words that had 
notably fi gured in the opening sentence of Kafka’s Metamorphosis.36 It 
was from a “troubled dream” that Gregor had woken to fi nd himself 
transformed (from human to overturned animal); here from a “troubled 
dream” the horse tries to exit— impossibly, as in so doing it can only 
burn its wings and fall (turning from animal to falling human: “Icarus 
burning his wings in an attempt to wake from a dream of his own mak-
ing” [137/108]). As it happens, The Metamorphosis too featured lost 
wings, through an enigma that should allow me here to conclude, sug-
gesting simply and obviously that human stories are lined with a trail 
of fl ightless, falling animals. The quote is from Marina Warner’s Fantas-
tic Metamorphoses: “Vladimir Nabokov, uniquely both distinguished 
lepidopterist and fabulist, wanted to establish exactly which species of 
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insect Kafka [was] evoking [in The Metamorphosis . . . He] concludes 
that the bug is simply ‘a big beetle,’ indeed, as he can reach the door 
knob with his feelers, one that is three feet high. Nabokov points out 
that Gregor should have realized that as a beetle he had a pair of wings 
hidden under ‘the hard covering of his back,’ which could have carried 
him for miles and miles in a blundering fl ight.”37
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Man of the Forest
Éric Chevillard, with La Fontaine and Poe
Literature was born on the day when a boy came crying wolf, wolf and there 
was no wolf behind him. That the poor little fellow because he lied too often 
was fi nally eaten up by a real beast is quite incidental . . . Between the wolf in 
the tall grass and the wolf in the tall story there is a shimmering go-between. 
That go-between, that prism, is the art of literature. 
—Vladimir Nabokov
“They are no longer anywhere, everywhere they are not, even if while 
living they did not occupy all points in space; one could go some time 
without meeting one, look up from one’s task and not see any around, 
this would occur and was not shocking, [but] now they are missing in 
every place and in every instant.” Éric Chevillard’s Sans l’orang- outan 
(2007; Without the Orangutan) imagines a dire predicament.1 The last 
two orangutans have died, and with them has perished a species now 
realized, too late, to have been the subtle cog in the very wheels (le sub-
til rouage) of the human world (21). Without the orangutan the world 
now collapses, all meanings reel between extremes, and Chevillard’s 
riotous novel, espousing these reelings as its very form, places the ani-
mal, in its extinction, everywhere where it is not to offer a sort of par-
adoxical and irreverent orangutan- machine, a 187- page account of the 
world exhaustively abandoned— and proportionally haunted— by the 
orangutan. Causality, identity, difference have all broken down: people 
and things no longer reach their destinations, the sun has fatally re-
ceded from the earth, humans have started to resemble each other, and 
space and distance themselves have ceased to be differentiated, caus-
ing collisions and incest. What is more, “the length of the meter has 
changed”— it has increased, for this length had naturally been set by the 
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millennially brachiating limbs of the orangutan as it had swung from 
trees.2 Chevillard has ostensibly done in this book what he does in all 
his fi ction: approaching the real as a deserted stage, he introduces a 
particular and thoroughly unaccountable entity in all its empty places, 
as if to see what might happen.3 Such exercises in thought and style are 
in Chevillard’s hands so many experiments in possible worlds. Even 
so, in Sans l’orang- outan, the imagined extinction of a species arguably 
provides the most provocative, not to say the ideal material for such 
experiments, for reasons that, like (or carried away with) the orangutan, 
escape the boundaries of the text. “The orangutan carries away also the 
name orangutan,” writes Chevillard, “and our language is orphaned in 
turn, for the sign [signe] will not long survive the ape [singe]” (53). The 
novel reads, in its entirety, as an exploitation of this lag between singe 
and signe, between the animal body and its name. To consider seriously 
the stakes of such a lag, to recover their legibility beyond the evident 
terms of some sort of postmodern wager (language as absence, as free 
play of the signifi er, as generalized pastiche or irony, the receding of 
the referent, etc.) is to return to a long tradition of animals enrolled in 
narrative. What long made possible, or at least invisible, a contract— 
between language and animal bodies— which, now, on the death of the 
last orangutans, should lie so exposed and undone? And, for that mat-
ter, why, with the vanishing of the orangutan, in its severance from its 
name, should the meter, and indeed all measure, all assurances of dis-
tance and positionings, be also lost?
Wolf Trap
A “double fable” fi rst appearing in the 1668 original collection of Jean 
de La Fontaine’s Fables had the wolf twice positioned outside a door, 
and twice tricked. The fi rst fable within the fable (“Le loup, la chèvre 
et le chevreau” / “The Wolf, the Goat and the Kid”) saw the wolf using 
the mother sheep’s password to deceive a lamb into opening the door. 
The strategy fails, as the lamb, “twice prudent,” not content with the 
password, and looking through a tiny crack in the door, asks the wolf to 
show “patte blanche” (a white paw, and thus, symbolically, its “hand,” 
i.e., its good faith/intentions). The wolf walks away, defeated. In the 
second fable (“Le loup, la mère et l’enfant” / “The Wolf, the Mother, 
and Her Child”), the wolf, standing outside a village house, overhears 
to its delighted surprise a mother telling her wailing infant that if it does 
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not quieten down she will offer it up as food to the wolf. When the 
child (understandably) continues to wail, the mother changes her line 
to assure it that if the wolf appears it will be killed. Hearing this, the 
eavesdropper is indignant: “Dire d’un, puis d’un autre? Me prend- on 
pour un sot?” The line is translated in 1841 by Elizur Wright (the fi rst to 
translate the entire fables into English) as: “‘Humph!’ cried the veteran 
mutton- eater / ‘Now this, now that! Now hot, now cool! / Is this the 
way they change their metre? / And do they take me for a fool?’” The 
wolf promptly cries out its resolve to eat the child the next time it fi nds 
it collecting nuts in the woods. Whereupon people exiting the house fi nd 
the eavesdropper, capture it, and, hearing its story (in line 26, “Aussitôt 
il conta l’affaire” / line 40, “He told it all”), decide to kill and quarter 
it. The dismembered parts of the wolf are exhibited on the village head-
man’s door, along with a placard warning wolves not to heed tales spun 
by mothers to their children.
Le loup, la mère et l’enfant
Ce loup me remet en mémoire 1
Un de ses compagnons qui fut encor mieux pris:
Il y périt. Voici l’histoire:
Un villageois avait à l’écart son logis.
Messer Loup attendait chape- chute à la porte; 5
Il avait vu sortir gibier de toute sorte,
Veaux de lait, agneaux et brebis
Régiments de dindons, enfi n bonne provende.
Le larron commençait pourtant à s’ennuyer.
Il entend un enfant crier: 10
La mère aussitôt le gourmande,
Le menace, s’il ne se tait,
De le donner au loup. L’animal se tient prêt,
Remerciant les dieux d’une telle aventure,
Quand la mère, apaisant sa chère géniture, 15
Lui dit: “Ne criez point, s’il vient, nous le tuerons.
— Qu’est ceci? s’écria le mangeur de moutons:
Dire d’un, puis d’un autre! Est- ce ainsi que l’on traite
Les gens faits comme moi? me prend- on pour un sot?
Que quelque jour ce beau marmot 20
Vienne au bois cueillir la noisette!”
Comme il disait ces mots, on sort de la maison:
Un chien de cour l’arrête; épieux et fourche- fi ères
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L’ajustent de toutes manières.
“Que veniez- vous chercher en ce lieu?” lui dit- on. 25
Aussitôt il conta l’affaire.
“Merci de moi! lui dit la mère;
Tu mangeras mon fi ls! l’ai- je fait à dessein
Qu’il assouvisse un jour ta faim?”
On assomma la pauvre bête. 30
Un manant lui coupa le pied droit et la tête:
Le seigneur du village à sa porte les mit;
Et ce dicton picard à l’entour fut écrit:
“Biaux chires leups, n’écoutez mie
Mère tenchent chen fi eux qui crie.” 35
The Wolf, the Mother, and Her Child
(translated by Elizur Wright)
This wolf another brings to mind, 1
Who found dame Fortune more unkind,
In that the greedy, pirate sinner,
Was balk’d of life as well as dinner.
As saith our tale, a villager 5
Dwelt in a by, unguarded place;
There, hungry, watch’d our pillager
For luck and chance to mend his case.
For there his thievish eyes had seen
All sorts of game go out and in— 10
Nice sucking calves, and lambs and sheep;
And turkeys by the regiment,
With steps so proud, and necks so bent,
They’d make a daintier glutton weep.
The thief at length began to tire 15
Of being gnaw’d by vain desire.
Just then a child set up a cry:
“Be still,” the mother said, “or I
Will throw you to the wolf, you brat!”
“Ha, ha!” thought he, “what talk is that! 20
The gods be thank’d for luck so good!”
And ready at the door he stood,
When soothingly the mother said,
“Now cry no more, my little dear;
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That naughty wolf, if he comes here, 25
Your dear papa shall kill him dead.”
“Humph!” cried the veteran mutton- eater.
“Now this, now that! Now hot, now cool!
Is this the way they change their metre?
And do they take me for a fool? 30
Some day, a nutting in the wood,
That young one yet shall be my food.”
But little time has he to dote
On such a feast; the dogs rush out
And seize the caitiff by the throat; 35
And country ditchers, thick and stout,
With rustic spears and forks of iron,
The hapless animal environ.
“What brought you here, old head?” cried one.
He told it all, as I have done. 40
“Why, bless my soul!” the frantic mother said,— 
“You, villain, eat my little son!
And did I nurse the darling boy,
Your fi endish appetite to cloy?”
With that they knock’d him on the head. 45
His feet and scalp they bore to town,
To grace the seigneur’s hall,
Where, pinn’d against the wall,
This verse completed his renown:— 
“Ye honest wolves, believe not all 50
That mothers say, when children squall!”
The seventeenth- century French scholar Marc Escola, in his wonder-
ful book Lupus in fabula, playfully analyzes both the internal structural- 
moral coherence of these fables and certain elements of unaccountability 
within them that appear to arbitrarily block certain other equally pos-
sible unfoldings.4 For instance, why does the lamb in the fi rst fable go 
further in its caution than even its mother had advised? If not for this 
excessive caution, indeed, the wolf’s strategy was set to succeed (as his 
acts of deception and disguise do in certain other well- known fables— 
recall the “wolf in sheep’s clothing”). And, in the second, what makes 
people exit the house at precisely the moment at which the wolf is plot-
ting to kill the child one day in the woods, when the inverse scenario 
was equally possible— in other words, that the wolf enter the house at 
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this moment and eat the child, fulfi lling the mother’s fi rst promise? The 
fable’s outcome consists instead, critically, in a realization of the second 
promise (that the wolf, on appearing, be killed).
Escola’s concern, in analyzing these fables, is to demonstrate how 
it is always possible to activate supplemental textual potential within 
a given text by recovering the traces of what he calls an “erratic struc-
ture,” bared in surface “dysfunctionings” or places of “disequilibrium” 
where narrative logic, hesitating, then making a decision which instantly 
becomes its constraint, is seen to move from one “local coherence” to 
another. The method allows him to show, with great fi nesse, how the 
two seemingly irreconcilable parts of La Fontaine’s double fable can 
be recombined to produce a tale bearing an uncanny resemblance to 
Charles Perrault’s Le petit chaperon rouge (Little Red Riding Hood). 
As for me, my interest lies particularly in the second fable and in the 
fate of the wolf, and in the structure of duplicity to which the fable re-
sorts, both in content and in form, in order to trap it. As Escola notes, 
the wolf’s error, in “The Wolf, the Mother, and Her Child,” is in failing 
to distinguish between the literal and the fi gurative— or, we could say, 
between “reality” and fi ction. Indeed, what the wolf takes literally (the 
promise of the child as food) was only intended fi guratively— and this is 
its error. However, and conversely (and here, I will suggest, lies a murk-
ier realm), its crime, for which it must die, is not a real act (for it has 
not killed the child) but for having imagined it— and this is presumably 
what it confesses to in the abyssal line 26/40 (“Your dear papa” through 
“He told it all”: abyssal because in this recounting and its eliding is also 
a mise en abyme within the fable, from the wolf’s vantage point, of the 
whole of the fable). Now, within the logic of the fable, it is a temporal 
conceit (or rather deceit) that makes sense of such a conversion: the 
wolf, harboring such designs, would have killed the child at the next 
opportunity, it was only a matter of time, itself encapsulated within line 
26. But since the fable cannot tolerate within its diegesis this extension 
of time (wherein the wolf would commit the deed and thus in reality 
earn its retribution), it resorts to a canny short- circuiting, and incorpo-
rating the extension as unbearable future yet (crucially) not as permis-
sible unfolding of time, performs a forced symbolic reparation of the 
logical contradiction that had so perplexed the wolf: “Dire d’un, puis 
d’un autre?” (“Now this, now that! Now hot, now cool!”). Temporality 
and morality are here chiasmically at odds: following a de Manian read-
ing, one might say that a discontinuity of structure passes for a temporal 
continuity and vice versa5— and that the dismembered body of the wolf 
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stands at the site of this two- way conversion. In preempting the crime, 
the fable effectively annuls it; yet in folding in the annulled time/crime 
in which the wolf can realize its always already guilty lupine destiny, it 
maintains the authority to punish the wolf for it.
Another place from which to approach the fable’s deceitful structure 
is found at its close, in that placard on which the village chief inscribes 
in Picard, beside the trophied head and leg of the wolf, a warning to 
wolves not to heed what a mother may tell her crying child. An exqui-
site twist, this. That the message should be addressed to wolves (with 
the added effet de réel of the Picard dialect) is remarkable enough, 
marking a place of overdetermined, saturated liminality in which the 
frontispiece (the writer/reader “interface”) of the fable and the human/
wolf border appear to coincide, and the fable’s moral coherence is sug-
gested as being organized around and in respect of the wolf’s interpre-
tive agency— a suggestion itself preciously paradoxical given that what 
the wolf is shown as incapable of understanding is precisely the fi ctional 
mode, in other words fables, and thereby this fable . . . Then there is the 
unconcealed amorality of the inscribed message, affi rming the untruth 
quotient in human- speak. Or clarifying that untruth to the one entity 
at the expense of which it circulates, the only interpreter, perhaps, who 
can— if only it could— recognize it as untruth. As if the wolf stood at 
(and for) the exposed side of human meaning, the unprotected side, 
where it lay bare and inconsistent, words and things stitched together 
loosely, irresponsibly, fi t to persuade only crying babies and idiots (“me 
prend- on pour un sot?” / “And do they take me for a fool?”).
Something like a fourth- wall dispositif was of course at work from 
the very outset of the fable, as the wolf positioning himself outside the 
villager’s dwelling overheard the mother speaking to the child. This 
would be a classic instance of irony arising from an unequal distribu-
tion of knowledge within a space, or, more precisely, from a differential 
in symbolic competence (in telling apart the literal from the fi gurative, 
the false promise from the serious), but for the added factor of a hom-
onymic pull, shall we say, whereby Messer Loup believes himself to be 
the referent of the mother’s utterances, and identifying immediately with 
every occurrence of the word “loup,” must then, in the face of the irrec-
oncilable, be literally dismembered (if the logos itself, here challenged 
by the wolf, is to be repaired)— it is, here again, a mere matter of time. 
The most powerful event of “The Wolf, the Mother, and Her Child,” 
then, is in the threat posed to the functioning of language itself, as the 
wolf with its stubborn presence, with its very body, attempts to close the 
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gap (between the world of things and the world of words, or between 
the referent and the signifi ed) constitutive of symbolic possibility. In this 
sense, the fable is, in its broadest terms, shall we say, about what happens 
to signifi cation when an animal enters the scene. For if the wolf cannot 
bear to hear its name spoken in vain, if the wolf cannot tolerate meta-
phorical language, nor can metaphor in the end really suffer the wolf. 
As Susan McHugh lucidly notes, “The aesthetic structures of metaphor, 
though precariously supporting the human subject, seem unable to bear 
animal agency.”6 Metaphor would rather work its “substitutive logics” 
(489) at a safe imaginative distance from the real wolf, as unperturbed 
by its realness as it is by its quickness to spot contradictions. What a 
naive literalist, the wolf. The Picard sign points the way to the more 
sophisticated world of humans, where words do not have to mean what 
they say. This in itself cannot be a systematic principle, however, as the 
fable itself duplicitously demonstrates. The mother may not have meant 
that she would give her child to the wolf, but, manifestly, she did mean 
that if the wolf appeared it would be killed. How was a wolf to know?
The Passing (or “I Am a Wolf”)
The fold noted in La Fontaine’s fable is no doubt not as curious as all 
that; rather, such folds may well be constitutive points of torsion in all 
fables. For Thomas Keenan, author of Fables of Responsibility, indeed, 
a fable is always a story about subject accountability, in other words, 
what fables recount over and over again is, precisely, the paradoxical 
advent of something like an “I.”7 Keenan devotes a chapter of his book 
to Aesop’s fable “The Eagle and the Raven,” in which a raven, thinking 
it is an eagle, swoops down on a sheep, only to fi nd its claws stuck in 
the sheep’s thick wool and to thus learn at its own cost that it is not 
the bird of prey it thought it was. The failed eagle ends its days with 
clipped wings as a pet for the shepherd’s child, acknowledging now, at 
the end of the fable, that it is in fact a raven. Keenan writes: “The fable 
tells the story [  . . .  ] of a non- symmetrical movement from nameless 
bird to birdless name, the generation of the pure name that is the pre-
condition for the invention of the ‘I.’ This I is just as disfi gured as the 
so- called raven, a plaything for children, just as empty and robbed of its 
properties, and this doubled blank provides the equivalence that makes 
the utterance ‘I am a raven’ possible. With diffi culty, and at the price of 
its intelligibility” (65). The chiasmus (“from nameless bird to birdless 
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name”) could just as well apply to La Fontaine’s wolf, whose plight also 
carries it from being a body failing to decisively occupy its name (dire 
d’un, puis d’un autre?) to a body quartered, restored in its destruction 
to its name. Invoking the “dehiscence ‘within’ the bird” in Aesop’s fable, 
Keenan recalls the substitutive or supplementary lag that, for thinkers 
like Levinas, Blanchot, and Derrida, marks the arrival of the subject, 
caught between an “already there” and a “not yet”: “Like us, caught 
in the structural delay or the crippling lag of reading, the raven ‘is’ this 
morcellement du ‘sujet,’ passing without return across the trope or the 
pseudonym— the error— that marks its only possibility: there are bor-
rowed names, or no names at all” (69).
The “passing without return across the trope” gives me pause here, 
for Keenan’s own lucid parsing of the fable leads, rather, to the insight 
that there is a return in this commerce between names and bodies. A 
continual return, precisely, in that specter of a nameless body which 
every naming on one side of the trope produces on the other side as 
if retroactively, that is, as per a “structural delay” or a “crippling lag” 
whereby (ironic) structure is grasped as (temporal) event and vice versa. 
In other words, that as soon as there is a turn (a trope, i.e., representa-
tion) there is also, as its shadow, a return, and that this alone, the fable 
as return, if you will, can make available to thought— (at the price of 
being thought of) as what lies on the other side of naming— a habitat 
for nameless, unaccountable ravens and wolves. Naturally, Keenan’s ac-
count of the “passing” evinces a directional prejudice consistent with his 
concern with responsibility as a problematics of human subjecthood. 
Indeed, it is in this capacity that his analyses are taken up by both Judith 
Butler in Giving an Account of Oneself 8 and David Wills in Dorsality: 
Thinking Back through Technology and Politics.9 Keenan’s postulate of 
an “across” nonetheless locates a sort of threshold that makes equally 
possible the thinking of its “passing” from the other side, as it were, so 
that his very insights are productively, for our purposes, reversed. Just 
as every fable attempts to account for a “passing” into accountable (hu-
manlike) subjecthood, and precisely because this passing implies (folds 
in) a place that works as a trope, or a (“nonsymmetrical”) chiasmus, 
where structure works like narrative, and narrative like structure, what 
we may well fi nd (looking back) on the other side— in turn irreducibly 
indistinguishable from a before, and vice versa— is a prehistoric ahu-
man subject, that is, the animal.
If for Aesop’s raven, repairing the subject- predicate declaration of 
self- identity (“I am a raven”) was at the price of its freedom and prop-
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erties (its wings clipped, its life now that of imprisoned pethood), for 
La Fontaine’s wolf, saying “I am a wolf” could only be at the cost of its 
life. In these fables offering, then, if that is what they are doing, an al-
legory of a coming- into- responsibility, the animal body whose “errancy 
consists precisely in wandering away from its name” (Keenan, Fables, 
62) is not so easily subsumed or “sublated” in the telling. But nor is it so 
easily “recovered,” in this fabulist theater of passings, counterfeitings, 
maskings, and unmaskings (which may yet only be remaskings). In Lim-
ited Inc., Jacques Derrida, writing about how theories of subject unity 
and responsibility entail a certain policing to exclude the “parasitism” 
and errancy that he names the unconscious or undecidability, had told 
his own fable: “It is suffi cient to introduce, into the fold [la bergerie] of 
speech acts, a few wolves of the type ‘undecidability’ . . . or of the type 
‘unconscious’ . . . for the shepherd to lose track of his sheep [pour que 
le pasteur ne puisse plus compter ses moutons]” (quoted in Keenan, 
Fables, 48– 49). A little earlier he wrote of the effects of a “structural un-
conscious” that would “make appear (and [ . . . ] leap) the security bar-
rier which, at the interior of the system, . . . condemns the unconscious 
as one condemns or bars access to a forbidden place.” Keenan, recalling 
the intertextual network linking Derrida’s wolf fable to earlier fables 
(particularly the one in which the wolf in sheep’s clothing succeeds in 
obtaining plentiful access to its prey, but also a variant, in which, ac-
cordingly mistaken for a sheep, the wolf is killed one day for meat), 
notes beautifully here that, in Derrida’s recasting of the parts, “the wolf 
of undecidability imitates [ . . . ] not only the sheep but also the earlier 
wolves, and so the fable itself plays the part of the wolf in fable’s cloth-
ing” (50). If the morality of Derrida’s fable is, in Keenan’s words, that 
there is “no responsibility without undecidability, without the uncon-
scious and its parasites, and no fable, no example, without the risk of 
a certain simulation” (51), one could perhaps also say that there is no 
morality, no allegory without a “return” of/to a forgotten “literality”— 
which Derrida/Keenan’s preoccupation with subjecthood here must oc-
clude, but which some of Derrida’s later seminars such as The Animal 
That Therefore I Am or The Beast and the Sovereign (so interested in 
La Fontaine’s Fables) make clearly (as if retroactively) perceptible. In a 
certain and absolutely nonincidental sense, the destinerrance or adesti-
nation that came to be the condition of subjecthood and signifi cation 
through all of Derrida’s work— the originary possibility of forgery in the 
signature, the fact that a letter can always not arrive and therefore, in a 
certain sense, never arrives, or the premisedness of the oikos, the home 
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or (any) economy, on the possibility of transgression of its borders, to 
recall some of the best- known of these “supplementarities”— carves out 
nothing less than a place for the animal. For in inscribing within the 
possibility of identity, of intent, of meaning, the possibility, always and 
since the beginning, or even before the beginning (“depuis le temps” / 
“since time”), of an indirection, of an interception, an expropriation, 
had the philosopher not allowed, before the beginning, the possibility 
that while a mother wove innocent/guilty lupine fi ctions for the instruc-
tion/amusement of her child, a wolf stood eavesdropping at the door?10
C H A P E- C H U T E
The word La Fontaine uses to describe the wolf at the door, chape- 
chute, draws on an erstwhile literality largely lost to modern French. 
The medieval compound, from chape, the older word for “cape” (or 
woman’s/nun’s veil), and chute, the still- used word for fall, would have 
meant, at the time La Fontaine wrote, literally, a “cape- fall,” or “cape 
loss,” and accordingly, fi guratively, an unsought chance to profi t from 
the negligence or misfortune of another (Littré). The word chape itself 
in the meantime had evolved both as a term in certain specialized vo-
cabularies (maritime, architectural, technological) and more generally 
to mean a lid, a cover. There may be a limit to how far one can go in 
untangling the literal and metaphorical, and in regulating scale, in the 
case of this word, which very quickly seems to name both the “lid” of 
the very fi rmament (chape du ciel), and, as it turns out, a layer of wa-
terproof cement reinforcing vaults or roofs, no doubt to prevent rain-
water from dripping (so that we are not far from the scene of eaves, the 
edges of a roof, dripping, which is in turn the “forgotten literality” of 
the English eavesdropping)— but also, just perhaps, to stop words ut-
tered within four walls from escaping? Échapper (to escape), also from 
chape, suggests the Littré, would have derived its meaning from the act 
of throwing off one’s cape or robe, or, perhaps, of fl eeing while leaving 
one’s cape or robe in the hands of one’s pursuer.
Standing outside the door, happening to profi t from the villagers’ neg-
ligence in not properly shutting the door or in not cementing gaps in the 
walls, La Fontaine’s wolf is the witness, not to say the very “function,” 
of a slip— a slip of a cover, or a slip in attention— that opens the inside 
to the outside, and verbal meaning to its exorbitance. The wolf, chape- 
chute, is, in a sense, both inside and outside, its overhearing, whatever 
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its competence, exposing the boundaries of language, reminding it of 
the bodies in which it trades, of the intimacy of its transaction with the 
outside and the nonhuman. This is a good place to recall that the house, 
for Levinas in Totality and Infi nity, is a “primary appropriation” of 
interiority, so much so that the process of subjective individuation asks 
to be understood fi rst in the terms of the construction of a house: “The 
domicile, condition for all property, renders the inner life possible. The 
I is at home with itself. Through the home our relationship with space 
as distance is substituted for the simple ‘bathing in the element.’ But the 
adequate relation with the element is precisely bathing.”11 David Wills, 
commenting on the “demeure” (domicile) in Levinas, makes clear its 
place as primary and paradoxical dispositif, as it were, in “allowing 
the I to be precisely by being defi ned as an I that is housed within itself. 
From that point of view, the I does not exist without the conception 
of the house; the house exists and is constructed, as it were, prior to 
the formation of the I” (54– 55). Levinas’s insistence, nonetheless, on 
an “adequate relation with the element” (which the house would seem 
to already interrupt), leads him to concede to the originariness of the 
house only on the condition that its “door to the outside must . . . be at 
the same time open and closed” (148). Chape- chute?
A side note here: for one, there is little reason to believe, as some did 
in the past, that La Fontaine was a minute observer of fauna. He was 
not, for his animals came much more from a vast bestiary of fables and 
tales than from any attention to nature.12 Likewise, it is well known 
that Levinas was reluctant, in his thinking on subjecthood and ethics, to 
extend it to the realm of animals (with the notable exception of “Nom 
d’un chien ou le droit naturel”).13 Derrida enjoyed quoting that occa-
sion on which, asked in an interview whether his ethics might apply to 
the animal other, Levinas had retorted with the counterquestion “Does 
the serpent have a face?”14 It remains that in La Fontaine’s positioning 
of the wolf at the porous edge of a house, and in Levinas’s description of 
the house as the permeable closing off of a fi nite interiority from an in-
teriority without limit (“the element,” which Rilke and then Heidegger 
and Agamben would call “the Open”), we recognize in (differently) dra-
matized form that important if imperfectible boundary drawn between, 
on the one hand, human space as enclosure, separation, inside, and, on 
the other, an outside which we know, historically, immemorially, ecolog-
ically, ethologically, if now precariously, to be the space of the animal.15 
There is reason to expect and suspect, then, that any entry of the animal 
into human space will concern this border, and that if this border is 
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duplicitous (that is, constructed on a double fold, of the Baroque sort, 
whereby the inside is folded on itself, and the outside folded out),16 that 
this entry, or any ensuing exit, will, in complicating it, shed further light 
on what, following Keenan, I have been calling the “passing.”
The Unequal Animal
The exemplary text here is, of course, Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Murders 
in The Rue Morgue” (1841), which, if it famously inaugurated the genre 
of detective fi ction, did so equally famously through the supreme twist of 
ultimately tracing the gruesome murder of two women in a Paris apart-
ment to an animal recently arrived from Borneo. The lengthy discussion, 
opening the story, of the differences between the respective skills needed 
for playing draughts and chess, serves to set up the method by which 
self- appointed sleuth Auguste Dupin will fi nally arrive at the orang-
utan. This method is based on a twofold refusal of given parameters. 
On the one hand, analytic skill involves a further, deeper penetration 
into thought than “ordinary understanding” might obtain: “The analyst 
throws himself into the spirit of the opponent, identifi es himself there-
with, and not unfrequently sees thus, at a glance, the sole methods (some-
times indeed absurdly simple ones) by which he may seduce into error 
or hurry into miscalculation.”17 It is a method relying, in this sense, on 
chercher chape- chute, on waiting for the slightest slip whence advantage 
might be gained. The analyst must accordingly have “a comprehension 
of all the sources whence legitimate advantage may be derived”; these, 
in turn, “lie frequently among recesses of thought altogether inaccessi-
ble to the ordinary understanding.” On the other hand, skillful analysis 
involves extending thought beyond the apparent boundaries of the very 
game: “It is in matters beyond the limits of mere rule that the skill of the 
analyst is evinced”; “our player confi nes himself not at all; nor, because 
the game is the object, does he reject deductions from things external 
to the game” (240). In modern terms, what is being argued for here is a 
thinking outside the box— verily, the sealed apartment on rue Morgue 
cuts a compelling box— but which presents itself at the same time as an 
intensive movement probing into the “recesses” of the box.
It is the extensive direction of this thinking that will proceed to be 
most explicitly applied in the investigation that follows. Yet it is useful 
to note the dialectical character of the analyst’s skill as presented in 
the prologue, something to which I will return. Let me briefl y recall 
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the circumstances of the case. The apartment, whose doors are locked 
from the inside, and windows all tightly closed, is found in a state of 
great disorder; possessions are strewn about though a large quantity of 
gold coins had apparently not been taken by the intruder; the body of 
Mme L’Espanaye is found in the rear yard, with its throat “so entirely 
cut that, upon an attempt to raise her, the head f[alls] off”; the corpse of 
her daughter, equally mutilated, is found partially shoved up a chimney; 
neighbors and passersby, when interrogated by the police, all concur that 
they had heard two voices as they ascended the stairs to the apartment, 
but in each case the person interrogated said the fi rst voice, male, spoke 
in French, while ascribing to the other voice— described as “unequal” 
(249), “uneven[]” (250), “unusual” (256)— a foreign language the wit-
ness himself did not understand. Amateur detective Auguste Dupin in 
his analysis will proceed partly from this fact, noting that, when it came 
to the second voice, “no words— no sounds resembling words— were by 
any witness mentioned as distinguishable” (256). The “no” phrase, the 
decisive negation of human traits, this forced expulsion of the intruder 
out of the fi eld of possible human subjects, will trace, by means of a 
series, as we shall see, the path toward the orangutan.
The “clew” thanks to which the mystery unravels is come upon 
as Dupin stubbornly focuses his thinking on modes of “ingress” and 
“egress.” All paths connecting inside and outside seeming to be sealed 
(and there being “no secret issues” [257]), they must be eliminated. 
Dupin persists: “The doers of the deed were material, and escaped 
materially. Then how?” (257).18 The solution is found in a difference 
masquerading as identity. Two windows, identically sealed shut, with a 
spring mechanism and a nail, lead the very “perceptions” of the police 
to be “hermetically sealed against the possibility of the windows having 
ever been opened at all” (262). The hypallage here (yet another one), by 
which the terms describing the apartment (“hermetically sealed”) are 
displaced onto the police’s “perceptions” is fi tting, as when Dupin dis-
covers that one nail only appears intact, but that this is so only because 
it is so perfectly cracked that its “resemblance to a perfect nail [is] com-
plete” (259), it is both the sealedness of the domicile and that of the po-
lice investigation that comes undone. From this point it is only a matter 
of time before the riddle is solved: “the almost praeternatural character” 
(“praeternatural” meaning, precisely, outside or beyond the “natural”) 
of the strength a body would have needed to have swung itself into and 
out of the fourth fl oor apartment by means of the shutter and then the 
window, the adding up of the “ideas of an agility astounding, a strength 
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super- human, a ferocity brutal, a butchery without motive, a grotes-
querie in horror absolutely alien from humanity, and a voice foreign in 
tone to the ears of men of many nations, and devoid of all distinct or 
intelligible syllabifi cation” (263), in short, the “something excessively 
outré [from the French outre, or “beyond”]— something altogether ir-
reconcilable with our common notions of human action” (262), must 
lead to a criminal outside the fi eld of the human. The fi nal clues are in 
some ways redundant (and in others, suffi ciently decisive, so that one 
can wonder why such a careful “analysis” was even necessary): an un-
described “little tuft” of “most unusual” hair found on the scene of the 
crime is deemed “no human hair” (263), the “deep indentations” found 
on the throat of Mademoiselle L’Espanaye,19 in turn, form “the mark of 
no human hand” (263).
But there is another “clew,” subtler still, that had led here. Let me 
return to an earlier stage of the investigation, already alluded to. Neigh-
bors and passersby, when questioned by the police, had all concurred 
that as they had ascended the stairs to the apartment, they had heard 
terrible female shrieks, followed by a brief exchange between two 
voices, but in each case the person questioned was certain that the fi rst 
voice, male and gruff, spoke in French, while ascribing to the other 
voice, more shrill or more harsh, uncertain gender and indistinguishable 
words pronounced in a foreign language. Thus, an Italian witness thinks 
the second voice was that of a Russian, a Spaniard judges it to be that 
of an Englishman, the English witness is sure that the shrill voice was 
that of a German, and two French witnesses ascribe it respectively to a 
Spaniard and an Italian, while a Dutchman is sure the voice was that 
of a Frenchman, remarking that the words, impossible to distinguish, 
were “loud and quick— unequal.” Of all the adjectives used to describe 
the voice, shrill, harsh, strange, unusual, uneven, it is this “unequal” 
that Dupin will recall a few pages later as he builds the chain of de-
ductions that will ultimately lead to the orangutan. Incidentally Dupin 
will say that two witnesses used the words “quick and unequal” (the 
last word italicized in the original) when in fact only one had used the 
word. A second witness had said that the voice had spoken “quick and 
unevenly”— it is presumably this “unevenly” which Dupin apparently 
considers to be synonymous with unequal. And why not, after all? It 
remains that in rereading this story so exacting in its accounting of all 
facts pertaining to the case, one’s attention catches on this unnecessary 
doubling and italicization of “unequal,” with which Dupin proceeds, it 
turns out, to do nothing. There are arguably several threads that are not 
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quite followed up in Dupin’s demonstration, but simply woven together 
more and more tightly till somehow the animal is ensnared in them as 
in a net. Even so, a few pages further on, the word “unequal” recurs as 
Dupin recapitulates his observations: “My immediate purpose is to lead 
you to place in juxtaposition, that very unusual activity of which I have 
just spoken, with that very peculiar shrill (or harsh) and unequal voice, 
upon whose nationality no two persons could be found to agree, and 
in whose utterance no syllabifi cation could be detected” (260). Hearing 
this, the narrator says: “At these words a vague and half- formed con-
ception of the meaning of Dupin fl itted over my mind. I seemed to be 
upon the verge of comprehension, without power to comprehend— as 
men, at times, fi nd themselves upon the brink of remembrance, without 
being able, in the end, to remember” (260– 61).
In the frisson, the unheimliche of this moment, the story itself seems 
to be poised on the verge of comprehension, on the brink of remem-
brance. On the brink of recognition, almost, of the animal that it will 
only be able to cognize a few pages later when, after lining up several 
other elements that will retroactively support his thesis, Dupin sup-
plies, by means of an excerpt from Georges Cuvier’s Le règne animal 
(1817; The Animal Kingdom), the textual portrait of the murderer as 
“the large fulvous Ourang- Outang of the East Indian islands,” of “gi-
gantic stature,” “prodigious strength,” and “imitative propensities.” To 
remain with this moment, though, where the place of the murderer has 
been strained of human properties but has not yet received the name 
of animal, it is the word “unequal” that seems to suture the impossible 
remembrance, this word “unequal” itself already in excess of itself. For 
if it is a word actually pronounced in the testimony of a witness to qual-
ify the second voice he had heard, something like unequal from within, 
because the words pronounced by it were not in themselves or among 
themselves distinguishable, in Dupin’s use of it apposed to what follows, 
it seems to equally describe the fact that no two testimonies agreed on 
its nationality or language, so that that in this clashing of irreconcilable 
languages this voice was in effect unequal from without. But what does 
the word “unequal” even mean, when there is no other term to which 
the thing it describes is being compared? When used to describe a sin-
gle entity, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word could 
mean, starting from the sixteenth century, unfair, uneven, as in undulat-
ing, or insuffi cient, inadequate, as in to a task, but also, starting in the 
eighteenth century, excessive, disproportionate, as in an “unequal task” 
or an “unequal weight.” A strange word, then— a strange unequal word. 
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But its emphasis in Poe’s story must lead me to wonder whether by a 
kind of dislocation the adjective is not being summoned to describe not 
so much the animal’s voice, as the animal as unequal to itself, as an un-
equal place in the text, as if marking the very seams of the text, a place 
where the text itself is somehow, unequal.
The Cuvier passage, read by the narrator but not quoted in the text, 
is the only “glimpse” we are allowed of the “large fulvous Ourang- 
Outang” in Poe’s story, which ends with the confession of its “master,” a 
Maltese sailor who, having captured the animal in Borneo during one of 
his voyages, had been keeping it “carefully secluded” in his house, till it 
recovered from a wound in its foot and he could sell it. It was during this 
time that, unbeknownst to the sailor, the animal had observed him shav-
ing “through the keyhole of the closet,” which, given the “imitative pro-
pensities” of orangutans, would lead directly, on the day it escaped, to its 
brutal use of the razor in the L’Espinaye apartment, which he (the sailor) 
himself would witness while standing outside the window (whereupon 
he would exclaim in horror, and the animal would respond in confusion, 
these supposedly being the two voices heard by passersby) (268– 70). 
Some time after the murders, the orangutan is found by its master, “who 
obtain[s] for it a very large sum at the Jardin des Plantes” (the Paris zoo).
The movement that takes the orangutan from being “at large” (264), 
as it is for some days following the murders, to being recaptured and 
sold for “a very large sum” (270) is that of an inequality converted 
into a “passing.” And if the fi rst “passing” is that which by means of 
“ingress” and “egress” saw it momentarily and disastrously enter the 
Paris apartment, constituting a crime, this movement forms, in a sense, 
only the shadowy “return” of a second, the real, “passing,” whose in-
tention (it was only a matter of time) preceded the crime, that is, the 
transaction by which the orangutan, from the forests of Borneo, is en-
tered, as it were, on the French market. This movement, of course, is the 
economic, the irony of whose derivation from oikos, or house, will not 
be missed here. If the crime forms the shadow of the economic passing, 
it is because if, on one side of the transaction we now have an animal 
conferred a name and (exchange) value in exchange for bodily freedom 
and natural habitat (become, at the Jardin des Plantes, no more than a 
“plaything for children, just as empty and robbed of its properties” as 
Aesop’s raven [Keenan, Fables, 65]), on the other side stands a nameless 
body, unrestrained, unscripted in its movements, unaccountable in its 
actions. Indeed, the serial path of the “no”s had carved out a place for 
the orangutan that was at most the unnameable, hollowed out, outside 
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the human: “No words— no sounds resembling words,” “no human 
hair,” “no human hand” . . . The “imitative propensities” of the orang-
utan place it, at the same time (and this is where we must return to the 
twofold direction of the analyst’s skill both outside and inside the box, 
a tension in the story not entirely reconciled), at a difference of degree 
from the human. If in imitating the human it is symbolically less than 
it, and can thus be sold on the market for a price,20 in its “superhuman 
strength,” its “almost praeternatural character,” it is physically more 
than human. Or, to put it in tighter spatial terms, if in imitating the hu-
man it is inside it,21 in exceeding it (“excessively outré”) it is continually 
outside it. It should not come as a surprise, given the insistence of such 
a chiasmus, that the shadow scene in which the crime is committed is 
both a time lag in which the rules of accountability (economics, or the 
theory of the subject) are faced with (and must fail before) their own 
struck- through prehistory (for the criminal is a pre- economic, not to say 
an- economic, even antieconomic being, its “value,” as yet unestimated, 
is none or infi nite— unequal), and a space that folds in/out to connect 
both the inside to an outside (revealing suddenly a path linking the 
Paris apartment to the forests of Borneo) and, conversely, an outside 
to an inside (revealing, as if within the human, the “recesses of thought 
altogether inaccessible,” where an altogether unaccountable “Orang- 
Outang”— in Malay, the word means “man of the forest”— persists in 
its “wild ferocity”). No doubt it is because the animal in Poe’s story is 
so inextricably entangled with this very fold, indeed, because it is this 
very fold, that Dupin must, in his preface to his demonstration, call 
for a fl exibility, a folding out, of perception itself to recover sight of it: 
“To look at a star by glances— to view it in a side- long way, by turning 
toward it the exterior portions of the retina (more susceptible of feeble 
impressions of light than the interior), is to behold the star distinctly— is 
to have the best appreciation of its lustre— a lustre which grows dim 
just in proportion as we turn our vision fully upon it. [ . . . ] By undue 
profundity we perplex and enfeeble thought; and it is possible to make 
even Venus herself vanish from the fi rmament by a scrutiny too sus-
tained, too concentrated, or too direct” (252– 53).
What Song the Sirens Sang
“The Murders in the Rue Morgue” carries as epigraph a quote from 
Thomas Browne: “What song the Sirens sang, or what name Achilles 
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assumed when he hid himself among women, although puzzling ques-
tions, are not beyond all conjecture” (238). The second of the “puzzling 
questions” refers to the episode related in post- Homeric texts wherein 
Achilles’s mother Thetis, learning that her son would be killed if he went 
to war with Troy, had him sent to the island of Scyros, where the king 
Lycomedes hid him among his daughters in maidens’ clothes. Achilles is 
discovered through the cunning of Ulysses, who, after placing a shield 
and spear among maidens’ gifts in the king’s courtyard, simulates an en-
emy approach. Believing it, Achilles tears off his female clothing (chape- 
chute), picks up said shield and spear, and is thus identifi ed and enlisted. 
While Statius’s Achilleid does indicate that the name by which he was 
called by his “sisters” during this time was Pyrrha (from pyrrhon— 
“fl ame colored”!), this is perhaps a fi ner point. More likely pertinent 
to Poe’s purposes in this intertext is the motif of mistaken or concealed 
identity, subsequently unmasked (and, in this light, pyrrhon as con-
cealed “clew” is interesting, as it happens, describing aptly the color of 
orangutans). Following this logic, we might say that the trap laid for 
Achilles, whose hiding in Scyros is, to borrow Keenan’s words on the 
raven, a “wandering away from [his] name” (62), provides a model for 
the ruse (an advertisement in a newspaper regarding a found orang-
utan) by which Dupin lures the Maltese sailor to his doorstep, where-
upon, having committed this slip, the latter is forced into a confession, 
and identity as accountability (if split, complicated) can be ascribed. We 
fi nd here the expected “fold”: the trick involves presenting as found an 
orangutan which is lost (“at large”). This un- equality conceals another: 
for, given the essentially deductive logic that has brought Dupin to this 
point, his wager here is in presenting as real an orangutan that is as 
yet only a shadowy entity, a “side- long,” “outré” solution to a problem 
which, otherwise, would be intractable (“hermetically sealed”). Success 
in duping the sailor is therefore crucial to the enterprise, and the un-
settlingly Derridean overtones to Dupin’s certainty as he awaits “the 
man”— “It is true that he may not arrive; but the probability is that he 
will” (255)— confi rm that the success of the call is premised necessar-
ily on the possibility, inscribed within it, as its forked condition, that 
it will fail, that the orangutan will remain unfound, unreal, its fl ame- 
colored body so perfectly concealed “among recesses of thought”— and 
of diegetic reality— and so “altogether inaccessible” (239) as to be their 
vanishing point. That is to say: it cannot be found because it was never 
lost, there was never anything in the place from which something is 
now lost, nothing in the fi rst place,22 it is, then, something like an orang-
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utan of undecidability, and in never completely arriving in/to the text, 
it must ruin the text’s “count” of its bodies (que le pasteur ne puisse 
plus compter ses moutons). This orangutan, with no “prior reality” (to 
use Blanchot’s term, see further) can return to representation only as 
“struck- through,” under erasure, “undying,” as what “has faded, with-
out ever having been present,” as per a supplemental fate which, as 
Akira Lippit has lucidly shown, has been shared, in a certain history of 
Western thought (Heidegger, Breuer, Freud, Bergson, Derrida), by the 
animal and the unconscious.23
But the fi rst of the “puzzling questions”— “What song the Sirens 
sang . . .”— leads us into waters more muddied yet.24 Recalling another, 
all too well- known instance of Odyssean cunning— by which the hero, 
strapped to the mast of his sail, while his crewmembers rowed with 
wax in their ears, had succeeded in resisting the Sirens’ fatal call— the 
allusion connects Poe’s story to what is a darker place in the Homeric 
text, if we remember that in the encounter with the Sirens, as with a 
series of “mythic monsters” through the journey, epic reason had to vie 
with “fi gure[s] of repetition” that were remnants of an archaic mythic 
world, and which presented so many “claims from prehistory.”25 The 
question (what song the Sirens sang), which Robert Graves had also 
used in his opening to White Goddess, is posed again by Maurice Blan-
chot in Le livre à venir, who writes: “Some have said that it was an 
inhuman song— a natural sound [  . . .  ] but on the borderline of na-
ture, at any rate foreign to man; almost inaudible, it evoked pleasur-
able dreams of an endless descent which, in normal circumstances, 
can never be realised. Others suggested that it had a more mysterious 
charm; that it simply imitated the song of a normal human being; but 
since the Sirens, even if they sang like human beings, were only beasts 
(very beautiful beasts, admittedly, and possessing feminine charm), 
their song was so unearthly that it forced those who heard it to realise 
the inhumanness of all human singing.”26 Ulysses’s perfi dious encoun-
ter with the Sirens (“He took no risks but admired the Sirens with 
[ . . . ] cowardly, unemotional, calculated satisfaction”), exemplifying 
“the disturbing deafness of he who is deaf because he hears,” is no alle-
gory for Blanchot. The encounter inscribes, rather, the “hidden law” of 
every récit (60, 62): “Every narration secretly resists the encounter with 
the Sirens,” and “for such resistance Ulysses’ caution [ . . . ] is always 
exploited and improved upon” (61). The “hidden law” is summarized 
as follows:
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Narration is movement towards a point which is not only 
unknown, ignored and strange but such that it seems to have 
no prior reality apart from this movement, yet it is so com-
pulsive that the narration’s appeal depends on it to the extent 
that it cannot even “begin” before it has reached it, while it 
is only the narration and the unpredictable movement of the 
narration which provide the space where this point becomes 
real, powerful and appealing [attirant]. (62)
The fascination and peril Blanchot describes is one that is perceptible in 
Poe’s story, wherein the detective, to arrive at the truth of the tale, must 
in effect repeat a trajectory (that of the imagined intruder) of which 
there can be no representation prior to this repeating, and must yet 
make it through to the other side, by turning this repetition, power-
ful and alluring, into knowledge. If this reiterative structure makes the 
story a lucid precursor to (and revelator of that of) all detective fi ction— 
where detective and murderer classically mirror each other— the casting 
in it of an animal as the mirrored/mirroring other reveals (and perhaps 
alone could reveal) the more obscure, or most extreme, stakes of what 
Dupin’s journey— not to say “every narration”— inherits from Ulysses’s. 
For if in both cases the “irresistible pull” of the Sirens’ song must be 
opposed, it is because the self- identity of the human subject is assured 
by, is, indeed, conditioned upon that “disturbing deafness” toward what 
in an inhuman song could imply “the inhumanness of all human sing-
ing.” The choice that must be made is, in Blanchot’s terms, between the 
respective fates of Ulysses and Ahab in Moby- Dick:
It cannot be denied that Ulysses half- heard that which Ahab 
saw. But where he was able to resist what he heard Ahab 
was overcome by his vision. In other words, the fi rst rejected 
the metamorphosis into which the other vanished. After the 
test Ulysses is still what he was and the world, if less rich, is 
fi rmer and safer than before. But Ahab will never be himself 
again and, for Melville, the world threatens to collapse into 
that worldless space which draws him with the lure of a sin-
gle image. (64)
In forgoing “the lure of a single image,” and in offering, in its place, the 
passage from Cuvier, Poe inverts the Sirens’ inhuman song into natural-
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ist knowledge of the inhuman, received by the narrator as “suffi ciently 
well known to all.” The untranscribed intertext serves in fact to “seal” 
the story, substituting itself for the animal body at the precise place 
where, reconstructed from its parts, it was closest to view, and thus 
closest to being become. The danger averted by Ulysses was nothing less 
than that of “metamorphosis,” suggests Blanchot (“the fi rst rejected the 
metamorphosis into which the other vanished”), therein anticipating 
the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, for whom Moby- Dick 
was, undeniably, the story of a becoming- animal.27
What song did the Sirens sing? Kafka, writer of animal stories if 
there was one, had read the Homeric episode differently, assuming that 
Ulysses too, like his sailors, had stuffed wax in his ears. Of course, he 
wrote, “it was known to all the world that such things were of no help 
whatsoever. The song of the Sirens could pierce through everything, and 
the longing of those they seduced would have broken far stronger bonds 
than chains and masts.”28 Yet, while Ulysses “trusted absolutely to his 
handful of wax and his fathom of chain,” the Sirens themselves, when he 
approached, “did not sing, whether they thought that this enemy could 
be vanquished only by their silence, or because the look of bliss on the 
face of Ulysses, who was thinking of nothing but his wax and his chains, 
made them forget their singing” (431). Kafka offered two successive hy-
potheses. The fi rst: “Ulysses, if one may so express it, did not hear their 
silence; he thought they were singing and that he alone did not hear 
them” (431). And the second: “Perhaps he had really noticed, although 
here the human understanding is beyond its depths, that the Sirens were 
silent, and held up to them and to the gods the aforementioned pretense 
merely as a sort of shield” (432). Which hypothesis are we to believe? 
Was Ulysses’s “disturbing deafness” more disturbing for hearing the song 
while refusing its risks (Blanchot), in thinking that he alone didn’t hear 
the song when in fact in his forced deafness he heard its true silence 
(Kafka’s fi rst hypothesis), or in pretending he had silenced it when in fact 
it was truly silent (Kafka’s second hypothesis)? “Now the Sirens have 
a still more fatal weapon then their song,” wrote Kafka, “namely their 
silence. And though admittedly such a thing has never happened, still it 
is conceivable that someone might possibly have escaped from their sing-
ing; but from their silence certainly never. Against the feeling of having 
triumphed over them by one’s own strength, and the consequent exalta-
tion that bears down everything before it, no earthly powers can resist” 
(431). Pitting the “fatal weapon” of the Sirens’ silence against the equally 
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irresistible human “feeling of having triumphed over them” forces Kafka 
into a further folding of the fold (not hearing their singing > not hearing 
their silence > pretending the silence heard was the singing not heard), 
and into devising an escape clause whereby Ulysses, hearing the Sirens’ 
silence, only pretends to believe they are singing. Can there be a more 
devastating commentary on the relationship between logos and the in-
human other than this erasure of silence? And then there is the troubling 
question of the address of the pretense: for in holding up the shield of his 
pretense to the Sirens and to the gods, Ulysses successfully held it up to 
Homer too, that is to say, there is no place within the narration (save in 
the vanishing point of the conscience of the pretender— “here the human 
understanding is beyond its depths”) where such a pretense could be 
recognized as pretense. And so, though the Sirens were silent, we must 
remember them forever to have been singing.
Without the Animal
Through Kafka the problem is reversed, or becomes reversible: whether 
we impute silence to the animal or song, whether we represent it as lost 
or found, the risk is always that of an unequality,29 that fold, itself so 
inextricably embedded within representation as to form its impercep-
tible inner lining. Approaching Moby- Dick as but a variation on The 
Odyssey, Blanchot had described in vivid terms a cosmic agon between 
human protagonist and inhuman other, each vying for the very world. 
Their impossible coexistence in one space is precisely, writes Blanchot, 
literature’s “secret desire”:
The drama enacted between Ahab and the whale, which 
might loosely be termed metaphysical, is similar to that 
between Ulysses and the Sirens. Each protagonist seeks to 
encompass everything, to be the whole world, so that their 
coexistence is impossible, while at the same time their one 
desire is for coexistence and encounter. It is precisely the se-
cret desire to confi ne into a single space Ahab and the whale, 
the Sirens and Ulysses that turns Ulysses into Homer and 
Ahab into Melville and makes the world which results from 
this juxtaposition the greatest, most terrible and wonderful 
of worlds— alas a novel, only a novel! (63)
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Which should, surely, bring us back to Sans l’orang-outan. If La Fon-
taine’s fable had the animal standing outside the door, and then, in its 
dismemberment, at the gates of the village, if Poe’s story had it, by in-
gress and egress, cross the boundaries of the house, and then the bound-
ary separating forest from market, the particular conceit (or deceit) 
of Chevillard’s novel is in imagining the animal as a body crossing or 
“passing” an altogether more radical threshold, beyond which it van-
ishes exhaustibly from the “real.” It should perhaps not surprise us to 
fi nd in such a “fable,” like in the other two, an imaginatively recounted 
update from the historical human/animal “front”: just as wolves were 
real threats to livestock in the seventeenth century, and the orangutan 
was in Poe’s time a plausible example of the sort of exotic animal being 
increasingly “translated” (as per the French term used for such displace-
ments) from “exotic” habitats in Africa and Asia into zoos and collec-
tions in European metropoles, Chevillard’s novel indexes a time when, 
due to deforestation and continued poaching, the Sumatran species of 
the orangutan is estimated to be critically endangered and the Bornean 
species endangered, so that, to a purely logical eye, extinction can seem, 
as Chevillard both irreverentially and fi ercely suggests in precipitating 
it, a mere matter of time.30
The obsession of Sans l’orang-outan is in fact, from the outset, 
the (fearful) nonsymmetry between presence and absence laid bare 
by the event of extinction: “There are no more orangutans anywhere 
[nulle part], that is everywhere [partout], in every point of space it is 
no more” (35). To equate here nulle part (nowhere) and partout (ev-
erywhere), exact lexical opposites, is to acknowledge an outer limit 
where the symbolic must answer for itself (and, in so doing, collapse 
back on itself). If orangutans certainly did not occupy, while alive, 
every point in space, at present they are absent from every place and at 
every instant (31). Indeed, in drawing relative presence into absolute 
absence, the orangutan’s vanishing exerts phenomenological pressure 
on the inverse categories by a “passing” that makes perceptible, as if 
retroactively, on the other side, in its now total negation, corresponding 
to nothing that could ever have existed, a (struck- through) form of total 
presence. A kind of reverse- mirror logic inserts the orangutan every-
where that it is not. Reversing the direction of the movement by which 
fables, in Keenan’s thesis, carry nameless bodies toward location and 
accountability, this fable recounts the production of the perfect bodyless 
name— that is, the orangutan as ghost. Having perfectly crossed over to 
the other side, the orangutan can now occupy the novel’s pages in unfet-
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tered unequality. Through a radical unaccountability that is at the same 
time a dissolving of all bounds to its agency, the orangutan turns out— 
and in this turning out is a return as well as a turning inside out— to 
have held the very world together, held the very human together, so that 
in its disappearance everything slides toward chaos and catastrophe: 
“Wherever [the orangutan] was, wherever it is no more, vertigo pulls at 
me, my legs buckle, all my bearing abandons me, I know only to fall [je 
ne sais plus que choir]” (46).31
What I have been calling the “reeling” in Sans l’orang- outan takes 
many forms, like so many variations on a theme, so that the detail of it 
is of less interest than certain structures— as I have suggested, germane 
to Chevillard’s prose— that it makes apparent. One, already noted, is the 
crisis of measure, or of measurement, and particularly vertical extent, 
which the outstretched body and long forelimbs of the orangutan had 
long assured:
Don’t we already feel the difference, and that gravity, for 
instance, no longer weighs down only ripe apples? As if the 
orangutan— I cry pronouncing his name— held us stand-
ing by the hair from his branch. He pulled us upward. He 
opened the sky for us, made the clouds part, brought the 
moon closer. The orangutan carved a path for us among the 
stars. A clear path for our rockets, for our prayers. The trap-
door has closed again. The ceiling is collapsing. (22)
Sealing the pact between earth and sky, the orangutan had also ensured 
the distance between humans themselves, so that in its absence lands 
and homes collide, and humans fall together and merge in dangerous 
resemblance and aberrant intimacy. Its ability to climb and to grasp had 
served as prosthetic extension of human capacities, so that its aban-
donment of the world precipitates a collapse of phenomenological and 
moral meaning, a withering of the distance of prehension and compre-
hension, a shriveling up of the human reduced to foraging upon a newly 
hostile, arid earth: “Our arms no longer grasp anything. Our bodies 
are lost” (11); “we are amputated of several limbs” (16). The principle 
through all this seems to be, in part, that the difference organizing hu-
man life had been premised on the identity of the orangutan to itself: 
“Orangutan he was without measure, without remainder nor reserve, 
without shame nor scruple, headily, with provocation, some would say, 
orangutan without competition, it was useless to line up, defeat was cer-
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tain, the orangutan prevailed effortlessly over all suitors, in his category, 
he feared no one” (24, my emphasis). The string of “sans” (“without”) 
declines the in- difference of the orangutan in its unqualifi ed (or unquan-
tifi ed) coincidence with itself. This is a portrait of an equal animal, then, 
though the trick is that the price of such equality is its absence. What it 
had stood as guarantor of, retroactively, was the unequal self- identity 
of the human: “Without the orangutan, I am but the shadow of myself” 
(153).
Asked in a 2004 interview what place he gave to the animal, Chevil-
lard replied:
The animal is for me a reference point, a fi xed point in a 
moving landscape. One can always refer to it to know what 
life is foremost about, what it is before we build our fabulous 
career plans. Man adapts infi nitely [ . . . ] while the animal 
executes the program of the species to which it belongs. That 
is its force and its limit. Sometimes we fi nd ourselves envy-
ing this strength and even this limit of whose debt we are 
not entirely clear, far from it, of course. The animal reminds 
us of it. Man’s evolution, this perpetual revolution rather, is 
less frightening and dizzying because he has the faithful and 
stable animal at his side (sometimes even on his shoulder).32
Yet such a view (closing on a likely reference to portraits of the type 
writer with cat— one thinks of Borges and of Perec) is too stable to 
account for how Chevillard in fact treats his animals— witness the ever- 
morphing Palafox, the hedgehog of Du hérisson,33 or the orangutan at 
hand. In this sense, perhaps, he was being asked the wrong question on 
this occasion (whether he believed more in involution than in evolution, 
less in the human than in the animal). Earlier in the same interview, 
refl ecting on the proteiform character of Crab in La Nébuleuse du Crab 
(The Crab Nebula) and Un fantôme, Chevillard advanced notions that 
might well have more bearing on the orangutan: “Crab was for a long 
while for me that personal pronoun that the writer is missing, between 
the ‘I’ [le ‘je’] and the ‘he.’ Michaux says that the I [le moi] is an equilib-
rium position [position d’équilibre]. Crab embodies all the oscillations 
and vacillations of this I [moi] suddenly out of balance. Every whim 
that passes through him effectively transforms him: he becomes liquid 
if the slope favors it” (181; my translation). Henri Michaux, whose in-
fl uence on Chevillard’s oeuvre is undeniably profound,34 had written in 
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his postface to Plume: “I [MOI] makes do with anything. A fl exion in 
a sentence, is that another I (moi) attempting to emerge?”35 In a later 
interview Chevillard would offer an uncannily similar description of his 
own creatures: “They are the subjects of my sentences but the infl ection 
of the sentence modifi es their being and they can no longer resemble 
themselves at all by the time it ends. A sentence is a whole adventure 
and because they are its subject, they are inevitably transformed by this 
adventure that constitutes their only experience in this world. For them 
there is no outside the book. These characters are phenomena of writ-
ing, appearing in language, they live and die according to its laws.”36 
Calling them “literary ectoplasma,” he goes on to clarify: “They are 
not persons. They do not exist as neighbors. They are empty, ductile 
forms, polymorphous fi gures.” He would also return in this interview 
to the idea of unusual pronouns: “My characters, Crab or Palafox, for 
instance, are rather incongruous rhetorical fi gures or new personal pro-
nouns that parasite language and indeed take advantage of its extraor-
dinary resources, of its terrible effi cacy, to develop following their own 
law” (97– 98).
I must wonder here whether Sans l’orang-outan, which appeared 
shortly after this interview was published, was not a virtuoso culmi-
nation of just these principles. For was a narrative of extinction not 
precisely the means, the necessary fable, by which to ensure that “orang- 
outan” was no longer a location that could be occupied by any real “third 
person,” let alone by a “fi rst person,” and to confer upon it, rather, the 
charge and impropriety of one of those “new personal pronouns that 
parasite language,” “between the ‘I’ and the ‘he’”? This indeed would 
account for the reeling (as language and reference scramble to organize 
themselves vis- à- vis this incongruous entity), and also for the disquiet-
ing effects of the inversion, in Chevillard’s prose, by which the animal, 
far from being pure body or fl eshly real, becomes, on the contrary, pure 
textuality. Which makes for a radical reading indeed of Keenan’s thesis 
regarding fables’ way of illustrating the “generation of the pure name,” 
a fate that places the orangutan in the same shadowy realm as the Mau-
ritian dodo, “as forgotten as orang and outan, orang dash outan, also 
written outang with a g, optionally, whereas one doesn’t joke with the g 
at the end of orang, it’s Malay, more or less Malay, literally man of the 
forest, orang- outan or orang- outang” (53– 54).
It goes without saying that the fable is not just a fable but an in-
scription of the ecological costs of a modern history of the human, a 
stretching of the exactions of a certain “exotic” logic to their furthest 
82 ❘ Chapter 2
brink. In fact the way had been prepared by an earlier novel, Oreille 
rouge (2005; Red Ears), whose protagonist, sojourning in Mali, had 
been disappointed not to ever see any hippopotamuses. Escorted by his 
guide and self- appointed hippopotamus expert Toka on the animals’ 
trail, he was instead repeatedly treated to expert speculations on why 
they were no longer there, and on their grazing and reproductive hab-
its.37 The verbose knowledge he is provided on these occasions reveals 
itself, toward the end of his stay in Mali, to be information extracted 
from an encyclopedia. Had Toka himself ever seen a hippopotamus? 
Had anyone ever seen one? Oreille rouge returns to Paris shrilly and 
unscrupulously proclaiming he has. Where he does see them, ultimately, 
is at the local zoo. Therein is exposed the logic of the captive animal, 
perhaps not so different from that of language. As Walter Putnam puts 
it in an essay on the long history of displacement of exotic animals to 
Western metropoles (infelicitously titled “Can the Subaltern Growl?”), 
“The authenticity of the captured animal is, of course, guaranteed by 
the idea of other specimens ‘born free’ and leading wilderness existences 
that we could actually view given suffi cient time and resources.”38 The 
“return movement” Putnam describes, “a form of inverted colonial 
penetration” (124– 25) by which animals were turned into “mimetic 
capital” and a “surplus of meaning for the cultures that exhibited and 
observed them” (140– 41), tells the story both of a gaze and of a conver-
sion from wild, unaccountable animal body to sign. The provocation of 
Sans l’orang- outan is, in such a perspective, in imagining what would 
happen if there were no longer any “specimens ‘born free’ and leading 
wilderness existences” and if, once the last “captured animal[s]” had 
perished, the “surplus of meaning” were all that remained. The novel is 
this surplus of meaning. To this extent, its connection with the animal is 
that of a mischievous (and dangerous) remove, that of a representation 
which has cleaved itself free of the burden of its referent. No doubt 
the sans of the title Sans l’orang- outan should be read in this maximal 
capacity, and every inscription therein of the word “orang- outan” as a 
spectral fl oating of a name without an animal: “For our grandchildren 
the orangutan will be a specter, born of legend and drivel, yet they too 
will suffer from this absence but not knowing what to link it to, what 
its abolished object is, they will experience a permanent dissatisfaction, 
an inexplicable malaise that nothing deriving from man will appease, 
they will err without understanding in those zones of turbulence where 
the orangutan stood erect leaning on its fi sts, while they themselves lose 
footing, while their bodies fl ounder” (38).
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We are left, then, with something like a wolf in orangutan’s cloth-
ing, an animal of undecidability which, released from the regulatory 
constraints of the economy of presence, of the need for a referent, can, 
as extreme animot, occupy every possible place: it is god of all things 
and source of all misfortune, interstitial pronoun and theme of end-
less variations, available for exercises of all sorts: from a gymnastics 
on the level of narrative and sentence to the contortionist exercises in 
becoming- orangutan to which humans are seen subjecting themselves in 
the last section of the novel, under the emotional/cynical guidance of the 
unconsoled narrator. If wild animals “born free” in their faraway native 
habitats were long the alibi (which derives, we recall, from the locative 
case of the Latin alius, thereby signifying “elsewhere”) lending mimetic 
credentials and referential direction to exotic animals captive and relo-
cated in the metropoles (including through circulating representations 
thereof— toys, images, stories, words), the extinction of the orangutan, 
when read through the etymology of its name (“man of the forest”) 
that Chevillard recalls in passing, becomes that of an über- alibi. For 
was this sylvan man not the “born free” specimen which, from the be-
ginning (“depuis le temps”), assured the possibility of (deferred) mean-
ing to the existence of his deforested counterparts? If we follow such a 
hypothesis, the orangutan emerges as the very embodiment/disembod-
iment of something like an originary supplementarity, or what David 
Wills would call an originary “prostheticity,”39 founding the human. 
Chevillard will give this the name prehistory,40 and Sans l’orang-outan 
features a number of passages which “remember” human’s originary 
orangutan- ness, a remembering that is turned both toward the past and 
toward a possible future or a place outside of time itself (as per the sup-
plementarity of the logic of pre- history, as insistence that history cannot 
fully account for itself, that its fi eld cannot be closed): “We have lost 
all sense of balance today. We teeter dangerously. We no longer adhere. 
Every surface pushes us away or absorbs us. We used to be fl exible, 
bendy, undulating like our refl ections in water. We had pockets full of 
elastic. We intervened wherever there was a threat of boredom or paral-
ysis, as soon as the wind fell, as soon as narrative stilled itself in its form, 
as soon as the cadaver went still, we would appear” (154– 55). The “we” 
in these instances is a kind of composite human- as- orangutan fi rst per-
son, which attempts to straddle the abyss: “Yes, all that we thought we 
grasped slips away: it called for the four hands of the orangutan” (60). 
This location, in the absurd last section of the novel, where humans 
train to be orangutans, is seen to be a fatal one. Continually failing to 
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live like orangutans, the trainees succeed at most in dying the deaths 
of orangutans: “Balmer was the fi rst to perish like we will all perish, I 
hope, as a true orangutan” (169).
In such human deaths works the hoped- for reversal of a switch— 
Wills, commenting on Heidegger’s thinking on the human, writes of a 
“destining switch at the origin, a sending that is a diverting, a natural 
that as it were precludes the human, or an inventing that as it were pre-
cludes the natural” (Dorsality, 33)— that the narrator of Sans l’orang-
outan deems responsible for the death of the last orangutans:
There was an error. There was a mistake, it is clear. That 
crater had opened up to swallow us, and to rid the world 
of the threat posed by our death drive. [ . . . ] But a mistake 
was made by the universal forces blinded by their wrath and 
deceived by the resemblance between man and orangutan 
and which drove the latter into the abyss, the naive and 
urbane orangutan, that inoffensive sleeping and fruit- eating 
primate very exceptionally capable of brutality towards the 
termite. (52)
Orangutans, in this view, died mistaken for and in the place of humans. 
But the fi rst possible misrecognition, preceding and unnoticed under 
cover of this switch in death, was a switch in life. In its furthest wager, 
the novel suggests that the forces of natural selection and history, de-
ceived by the human/orangutan resemblance, had privileged humans 
in an arguable case of mis- address: “The orangutan was, much more 
than we, the man of the situation. [  . . .  ] But the orangutan needed 
to disappear for our millennial imposture to be exposed, which rested, 
granted, on a mistake that we did not consciously seek nor want, the 
great red ape [ . . . ] consented to our domination even while he could 
grind our skulls in his fi st like a nut, or, more gently but fi rmly, put 
us back in our place among the creatures of our order. He withdrew 
to his forests, vaguely disgusted, far from our agitations” (172– 73). 
Chevillard’s orangutan at its fullest subverting force— as animal of un-
decidability— is best summed up in this torsion, by which the possibility 
of a mis- taking, a misprision, an originary “diverting,” creeps into the 
human’s claim to its own location. The human is human only via this 
“millennial imposture,” having managed to “profi t as a parasite from 
existing structures,” to use the phrase with which Chevillard had once 
described Palafox’s occupation of the real, and of narrative itself (Pala-
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fox, 25). In Sans l’orang-outan it is the “existing structures” of nature 
and history themselves that are suggested to have been available for 
parasiting— and this, in turn, to be the work of all fi ction, starting with 
history itself as fi ction.41 Inextricably exorbitant to itself, the human 
needed the orangutan in order to better resemble itself, to better defend 
its own place: “Two hands will never be enough to defend a man. With 
four, we would alas not have a greater chance of survival, as we have 
seen. I suppose we would need a dozen hands” (87). The orangutan as 
supplementarity is itself a logic of endless mise en abyme and deferral, 
as if being human depending on being more orangutan than the orang-
utan. Dis- placed by the human (“He withdrew to his forests, vaguely 
disgusted”— note that in this reversal that produces “the man of the 
forest,” the forest does not precede the human but is produced by it, 
as what it invents and exiles), the orangutan inhabits that “perfectly 
empty” “space of exception” that Agamben describes as “the articula-
tion between human and animal” (38):
Insofar as the production of man through the opposition 
man/animal, human/inhuman, is at stake here, the machine 
necessarily functions by means of an exclusion (which is also 
always already a capturing) and an inclusion (which is also 
always already an exclusion). Indeed, precisely because the 
human is already presupposed every time, the machine ac-
tually produces a kind of state of exception, a zone of inde-
terminacy in which the outside is nothing but the exclusion 
of an inside and the inside is in turn only the inclusion of an 
outside. (37)
We recognize in this account the description of the very fold that has ac-
companied this refl ection at every turn. The orangutan and the human 
together form, in Chevillard’s novel, a continually reversible chiasmus 
of inside/outside. If the chiasmus is disturbed by the extinction of one 
of its terms, its sheer structuring force is dramatized in the solution it as 
if irrepressibly devises: diegetic and symbolic “reality” accommodates 
animal vanishing with an “all the better to invent it with” confi dence 
(and here we fi nd in terms quite different from Escola’s reading our own 
trail leading from La Fontaine’s tricked wolves to the cunning villain of 
Perrault’s Le Petit Chaperon Rouge [Little Red Riding Hood])— seizing, 
in the fl ight of the animal from its name, the opportunity to lift all prin-
ciples of realism, fi xity, constraint, or accountability on the name now 
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unburdened of its animal. “The orangutan has passed to the other side 
and no sign from him any longer reaches us. Even the great male, even 
Bagus, fi lling with air like a bagpipe his hypertrophied goiter, called a 
laryngeal pouch, I note the word before we forget it, and cupping his 
hands around his mouth, his brown hands of smooth palms, of nimble 
fi ngers, does not succeed, from where he now is, in extending his cry to 
us” (31).
To conclude, what of the unequal voice that the witnesses, in Poe’s 
story, had heard on the night of the crime? That would have been, as 
revealed by the Maltese sailor who arrives to tell the tale, “the fi endish 
jabberings of the brute” as it had left the scene. But can an orangutan 
fi endishly jabber? Uncannily, a recent documentary fi lm by French di-
rector Nicolas Philibert about a forty- year- old (now more than forty- 
nine- year- old) orangutan at the Jardin des Plantes, seems to pick up 
exactly where the Poe story ended and provides the most poignant an-
swer to this question. Remember what Berger had remarked about the 
zoo: “The view is always wrong,” “like an image out of focus,” because 
“you are looking at something that has been rendered absolutely mar-
ginal; and all the concentration you can muster will never be enough 
to centralise it” (23– 24). Overlaying upon long takes of a silent listless 
caged animal the ceaseless chatter of zoo visitors as they speculate on its 
thoughts and demeanor, Philibert’s Nénette (2010) at one point features 
an offscreen zoo attendant who explains that the bulging throat pouch 
on the male orangutan (Nénette’s son Tübo, who was born at the Jardin 
des Plantes and has since died) is the appendage enabling it to emit a cry 
that can travel vast distances in the wild. But, he then clarifi es, the ani-
mal has no need to do that here. Indeed, for what and with whom and 
across what surviving distances would Tübo have thus communicated? 
The “laryngean pouch” (“I note the word before we forget it” [Sans 
l’orang-outan, 31]) is his alibi, by which he is seen to still possess the 
lost distance he never had to begin with. This discreetly devastating mo-
ment of Nénette (its punctum) leads me to wonder whether the “fi end-
ish jabberings” of Poe’s orangutan and the “cry” of Chevillard’s Bagus, 
exiled beyond the reach of sound, are not “unequal,” precisely, because 
they are points where animal distance has collapsed into text, irrecov-
erable anteriority captured as catachrestic irony. And whether these are 
not just other words to describe the “fabulous complication” through 
which the human story has, “depuis le temps,” simultaneously sought 
the animal and been unable to bear its existence.42 Man, Protagoras 
had once dared declare, is the measure of all things; Chevillard’s fable, 
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taking fabulist economics to their complicated end, reveals this “mea-
sure” to be riddled with supplementarities, unsettled (unequaled) by the 
continual ghostly “passing” of an orangutan across intimate thresholds 
of human meaning and being. And so perhaps I can locate here, for 
now, my answer to my question as to why the question of the animal 
must imply a slipperiness of the meter. (Perhaps, had the orangutan been 
able to jabber, it would have said something like La Fontaine’s “veteran 
mutton- eater”: Is this the way they change their metre? / And do they 
take me for a fool?)
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Chapter 3
Vague Dog
Marie NDiaye, with Beckett, Levinas, Deleuze, Leibniz
So as to be here no more at last,
To have never been here, but all this time above,
With a name like a dog to be called up with
And distinctive marks to be had up with . . . 
— Samuel Beckett, Texts for Nothing
I sing the dog of calamities, whether wandering alone in 
the circuitous ravines of immense cities, or having declared, 
batting clever eyes, to some abandoned man, “Take me with 
you, and perhaps our two miseries will add up to a kind of 
happiness.”
— Charles Baudelaire, Spleen de Paris, trans. Keith Waldrop
What Can You Explain to Dogs?
What would it mean to say that a story or journey, to arrive at comple-
tion (or that I, to enter again my house— the house of the I), may need 
to get past a (/the) dog? Unthinkable dangers beset homecoming. One 
may have traveled too far or too long— or not far or long enough— to 
make the return. In returning, one may be other than the one who left, 
the ghostly double of another who never left at all— or another who 
never existed at all. One may not look (or smell) the same, and die un-
recognized at one’s own gates. Thus Ulysses, having reached Ithaca after 
twenty long years of war and voyage, is almost torn to pieces by the 
fi erce hounds of his loyal servant, the swineherd Eumaeus, who must 
intervene “by shout[ing] at the dogs and sen[ding] them fl ying with a 
shower of stones.”1 Yet the specter of this gruesomely ironic death so 
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narrowly averted (“he would have come to grief then and there, at his 
own farm, if the swineherd had not intervened”) is incompletely ex-
orcised in the averting. The dogs may have been driven off, but some-
thing about their fury remains, recalling the Red Queen’s riddle in Lewis 
Carroll’s Through the Looking- Glass: “‘Take a bone from a dog: what 
remains?’” Answer: “‘The dog would lose its temper. [ . . . ] Then if the 
dog went away, its temper would remain!’”2 What can you explain to 
dogs? Hidden narrative reasons may not be able (or enough) to call 
them off. Remember how Acteon, cursed by the goddess Artemis to take 
the form of a stag, is thereupon devoured by his own beloved hunting 
dogs. The Iliad abounds with references to dogs feeding on bodies fallen 
in battle, preying at that place where the protections of identity are lost. 
And this can mean simply where recognition has lost confi dence.
Yet, by way of canine lessons, we are less likely to remember the 
unrecognizing hounds of book 14 of The Odyssey than the emblematic 
scene in book 17 where, on entering the premises of what used to be his 
home, Ulysses, still incognito in beggar’s clothes, is feebly greeted from 
a distance by an old, ailing dog.
Argus was his name. Odysseus himself had owned and trained 
him, though he had sailed for holy Ilium before he could reap 
the reward of his patience. In years gone by the young hunts-
men had often taken him out after wild goats, deer, and hares. 
But now, in his owner’s absence, he lay abandoned on the 
heaps of dung from the mules and cattle which lay in pro-
fusion at the gate, awaiting removal by Odysseus’ servants 
as manure for his great estate. There, full of vermin, lay Ar-
gus the hound. But directly he became aware of Odysseus’ 
presence, he wagged his tail and dropped his ears, though he 
lacked the strength now to come any nearer to his master.3
So moved is Ulysses by these signs of recognition from his loyal dog, 
that he sheds a discreet tear— remembered (and multiplied) in the title 
of Roger Grenier’s book on dogs, Les larmes d’Ulysse (on which more 
anon). Inquiring after the handsome hound (“He’s a beauty, though 
one cannot really tell whether his looks were matched by his pace, or 
whether he was just one of those dogs whom their masters feed at table 
and keep for show”— what mistrust! What could there remain to test? 
But after the compromising tear cunning must quickly reestablish its 
mastery  . . .), Ulysses receives confi rmation from Eumaeus of what a 
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prodigious hunting dog Argos used to be in times past and how ne-
glected since having lost his master. No matter that there is no trace of 
Argos in the epic text before this moment. In these memorable few lines 
of book 17 this feeble, faithful dog lives a whole lifetime, stretching 
far beyond dog years to reconnect past and present and to seal by his 
knowing gaze not only his master’s identity, but also the integrity of the 
epic— the assurance of self- sameness against the odds of vast distance 
and years. This crucial function accomplished, the sickly dog can expire 
peacefully (“As for Argus, he had no sooner set eyes on Odysseus after 
those nineteen years than he succumbed to the black hand of Death,” 
267).
There are reasons to prefer to Grenier’s lachrymose title its En-
glish translation (by Alice Kaplan)— The Diffi culty of Being a Dog. 
Argos was less a dog, arguably, than a principle (loyalty, recognition— 
anagnorisis), and perfectly equal to it. But then were the hounds of 
Eumaeus dogs any more than Argos? Did they too not stand expressly 
for certain narrative or thematic principles (nonrecognition, loss of im-
munity, hideous irony, prehistoric claims)?4 What does a dog see when 
it recognizes us? What does it see when it doesn’t recognize us? Or 
is it that for every dog there is another that is equal in strength and 
opposite in direction? What does this mean for humans? What does it 
mean for dogs? Is a dog ever “literally” a dog? How many dogs does it 
take to arrive at an axiomatic or paradigmatic truth about dogs? Can 
anything be a dog?5
Queer speculations, these. But it is into such a region of murky ver-
dicts that the dogs of Marie NDiaye will lead me in these pages. First 
there were the unambiguously anti- Argos threshold fi gures that opened 
En famille (1991; Among Family), an early novel where the protagonist, 
having arrived at her grandmother’s house, is dismayed to be met with 
ferocity by creatures that should have known her well:
When she arrived in front of her grandmother’s house at the 
end of the village, the two dogs she had so often petted in 
the past, now old and blind, summoned enough strength to 
throw themselves furiously at the gate. Every time she tried 
to poke her face between the bars, they barked with a vio-
lence she had never known in them before. She called them 
softly by name. They redoubled their fury. She put down her 
suitcase, hoisted herself onto a large rock at one end of the 
gate— out of reach of the dogs— then squeezed her chest be-
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tween two bars and shouted towards the house for someone 
to open for her. She was upset that the dogs had not recog-
nized her, seeing it as a sign of serious failure on her part. 
(7/9)6
Barring the protagonist’s entry to the family home, momentarily block-
ing her admittance to the space of the story if not of the symbolic itself, 
the dogs are the fi rst expressors of the central drama of Among Fam-
ily. The “serious failure on her part” nods to the logic of the tortuous 
story that will shortly unfold, wherein Fanny’s wretchedness at being 
ostracized by her family is made more abject (and illegible) still by the 
speculation that she herself is obscurely responsible for her fate. But 
then, there will be occasion, through what follows, to think about why, 
where there is a dog, there is often a disturbance of accountability, of 
person, an uncertainty of who/whom. Alice Kuzniar, in Melancholia’s 
Dog, suggests that melancholia may see itself in a dog precisely insofar 
as it casts as a riddle the question of whose melancholia it is.7 If the 
aggressive dogs of Among Family, here and later in the novel, seem to 
raise the question of whose house it is and of whose fault it is, a graver 
prospect, as I follow them beyond this novel, is that dogs’ unique capac-
ity, vis- à- vis a weakened protagonist or identity claim, is to unnerve the 
sense of whose story it is.
The grandmother’s dogs (at which Fanny “without thinking” throws 
a stone as she leaves, injuring “the gentler one in the eye” [25/21]) are 
not seen again, plausibly dying soon thereafter; but their function, in 
addition to supplying that opening note of ontological anxiety (“hadn’t 
she played with them throughout her childhood?” [10/10]),8 is to pre-
fi gure a subplot of canine discontent that will periodically act up at the 
protagonist’s expense. Oddly, repetition will only increase the uncer-
tainty as to whether the anger being directed at Fanny is that of partic-
ular dogs or that of the whole species. Gathering like knots in the novel, 
they are the places of a blind fury, an allergic objection to her presence 
(though whether it is to her appearance— which the novel marks as 
different while suppressing the marks of its difference— or to her dis-
avowal of this appearance is importantly indeterminable). The diffi culty 
in locating the hostility (the dogs’ or the world’s? individuals’ or the 
species’?) is most vividly attested in the case of a “huge, yellow dog” 
which, taking up its post at the window of a restaurant’s sordid base-
ment kitchen the day that Fanny starts to work there, keeps a growling 
watch on her. Fanny’s response to this is narrated in these strange lines, 
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fairly representative of NDiaye’s treatment of her main characters: “She 
trembled to think of the day when he, or another, would fi nally punish 
her. ‘What can you explain to dogs?’ she muttered. ‘I played with them, 
I cleaned their kennel without shame, but as soon as the family turns 
its back on me, they devour me  . . .’” (83/68). Moving from the “he” 
to “another,” then to indeterminate “dogs,” to circle fi nally back to the 
treacherous dogs of her family home, Fanny’s thinking here produces, 
by the time it reaches the fi nal “they,” a monstrous aggregate of known 
and unknown dogs, joined in a single as if endlessly looped nemesis, 
communicating, inheriting, accruing ingratitude and vengeance. The 
short- circuiting through these third- person pronouns toward unrea-
son is made barely less strange by the seamless move from narrativized 
thought to direct speech, in what is a representative sampling of the 
technically good faith of a narrator at every point committed to not 
overstepping or calling out the character’s bad faith. Indeed, here as in 
much of NDiaye’s prose, the narrative voice, strained, literalist, eager 
not to be noticed (and as a consequence excessively noticeable), hugs 
the character’s thoughts so closely as to appear to have access to no 
other knowledge or reason— so that nothing in the text, in this instance, 
allows us to discredit, as unsound or merely symbolic, Fanny’s appre-
hension that dogs are occupying interchangeably the place from which 
her retribution will come.
Which certainly makes the bludgeoning to death of this particular 
dog a limited solution:
She kicked it violently under the muzzle, thinking: another 
will take its revenge!— then pushed it to the ground, deaf 
to its yelping. The dog now seemed old and tired- out. Was 
it really a threat or had she been mistaken? It might have 
made a more reliable and faithful companion than Eugene, 
who’d had ulterior motives for going with her. Already tired 
out from her struggle with the dog, she fi nished it off with 
a kick in the stomach, then with the tip of her toes slid the 
heavy rain- soaked carcass from the sidewalk into the gut-
ter, where the gushing water carried it gently away. She ran 
away guiltily, but comforted herself with the thought that 
she would no longer be afraid to look up at the basement 
window. This ugly beast had made her toil in the kitchen 
even more diffi cult! Besides, one summer’s day in the yard, 
hadn’t she seen Uncle George coldly shoot his most faithful 
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hunting dog then dump its body on a manure pile because 
it had just devoured three chickens? He had not eaten lunch 
with any less appetite than usual, and Grandmother’s dogs 
always jumped with joy at the sight of him and greeted him 
by licking his hands. If her uncle George— who knew how 
to handle dogs— did not hesitate to punish them with death, 
neither he nor any other member of the family would blame 
Fanny for killing this fi lthy animal. (88– 89/72)
Indeed, the feared retribution from dogs is here not so much vanquished 
as given further grounds (“another will take its revenge!”), and the 
fl urry of mutually negating postulations of self- doubt (was it perhaps 
a friend?) and desperate self- justifi cation (would my family members, 
always rightness incarnate, not have done the same?) that follow suc-
ceeds in neither locating nor diverting responsibility for the violence of 
the killing. Rather, it sheds ungainly light on a self dispossessed of sure 
reference, as much in relation to the dog as in relation to itself. In the ir-
resolution regarding what or who the yellow dog was, as becomes clear 
in the overwrought analogy with the deed of Uncle George (a particu-
larly dislikeable representative of the family bent on excluding Fanny 
from its ranks), Fanny risks playing out her own story, except here she 
positions herself on the other side, and, excluding the dog, seems not to 
see that she has only given sharp illustration to the logic by which her 
family can “coldly” “punish [ . . . ] with death” their own “most faith-
ful” member (155).
In the course of the novel Fanny will go through yet more circles of 
self- exile— where dogs often seem to wait menacingly on the sidelines.9 
But it is a section titled “The Wedding Preparations and Fanny’s First 
Death” (184/150) that confi rms the gravest consequences of the canine 
subplot as a radical other to plot— that is, as a deplotting of positions, a 
zone of potentially lethal syntactical indifferentiation. In the “dreadful 
dog episode,” as it is later called (230/186), Fanny, who has been sit-
ting hunched in a nook previously reserved for the family dogs, feeding 
like a dog on scraps from meals passed secretly to her by her mother 
(otherwise unmoved by her daughter’s predicament), bounds out at the 
sound of the name “Léda”— which she associates with a missing- fairy- 
godmother- like aunt whose reappearance, she believes, would put an 
end to her own stigma— only to fi nd that it is the name her cousin/
fi ancé has given to his new “big, strong dog.” The dog promptly attacks 
her, tearing off “big hunks of fl esh” while Fanny makes “[not] a sound 
Vague Dog ❘ 95
except [for] a slight, very slight squeal!” (186/151). The exclamation 
mark, while mimicking those that would usually have accompanied ut-
terances in direct or free indirect style (e.g., “She kicked it violently 
under the muzzle, thinking: another will take its revenge!”), here be-
speaks the dreadful rudderlessness of the narrative voice as it loses the 
body to which it had till then clung so closely and is now exposed in its 
grotesque nudity. Fanny’s Aunt Colette at this point briskly “regained 
her quick- wittedness, and without distaste— just as she gutted rabbits 
or cleaned calves’ heads— she wrapped what was left of Fanny in an old 
sheet and went out to throw the whole thing on the manure heap at the 
bottom of the garden” (186/151).
When fi nally (for my purposes here), Fanny’s fi ancé George comes 
to inquire after her, Aunt Colette tells him where she is (“in the gar-
den,” “on the manure heap”), whereupon we read: “But the hens had 
already gobbled up all that was left of Fanny. Finding nothing but a 
few scraped bones, a few bloody hairs, George thought Aunt Colette 
was making fun of him and that he had been mistaken to take her an-
swer literally” (187/152). In assuming a mistake, George conveniently 
pleads escape from the literality of the novel itself, while the narrative 
voice for its part assumes unseemly cover in a characteristic slip into 
free indirect style: “In any case, he had come on impulse; wasn’t his 
love for Fanny passing?” But this non- self- implication, this undecidable 
allegiance of the narration treats others— in this interlude of Fanny’s ab-
sence or diminishing— only as it at other times treats Fanny: espousing 
the turns and boundaries of her own thinking, even as it passes its own 
turns and boundaries for hers— so that neither is it ever suffi ciently dis-
entangled from her thinking to (need to, or seem to) judge it as curious 
or misguided, nor can its thinking ever be confi dently judged as curious 
or misguided by us (for perhaps it is only her thinking?). The novel is 
replete with such instances (often in the interrogative). Consider for 
instance how Fanny represses her hurt when Lucette pockets her only 
picture of her aunt Léda— “After all, she owed the people here— hadn’t 
they, after the usual precautions, treated her less like a stranger than 
her own family had on Grandmother’s birthday?” (63)— or her hesitant 
happiness to see her father so delighted at the post- dog transformation 
of her features (whereby she has presumably lost the difference that 
was her stigma): “But wasn’t she happy, despite her confusion, to be so 
enthusiastically received by her father . . . ?” (195).
Gérard Genette wrote astutely once of Gustave Flaubert (a writer 
whose infl uence over NDiaye is indeed striking) that his mastery of free 
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indirect style allowed him to “make his own language speak this both 
loathsome [écœurant] and fascinating idiom of the ‘other’ without be-
ing wholly compromised or wholly innocent.”10 No words (écœurant 
here equally translates as “sickening” or “nauseating”) more fi ttingly 
describe NDiaye’s prose— and, even beyond particular instances, the 
general politics, not to say malady, of a narration whose defense is in its 
continual claim to be merely ventriloquizing or speculatively inhabiting 
a point of view, rather than itself (necessarily) sharing or condoning 
it. The real drama, one might say, of Among Family— and, more dis-
turbingly, of much of NDiaye’s prose— is that in the character’s desper-
ate desire to belong, to merge her “imperfect fl esh” with the family’s 
(wishing in one instance “to become perhaps one of the faithful dogs” 
[65/52]) is possibly but an elaborate allegory of the condition of the 
narrative voice: without moral bearings because without a place, with-
out a body or memory of its own. At times when it is not sticking closely 
to Fanny— because she is indisposed or because while recounting ex-
ternal facts it has seemed to lose access to her thoughts— it fl aps about 
untrustworthily, as if needing to do or say something while waiting to 
merge again, attempting accordingly not to say anything that would 
overly implicate it (thus often resorting to mere questions or conjec-
tures), yet with every word only revealing how indifferently it might 
serve friend or foe. Thus, when Fanny is in the doghouse, we read of her 
mother who repeatedly passes by, stopping sometimes to absently feed 
her: “Did she even remember what she would have found in the nook 
if she raised the curtain? Probably not, considering how distracted and 
distant she was . . .” (182/148), and, further on the same page: “Would 
she even have wanted to believe that a daughter of hers could be in 
the nook? She was careful that no one saw when she half- opened the 
curtain, but it could have been out of a sense of propriety” (182/149). 
The French text here reads “par pudeur,” which if anything describes 
the narrative voice that a kind of pudeur (or self- consciousness, reserve) 
keeps from probing any further. That “nook” behind the curtain is in 
fact a nook— a limit- point— in narrative consciousness itself, which it 
(conveniently) disguises as an unreachable point in the mother’s mind.
But then if the whole trick is to present words or thoughts or events 
as if they were being simply relayed, without narrative reservation or 
dismay, what immunity can a story claim at all from violation or vio-
lence? It seems not impossible that the dog that devours Fanny is a body 
arisen directly from this promiscuity of the narrative voice, from its 
compulsive urge to literalize its own nonidentity (and thus play at dis-
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appearing). For several sorts of circles are seen to tighten around Fanny 
in that episode, all overdetermined by the dogness of the dog: reduced 
to the fate of a dog, she is torn to pieces by a dog; her memory, earlier, 
of Uncle George killing his dog and “dump[ing] its body on a manure 
pile” here turns prophesy, with the twist that in this scenario she is 
the dog; “Léda,” whose name she had so desperately invoked and even 
wished at one point might at least name a dog (“‘You’ve never even 
met anyone by that name? Not even an animal?’ Fanny would insist, 
discouraged. ‘Not even a dog?’” [143/116]), turns out homonymically 
to name a dog (so that it is a speech act that provokes what follows: 
“Someone, perhaps the fi ancée, cried out: ‘There’s Léda and Eugene!’ 
and they saw Fanny jump out” (151), an “Argos moment” gone terribly 
wrong); Fanny, who had so ardently sought assimilation (“to become 
perhaps one of the faithful dogs” [65/52]), is indeed, most intimately 
assimilated by a dog (“as if it wanted to taste all of her before deciding 
to swallow” [186/151]). Lured by a mirage of identity between long- lost 
aunt and new pet, literal meaning and fi gurative, dog as other and self as 
dog, it is as if the narration of En famille itself lost in that moment— or 
pretended to lose— the capacity to protect one from the other, or to tell 
the difference.
A Kind of Grimace
Bad dogs, bad faith, blind spots, and barred entryways riddle NDiaye’s 
novels. My Heart Hemmed In (2007; Mon coeur à l’étroit) shares with 
Among Family a protagonist (Nadia) whose consciousness— governing 
the narrative— is arranged around a cryptonomic suppression of the 
truth regarding her class origins and ancestry. The novel anthologi-
cally repeats and anticipates others: like in Among Family the negated 
truth generates an anathemic logic making it diffi cult to know what 
has been suppressed;11 as with Clarisse in the later Ladivine (2013), the 
invention of a new life for Nadia will entail the false premise that her 
parents are dead; obstructed through every available symbolic channel, 
the repressed returns to haunt Nadia through a series of disconcerting, 
senseless degradations that are so many cracks in the edifi ce: an open 
wound in her husband’s side, the souring of her relationships, enigmatic 
or accusatory responses from her environment, an unexplained and 
possibly monstrous pregnancy, itself prefi gured by Rosie Carpe (2001). 
In the midst of this generalized unraveling of Nadia’s carefully disposed 
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world, enter her son’s dog Arno, whose vicious anger toward her forms 
a salient point of hostility— not to say a vague counterknowledge seem-
ing to challenge what she (thinks she) knows.12 Vague because like in 
Among Family, it is impossible to name or limit whatever knowledge 
the dog might possess. The son, perplexed, wonders whether Arno is 
picking up on Nadia the scent of another male dog, whereupon she re-
torts that the dog probably senses the less- than- wholehearted welcome 
her son and his wife are extending her, a point he appears to concede 
(239– 41).
Arno’s small role in My Heart Hemmed In is ultimately inconse-
quential, more noteworthy is Nadia’s inordinately articulate aversion 
for him, and for her son’s keenness to talk about him: “Doesn’t he know 
I don’t care about dogs? That for me dogs don’t exist? That any word 
spoken about a dog bores me to tears [m’ennuie intolérablement— 
equally “bothers me intolerably”]” (239/222). In this statement of aver-
sion both categorical and undecided as to its own vehemence (disinterest? 
boredom? or unbearable distress? but with dogs per se— or all talk of 
them?), the most puzzling phrase is surely “for me dogs don’t exist.” Is 
that to say that dogs too have been buried alive (along with her parents, 
her fi rst husband, her true origins) in the “ugly depths [vilain repli]” 
of Nadia’s heart (273/252)? If one really wanted to give this dog its 
meaningful place in the novel (or in the universe), one might surmise 
that Arno (who happens also to be from Bordeaux, like herself) senses 
in Nadia (like the dogs of the earlier novel had in Fanny) the dishonest 
concealing of a secret. For do dogs not instinctively abhor lies? Indeed, 
an insistently ethical reading would make cynics of NDiaye’s dogs (and 
in so doing restore cynicism to its etymological truth). Diogenes was 
known to say that while other dogs bit their enemies, he bit his friends, 
in order to save them. “This paradoxical pedagogy,” writes Michèle 
Clément, “illustrated by the inversion of the use of the dog, which no 
longer protects from the outside but from the inside, is the foundation 
of cynicism.”13 Peter Sloterdijk has commented on the critical pertinence 
of the dog fi gure to the cynic, serving as “the biting conscience of every 
dominating self- satisfaction,” ever ready to denounce those “ashamed 
for the wrong reasons, for their physis, their animal sides (which, in 
fact, are innocent), while they remain unmoved by their irrational and 
ugly practices, their greed, their unfairness, cruelty, vanity, prejudice and 
blindness.”14 Michel Foucault in turn, in his Courage of Truth lectures, 
would refl ect on the Cynics’ reappropriation of that “life which does 
in public, in front of everyone, what only dogs and animals dare to 
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do, and which men usually hide.”15 Cynics took “to the point of its 
extreme consequence and reversal” the philosophical ideal of the true— 
unconcealed— life, theirs was the shameless, scandalous embodiment 
of a “diacritical, barking life,” one able to tell apart truth and falsity, 
master and enemy (243– 44). But Foucault noted here “a very strange 
paradox,” a “double attitude,” whereby philosophy, even while readily 
reclaiming cynical thought as its “universal core,” tended to reject the 
Cynic, as embodying truth too radically, vulgarly. Thus cynicism forms 
the heart of philosophy, while “the Cynic is driven out; he wanders [le 
cynique est chassé, le cynique est errant],” inadmissible, unbearable, on 
the margins of society.16 “Cynicism is thus this kind of grimace that 
philosophy makes to itself, this broken mirror in which philosophy [le 
philosophe] is at once called upon to see itself and fails to recognize 
itself” (248/270).
Might this forceful insight extend to NDiaye’s world, so darkly moral? 
Should we imagine that the dogs are the grimace these novels make to 
themselves, a cracked mirror held up to their heroines? Between Among 
Family and My Heart Hemmed In, a 2004 story titled “Brulard’s Day” 
presents in support of such a hypothesis a remarkable scene where a 
dirty, pitiful, nauseating, improbable crossbreed, the ugliest dog Brulard 
had ever seen, which her husband acquired soon after she suddenly left 
him (because he considered seriously that the dog might be her), as-
sumes the character of an unsettling mirror:17
Pendant les quelques secondes où les yeux du chien furent à 
hauteur des yeux de Brulard, celle- ci eut l’impression brutale 
de voir s’y refl éter ou s’y noyer sa propre âme anxieuse. Il 
lui sembla que le miroir sombre des pupilles du chien ne lui 
renvoyait pas l’image de sa propre fi gure réduite mais autre 
chose, d’inattendu, d’inexplicable— comme si, se dit Brulard 
déroutée, elle avait soudain changé d’aspect au point de ne 
plus se reconnaître, ou encore comme si l’oeil noir incom-
préhensible du chien réfl échissait l’être véritable et secret de 
Brulard, dont elle- même n’avait pas la moindre idée, qu’elle 
ne pouvait décrire même en le découvrant ainsi révélé dans 
le regard de cette bête pitoyable. (131– 32)
For the few seconds that the dog’s eyes were level with Bru-
lard’s, she had the brutal feeling that she could see her own 
anxious soul refl ected or submerged deep inside them. The 
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dark mirror of the dog’s pupils seemed to be showing her not 
her own miniaturized face but something else, unexpected, 
inexplicable— as if, Brulard told herself at a loss, her appear-
ance had suddenly changed beyond all recognition, or as if 
the dog’s incomprehensible black eye were refl ecting Bru-
lard’s true, secret being, of which she herself had no notion, 
which she couldn’t describe, even on fi nding it thus revealed 
in the gaze of that pitiful creature. (104)
Certainly, this little dog, “good- hearted and peaceable” (127/101), is a 
more touching canine presence than any other in NDiaye’s oeuvre, bear-
ing out Michael Sheringham’s hypothesis that it might be a transitional 
object enabling Brulard’s cognitive evolution (if destroyed soon thereaf-
ter by a Great Dane in a horrid manner).18 Even so, looking more closely 
at the mirror scene, one is struck by the string of terms signaling indeter-
mination (“something else,” “unexpected,” “inexplicable,” “incompre-
hensible”) which, while they make as if to describe Brulard’s face in the 
“mirror,” more accurately index it as indescribable. As if mimicking her 
own inability to conceive, let alone analyze, her “true, secret being” (“of 
which she herself had no notion, which she couldn’t describe”), the long 
sentence (beginning “The dark mirror . . .”) confounds itself in subordi-
nate clauses (“as if,” “or as if,” “of which,” “which”) and spirals back 
upon itself as if to further shut out its object (“beyond all recognition”). 
This piece of unwieldy, baroque, “bad” prose is characteristic of what 
happens to NDiaye’s language when it approaches something suggested 
(or suspected) to be a truth. Bad prose also because Brulard’s govern-
ing point of view through the scene seems not to supply coordinates 
strong enough to dispense with the repeated reiteration of her name— 
witness in the French the unnecessary (almost jarring) “celle- ci” where 
an “elle” (as it becomes in the English “she”) should have been enough, 
but also the “se dit Brulard” (“Brulard told herself”) where a “se dit- 
elle” (“she told herself”) would have been just fi ne, and, again, the “être 
véritable et secret de Brulard” (“Brulard’s true, secret being”) where, 
likewise, given the perspectival regime, a possessive (son/her) should 
have amply suffi ced. It is almost as if the passage were staging a subtle 
separation between theme and syntax, between, on the one hand, the 
dog that draws Brulard toward a defaced, unnamed outside of the text 
and, on the other hand, a narration that pretends not to be implicated, 
indeed, plays at defamiliarizing itself from Brulard, peeling itself away 
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minutely from the sinking soul (“s’y noyer sa propre âme anxieuse” / 
“her own anxious soul [ . . . ] submerged”). Might it be that, as with 
the “dreadful dog episode” of Among Family, the face- à- face with the 
dog is a function (and dramatization) primarily of the narration’s own 
unhomeliness, its unhoming powers, that is, its power, in detaching itself 
ever so slightly from its protagonist, to sustain a gap between her and 
herself, even as the story’s central, unending effort is that of behaving 
as if there weren’t one? And that this, somehow, is what the dog is— a 
sort of fi gure for this irreducible, unspeakable gap— before it is given 
a “fl eshed- out” place, as it were, as a dog? So that when Nadia muses 
desperately, in My Heart Hemmed In, that “for me dogs don’t exist,” 
there is reason to suspect that the statement expresses not merely a 
character’s incidental disinterest or distaste, but a more fundamental, 
transdiegetic, atavistic dread of what force dogs may incarnate, of the 
untamable narrative drift by which the name or idea of a dog produces 
a dog— narration’s dog, which, even as it stands close and fl eshly, odor-
ous, breathing warm, thick breath, baring the dark black of its eyes or 
the moist inside of its gums, is at the same time perhaps no more than 
the dogly form given to the story’s own autoimmunity, an indiffer-
ence at the story’s heart that unhinges the terms on which identity and 
recognition would depend. An inhospitability, if you like, that works 
unaccountably against what might be deemed the traditional symbolic 
interests of the novel: essentially, protagonism, separation of voices/
perspectives, immunity of the human (premised notably, one could say, 
on the distinction between person and prey/fl esh). While “Brulard’s 
Day” and My Heart Hemmed In both attempt to close on a redemptive 
note, the pessimistic end of Trois femmes puissantes (2009), published 
eighteen years after En famille, suggests that the dog, wittingly or not, 
thematized or not, itself fi erce or not, continues to be positioned as 
the breathing, living, recognizing/nonrecognizing, grimacing totem (or 
alibi . . .) of narrative adversity, and even auto- aversity, that is, narra-
tive’s capacity to turn on itself. In the third of the powerful women (yet 
what form of power is this?),19 Khady Demba, we fi nd at long last a 
NDiaye protagonist no longer alienated from or disavowing her name 
and her story. Yet even she will be fatally denounced— along with other 
clandestine immigrants attempting to escape a detention camp, and 
before they are caught by guards— by dogs that materialize in the last 
sentence unnecessarily: “As they moved forward dogs began barking 
and shots rang out” (292).
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Nowhere in Itself
The problem with dogs’ special gift for recognition is that it may ag-
gravate the burden of human self- identity. This is at least as much a 
historical entanglement as a conceptual (or empirical) one. Inasmuch 
as the presence of domesticated dogs is attested as far back as 12,000 
or 18,000 (not to say, as some would, 100,000) years before the Chris-
tian era,20 certainly the histories of domiciles and dogs cannot easily be 
untwined. “Man took the (free) wolf and made the (servant) dog and 
so made civilization possible,” Donna Haraway writes pithily, even as 
she points to the murky distribution of agencies in this “cross- species 
socialization”— for was it man who domesticated the free wolf or was 
it some “wolf wannabe dogs” who, seeking profi t from “the calorie bo-
nanzas provided by humans’ waste dumps,” adapted accordingly?21 Jean 
Rolin notes that canine evolution is “a painful question” and the subject 
of “violent polemics” among specialists; many of them fi ercely disagree 
with Raymond and Lorna Coppinger, who believe that wolves genet-
ically predisposed to show a lesser fl ight distance— those who, when 
approached, were less prone to run away— were naturally selected to 
survive on the waste of early human villages and thus domesticated 
themselves (101, 245/247). A recent study goes so far as to impute the 
friendliness of dogs (and their divergence from wolves) to variations in 
two specifi c behavioral genes, in turn found to be linked, in humans, 
with Williams- Beuren syndrome, a congenital disorder of which one 
core symptom is hypersociality.22 For me it is a fable of Jean de La Fon-
taine’s titled “Le loup et le chien” (“The Wolf and the Dog”) that most 
poignantly memorializes this hotly contested event of the mesolithic or 
superior paleolithic age. In this fable a hungry, skinny wolf is almost 
persuaded by an enviably plump dog to return with it to the homestead, 
where he will enjoy access to plentiful food and comfort in exchange 
for some “light work” (a spot of barking, chasing, fawning . . .). But on 
the way there, he notices with great foreboding the discolored patch left 
on the dog’s neck by its collar. Understanding its implications (“[ . . . ] 
What! Run you not, then, / Just where you please, and when?”), the 
wolf parts ways with his “fat relation,” the fable’s last lines sealing his 
declaration of freedom and his fl ight— in Elizur Wright’s translation: 
“[‘. . .] It ought to be a precious price / Which could to servile chains 
entice; / For me I’ll shun them while I’ve wit.’ / So ran Sir Wolf, and 
runneth yet.” There runs a wolf committed to fl ight distance— a distance 
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that stretches out poetically at the fable’s close (can the wolf ever run 
far or fast enough?).
As against the wild “wit” of those wolves resolved to remain wolves 
and free (and we may consider at what cost, the French wolf being to-
day, technically speaking, an extinct subspecies),23 the dog’s consent or 
aptitude for domestication and its provisions— “[ . . . ] ‘you only need / 
To bark a little now and then, / To chase off duns and beggar men, / 
To fawn on friends that come or go forth, / Your master please, and 
so forth’ . . .”— has been arguably limitless, its suitability as man’s best 
friend having everything to do with an asymptotically compressed fl ight 
distance— the dog, in a sense, cannot get close enough. Whence, too, 
the slippery, compromised coordinates of the history of human- canine 
coevolution. Whose story even is it? And who disappears, the longer 
one probes into it? Even dogs may love us less for our presence than for 
the traces, waste, and warm gaps we leave. So suggests Allan Stoekl, in 
a beautiful refl ection on ecology as “a movement of ghosts, speculative 
and specular entities”:
We don’t even know whether we (humans) domesticated 
dogs, or whether they domesticated us. Perhaps there’s no 
coincidence that human agriculture and social hierarchy— 
and the appearance of the fi rst towns— developed around 
the time dogs were “domesticated.” Did “we” somehow 
make the dog (formerly the wolf) particularly responsive 
to human intentions and desires? Or did the dog transform 
and essentially create humans, making possible the domes-
tication (and herding) of other animals, and the protection 
of private property? The “human” may simply be an after- 
effect of canine self- preservation.24
Why do we insist on seeing the dog as a creature of home and famil-
iarity? Following it seriously may lead rather to startlingly unfamiliar 
tellings that would exile us altogether from home. Indeed, the sover-
eignty of the human vis- à- vis its own story— not to speak of stories at 
large— starts to seem a feebler claim once one starts to consider that 
dogs might be the cosponsors of things as distinctly “human” as agricul-
ture, social hierarchy, or private property.25 Oh, but surely the capacity 
to tell stories is properly human, you despair— so that at least in the 
“author function,” in assumed enunciatory positions, in our literature 
104 ❘ Chapter 3
and in our conversations, we stand alone and whole? Not quite, if we 
are to consider the remarkable hypothesis, cited by Haraway (albeit 
with skepticism), that human language itself, to develop, had awaited 
the dog: “Some commentators think that even something as fundamen-
tal as the hypertrophied human biological capacity for speech emerged 
in consequence of associated dogs’ taking on scent and sound alert jobs 
and so freeing the human face, throat and brain for chat” (31). Michel 
Serres in turn, musing on the beginnings of human language, imagines 
as the fi rst voices those of women, mothers, as “they command the dogs 
to turn their defensive barking in the direction of the jackals and inva-
sive wolves” and thus “protect the fruit of their wombs and the meat 
and milk that feeds their children.” Thus, language, even as it “is born 
to protect births,” as humans’ claim to immunity from the wilderness, 
is inseparable in its beginnings from a turning of dogs away from, or 
on, wolves.26
Credible or incredible, such conjecturings certainly make of the dog “a 
painful question,” gnawing away at even those analyses that would take 
it on. Humanists and deep ecologists, as Haraway notes, have equal and 
opposing stakes in the location of that wolf/dog boundary, in pulling it 
this way or that (28, 30). In her privileging of anecdotes of “metaplasmic,” 
“naturalculturural,” “becomings- with,” “sym- bio- genesis,” “worldings,” 
“species coshapings,” and global, reciprocal, entangled “ethics of fl our-
ishing,”27 Haraway herself is wont to absorb (rather than to “problema-
tize”) the diffi culty dogs may pose to our concepts. This she foregrounds 
as her ethics and her method, which require that “there be no deviation 
from the animal stories themselves. Lessons have to be inextricably part 
of the story.” For Haraway dog writing is a serious strand of feminist 
writing, and its rule, derived from lapsed Catholicism, is premised on 
the belief “that the sign and fl esh are one” (Companion Species, 17). 
Thus she writes with the dog, which, if it is “material- semiotic” and 
even a “fi gure,” is no “alibi for other themes” nor a “surrogate[ . . . ] for 
theory”: “They are not here just to think with,” she writes, “they are 
here to live with” (5). Dog writing is then unavoidably autobiographi-
cal, at least in the broadest (or the most fundamental) sense— to write 
about dogs is to narrate one’s own entangled fl eshly- symbolic situated-
ness. If such webbed, hyphenated, neologistic, technoscientifi c- cultural, 
cross- species interfacial writing risks its own brand of utopianism, it 
responds to something real and continually confounding: the fact that 
the distinction between fi gure and ground— not to say representational 
language itself— tends to go slippery around dogs. This emerges clearly 
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in a meditation by Carla Freccero (whose thinking here closely follows 
Haraway’s and serves as a methodological lesson in it) on the mauling 
to death of a woman in a San Francisco apartment building in 2001 
by two Presa Canario dogs owned by proxy by a prison inmate. The 
gruesome incident, immediately framed in terms of gender, sexuality, 
race, and class (the victim was lesbian; the dog’s fury or motivation in 
certain discourses was represented as masculine; the case was fi led by 
the victim’s lesbian partner, raising the issue of the rights of partners in 
same- sex unions; Pelican Bay prison’s treatment of its prisoners placed 
it on par with detention spaces in Iraq, etc.), turned into a legal and 
epistemological fl ash point, raising abyssal questions regarding respon-
sibility, human- animal relations, and intersections of gender difference 
and racial difference with species difference. Distentangling the multiple 
“becomings” the case involved and which humanism— or for that mat-
ter any one interpretive frame— is “unable to contain,” Freccero’s essay 
“Carnivorous Virility; or, Becoming- Dog” offers a case study, by the by, 
of how, the harder one tries to read such an incident, the more in fact 
the dog vanishes.28 Besides, was it ever literally a dog? (Is a dog ever 
literally a dog?) Here humiliation at being treated like dogs in prison 
led to a warrior subculture reclaiming the dog as a symbol of raw male 
counterpower. But in this identifi cation and the discourses it engenders, 
the dog can only be pure essence (essentially innocent or genetically 
ferocious) or pure instrument, that is, it either subsumes human self-
hood altogether or is swallowed up in its mediation of it (186).29 The 
sexuality/race lens yields similar anamorphoses: metonymies of fetish-
istic investment (locating in the dog a compensatory, racialized, narcis-
sistic masculinity) get to express themselves within metaphors safely 
heteronormative (which reinstate themes of protection, guardianship, 
family). Thus on the one hand implications of homosexuality and besti-
ality haunting the man- dog relationship are evaded, while on the other 
a complicated American history of racialized power is also disavowed. 
Considering the two “haunted ontologies” (191), Freccero concludes 
that “both transform the human- dog encounter into a potent and con-
densed fi gure of (human) sexual/sexuality and racial confl ict distributed 
across multiple cultural institutions or ‘state apparatuses,’ from the legal 
system to the prison system to the populist imagination represented by 
the media” (190). Haraway too speaks of companion species as fi g-
ures: “As ordinary knotted beings,” she writes, “they are also always 
meaning- making fi gures that gather up those who respond to them into 
unpredictable kinds of ‘we’” (When Species Meet, 5). But it is inter-
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esting to see, with Freccero, that in a crisis, the dog’s becoming- real, 
becoming- excessive, becoming- monster (what she calls, after Derrida, 
“carnivorous virility”) works hand- in- hand with its becoming- fi gure, 
a becoming- blurred, not to say a becoming- ghost (counterpart to “the 
ghost in the machine of transnational capital and the prison industrial 
complex” [183]?). Even as the dog mauls a person to a ghastly death, it 
would seem to disappear in and to the event. Either the event is about 
the dog, and the dog exhausts it (for what can you explain to dogs?); 
or, more likely, it never really was about the dog, and an inexhaustible 
picture of the world is revealed, but the dog curiously falls out of it.
I take this to be one of the kinds of vanishing that Colin Dayan is 
describing when she writes, in The Law Is a White Dog, that “the dog 
exists nowhere in itself.”30 In this strange and moving book, Dayan re-
traces and connects the various fi ctional, analogical, phantasmatic, com-
pensatory ways in which the dog, and particularly the stray, has through 
European and American legal history prefi gured, accompanied, belied, 
and survived (as its ineradicable residue) the arrival of the human at 
personhood. Through the evolution of the law, she shows dogs to have 
had the status of inconvenient, imperfect property— that is, hovering 
complicatedly between animals over which the property right was com-
plete (economically useful farm animals, principally) and wild animals 
for which there could be no claim to property (and therefore to liability) 
at all. Naturally it was when a dog stepped out of line (by straying or 
biting) that it confounded laws pertaining to property— while at the 
same time spectrally rehearsing predicaments increasingly meted out to 
humans considered vagrant or deviant. Imperfect property: that is, more 
person- like than property, yet less than person (240– 42, 248). But less 
than person in a way that specifi cally demonstrated how a person too 
could be turned into something less than person, dog- like (241). “Only 
with dogs before us and beside us can we understand the making and un-
making of persons,” writes Dayan (209), pointing to the various ways in 
which slavery, capital punishment, and torture have logically depended 
on the animal analogy even while disavowing it. Banishment, expul-
sion, and radical depersonalizing, in modern history, are in fact never 
exceptional instances where the law is suspended, forgotten, or weak, 
but rather where it reveals its never- renounced archaic, ritual, magical 
side, its power to make unreal the claims of personhood. An overde-
termined fi gure in Dayan’s analysis, a paradox, “so empty of substance 
that it can accrue to itself all kinds of projections,” the dog is a fl eshly, 
unhomely reminder of a kind of originary fi gural trickery, involving 
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continual migrations, morphings, mirrorings, dematerializings— there is 
nothing simple to what “dog” (and by extension “person”) might mean. 
Even as dogs allegorize dispossession and abjection— in popular imag-
inaries (such as that of Haiti) they may be seen as the ghosts of people 
divested of natural rights or personal properties— they are equally the 
vessels of a twisted vengeance, identifi ed just as naturally with brutal 
state authority and sometimes wanton persecution— as in the case of 
slavery, racialized policing (hence white dog), concentration camps, and 
high- security prisons. No wonder the dog is ambivalent. It would have 
to be, to follow Dayan here, at least as ambivalent as is the legal, social, 
material history of modernity that has produced personhood and made 
it possible to bear rights even while simultaneously inventing forms of 
disfi gured personhood, stigmatized bodies, stripped of the right to have 
rights, specters banished from the city or the very world.
Placebo (Levinas’s Dog)
Can dogs bear the fi gural excess gnawing at them, commandeering their 
properties to contradictory ends, invoking their name even as it drives 
them out of their bodies? In a sense this was the problem faced by Em-
manuel Levinas in the much- commented short essay “The Name of a 
Dog, or Natural Rights,” the fi rst third of which the philosopher had 
to devote to getting past considerable parabolical and allegorical drag 
before suggesting that the dog of Exodus 22:31 (“You shall not eat any 
fl esh that is torn by beasts in the fi eld; you shall cast it to the dogs”— 
“So who is this dog at the end of the verse?”) is in fact, simply, “a dog. 
Literally a dog!”31 First a catalog of dog proverbs and locutions must 
be rolled out, most of them specifi c to the French idiom: un chien dans 
un jeu de quilles (a dog in a bowling alley, or bull in a china shop), qui 
veut noyer son chien l’accuse de rage (he who wishes to drown his dog 
charges it with rabies, i.e., justifi es the action after the fact), métier de 
chien (a dog’s work), temps de chien (dog weather, i.e., horrid weather), 
temps à ne pas laisser un chien dehors (weather in which one wouldn’t 
leave a dog out, i.e., horrid weather), faire le chien couchant (to act 
like a lying dog, i.e., in a servile, obsequious way), entre chien et loup 
(between dog and wolf, describing twilight, where the difference is not 
clear).32 “But enough of allegories!” writes Levinas at this point. “We 
have read too many fables and we are still taking the name of a dog in 
a fi gurative sense” (152). To identify the dog at the end of the Exodus 
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verse, a dog to which men may be somehow indebted, he would proceed 
to work his way, through the dogs of Egypt in Exodus 11:7— who, on 
the night of the “death of the fi rst- born,” “will not growl!” allowing 
the Israelites to fl ee their bondage— to Bobby, a “wandering dog [chien 
errant]” who, while Levinas and others were being held in a Jewish 
prisoner- of- war camp in Nazi Germany, would await the prisoners as 
they returned from forced labor each day, “jumping and barking in de-
light.” “For him, there was no doubt that we were men,” writes Levinas 
(153), to then conclude:
Perhaps the dog that recognized Ulysses beneath his disguise 
on his return from the Odyssey was a forebear of our own. 
But no, no! There, they were in Ithaca and the Fatherland. 
Here, we were nowhere. This dog was the last Kantian in 
Nazi Germany, without the brain needed to universalize max-
ims and drives. He was a descendant of the dogs of Egypt. 
And his friendly growling, his animal faith, was born from 
the silence of his forefathers on the banks of the Nile. (153)
“The Name of a Dog” struggles with the enigma of what a dog is. The 
essay, and, within it, this passage in particular, the only place where 
Levinas would grant the possibility of ethical recognition— or for that 
matter give any serious ethical thought— to an animal, has drawn a 
great deal of commentary,33 none more thoughtful than that of David 
Clark, who has refl ected both on the pressures by which the strongly 
humanist claims underpinning Levinasian thought neutralize (and even 
derealize) Bobby and the sense in which they stand nevertheless to be 
unsettled by him. No doubt because so much lay at stake there, this 
dog cuts a necessarily paradoxical, self- limiting fi gure, Clark suggests 
in a fi rst essay on the subject, a “depthless surface,” a “cyborg,” both 
“lifeless and alive,” having and not having a face.34 While for Levinas, 
importantly, it is with the face (itself paradigmatically human) that eth-
ics starts,35 Bobby, because he is an animal, necessarily “enjoy[s] an ex-
cess of life over face” (57). Ultimately, Clark decides, Levinas’s Bobby 
is too poor of face to carry anything more than a provisional and “lim-
ited testimonial function,” “in earnest of the true human witness whose 
account— in the form of Levinas’ essay— has always already usurped 
Bobby’s place in our reading of it” (70). The dog’s impact, he ventures 
in another striking formulation, “is fi nally only a placebo effect, or per-
haps a form of animal triage in a time of terrible need.”
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With the words “placebo” and “triage” something of the puzzle of 
Levinas’s essay seems to carry over into that of Clark. Why these words, 
and what do they have to do with dogs? As broadly medical terms they 
expand an initial metaphor by which Bobby serves temporarily as “the 
good medicine” that does “a certain purifying work,” “restores a min-
imal health to the camp” (even while he must be excluded after his 
work is done). But they seem to spill just as easily over this metaphoric 
fi eld, both because of the etymology of “placebo”— from the Latin for 
“I shall please” (fi rst- person future of the verb placere, used to name 
fi rst a kind of vesper, then a fl atterer, then a drug that heals less than 
it consoles)— and because of the implications of “triage” (usually used 
where lives are threatened, resources are scarce, and what is still curable 
must be attended to by level of priority), by which it is the ethical capac-
ity of witnessing (and by extension humanity itself, and by restriction 
the philosopher’s own testimonial- narrative agency) that here plays the 
part of threatened life that must place its bets with care. In this instance, 
fi nding itself without human agents or the habitual parameters able to 
sustain it (the prisoners having been “stripped [ . . . ] of [their] human 
skin” [153]), witnessing projects itself in extremis onto a stray dog. 
“Pour lui— c’était incontestable— nous fûmes des hommes” (234; liter-
ally, “For him— there could be no doubt— we were men”): inserted in a 
forceful way within the statement, the claim of certainty here (“c’était 
incontestable”) expresses starkly how humanity, placed under severe 
threat, reroutes itself through the dog’s eyes— in a last effort to save 
itself. To be clear, the text does not strictly say that for Bobby the prison-
ers are undeniably humans (this who could say?) but rather that Bobby 
undeniably behaves as if they were (a distinction lost in Sean Hand’s 
fi ne translation: “For him there was no doubt that we were men”). Sur-
rendering themselves to Bobby’s eyes, the prisoners must assume at all 
costs that he sees men and that the joy he demonstrates is joy at pre-
cisely that; without the power to suppress doubt in the dog’s mind, they 
suppress it (as if one could stand for the other) in their own (“c’était 
incontestable”). The essay’s argument— of a piece with the men’s very 
survival— requires so critically that Bobby bear humanity across to the 
future that it must rely on a presumed and unequivocal one- to- one cor-
respondence between truth (who/what the men are) and affect (Bobby’s 
manifest joy), a last- ditch behaviorist wager, as it were, secure in the fact 
that there is no telling apart the dog’s behavior from what would have 
been shown to (them had they been) men— any difference or “doubt” 
simply has no place or status in world or thought, is nowhere to be 
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found (sealed away in the dog; the dog itself may not know it). It is in 
this grave and singular sense that the dog shall please: following that 
curious form of agency by which a medicine or treatment is “believed 
by the patient to be therapeutic (and [is] sometimes therefore effective)” 
(“Placebo,” OED; my emphasis). The chief characteristic of the “pla-
cebo effect” (a benefi cial effect after taking a placebo) is not that it is 
somehow false but rather, more interestingly, that it cannot be attributed 
to the placebo’s properties. Thus, the placebo effect is where the placebo 
itself vanishes. The placebo is that to which nothing of its therapeutic 
effect can be strictly traced back (even while such a link cannot be pos-
itively disproved). Bobby’s witnessing, likewise (at any rate, this is how 
I read Clark reading Levinas) turns on the condition that it not look 
back at itself— lest it discover it is missing (within the given script, i.e., 
Levinasian humanism, or Western philosophical thought as a whole) 
the ability to witness (“with neither ethics nor logos” [233/152]). This 
is, one could say, a witnessing that is “nowhere in itself”— Bobby wit-
nesses, but somehow, when called out, “is” himself not.
In his second take on the Bobby essay, Clark would unfold some 
of these radical potentialities traced in the fi rst, recalling that for Der-
rida “something withdraws from sight— or is out of earshot— a secret, 
as it were, at the heart of testimony, namely the trace of a singularity 
and non- substitutability of the work of the witness— and that is not 
witnessed, not as such. To witness without witnessing— is this not Bob-
by’s in- human or other- than- human role in Levinas’s testimonial essay? 
Perhaps Bobby offers Levinas an immemorial trace of that trace, with-
out which witnessing would not be possible; he recalls the languageless 
spur to language and thus, for Levinas, to responsibility.”36 Earlier in 
the essay, disagreeing with readings of the Bobby essay that too hastily 
assume a Kantian humanism to be precluding the possibility of an eth-
ical opening to the dog, Clark had pointed out that even for Kant, the 
ethical obligation is in fact “in- human,” “‘something other (than man 
as such),’” so that Levinas’s references to Kant through his essay are in 
fact “his way of exposing his text to the alterities that disturb Kant, and 
indeed make him other to himself” (26). Inspiredly, Clark recalls the 
emergence in Levinas’s writings, around the time of the Bobby essay, 
of the important, ambiguous, unsettling fi gure of le tiers (the third), “a 
kind of witness to witnessing,” a necessary, irreducible fi gure of third-
ness by which the dyadic fi eld of ethical obligation is always opened 
out to absent, faceless others, “compelling us to ask,” writes Clark, 
“whether there is not always an other other” (33– 34). He wonders at 
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this point, paronomastically, across languages: “And when le tiers was 
on Levinas’s lips, did he ever hear or think another word encrypted here, 
namely das Tier [German for “the animal”]? Did he ever say the one 
word and, without meaning to, hear the other? For example, when as a 
French speaking prisoner in a German labour camp, his gaze met that 
of a dog who acted as witness to his humanity . . . and something more 
or other than his humanity?” (34). Even if this message (which makes 
of Bobby “a strange kind of avatar” [33] for le tiers) was “almost inau-
dible” to Levinas himself, Clark’s reading makes sense of why and how 
Bobby might have haunted and even possessed the philosopher, whose 
disavowal of him could symptomatically never be complete (31).37
Vague Dog
“The Name of a Dog,” as has been amply noted, marks several ex-
ceptions within Levinas’s oeuvre: the only place where he so directly 
broaches the possible relation between ethics and the animal, it is also 
the most personal and testimonial of his essays. But then it is also argu-
ably the most literary of his writings, in its sifting through of allegor-
ical and rhetorical overdeterminations of dogs, in the way it positions 
Bobby on its edge and allows his presence to multiply precede him, in its 
clinging close to language, its self- conscious shifts of angle and register 
as it advances toward the pithy core of its tale, its exclamation marks,38 
its Baudelarian provocation and wavering of tone. (Interestingly, the 
last prose poem Baudelaire would ever write, “Les bons chiens” [The 
Good Dogs], closing Le Spleen de Paris, was an ode to street dogs . . .). 
The transcendence “with neither ethics nor logos,” the barking born of 
silence, the emphatic distance taken from the Homeric precedent, effect 
so many decouplings and redistributions by which Bobby’s presence is 
given as defamiliarized and, consequently, somehow fl ickering. Eluding 
a conceptualizing narrative, and thereby eluding philosophical recuper-
ation, Bobby is placed rather under the sign of paradox— to read his 
act demands a different sort of reading of texts and concepts, one that 
would suspend their provisions and combine the parts differently. No 
doubt this is why Levinas’s essay has elicited commentary that is itself 
far- fetched, risky (witness here Llewelyn, Clark, Hantel, Katalyn, or my 
own “wandering” prose). To read “The Name of a Dog” is to be in turn 
haunted by that scene and that dog and the grave part it is entrusted 
with.
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For my part I am troubled by an enigmatic question Dayan raises 
with stray dogs in mind: “If the natural creature possessed of personal 
status [and renounced upon entering social- legal personhood] dies not 
to be reborn in the spirit but in the body of civil society, what kind 
of body is this?” (42). Indeed, behind the apparent (cover) question of 
what kind of mind Bobby’s is (how can there be a Kantian without 
ethics nor logos, etc.?) is possibly a more fundamentally troubling ques-
tion: what kind of body his is. As Karalyn Kendall has noted, “Bobby, 
for all his jumping and barking, cannot seem to show his face in ‘The 
Name of a Dog.’ He appears quite literally in name only, for Levinas’s 
account of Bobby’s behavior offers no sense of a specifi c canine body of 
a given size, shape or color” (192). So much so that Max Hantel (even 
as he proposes to read Bobby as the “Anomalous” described by Deleuze 
and Guattari, “radically open to transversal relationships,” with “only 
affects” [117]) detects a “wagging tail” at no point mentioned in the 
text, reading it (quite wonderfully) as an index of tension, of oscillation, 
by which Bobby himself, as he beholds the prisoners, “runs to unknown 
becomings”: “The tail wags in this moment, suspended between, on the 
one hand, the possibility of a comforting reterritorialization and, on the 
other, the risk of tracing new paths with no guarantees” (121). A tail 
with two hands perhaps, but a tail for all that.
Which, were one to wonder idly (given the hands) whose tail it is, 
and/or (given the tail) whose hands it is, may be the point. Namely, the 
question “What kind of body is this?” may yet be awaiting a properly 
literary answer— that is, an improper literary answer, if one considers 
that the literary may be precisely what ceaselessly undoes the law of 
the proper. Levinas may insist that Bobby is “literally a dog!,” but the 
diffi culty with the literal is precisely that it may be simply indifferent to 
realism, allowing a dog to appear “in name only” (Kendall, “The Face 
of a Dog,” 192), which is to say, equally (indistinguishably), something 
quite other to appear in the name of a dog. The proverbial locutions 
and fi gurative usages (dog in a bowling alley, etc.) that Levinas had 
attempted to clear out of the way had at least each offered some sense 
of what a dog is, of what they meant by “dog.” Whereas, literally speak-
ing, as it were, there is no such thing as a dog— or there are no bounds 
to it. It must coalesce somehow as an effect of its parts, must start and 
end unaccountably, however weakly or improbably assembled. Bobby 
hangs together as a dog around his jumping and barking, the rest of his 
body is supplied by an unheaved corpus, where concepts and predicates 
(the constituent parts of an entire Western tradition of humanism and 
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ethics) slide into new places and reassemble, forming new seams, leav-
ing new gaps. Not just a prosthetic dog, but, in “the name of a dog,” a 
sort of joint where the corpus, or the world, comes together in the last 
instance and something in it does not quite add up, must be repaired 
by paradox (so that meaning, so that the world, may survive). In that 
place, a dog without ethics can act ethically. There a dog without reason 
can attest to the dignity of the human person. There can be thought 
where there can be no thought. There can be humanity where humans 
are “stripped [ . . . ] of [their] human skin.” And perhaps in a way not 
entirely unrelated (this being as I proceed the weird heart of the matter) 
to the way in which there can appear a dog where there could just as 
well have been no dog: “And then, about halfway through our long 
captivity, for a few short weeks, before the sentinals chased him away, a 
wandering dog entered our lives” (153).
Wandering dog: so very evocative a term! More commonly, one 
might say “stray dog.” The strayness of Bobby is important to Levinas 
(who notes that the dog “survived in some wild patch in the region 
of the camp” and makes a point of marking the difference between 
this dog encountered “nowhere” and Argos, that dog with master and 
home in “the Fatherland”). A stray dog is by defi nition a dog with-
Figure 3.1. Street dog I, Bangalore, photograph by the author.
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out a proper place. Wandering— chien errant— in French (and thus in 
the many West African and Francophone Caribbean cities where dogs 
wander), the stray dog goes vague— perro vago in Spanish, cão vadio 
in Portuguese— in the many Latin and Central American cities where 
stray dogs abound. Vague dog. And then, about halfway through our 
long captivity, for a few short weeks, before the sentinals chased him 
away, a vague dog entered our lives . . . The detour through the Span-
ish and Portuguese presents the interest of recalling a meaning “vague” 
once carried in English and French, and fi rst had in Latin, the very one 
implied by Kant in the Third Moment of the “Analytic of the Beauti-
ful” when he wrote of two forms of beauty: pulchritudo adhaerens, 
“dependent beauty,” beauty that is premised on a concept, and pul-
chritudo vaga, “free (or vague) beauty,” whose examples (e.g., beautiful 
creatures of the skies or the seas) “signify nothing by themselves,” “are 
not attached to a determinate object in accordance with concepts re-
garding its end, but are free and please for themselves.”39 Vaga comes 
from vagus, signifying in Latin “wandering, inconstant, uncertain, etc.,” 
of which the most “literal” remnant in English is the now- obsolete use 
of “vague” to mean “vagrant” or “vagabond” (OED). Pulchritudo vaga, 
for Kant, “presupposes no concept of what the object should be” and 
is subject to an aesthetic judgment therefore purer than that elicited by 
an object appreciated as that particular object.40 Interestingly for me, 
Alain David, in an essay on Levinas titled “Cynesthèse: Autoportrait au 
chien,” even without noting the specifi c relevance of the term “vague” to 
stray dogs (indeed, in a moment where the Bobby essay seems to have 
been forgotten), deems Kant, in his forging of the notion of pulchritudo 
vaga— “this beauty of erratic forms, whose smiling calm proceeds from 
the sense in which these forms concern no anguish nor attachment to a 
ground”— to be invoking in his way the rhetorical fi gure of hypallage 
(and so we encounter the dear fi gure again), as “free expression, lib-
erated from the veneer [gangue] of forms, a displacement of qualities 
that no longer refer back to nouns, unsuitable [disconvenant] to all.”41 
The fi gure of hypallage— as in the example he offers of “the yellow 
sweetness of tea, instead of the sweetness of yellow tea,” a wandering, 
a vagueness, of the attribute— in David’s terms “describes perhaps that 
interruption that has become pure adjectivity (indifferent to substan-
tives [i.e., nouns] which are still beings, subject to being and to death) 
and meaning [signifi ance].” Ibant obscuri sola sub nocte, or “They went 
darkly beneath the solitary night,” goes the famous Virgilian example of 
a hypallage, where Aeneas and the Sybil borrowed their darkness from 
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the night and in return gave it their solitude. (But the other term, the 
second half of the chiasmus, is often absent in the hypallage, whence 
such phrases as “restless night.”)
Is it not such a vagrancy of properties, precisely, that allows Bobby to 
become an outpost for what meanings are condemned and suppressed 
in the human? In jumping and barking, the dog all but speaks. If he 
knows, is himself this knowing, he must do so, given (and in order to 
“pass”) the constraints of Levinas’s ontological grammar, in the errant 
(not to say aberrant) mode of a night that is solitary or restless. Hypal-
lage as a fi gure wields rare poetic and political force, evincing eloquent, 
obstinate indifference to the proper. Moreover, and importantly, it is not 
an affair of anthropomorphism or even prosopopaeia (even if it can pro-
duce these as two of its possible surface effects), because it concerns that 
literality of language at which, before (or beneath or despite) “proper” 
attributions, that is, before (and even so that) they can be “correctly” 
attributed or misattributed, qualities know no place, so that they are in-
determinate or vague. It is against such a suggested literality of language 
(a poiêtic dreamtime of roaming forms, colors, properties) that the as-
signment of a quality, its attachment to a ground, its affecting of a body, 
when it happens, carries the power of what Paul Ricoeur would call 
a “métaphore vive” (language’s “live” power, with every metaphor, to 
create the real), and what Deleuze and Guattari would call becomings: 
blocks of events, affects, knowings, livings, crossing porous thresholds, 
sweeping through what our distributions and representations persist in 
demarcating as discrete, unitary subjects.42 To be clear: it is biopolitical 
violence that overturns the “proper” in the camp, turning the Jewish 
prisoners into something “subhuman, a gang of apes,” capable only of 
“monkey talk.” But this overturning remains a wielding (in the negative) 
of the force of the proper. If hypallage is a meaningful response to the 
unmaking of persons that is concentrationary violence, this is not due 
to its vested interest in the proper (quite on the contrary, as I have said) 
but inasmuch as it offers a poetic correlate, as it were, to nonviolence: 
its work never to deprive or remove nor to impose or disfi gure but, qui-
etly, to divert, to miscegenate, to cross, to crisscross, to smuggle across, 
to express in one entity the untethered, stray, and perhaps unavoidably 
testimonial traits of another. Seen this way, it is the fi gure of contraband, 
also of contagion and affect, making readable the sense in which one 
body cannot not be “bodily” affected by another in its proximity and 
in relation with it. It is in this rigorous sense a (and arguably the) fi gure 
of deconstruction, in that it reveals the extent to which every subject is 
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expropriated by its “own” qualities, inhabited by traces of that from 
which it may claim or strive to distinguish itself. Perhaps, to overstate 
the point only slightly, it is this sort of nonviolence of the hypallage, as 
the work of what in the distribution of properties remains undifferenti-
ated, vague, homeless, essentially unhomely, that “The Name of a Dog” 
dreams of opposing to the Nazi ideology of identity and difference; at 
any rate this would be one way to understand how— and how tensely, 
how improbably— humanity here, stripped of its skin, can be saved in 
the name of (i.e., in what goes by the name of) a dog.
Not that animality in Levinas’s essay can be anything other than 
an idea irreconcilably divided- from- within. Transcending itself in the 
“literal” animal (Bobby), animality nonetheless metaphorically ensures 
“subhuman[ity]” in humans (“gang of apes”), as per a chiasmatic dead-
lock that rightly frustrates contemporary readers. Yet the diffi culty is 
real— material- historical, philosophical, political, ongoing— and hypal-
lage resolves it less than it attests (by the tautness of its threads) to it. 
The work of determining how Levinas’s essay may despite its irreduc-
ible contradictions be nonetheless advancing thinking on the animal is 
being painstakingly done by Clark and others; I have at length come 
to realize that my own haunting is by something else. “There is some-
thing far worse than being turned into an animal,” as Dayan writes, 
and “naming that thing requires a great deal of thought” (71). While 
“that thing” is, for Dayan, dehumanization, or depersonalization, itself 
“not easy to accomplish” (95), I have come to read her proposition 
in relation to that of a rather different thinker, Clément Rosset, when 
he writes that “the fear of dying is only a secondary consequence of 
the fear of not living.”43 Rosset is, at this point of a book titled The 
Real and Its Double, correcting what he perceives to be Otto Rank’s 
haste in equating the fear of the double with an ancestral fear of death: 
“Much rather than his imminent death,” he writes, “the source of the 
subject’s anxiety is his non- reality, his non- existence. It would not be so 
bad to die if one could at least be certain one had lived” (56). Human 
reality, claims Rosset, may repeatedly and mistakenly be searching for 
its other in various ghostly others when it is rather itself its own other, 
indistinguishably, or— what amounts to the same— the other of nothing. 
The argument, initially one about pervasive structures of avoidance and 
illusion (duplication and secondariness) in humans’ relation to reality, 
turns ultimately on the “disastrous ontological quality” of existence: as 
fi rst formulated in Plato’s Cratylus, a being derives infi nite value from 
being unique, just as, by virtue of that very uniqueness that makes it 
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irreplaceable, it is devalued infi nitely (51). That is to say that, once a 
unique thing or being or reality is gone, nothing replaces them. What 
sort of space was that, then, that now reverts to nothing? What kind of 
body was that, which need not have been in the fi rst place? The “disas-
trous ontological quality” of being, then, is that of never having been 
“more than a very weak, very ephemeral participation in being” (52). 
The problem, in a sense, is that we stop at the dog because we think we 
know what a dog is (whose other it is, what sort of other). And that we 
think we know what the dog is because we think we know what the 
human is. But, Rosset reminds us, our anxiety when faced with doubles, 
others, refl ections, images, traces, is precisely in knowing that the proof 
by the thing itself (the proof of self by self) has never been effective (79). 
(This was also Derrida’s untiring lesson regarding the signature, and re-
garding [self- ]presence.) In fact, one is never suffi ciently visible or plau-
sible as a unique being; in the fi nal analysis one cannot establish one’s 
body and existence by oneself, except on paper (through institutions, 
legal rights, documentation, acts of witnessing, writing) (75– 77). How 
immeasurable a burden of proof this is is made clear in times of crisis— 
when there are no papers, or when papers mean nothing. Then— and 
this is precisely that point of unmaking that so preoccupies Dayan— the 
human person turns implausible, returned to the ghostliness of being 
the other to nothing. To my mind the drama of Bobby’s presence is most 
soberly registered at that place where he is not even just a wandering 
dog, or a vague dog, but standing at (and for) that place where human 
properties and meanings must survive their own being- vague.
P E T I T E S P E R C E P T I O N S  (The Leibniz- Bayle- Deleuze Dog)
Vagueness happens to be an important notion in analytic philosophy 
and linguistics, where it describes those predicates whose boundaries 
are inherently unclear: it is hard to say where precisely they begin or 
end, which objects belong to them and which do not, without coming 
up against the riddle of borderline cases.44 Hence the vagueness of a 
proposition such as “the person was tall”— How tall? Taller than what 
others? Where is the threshold where tallness begins? (And what would 
that place— that fi rst place of tallness— even look like? Is it not an ir-
rational, slippery threshold, for the fact that the taller one is, as with 
Alice when she grows, the shorter one was, and therefore the shorter 
“tall” is?)45 Vague in this sense too, then, seems to describe the weird 
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predicament of a quality’s or a concept’s being the other of nothing, its 
way of fl ickering, of fl uttering, of seeming ghostly, as its proof, or center, 
stands outside it. Discussions of vagueness often refer back to a paradox 
formulated by the fourth- century b.c.e. Greek philosopher Eubulides of 
Miletus (most famous for his paradox of the liar: “What I am saying 
now is a lie”) known as the paradox of the heap or the sorites paradox 
(from the Ancient Greek word for “heap”). A certain number of grains 
of sand (say one million) makes a heap. A heap minus one grain of sand 
is still a heap. Proceeding according to the two premises, grain by grain, 
down from one million to one, one arrives at a single grain of sand that 
is, absurdly, still a heap. Conversely: one grain of sand + 1 does not 
make a heap; keep adding according to this logic, and we get to one mil-
lion grains of sand that are still not a heap. The sorites paradox has elic-
ited a “desperately wide range” of theoretical solutions.46 Establishing a 
fi xed threshold or boundary between heap and pile (or tall and not tall) 
is unsatisfactory because it would be arbitrary and would illuminate 
nothing about the truth of how terms such as “heap” or “tall” function 
meaningfully in natural language despite their vagueness. In the extreme 
one can decide simply (this would be the skepticist’s answer) that there 
are no such things as heaps. An epistemicist’s answer is that there is a 
boundary separating heapness from itself but that it cannot be known. 
A more pragmatic or political approach (for instance, when addressing 
the vagueness of legal terms) would be to seek a group’s consensus on 
what constitutes heapness or tallness. For some philosophers vagueness 
is a property of language, rather than of truth.47 Starting in the 1960s 
others argued in favor of “fuzzy hedges,” “quasitransitive relations,” 
and other descriptions of transitional zones of partial, weakened, or 
indecisive difference/identity (“truth gaps” and “truth gluts”) between 
heap and nonheap where something may be neither wholly heap nor 
wholly nonheap, or both heap and nonheap, or where the difference, at 
any rate, may not yet be distinguishable.
Samuel Beckett had mulled in several places over the sorites paradox 
and other paradoxes resulting from nonfi niteness or vagueness. In ex-
tensive notes taken in the 1930s on early Greek philosophy, he likened 
them to Zeno’s paradox— also concerning thresholds only asymptot-
ically (i.e., never quite yet) arrived at— and sometimes misattributed 
the sorites paradox to Zeno.48 “Finished, it’s fi nished, nearly fi nished, it 
must be nearly fi nished. [Pause] Grain upon grain, one by one, and one 
day, suddenly, there’s a heap, a little heap, the impossible heap,” goes the 
much- quoted opening line (Clov’s) of Endgame (1957). A more diffuse 
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treatment of Eubulides’s riddle in the wartime novel Watt (published in 
1953) makes of the imperceptible slipping of sand grains nothing less 
than a theory of the (slightest) event.49 Things here are slippery in more 
than one way. Chris Ackerley, who has written substantially on Watt 
and who points to Beckett’s exposure to Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s 
Monadology in the very years— and initially through the same source, 
Wilhelm Windelband’s A History of Philosophy (1901)— in which he 
encountered the Pre- Socratics, suggests that in Beckett’s thinking the 
sorites paradox came to be quasi identifi ed with Leibniz’s petites per-
ceptions.50 Following Leibniz’s doctrine of preestablished harmony, the 
soul (or soul- like substance, which he would come to name the monad) 
was a “perpetual living mirror of the universe”51— in Windelband’s 
words, “The monad knows the world because it is the world.”52 This 
relation was worked out in detail through the theory of petites percep-
tions, by which the monad “has very many more representations than 
it is conscious of.”53 A crucial point, for in Leibniz’s view “herein l[ay] 
the great mistake of the Cartesians, that they took no account of per-
ceptions which are not apperceived,” that is, perceived consciously.54 He 
would offer up, as against the Cartesian res cogitans— which had in turn 
led both to a denial of souls to animals and to an insistence on the sepa-
ration of soul and body, both of which Leibniz would dispute— a newly 
dramatized understanding of “the life of the soul [as what] transcends 
all that is clear and distinctly conscious, and is rooted in obscurely pre-
saged depths” (A History of Philosophy, 2:464). Now, a dog enters the 
scene precisely here, what is more, owing to a French connection. For 
it was the French philosopher Pierre Bayle, exiled in Holland, author of 
the Dictionnaire historique et critique (the fi rst edition of which [1697] 
featured his fi rst comments on Leibniz), who had challenged Leibniz 
to explain how his theory might account for the sudden transition in 
a famished dog from pleasure to pain when it is unexpectedly, while 
eating some bread, struck by a stick. Wherefrom would the pain issue 
forth, Bayle asked Leibniz, if monads, “windowless,”55 cannot be infl u-
enced from without? Are we to believe that this passive state sponta-
neously arises from the dog itself, in other words, independently and 
(thereby) even potentially in the absence of the stick?56 The engagement 
between the two philosophers over several years of published writings 
and correspondence (1687– 1706) is now understood, despite disagree-
ments never quite overcome, to have been determining in prompting 
Leibniz to take his thinking to its furthest and sharpest scope.57 In the 
Histoire des usages des savants as well as in notes following the 1702 
120 ❘ Chapter 3
edition of the Dictionnaire he would take pains to respond to Bayle in 
some detail, resulting in this explanation:
The causes that make the stick act (that is to say the man 
positioned behind the dog, who is getting ready while it eats, 
and everything in the course of bodies that contributes to 
dispose the man to this) are also represented from the fi rst 
in the soul of the dog exactly in accordance with the truth, 
but weakly, by little, confused perceptions, without apper-
ception, that is to say without the dog noticing it, because 
the dog’s body also is only imperceptibly affected by it. And 
as in the course of bodies these dispositions fi nally produce 
the blow pressed hard on the dog’s body, in the same way 
the representations of these dispositions in the dog’s soul fi -
nally produce the representation of the blow of the stick. 
Since that representation is distinguished and strong, . . . the 
dog apperceives it very distinctly, and that is what makes its 
pain.58
Leibniz would clarify the need to “distinguish between the spontaneous 
and the voluntary”— the dog does not will the change, yet it supports it 
through its own spontaneously evolving and productive representations: 
“The principle of change is in the dog. The disposition of its soul moves 
imperceptibly towards giving it pain; but this is without its knowing, 
and without its wanting it. The representation of the present state of the 
universe in the dog’s soul produces in it the representation of the sub-
sequent state of the same universe, just as in the things represented the 
preceding state actually produces the subsequent state of its world.”59 
The point is that what happens on the level of inner representations 
mirrors and actualizes what happens on the level of represented (events 
of the world), so that the passage from pleasure to pain is made possible 
precisely by the fact that, somehow, even before the blow falls, “both 
the stick and its wielder are expressed in the mind of the dog.”60 Thus 
the event itself, when it occurs, has the character of an accumulation, 
where enough petites perceptions— like grains of sand— have added up 
for the threshold of consciousness to be crossed, and virtual and actual, 
inner and outward reality to correspond: in the words of Gilles Deleuze, 
who would return repeatedly, in his book on Leibniz, to the dog, “pain 
has not abruptly followed pleasure, but has been prepared by a thou-
sand minute perceptions.”61
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In Deleuze’s hands the Bayle- Leibniz dog would become a fi gure for 
the ceaseless disquiet of animate life, continually alert to those minute 
slippings— “When no one is looking, no one listening, in tiny packets 
of two or three millions the grains slip, all together, a little slip of one 
or two lines maybe, and then stop” (Watt, 43)— that may in a situation 
or event already be carrying it toward its disfi gurement: “If Leibniz at-
taches so much importance to the question of the souls of animals, it is 
because he knows how to diagnose the universal anxiety of the animal 
watching out for danger [de l’animal aux aguets], that seeks to grasp 
the imperceptible signs of what can turn its pleasure into pain, its hunt 
into fl ight, or its repose into movement” (The Fold, 56; translation mod-
ifi ed). Deleuze would write some pages later of the petites perceptions 
that they “constitute the animal or animated state par excellence: dis-
quiet [l’inquiétude]. These are ‘pricklings’ [aiguillons], or little foldings 
that are no less present in pleasure than in pain. The pricklings are the 
representative of the world in the closed monad. The animal that anx-
iously looks about [l’animal aux aguets], or the soul that watches out 
[l’âme aux aguets], signifi es that there exist minute perceptions that are 
not integrated into present perception, but also minute perceptions that 
are not integrated into the preceding one and that nourish the one that 
comes along (‘so it was that!’)” (86– 87). If we remember that in Leibniz’s 
monadology soul and world mirror each other, what starts to appear is 
that the âme aux aguets (the soul “on the lookout” or “on guard”), as 
Deleuze so vividly calls it, is the rigorous correlate to the Baroque con-
ception of world. The dog looks out (is this looking out without seeing, 
as it were) at a world that is essentially one, but differing infi nitely in de-
gree and direction.62 The world that provides sustenance at one moment 
may in the next moment injure or menace with death; a soul such as the 
dog’s must, in refl ecting the world, carry within itself at the same time 
a multiplicity of perceptions and possible perceptions.63 Yet, because 
the petites perceptions are largely unconscious, the dog’s knowledge is 
a peculiar one, unrepresented to itself, a wary dwelling and watching 
through the expressive work of which the world— as endless change, 
constant foldings and unfoldings, events continually in production— 
repairs its own apparent differences and ceaselessly actualizes itself as 
(infi nitely) one.64 Indeed, the dog exemplifi es (it is an example but also 
a fable) the soul that for Leibniz is the place of a “concentration of the 
universe” (GP 4:53), with “the means suffi cient to unfold the history of 
that universe through its perceptual states.”65 It is in this fairly radical 
sense, then, that the (Baroque conception of) world needs the (Baroque 
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conception of) dog. And perhaps the dog more vividly, more intuitively, 
than any other animal precisely (this being the unsaid in Bayle and Leib-
niz and of particular interest to me) because, positioned as it is vis- à- vis 
the human world in a way that is uniquely experimental, hopeful, vul-
nerable, entre chien et loup (drawing from that same world alternately 
its assurances and its abjection), a dog fi nds its life nervously indexed 
exactly on that threshold (that vague boundary) where food is always 
on the verge of turning into stick (and/or vice versa), and pleasure into 
pain (and/or vice versa), and thus, in the petites perceptions, its very 
survival continually at stake.
“If someone asked me ‘What is an animal for you?,’ I would answer, 
‘It’s to be on guard [aux aguets].’ It’s a being that is fundamentally on 
guard [c’est un être fondamentalement aux aguets],” Deleuze said fa-
mously in L’abécédaire, those eight hours of interview recorded in the 
very year he published his book on Leibniz.66 He would concede (when 
pressed) that this may serve as an analogy for the state of the writer, 
of the philosopher, only to then return explicitly to the predicament of 
animals: “[The animal] doesn’t do anything without being on guard. 
It’s never at peace [on laisse jamais tranquille un animal]. . . . When it 
eats, it has to notice [surveiller] what’s happening behind its back, if 
something is happening to the side, et cetera. It’s terrible, this existence 
of being on guard [c’est terrible, cette existence aux aguets].” To me it 
is clear,67 even while Deleuze may throw us off the scent by commenc-
ing the “A for animal” entry with a general condemnation of familiar/
familial animals and with a statement of strong distaste for dogs in 
particular (their bark the “stupidest noise,” “the embarrassment of the 
animal kingdom,” etc. [24]), that it is not the wild or unfamiliar animal 
that he is thinking of here when he defi nes the animal, and associates 
with it foremost the character of “être aux aguets,” but rather that very 
wretched dog that eats while a man approaches stealthily from behind 
with a stick. In its transmission from Bayle to Leibniz to Deleuze, that 
unseemly scene will have gathered dramatic allegorical force, emblazon-
ing in its details the experience of embodied, temporal, injurable life, 
and registering the exact sense in which that experience can be— in the 
word’s original sense, derived from terror— “terrible.”
Terror is arguably the price to pay for the (i.e., Leibniz’s original) re-
fusal of the abstract, discrete concepts of classicism. “Instead of sticking 
to abstractions, we have to restore the series,” Deleuze writes in The 
Fold, then goes on to describe the man approaching the eating dog, “tip-
toe[ing] up from behind,” “rais[ing] the instrument,” and correspond-
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ingly, in the soul of the dog, the “thousand minute perceptions— the 
pitter- patter of feet, the hostile man’s odor, the impression of the stick 
being raised up” (56). The terror is in realizing that opposites are not 
opposed, but in a continuum, differing only in degree. The same world 
can by turn be hospitable or hostile, the change creeping in impercep-
tibly till it is (as if) suddenly effective. There, then, lies the secret lesson 
of the petites perceptions, a secret that Leibnizian philosophy, in its re-
sponse to Bayle, would come to locate, for didactic purposes, in the 
dog. The infi nite unity of the world becomes the dog’s to bear. What 
would not have escaped Beckett as he connected the sorites paradox 
and the petites perceptions— particularly in his early novel Watt, which, 
as Germaine Brée was the fi rst to suggest in 1963, “appears as an inten-
tional parody and refutation of Leibniz’s ‘best possible of worlds’”— is 
that what is located in the dog describes, equally, our own dog life to 
live, without ground, without home.68 “To think, when one is no longer 
young, when one is not yet old, that one is no longer young, that one is 
not yet old, that is perhaps something. To pause, [ . . . ] and consider: the 
darkening ease, the brightening trouble; the pleasure pleasure because 
it was, the pain pain because it shall be; the glad acts grown proud, 
the proud acts growing stubborn; the panting, the trembling towards a 
being gone, a being to come; and the true true no longer, and the false 
true not yet” (Watt, 201). If there is a lesson of the dog, it has to do ob-
scurely with this vagueness, which in the extreme instance, in substitut-
ing creeping, unstoppable continuities for oppositions, is what secretly 
connects (this is why we dread it) what a thing or being is to what it is 
no longer, or not yet.
The Relation Woven Nightly (Beckett’s Dog)
When Watt wonders, thereby weirdly anticipating Levinas’s question 
(“So who is this dog at the end of the verse?”), “But was a dog the same 
thing as the dog?,” and, a little further, “a fortiori were several dogs the 
same thing as the dog?” (96), I fi nd a clue to why dogs keep appearing 
at those places where concepts and humans go vague. Beckett’s pro-
tagonist, while in the service of the most enigmatic Mr. Knott, is here 
mulling at length over the riddle of a certain instruction pertaining to 
his employer’s daily one- dish meals, namely “to give what Mr. Knott left 
of this dish, on the days that he did not eat it all, to the dog” (91). There 
is no dog in the house, “so that it was necessary that a dog from outside 
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should call at the house at least once every day, on the off chance of its 
being given part, or all, of Mr. Knott’s lunch, or dinner, or both, to eat.” 
The matter, like all matters in this novel of series and permutations, 
presents “great diffi culties” (91): some days Mr. Knott would eat every-
thing he was served, on others he would leave some unforseeable part 
of his lunch or dinner or both, on others yet (rare) he would eat nothing 
at all (which would be “of course wonderful days, for the dog”). The 
problem is that “the average hungry or starving dog, if left to its own 
devices,” would not willingly depend for its daily survival on a food 
source so erratic (92). Twenty- fi ve pages of elucubrations follow, in the 
course of which, piece by piece, is assembled the arrangement, and in-
deed the world system, that must logically be implied by the mysterious 
injunction: A dog (kept) continually hungry must present itself every 
day at an appointed hour (after Knott’s second meal) to eat however 
much food there remains to eat, there must be a keeper for this dog, 
there must be a second hungry dog on reserve in case the fi rst dog dies 
(a fair probability since on some days there will be nothing for it to 
eat, and on others the food would be “a little on the rich and heating 
side, for a dog,” and since in any case the dog is kept on a chain with 
no exercise [112]), and eventually a third in case the second dies, “and 
so on indefi nitely”; there must also be a backup for the keeper in case 
the keeper dies, and a third in case the second dies, “and so on indefi -
nitely”; there must be monetary incentive to ensure the daily service and 
no departure from it, therefore the keepers must be (kept) poor; and so 
on. Watt’s ratiocinations lead ineluctably to “the solution that seemed 
to have prevailed”: on the one hand, “a kennel or colony of famished 
dogs”; on the other, “a suitable large needy local family of say the two 
parents and from ten to fi fteen children and grandchildren passionately 
attached to their birthplace” (98– 99). There are few more chilling ex-
amples in modern literature of what can happen when logic takes the 
place of narrative or world. One thinks, for example, of the way com-
petitive games order life on the dystopian island of Georges Perec’s W 
or The Memory of Childhood. Beckett, “an engaged and traumatized 
witness” to the “genocidal disasters brought about by twentieth- century 
thinking,” wrote Watt during the period from February 1941 to Feb-
ruary 1945, the fi rst part of which he spent working for a resistance 
network in Paris and the rest in fl ight from the Gestapo and hiding in 
the Vaucluse.69 That the shadow of a concentrationary world should 
fall so darkly on the novel is then hardly surprising; for Ackerley, Watt 
“testifi es eloquently to a world in ruins.”70 More remarkable is the fact 
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that the pages given laboriously over to “this matter of the dog required 
to eat the food that Mr. Knott left” (99) should be the principal place 
where this shadow falls.71
Writing on Beckettian exhaustion, Deleuze himself would cite this 
“great serial novel, in which Mr. Knott[’s] only need is to be without 
need,” where the exhaustive is the fi eld of a subjecthood itself exhausted, 
that has “renounce[d] any order of preference, any organization in re-
lation to a goal, any signifi cation.”72 The distinction between terms, at 
this exhaustive/exhausting point of language, writes Deleuze, serves no 
end “except to create further permutations. It is enough to say about 
an event that it is possible, since it does not occur without merging 
with nothing, and abolishing the real to which it lays claim” (153). Ad-
mittedly, the dog is not the most exemplary instance of an exhaustive 
series in Watt.73 It offers, nonetheless, emblematic grounds for showing 
that Beckettian exhaustion is not, as Deleuze would have it, strictly or 
necessarily without value or investment, but on the contrary can be the 
radical means by which to delimit the properly unbearable.
To begin with (by way of secondary evidence), there are places in 
Watt where, within a series, a particular permutative outcome is sug-
gested to be unhappy. There is the fact that when Watt thinks, through 
a series of possible confi gurations, of what Knott’s relationship to his 
daily food arrangement might be (varying around the axes: Is he re-
sponsible for it? Does he know he is? Does he know the arrangement 
exists? Is he content with it?), he expressly leaves out all those con-
fi gurations wherein Knott might not be content, as François Martel 
has noted without venturing any particular reading of it.74 That the 
possibility of Knott’s unhappiness— vis- à- vis an arrangement that has 
“never varied, since its establishment, long long before” (88), a har-
mony preestablished, shall we say, to follow Ackerley’s reading of Watt 
as a rehearsal or parody of Leibnizian thinking— does not bear think-
ing fi nds within the novel a likely (if nonexplicit) explanation. For it is 
Watt himself who, while in Knott’s service, shedding “tears of mental 
fatigue,” is responsible for the daily brewing of his preestablished stew, 
whose ingredients and dosages had been “calculated, with the most 
minute exactness, to afford Mr. Knott [ . . . ], the maximum pleasure 
compatible with the protraction of his health” (88). Here, then, is why 
Watt is a novel about “the tragedy of the monad that tries to accom-
modate itself to the ‘establishment’”:75 to be a servant of the prees-
tablished order is to fi nd certain kinds of relations to it, and thereby 
certain regions of world and self (those not in harmony with it), si-
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lenced as unthinkable, or rather, too painful to think, for they would 
instantly put in question the harmony of the whole; worse still, they 
might show universal harmony to be premised on a making- unreal of 
singular predicaments. It is in these terms that I would understand, 
likewise, the extraordinary passage (again read for its logic but not for 
any “meaning” by Martel— oh the happy age of formalism!) where, 
before a picture in Erskine’s room featuring a circle and a center, Watt 
runs through all the possibilities of what it might be a picture of, to fi nd 
himself inconsolable at the last:
And he wondered what the artist had intended to represent 
(Watt knew nothing about painting), a circle and its centre 
in search of each other, or a circle and its centre in search of 
a centre and a circle respectively, or a circle and its centre in 
search of its centre and a circle respectively, or a circle and 
its centre in search of a centre and its circle respectively, or 
a circle and a centre not its centre in search of its centre and 
its circle respectively, or a circle and a centre not its centre 
in search of a centre and a circle respectively, or a circle and 
a centre not its centre in search of its centre and a circle 
respectively, or a circle and a centre not its centre in search 
of a centre and its circle respectively, in boundless space, in 
endless time (Watt knew nothing about physics), and at the 
thought that it was perhaps this, a circle and a centre not 
its centre in search of a centre and its circle respectively, in 
boundless space, in endless time, then Watt’s eyes fi lled with 
tears that he could not stem, and they fl owed down his fl uted 
cheeks unchecked, in a steady fl ow, refreshing him greatly. 
(129)
The last confi guration easily, pithily formulates the missed relation be-
tween, on the one hand, a preestablished world order that indifferently 
seeks any body or self to stand at its center and assure in turn its har-
monious functioning, and, on the other, that body or self that looks 
for a world that might be its world and home. That “it was perhaps 
this,” that this should have been the outcome arrived at as the best of 
all possible worlds, has Watt crying tears that the world cannot in fact 
receive nor contain, since the world seeks and knows not him but “a” 
body whatsoever in his place. Thus his tears fl ow “[un]stem[med],” “un-
checked,” unworldly.
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Under cover of the “outrageous parody of scholasticism” of Watt,76 it 
seems to me that Beckett would prize open small windows (in a suppos-
edly windowless world) in precisely this way, that is, as bits of meaning 
and feeling that the world and its telling have no place for. So with the 
business of the dog by which “Watt was, for a time, greatly interested, 
and even fascinated,” “attach[ing] to this matter an importance, and 
even a signifi cance, that seem hardly warranted” (116). As the arrange-
ment works out its perfected form, tiny excesses accrue here and there: 
the man sent from the house to seek out a/the dog cuts “a wretched and 
ridiculous fi gure” (94); the dog, once it is established to be the same 
from day to day, becomes “the same poor old dog” (96) and then the 
“faithful emaciated dog” (97);77 in one fl awed scenario, “the man and 
dog come running to the door, when there was nothing [to eat for the 
dog], or onward plod, when there was something” (97; my emphasis). 
In other words, as the scene gains consistency, small semantic elements 
appear that seem to indecently exceed the strictly logical necessity at 
work. But then again, are these elements really excessive or erratic? 
When one pays closer attention to them, they gather rather as points 
where the imagination (Watt’s or Watt’s) most clinically registers what 
is necessarily implied, indeed required by the system— places where suf-
fering forms in truth the system’s central animating principle. For, at 
the center of the system that ensures that Knott’s “remains,” as they are 
called (115), go to the dog, is a dog kept famished, prevented from seek-
ing its nourishment through any other means, and forced to eat no more 
and no less than what Knott leaves. So that we should perhaps not be 
surprised to see materialize, around the “real live famished dog as large 
as life” (100), also a stick and a disciplining scene:
Passing on then to the solution that seemed to have pre-
vailed, Watt found it to be roughly this, that a suitable local 
dogowner, that is to say a needy man with a famished dog, 
should be sought out, and on him settled a handsome annu-
ity of fi fty pounds payable monthly, in consideration of his 
calling at Mr. Knott’s house every evening between eight and 
ten, accompanied by his dog in a famished condition, and 
on those days on which there was food for his dog of his 
standing over his dog, with a stick, before witnesses, until 
the dog had eaten all the food until not an atom remained, 
and of his then taking himself and his dog off the premises 
without delay. (98)
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Here the scene is reconstituted at its most elaborate, featuring all its nec-
essary components. Earlier and later, the stick and witnesses are omit-
ted, or only tacitly implied in a “standing over” (95, 96, 113). Ackerley 
has connected a reference to a stick elsewhere in Watt with a Schopen-
hauerian thematic of self- extension of the body in relationship to itself 
and its environment.78 The stick for Schopenhauer (and for Stephen 
Dedalus) serves to verify the existence of a thing. But the stick of the 
“standing over” is no Schopenhauerian stick, it would seem to be rather, 
alas, a stick of the Bayle- Leibniz sort, held aloft while a dog eats. With a 
twist, if one considers that the power of the stick here is not to interrupt 
the dog’s eating but quite on the contrary to ensure that it “eat[s] all the 
food until not an atom remain[s].” It is worth remembering here that 
for Leibniz, hunger/satiation, like pain/pleasure (and even appearing to 
provide the model thereof), were not simply linked through reversal or 
separated by a frank caesura, but spilled forth into each other like para-
doxical communicating vessels: “How could a feeling of hunger follow 
one of satiation if a thousand tiny, elementary forms of hunger (for 
salts, for sugar, butter, etc.) were not released at diverse and indiscern-
ible rhythms? And inversely, if satisfaction follows hunger, it is through 
the sating of all these particular and imperceptible hungers.”79 Leib-
nizian thinking stands not to survive Watt’s “concrete and burlesque” 
twist,80 whereby what determines the end of the dog’s meal is no longer 
an inner threshold of satiation, where a thousand petites perceptions 
culminate, but rather an outer injunction and limit (the stick, enforcing 
subservience to the dish, that must be emptied), by virtue of which the 
faithfulness of “the faithful emaciated dog” names its forced consent 
to being hollowed out of itself as it were— made all appetite and no 
perception/affection. Thus preestablished harmony gives way to what 
Beckett would call some pages later a “preestablished arbitrary” (134). 
Is it that monadological thinking cannot account for biopolitical vio-
lence, or that it had in fact allowed for it from the beginning?
Perhaps the key to Beckett’s provocation to Leibniz (appearing as 
he does here almost as a second Bayle) is in the insistence that “not an 
atom remained.” Atomist or protoatomist though Leibniz was, he had 
no place for emptiness or nothing, suggesting rather folds or what later 
materialists would call fractals, waves, quanta.81 This is fundamentally, 
one could say, what made him “a philosopher of habitat and ecology.”82 
To this Beckett opposes the zero- sum economy of the pot that must 
at all costs be completely emptied. An imagined scenario (not effi cient 
enough to prevail) where a person might be employed every night to 
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take “the pot full” to dog after dog “until all the food was eaten, and not 
an atom remained, and then to bring back the pot empty” is followed by 
this rare parenthetical meditation on the nonsymmetry of fullness and 
emptiness: “(And is it not strange most strange that one says of a thing 
that it is full, when it is not full at all, but not of a thing that it is empty, 
if it is not empty? And perhaps the reason for that is this, that when 
one fi lls, one seldom fi lls quite full, for that would not be convenient, 
whereas when one empties one empties completely, holding the vessel 
upside down, and rinsing it out with boiling water if necessary, with 
a kind of fury)” (95). It is this seemingly excessive but in fact strictly 
economic (economistic) “fury” that will fi nd concrete expression in the 
stick, whose work is to ensure that the pot is emptied every night, as it 
were, into the dog, “until not an atom remained.” The perfect economy 
of Knott’s establishment is thus ensured by this dog, alternately starved 
and forced to eat, not so much a monad within the world, as the dark 
hole where what does not quite “add up” in the world can be evacuated. 
Such evacuation— the rounding off of “remains” to zero, the production 
of clean borders and emptiness— is not achieved without fury.
That the nightly scene of the dog’s feeding is one that affects Watt— 
the dog’s plight emerging then as perhaps even what is most unbearable, 
more so even than Knott’s possible discontent (its symmetrical double,83 
but whose main effect is to exile the dog further from thought)— is ev-
idenced in the fact that though “it was part of Watt’s duties [ . . . ] to 
witness the dog’s eating the food, until not an atom remained,” actually 
“after the fi rst few weeks Watt abruptly ceased, on his own respon-
sibility, to discharge this offi ce” (113). The refusal entails certain in-
tricate measures (a code involving a light lighting the doorstep where 
the food is kept, when there is food, etc.) and possibly “the gravest 
consequences, both for Watt and for Mr Knott’s establishment,” we 
learn, yet “he could not have done otherwise, believe it or not, than he 
did” (114– 15). No reason will be provided for Watt’s declining of his 
witnessing/disciplining role, though it is made clear that it is certainly 
not because he loves dogs (“greatly preferring rats”), nor any one dog 
in particular (Kate, in service when he joins Knott’s estate, he fi nds “of 
repulsive aspect” [111– 12]). But it can be guessed that Watt’s refusal, 
despite his fear of being punished for it and/or that it will bring about 
great harm to the establishment, is of an obscurely similar order to his 
great sorrow at the last of the circle/center hypotheses. The “relation 
that the dog wove nightly” (116)— and by extension the establishment 
or the preestablished/arbitrary world system— enlists Kate as it would 
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any other body in her place, it runs, as per the original injunction/riddle 
governing Knott’s food arrangements, on a notion (and a keeping- in- 
optimal- operation) of “the dog,” with no relation whatsoever to any 
questions concerning who or what “the dog” might be— “But was a 
dog the same thing as the dog? [ . . . ] a fortiori were several dogs the 
same thing as the dog?” (96). What stands at the place of “the dog” is a 
bleak and godforsaken life. Released from sight, unmoored eventually 
from words and thought, Kate will fl icker between existence and nonex-
istence, unthinkable center of the world, appearing nightly in a pool of 
light, to then return again to darkness: “He had turned, little by little, a 
disturbance into words, he had made a pillow of old words, for a head. 
Little by little, and not without labour. Kate eating from her dish, for 
example, with the dwarves standing by, how he had laboured to know 
what that was, to know which the doer, and what the doer, and what 
the doing, and which the sufferer, and what the sufferer, and what the 
suffering, and what those shapes, that were not rooted to the ground, 
like the veronica, but melted away, into the dark, after a while” (117).
Dog sustenance would again turn (endlessly, abyssally) into suffering 
in the doggerel opening act 2 of Waiting for Godot, where a dog steals a 
crust of bread (it is a sausage in the original French text) from a kitchen 
only to be beaten to death for it (with a ladle), whereupon the other 
dogs bury it and inscribe on the tomb the tale of the dog that steals 
a crust of bread from a kitchen only to be beaten to death for it, and 
so on, a recursive loop of a song that, if not for the return of Estragon 
(who himself was beaten during the night that he spent in a ditch), 
would continue endlessly.84 Beckett’s dogs are curious creatures, as if 
underdeveloped and excessive at the same time. If they are “despised 
for their obviousness”85— and we might remember here that “obvious” 
comes from ob viam, “in the way”— it may well be because they express 
too obviously a tetheredness to that threshold where doing can turn 
into suffering, eating into aching— not to say the extent to which some-
thing like subjecthood (as initially subjection— remember Bentham/
Derrida’s “Can they suffer?”) starts precisely at that threshold— that 
the self would rather “despise and refuse” in itself. Which might account 
for the moving moment in Krapp’s Last Tape, where Krapp (there too in 
a mise en abyme, since it is Krapp listening to his past self on a tape) can 
no longer separate his own (refused) sadness at his mother’s death from 
the (too obvious) disappointment of a little dog:86 “There I sat, in the 
biting wind, wishing she were gone. (Pause.) . . . I was there when ( . . . ) 
the blind went down, one of those dirty brown roller affairs, throwing 
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a ball for a little white dog as chance would have it. I happened to look 
up and there it was. All over and done with, at least. I sat on for a few 
moments with the ball in my hand and the dog yelping and pawing at 
me. (Pause.) Moments. Her moments, my moments. (Pause.) The dog’s 
moments.”87
Not I
Deleuze would not enact the same “refusal to be present when the 
dog ate the food” (Watt, 115) as Watt. This extraordinary thinker of 
becoming- animal, when revisiting a second time in The Fold the Leib-
nizian scene of the dog always- on- the- verge- of- being- fl ogged, slips curi-
ously into the fi rst person: “However abruptly I may fl og my dog who 
eats his meal, the animal will have experienced the minute perceptions 
of my stealthy arrival on tiptoes, my hostile odor, and my lifting of 
the rod that subtend the conversion of pleasure into pain” (86– 87; my 
emphasis). A disconcerting point of view to say the least, until one con-
siders that such a distribution of positions was perhaps already fore-
told in Bayle- Leibniz. For to insistently locate the drama of the petites 
perceptions in a dog was to not suffi ciently guard against the fantasy 
of an essential difference between humans and animals. A difference if 
not in terms of capacity (for in this respect the dog is meant to stand 
for the soul in general, including the human soul), at least in terms of 
predicament and narrative position— for as soon as a stick appears, a 
man appears to wield it, and this man is presumed to be self- identical, 
that is, assured of the consciousness of his intention and thus of inhab-
iting for all intents and purposes the realm of reason and apperception. 
Of course one could maintain that the “I,” in its exaggerated exteriority 
(“my stealthy arrival on tiptoes, my hostile odor”), forms here at most 
a sort of prop, a weak defense and foil, and that the perceptual- affective 
energy, the sensory intensity of embodied life is, in the scene, entirely 
that of the dog. But the point is that Deleuze, even as he holds up Leib-
niz’s dog as a fi gure for the universal anxiety of the soul, in assuming 
in this lapse the position of man with stick, at the same time symptom-
atically illustrates the force— narrative, representational, gravitational, 
biopolitical, but also/even pedagogical— that will always attempt or 
appear to preserve, or to prefer, subjecthood at a distance from the “être 
aux aguets”— even if this means a subjecthood rather impoverished or 
ungainly (sad stick man, “stealthy” and “hostile”).
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True, even while the deepest thrust of Leibniz’s thinking (and that of 
Bayle) was anti- Cartesian and even while by “animals” he meant “all 
living creatures up to and including man,”88 he did locate in humans 
alone (or at least in “the wisest people”) the ability to refl ect on the 
reasons for why what happens happens— while “brutes” (that is, ani-
mals), like pure empiricists, base their knowledge entirely on what has 
already been known to happen and thus could happen again, “without 
being capable of determining whether the same reasons hold good”: “It 
is because of this that it is so easy for men to catch animals,” Leibniz 
would write, pointing out that “men become more skillful by discover-
ing countless new contrivances, whereas the stags and hares of today 
are no more cunning than those of yesterday. The sequences of brutes 
are but a shadow of reasoning, that is to say, they are but connexions 
of imagination, transitions from one image to another” (Philosophi-
cal Writings, 152). Granted, as Garin Dowd notes in a lucid essay on 
Beckett and Leibniz, “the dog [ . . . ] has an archival capacity” (Dowd 
quotes Leibniz: “When dogs are shown a stick, they remember the pain 
which it has caused them in the past, and they run away”).89 Still, in the 
hierarchy of monads it is a properly refl exive capacity that is needed for 
a soul to become a rational self: “It is by knowledge of necessary truths 
and by their abstractions that we are raised to acts of refl ection, which 
make us think of what is called the self, and consider that this or that is 
within us.”90 Thus, if for Leibniz the dog can remember and even learn 
to avoid, to become a rational self is to go further still, it is to transcend 
one’s dog life as it were, those mere appetites and aversions, pleasures 
and pains, it is ultimately to turn the stick into a heuristic device— as, 
say, Beckett’s Malone would do awhile, using it to reach out and enu-
merate his possessions and thus to verify the extent of the self— not to 
say a concept: “How great is my debt to sticks! So great that I almost 
forget the blows they have transferred to me.”91
Yet has one ever completely arrived at such a transcending? What if 
the drama of the “être aux aguets” simply got transposed onto another 
level? For is the self not a function of the continual (attempted) dividing 
off of the “I” from the “animal that therefore I am,” the dog condemned 
to live in fear of the stick, at its mercy? And is a life— or a story— not 
the space of a continual striving (or dreading) to know “which [is] the 
doer, and what the doer, and what the doing, and which the sufferer, and 
what the sufferer, and what the suffering” (Watt, 117)? To be aux aguets 
is to lie in wait (guetter shares its root with “wait”), so as to surprise 
or to avoid being surprised (Littré). Within this waiting that describes 
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wakeful, watchful life, the ambusher strives, through strength or cun-
ning, to distinguish itself from the ambushed, the human from the ani-
mal, the narrator from the narrated. The “être aux aguets” describes an 
intense, anxious vigilance as possibility unfolds and divides. To under-
stand it as a state of destinal suspense, a tense place where living beings 
stand waiting and wary, is to feel an unease at the thought of which of 
us— or which part of us— might not or does not survive the unfolding.
And what of NDiaye’s dogs that led me down this winding, riddled, 
eccentric path, through Levinas, vagueness, Beckett, Leibniz, Deleuze, 
and the “être aux aguets”? They pose an enigma that I slowly gather the 
means to interpret: the presence of a dog in a story may point foremost 
toward the drama of what struggles— what has historically struggled— to 
be apart from it, to not identify with it. Not I: so one might formulate 
this drama, remembering one of Beckett’s most troubling monologues 
(1972; Not I) but also so many limit- like points in his writing, where 
a speaking voice recognized both that it could not stop speaking (and 
thus continually producing inescapable images of itself, yet which were 
not suffi ciently itself for it to stand there once and for all for itself: 
“For why [ . . . ]? And whose voice asking this? Who asks, Whose voice 
asking this?”),92 and that it could never be sure that it was itself really 
speaking: “I never spoke, I seem to speak, that’s because he says I as if 
he were I, I nearly believed him, do you hear him, as if he were I, I who 
am far, who can’t move, can’t be found, but neither can he, he can only 
talk, if that much, perhaps it’s not he, perhaps it’s a multitude, one after 
another, what confusion”93 This not I is not exactly short for the I am 
what I am not and I am not what I am that for Sartre described the 
structure of bad faith, that irresistible human fl ight from the knowledge 
of (and responsibility for) who/what one is.94 In Beckett it describes a 
more unearthly paradox, by which, through the “I,” we enter both lan-
guage— as speaking subjects— and the indifference of language to who 
is saying I and to what it means to be mute or to die: “Unless another 
still. Nowhere to be found. Nowhere to be sought. The unthinkable last 
of all. Unnamable. Last person. I. Quick leave him.”95 Still, ultimately 
both have to do with the fact that with the possibility of thinking/say-
ing “I” comes also the possibility of feigning, evading, hiding, dividing, 
surviving (as) the I. It is what Derrida, discussing autobiography, would 
seem to gesture to as the I’s unfalsifi ability (my term), which is precisely 
its ability to be used (potentially endlessly) falsely yet to never be called 
out, nor called on to bear the burden of its own proof.96 With the power 
to think/say I (a power essentially founded, as Derrida would recall, on 
134 ❘ Chapter 3
a domination over animals)97 comes also the paradoxical possibility of 
claiming “(I am) not I”— an extreme measure taken when the self can-
not bear its place or charge (and fl ees it, in a sort of irreducible fl ight 
distance), or, experienced or conceived in a more ordinary or originary 
sense, a deep truth about the I (playful or grave, alienating or dialectical, 
making life livable or unlivable), which is that it can never wholly and 
only and defi nitively speak for itself: “He has me say things saying it’s 
not me, there’s profundity for you . . .”98 What if, taking literally Derri-
da’s claim (as he reviews Western thinking on the animal, from the book 
of Genesis to Kant to Lacan) that “power over the animal is the essence 
of the ‘I’ or the ‘person,’ the essence of the human” (130/93), one were 
to consider the “not I”— which, in Beckett, as Rolf Breuer notes, works 
as a grammatical/logical “trick” where the point is actually to not think 
or say I— as that paradoxical place where language might think the 
animal (i.e., that to which it has denied speech and thus the possibility 
of “I”),99 as if turning itself inside out, reaching for its furthermost, un-
bearable outpost (that place where language virtually annuls itself) in 
order to name (even while seeming to negate) my (the I’s) secretly shared 
passivity and fi nitude (and even muteness) with animals, my ability to 
suffer and to die.100 Here we encounter an abyssality that Derrida would 
comment on everywhere, and which in his hands never failed to leave 
defeated all arguments for what is “proper” to the human: if it is possi-
ble to pretend, it is not possible to limit the object and level of pretense: 
thus one can pretend to pretend, and this possibility is no less available 
to animals (pace Lacan) than it is to humans.101 Similarly, from the mo-
ment that it becomes possible to say “not I,” it becomes equally possible 
to say “not not I” and so on, so that— and all the more since the only 
witness and arbiter for such identifi cations and disidentifi cations is the I 
itself— it may no longer be possible to arrive at an I free from all that is 
“not I,” nor, even more importantly, a “not I” suffi ciently cleaved away 
from the I not to still be it. I may always simply be pretending that 
something/someone is not I, or pretending not to be I (or, in Beckett’s 
language, pretending to be not I),— or, indeed, pretending to be I (and 
therefore in truth not I)— who is to say? (And whose voice saying “Who 
is to say?”)
These riddles may seem a far cry from NDiaye’s work but in fact 
such abyssality covertly animates many of her stories: in characters who 
insist on proceeding as if they were “not I” (because the “I” is marked 
with the shame of [bodily or historical] difference) but around whom 
language starts to work as the repressive (and French Republican) law 
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itself works,102 that is, in making the repressed difference itself invisible, 
unutterable, and thus permitting exclusion or violence on its basis to 
equally function outside all symbolizable frames. Thus, in My Heart 
Hemmed In, when Nadia says, “We’re exactly like you,” the pharmacist 
replies: “So you think, [  . . .  ] the disgust and hostility you inspire in 
some people, not me, oh not me [ . . . ] Forgive me, this is so hard . . . 
You have something in your face that people can’t stand to see . . . not 
on any face . . . and it’s something truly repugnant, not for me, no, not 
yet” (28/21). In a sense, the diffi culty of these narratives is that in them 
a “not I” has effectively substituted itself for an “I” (or one could say 
the reverse, depending on whether one is concerned with the level of 
speaking or being), but subsequently these two (the “I” and the “not 
I”) have effectively swapped names. The trick is so perfect (this is the 
unfalsifi ability of the I) as to not be unmaskable through language or 
representation; indeed, it actually grounds all representations.
To say, then, that it takes a dog to see through it, to call out the 
phantasmatic (and also perfectly conventional, socially stipulated, 
normative) separation between I and not I— that fi rst speech act and 
immunological act on which identity and narrative are assumed to be 
premised— is to lend the name or shape of “dog” to that which within a 
story cannot be represented through the story’s own distributions (sub-
ject/object, known/unknown, I/not I)—because these distributions are 
founded precisely on a fi erce unthinking or unknowing of it (“for me 
dogs don’t exist”). Thus, in César Aira’s short story “The Dog,” as a 
man on a moving bus starts to realize that the dog following relentlessly 
and barking fi ercely is in fact coming for him because it has not forgot-
ten his cruelty to it many years before (“what I’d done to him was truly, 
unspeakably disgraceful”), he admits: “I realized that I had been count-
ing on a certain impunity. I had assumed, as anyone in my place might 
have done, that a dog being fi rst and foremost a dog, its individuality 
would be reabsorbed by the species and fi nally disappear. And with that 
disappearance my guilt would vanish too.”103 Further, he grasps at other 
possible arguments against this being the same dog: “Dogs don’t live 
that long” (47). But it is clear that, more deeply still, he wishes to argue 
(to the other bus passengers, to the symbolic order, to himself) that it is 
not him that the dog recognizes and is coming for: “All I had to do was 
deny my knowledge of the animal, and no one would contradict me. I 
gave thanks for words and their superiority over barks” (52). The dog 
in this story (as in certain others that have preoccupied me here) is a 
thing as if hewn from a substance other than that of the story, the story’s 
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buried and unspeakable heart: “What I saw in his eyes was not the fury 
I’d been expecting but a limitless anguish, a pain that wasn’t human be-
cause it was more than a human could bear” (48). If dogs did not exist 
would we have invented them, perhaps, to carry what exceeds what we 
can bear?104 (Who says we have not?) Is this why we “are— sometimes 
only momentarily— incapable of beholding a dog”?105
Is it that the expressivity of dogs is underwritten always by the 
brevity of their lives? In a passage of Un chien mort après lui that has 
haunted me for years, Jean Rolin notes his hyperalertness to stray dogs 
in cities and texts. The dogs turn here both utterly prosaic (they are the 
emblems of the unfi nishedness of the work of the political/municipal, 
often signaling poverty, failed urban management, confl ict, or a period 
of social transition) and quasi mythical, things always about to disap-
pear, merging with their own disappearance:
By dint of [À force de] searching texts for occurrences of 
stray dogs, one ends up developing, or fancying that one is 
developing, a sort of instinct, or experience, that makes one 
sense several lines ahead their imminent appearance. But it 
can so happen that the early signs are misleading and that 
this expectation [attente] is disappointed, the scene or pas-
Figure 3.2. From Alan Beck, The Ecology of Stray Dogs.
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sage in question giving you then the impression that there 
are dogs missing [il y manque des chiens]. (94)106
Stray dogs have vanished from many cities today. In others, dogs’ brief, 
chary lives, their vivid circadian rhythms, continue to form a parallel, 
ancient, shadow ecology to those of people. (So attests this chart so 
oddly moving in Alan Beck’s The Ecology of Stray Dogs, a study of 
Baltimore carried out in 1970 and cited by Rolin.)107 In a more recent 
book, With Dogs at the Edge of Life, Dayan continues as if haunted 
to write about dogs. The book’s last section, “Pariah Dogs,” turns to 
populations of strays (in Turkey, Mongolia, etc.) increasingly subject to 
control and extermination. Do we know what is missing when dogs are 
missing? These are “creatures that can still feel, hear, touch and remem-
ber all that has been and will be destroyed,” writes Dayan.108 Alerted 
to what dogs could do and be in NDiaye’s world, I too, like Rolin, 
came to feel I could sense where dogs could (or even should) have 
been but were missing (Il y manque des chiens). Sometimes, thinking 
too literally, madly, like a NDiaye character sensing a truth obscurely, 
I wondered whether there are not two kinds of stories in the world as 
there are two kinds of cities, one that at its very start eliminates dogs, 
to better clear space for a self- assured, self- possessing, masterful I, and 
another that (like NDiaye’s) does not make dogs impossible entirely, 
one where the self dwells more tensely, provisionally, in the spaces they 
concede.
Now, obviously, a dog in a story need not stand always or simply 
in a reliable relationship with some inconvenient truth the subject or 
narrative regime has suppressed. When Hearne wrote of people “inca-
pable of beholding a dog,” she was in fact referring to what she called 
“natural bitees,” “people whose approaches to dogs (and perhaps to 
people as well) are contaminated by epistemology. They attempt to in-
fer whether or not the dog will bite, jump up on them or whatever. 
Instead of ‘reading’ the dog, as handlers say (the German philosopher 
Martin Heidegger might call this listening to the dog’s being), they cast 
about for some premise from which they can draw an inference that will 
give them certainty about the dog’s behavior.”109 Assuming conceptual, 
even ethical, consistency from NDiaye’s dogs, for a long time “cast[ing] 
about for some premise” where they could all fi nd their common cause, 
I too, I now see, made a natural bitee. But then a dog may make it dif-
fi cult to think certain things apart from it, it comes in the way, borrows 
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the forms of other things— or lends them its own qualities. At long last 
I started to see that it was less dogs per se than this diffi culty (some-
times) of beholding the dog that had been egging me on. “Egging,” an 
old word, having everything to do with a nearing to the edge,110 as in 
Dayan’s dark title (With Dogs at the Edge of Life). The dog most diffi -
cult to behold may not be the most fi erce or frightful dog, the cleverest 
Cynic or Nietzschean nor the most ethical dog. It is more likely to be a 
radically ambiguous, unwhole, even pitiful thing (“surviv[ing] in some 
wild patch,” like Bobby, of a story or a life). In its presence the I feels 
its fi eld (its I vs. not- I allotments, its self- persuasions regarding what it 
is and what it is not) unnerved, as if faced with its own “outside,” as 
if unsure about the direction of the banishment. Do I face here what I 
have abandoned or what has abandoned me?
Dog of the Outside
Take the “yellow dog” of NDiaye’s Rosie Carpe (2001). As Lagrand 
ponders over why he is so accepting of the fi lthy, parasitical brother of 
Rosie, it occurs to him that Lazare “might be the yellow dog in human 
shape, the lonely, sullen stray, which his mother had taken in in the 
past, washing and feeding it without ever beating or cursing it.”111 In his 
shame and disgust vis- à- vis Lazare it is likely “his dog he was ashamed 
of, his own dog he was disgusted with,” for when his mother had aban-
doned him, the dog too had plausibly disappeared with her: “He was 
taken in by his grandparents and had then lived with them, but without 
the dog, and there had never been any question of a dog after that, nei-
ther the one that had disappeared as suddenly from Lagrand’s existence 
as his own mother, nor of any other, for the couple were both suspi-
cious of dogs— the old couple, whose life consisted of tiny, daily defense 
strategies against the evils of the unknown, judiciously condemned all 
dogs as detestable” (232– 33/206– 7). Here too, then, we fi nd a dog serv-
ing as potential transitional object, a catalyst for insight into past or 
self, an entity part unloving part unloved, part abandoning part aban-
doned, seeming to carry over something of the ruptured or disfi gured 
maternal relationship (if not, further back, of a lost father).112 NDiaye 
is by her own admission fascinated by mothers abandoning their chil-
dren, a pattern in turn linked through her oeuvre, as Andrew Asibong 
has compellingly shown, with that of female protagonists’ recurring 
affective defi ciency or “deadness.”113 But given the dogs adding up in 
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NDiaye’s world, how tautologically they seem to appear (a dog is a dog 
is a . . .) and how totally they can be refused (Lagrand’s grandparents’ 
blanket condemnation of dogs recalling Nadia’s in My Heart Hemmed 
In), given also what tense and shadowy things dogs turn out to be the 
closer one gets— there is a case for wondering whether the NDiaye dog 
is not always more generally and fuzzily— totemically?— connected 
with unhappy personhood (a dimension common to all novels). Cer-
tainly Rosie Carpe goes furthest in suggesting that animals may stand 
at precisely those points where the self is least certain of its properties 
and identifi cations— and perhaps in just the way that Deleuze suggested 
when, commenting on Leibniz’s “animal monadology” (“an infi nity of 
creatures” within me, of which “the animals that I meet outdoors are 
nothing but an enlargement”), and shortly before referring to Beckett 
(this time to Malone, as “consummate proof” of Leibniz’s system), he 
wrote: “In fact, it is very diffi cult for every one of us to make a list of 
our own belongings. It is not easy to know what we own, and for what 
length of time” (The Fold, 109). Lagrand will slide into a fearful torpor 
after driving past a fl y- infested cow carcass on the road, and seeing 
one of the fl ies attempt to sit on his own hand: “But I’m not that dead 
cow, he told himself, thinking slowly and with diffi culty” (203/179). 
There are other comparable moments: Rosie, hearing the hungry oxen 
bellow in the ravine as they do throughout the novel, fi nds herself “no 
longer knowing if she were there, seated in front of the house, or farther 
down in the ravine beside the bulls and moaning with them” (160/140); 
in the mirror, she will later see an alarmed sheep where her own face 
should have been (301/272); at the hospital Lagrand fears that the nurse 
is about to “split his head open” so that he will see “his own blood 
spurt onto the tiles” (“And yet no knife struck . . .”) (270– 71/243). In 
My Heart Hemmed In a few years later a scattered trail of italicized 
thoughts would attest to similar fears, identifi ed distinctly, in some 
places, with those of an animal in the throes of death or anticipating 
its own slaughter. Dominique Rabaté has commented on these bits of 
uncontrolled inner speech or “parasitic thought” scattered through My 
Heart Hemmed In and in the second story of Trois femmes puissantes, 
a technique of a piece with NDiaye’s “second manner” (characterized 
by strict focalization and the use of the fi rst person) and whose fi rst use 
he dates to the bleak play Rien d’humain (2004). For Rabaté these are 
bits of erratic content that manage to slip past the strict surveillance by 
which characters tend to police their thoughts and speech. “Something 
insists on being uttered, despite the codes of exaggerated politeness, or 
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in their folds.”114 If these are rare “moments of liberation,” they are es-
pecially instances, writes Rabaté insightfully, of a character’s surrender 
to the forceful irruption of something too long repressed.
But then hadn’t bits of unmoored, stupefi ed thought infi ltrated 
NDiaye’s prose quite early on, hadn’t the “fascinating and sickening” 
use of free indirect speech115— but also of exclamation marks and ques-
tion marks— in En famille already presaged it? I wrote earlier of “nar-
ration’s dog” and places of strangeness where narration could turn on 
itself or away from itself, but it is time to draw closer to the edge, and 
to the question of how or why in the vicinity of a dog there so often 
occurs, in NDiaye, a disturbed arithmetic— we could call it an unwhole-
ing— of perspective not to say person. Rosie Carpe offers an extreme 
illustration of this, soon after the analogy is drawn between Lazare and 
the yellow dog: Lagrand, having received Lazare’s murder confession 
and absorbed his guilt of the random killing of an old man, becomes 
so confused as to ask himself, even while thinking, who is doing the 
thinking: “He felt full of Lazare; he seemed to be Lazare himself coming 
home and fi nding death brought into this house by Lagrand’s hand. 
This is just horrendous, he thought— but who, he carried on to himself, 
was thinking this? Was it Lagrand or Lazare? [  . . .  ] Nothing about 
his body could belong to Lazare, who looked like a dog deprived of 
rations [chien sans pitance], with a fi gure at once thin and limp, long 
and ill- defi ned, whereas Lagrand, he knew, was a superb horse, dusky 
and shining, taut and muscular” (238/212). The (self- )consciousnesses 
of two characters appear to cross here, and, more subtly, in several other 
passages in free indirect style that unduly repeat Lagrand’s name (“lui, 
Lagrand”— remember this very tic in the Brulard story), as if indexical 
uncertainty (him or another?) were imperiling thought’s very adherence 
to thinker. But the name (repeated like a talisman) cannot, any more 
than the shining horse, constitute decisive enough resistance (not I, not 
I . . .) to the sordid pull of the “chien sans pitance,” literally a dog left 
or kept hungry. NDiaye has said herself that Lagrand is a character 
“endowed with the ability to literally put himself in the other’s place, to 
suffer for him,”116 and the word “literally” used by a writer so careful 
with her words should surely not be taken metaphorically. Lagrand— 
signifi cantly, NDiaye’s fi rst identifi ed Black character, created fi fteen 
years into her writing career— will struggle with an “unbearable com-
passion” (266/238) as he identifi es successively in the pages that follow 
with the old man killed by Lazare and his friend Abel, with Lazare and 
with Abel, so that he must “literally”— that is, through explicit, inescap-
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able, narrative veerings— reinhabit thinkingly the scene of the murder 
which Lazare and Abel had committed without thinking.
But Lagrand’s function as all- gathering narrative consciousness (and 
moral conscience) in the novel, and the suggestion that he must think 
not merely for himself but also for others still do not fully account 
for the strangeness of the “who [  . . .  ] was thinking this?” Recalling 
Beckett’s “And whose voice asking this? Who asks, Whose voice asking 
this?,” such a question seems to breach a limit and to betray more fun-
damentally the presence— supernumerary yet impregnable— of some-
thing like narration itself, known more often and less disquietingly as 
the narrator. Through the capacity always latent in internal monologue 
or free indirect discourse to fold back on itself, to disown its own illu-
sion, Lagrand interrupts his own supposedly internal thought process to 
wonder whether thoughts are not being imputed to him, or implanted in 
him, which more logically belong to Lazare. But this being a novel (an 
unrigorous, self- comforting way to start this sentence, for would this 
not be even more terrifying in life? This being here the veritable point), 
what means of appeal, verifi cation, or resistance might a character have 
left when seized with the suspicion that their thoughts are not their own, 
that there is another behind them— or, perhaps worse, no one at all?
Writing on Rosie Carpe, Elisabeth Arnould- Bloomfi eld has convinc-
ingly shown that while the novel through its enunciatory framework 
amplifi es Rosie’s trauma and passivity (her life seeming to be told from 
her point of view but in fact under the strict— and too eloquent, to the 
point of uncaring— mastery of a narrator), Lagrand’s consciousness is 
able to substitute orphically (or psychoanalytically) for hers precisely 
through what the novel suggests is an “identical fi gural unconscious.”117 
Noting the remarkable nonrealism of this traumatic substrate shared 
between the two characters (where motifs are repeated across points of 
view, word for word and noticeably), Arnould- Bloomfi eld argues that 
here the narrative meets its own radical exteriority— gesturing toward 
the forms of traumatic reality, but equally, in keeping with Blanchot’s 
notion of disaster, to the trauma at the origin of the novel itself as ex-
pressive form (26– 28). The question of “who is thinking” indeed con-
nects poignantly to that of trauma— whether understood as “an event 
that has happened to me but to which I can never be present”118 and 
which therefore I might not be able to think, or in the thinking of which 
I might not be me, or, more generally, as the exteriority with which 
speaking affects being, and which Foucault had once called, writing 
on Blanchot (and modern fi ction more generally), la pensée du dehors. 
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“Literature,” he wrote, is “language getting as far away from itself as 
possible,” that “returns thought to the outside” and itself stands outside 
what it says, “for it undoes every fi gure of interiority.”119 Of or from the 
outside, literature thus understood presents a thinking on life that is not 
formed in our image, that “makes to draw one toward it,” in Foucault’s 
words, with an “indifference that greets [the person it attracts] as if he 
were not there” (28). We recognize here the terms in which Foucault 
had invoked Beckett’s The Unnamable, which made a long- lasting im-
pact both on his thinking and on Blanchot’s: “‘What does it matter who 
is speaking,’ someone said, ‘what does it matter who is speaking.’”120 
Speech of or from the outside takes the form of a “continuous stream-
ing of language. A language spoken by no one: any subject it may have 
had is no more than a grammatical fold” (The Thought from Outside, 
53– 54).
There is a connection here between the outside and dogs so literal 
that it embarrasses. But then what if NDiaye’s (much- speculated- upon) 
reluctance to write explicitly about race correlated directly with a long 
reticence to write about the right sort of dog?121 For it seems that after 
the disagreeable encounter with the ugly, fi lthy, “yellow dog” outside the 
kitchen basement window in Among Family (which Fanny, remember, 
pounds to death, to then wonder: “Was it really a threat or had she been 
mistaken?”) there are, by way of homeless, unowned dogs in NDiaye’s 
writing, only the childhood “yellow dog” vaguely remembered by La-
grand in Rosie Carpe (signifi cantly the softening of the treatment of the 
ugly yellow stray comes in the same text that carries the fi rst reference 
to Blackness) and, most explicitly, the dog of the second half of Ladivine 
more than twenty years later. Most of the dogs of Among Family, the 
dog of My Heart Hemmed In and that of La femme changée en bûche 
(1989; The Women Turned into a Log), those of “Une journée de Bru-
lard” (and even the fi rst half of the dogs of Ladivine) are dogs attached 
to houses and/or masters. I like to imagine that it was only when NDiaye 
visited Ghana for a ten- day reconnaissance with fi lmmaker Claire De-
nis that she had occasion to “discover” stray dogs, to be affected by 
those singular, unaccountable forms of presence and watchfulness.122 
The stray dog is “very provoking” (as Humpty Dumpty would say) not 
just because it answers to no one but because one might imagine its 
very allegiance to the world of persons (ownership, authority, property, 
propriety) to be weak. In the stray it is as if the drama of what a dog is 
were kept vividly alive: diverging continually (because too hungry, or 
too friendly) from the wolf; living in continual hopes of food and fear 
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of pain (and fear of fear); the “être aux aguets” par excellence, warily 
observing its host world at every moment for the fi rst sign of betrayal 
or ambush. Stray dogs provoke also another kind of unease that is at 
the same time a relief— at the thought that, like stories or utterances, 
dogs are never rounded up or rounded off once and for all, there are 
always traces, shadows, specters, unassimilated “bits,” fl eshly remain-
ders of a making of the world that is ongoing, unfi nished. To watch a 
dog in the street, curled up in a fi tful sleep, barking with mythical anger 
at a passing car, trotting and stopping nervously, attempting in its own 
interest mildness and fi erceness alternately, is to realize obscurely that 
something about our reality is being continually negotiated at this place, 
that the dog is the nervous border of our world, itself its live and raw 
skin. Vis- à- vis the human, the street dog (the Third World dog) is both 
absolutely other and absolutely implicated. So much so that it seems to 
confound these two directions (which the fold and which the un- fold?) 
and expose our very intimacy to the outside. It is in this sense that it 
may emerge as too plain a fi gure to see for something as vague and vast 
as thought itself (la pensée du dehors), a reminder that meaning (as 
what makes world), before its domestication, before it is consigned to 
particular places (who thinks what, when, where, why), is unhoused, 
unowned, wandering, ghostly, not in our image; and that even after (or 
despite) its many spoken- for assignments, perhaps a part of it remains 
thus unapportioned, vague— there is at every moment more potential 
for thought than world.123 Or to put it differently: the (humanly sig-
nifi cant) world has never been suffi ciently wrested away from the out-
side, and dogs haunt us as determined, distorted survivors (prisoners of 
war?) of the receding forest.124
Find It (The Last Dog)
It is high time (unless it is too late) to consider the last of NDiaye’s 
dogs— last at the last count, and which initially so disturbed the count 
that I was faced with a crisis. Either “the dog” really was thoroughly 
unaccountable, and could mean anything from one iteration to the next 
(but there was something jarring in such a conjecture, for surely a writer 
so serious and careful could not treat a thing so fl ippantly), or there was 
much more work to be done, a longer journey to be undertaken— at the 
cost of questioning everything I thought I knew— in order to make sense 
of it. Whence this (dog- damned) chapter.
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Ladivine (2013) is centered on yet another paradigmatic female 
protagonist— Malinka/Clarisse, daughter of Ladivine Sylla— in elabo-
rate denial of her name and origins. In the fi rst section of the novel, told 
from her tense point of view, Malinka renames herself Clarisse, marries 
Richard Rivière and moves to Langon, has a daughter whom she names 
Ladivine, and lives for many years a carefully constructed and depthless 
life en famille, as if frozen by her own lie: for she started while young 
to claim that her mother was dead— instead she secretly meets “the ser-
vant” (as if for form’s sake, with restricted exchange and affect) in Bor-
deaux once a month. After her daughter Ladivine has grown up and 
left home, Clarisse is suddenly left by her husband (who has ultimately 
realized he never knew her) and her world falls apart. She takes up with 
a younger, unseemly man by whom she does not feel judged, whom she 
introduces to her mother and who one day brutally murders her.
There is a signifi cant “dog” (which may be two dogs) in this fi rst half 
of the novel. When the couple is still newly married, a mighty wolf-
hound belonging to Malinka/Clarisse’s father- in- law saves her baby 
daughter Ladivine’s life, and Clarisse, feeling a “strong sense of a bond 
not to be rashly broken, a secret union,”125 notices that the dog has 
“the same eyes as Malinka’s mother’s”— that is, her own mother’s, but 
here and in other places the narration is at its most contorted, bending 
backward, permitting Clarisse to continue to not coincide with her own 
body and history.126 Are such primary distortions not in the end the 
reason why “the dog” (as identity- vane [as in a weather vane], indica-
tor of degree zero identity- stability?) cannot ever in NDiaye’s world 
be entirely identical to itself?127 Years later, Richard’s father is found 
dead in his shop, his face half devoured by the dog— whether killed by 
it or not is unclear. Wait, the same dog? No, the mother replies (“‘the 
fi rst one died ten years ago at least’”), “‘but it was the same breed, and 
they looked so much alike you forgot it wasn’t that other one. Not to 
mention that your father gave it the same name’” (102/67– 68). The 
mother’s words on the subject are ominous: “‘Do you have nothing to 
feel guilty about? Are you absolutely certain your life is in order? [ . . . ] 
because your father ended up paying for something or someone, and he 
was the most virtuous man there ever was. So, yes, I dearly hope you’ll 
take care to live a life no one will ever curse you for.’” The dog is put 
down, but the mother warns that it will return, “‘that one or another, 
exactly the same, with the same name, and it will attack anyone who 
deserves it’” (103– 5/68– 69). While a strong homology connects this ep-
isode with the undifferentiated, overdetermined canine nebula/antiplot 
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of Among Family, it appears that, twenty- two years later, this overdeter-
mined “nemetic” function of dog is being revisited either parodically or 
in dead seriousness (this will forever remain for me an undecidable) in 
order to be called out as (always having been?) equivocal. “Dogs don’t 
‘turn on their masters,’” Vicki Hearne— who knew dogs like no other— 
once wrote, “but the light turns on itself if you aren’t respectful.”128 
For Hearne a dog bite was always the site of a failure of language, not 
to say the failing of language, that is, when humans wield language or 
meanings carelessly or in ways they do not “mean.”
The second section of the narrative is recounted from the point of 
view of Clarisse’s daughter Ladivine, three years after her mother’s 
death, on a family vacation– turned- nightmare in an unnamed city of 
the Global South, where, as NDiaye concedes in an interview, “people 
are dark and where it is very hot.”129 As events turn from uncanny and 
unnerving to hostile Ladivine feels more and more alienated from her 
family and more and more in dark affi nity with the place— and with a 
big brown dog seeming to keep watch over her. She wonders, even while 
never feeling “the slightest fear or unease,” whether it is “spying on her 
or protecting her,” a “guardian” or a “calamity” (154, 158, 206/103– 4, 
136, 139). Could someone, in order to protect her or someone in her 
family, have taken to “temporarily inhabiting the fl esh and the skin of a 
huge scrawny dog” (142/95)? The prospect is initially disagreeable. But 
as Ladivine II’s innermost thoughts begin to accommodate the dog, it 
assumes an “all- knowing [omniscient]” gaze (238/162), seeming to be 
the harbinger or agent of something imminent, “perhaps waiting for 
some sign from her, no, not even that, a breath, a thought, and with that 
it would come take her away to some mysterious place with no name” 
(241/164). Followed by it, Ladivine would sometimes slow down, “be-
cause the anxiety she imagined invading its canine heart [were the dog 
to lose sight of her] saddened her own” (143/96). Later, when she is 
desperately wanting to leave the hotel as everything becomes gnarled 
and inhospitable, she is convinced that the dog knows it ever better than 
she: “Wouldn’t it know, couldn’t it decipher her sentiments better than 
she herself, and didn’t it inhabit Ladivine Rivière’s skin more intimately 
than she herself, who sometimes felt she’d become nothing more than 
Clarisse Rivière’s bereaved daughter?” (273/186). We note again, like 
in so many passages in free indirect mode through NDiaye’s novels, the 
way the most intimate names (here her own, her mother’s) have of be-
coming tokens of their distance, thought thus expressing its emergence 
from a place outside the intimacy of self- identity, or already hurtling 
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away from it. Indeed, here it seems that a leaving of her world is well 
under way, Ladivine’s self is already migrating toward the dog. Looking 
into its eyes, she is convinced “she ha[s] the eyes and the gaze of that 
dog,” is “tempted to let them swallow her up,” indeed, she “yearn[s] to 
be it” (221, 224/149– 50, 152). Fifty pages before the end of the novel, 
she responds to an irresistible call (which she takes to be her mother’s) 
and enters the deep forest. At this point the word “dog” itself disappears 
altogether, as the self merges with it and “trots” out of the forest on 
“her long, slender paws [pattes]” (328/224; translation modifi ed). Be-
fore narrative perspective leaves her, “Ladivine” (the novel’s title, and 
also the name that Ladivine II unknowingly inherits from her grand-
mother) names fl eetingly the dog as governing point of view: “Once the 
SUV had started up and gone on its way through the clearing, Ladivine 
set off running again. / Joyful and proud that she’d found them and 
could thus place them under her care, she let out little cries she alone 
could hear, immediately swept off by the rushing wind” (328/224). A 
passage infi nitely beautiful and infi nitely hideous. In it is for me both 
the obscene insolvency of NDiaye’s novelistic world and the point of its 
deepest truth.130 NDiaye would be pressed in the Devarrieux interview 
on the notion of dog avatars (“Where does the dog reincarnation idea 
come from? Did you invent it or is it a belief?”), to which she would 
reply immaculately: “It is no doubt a belief in the sense that I imagine 
that it might exist in certain parts of the world, but I do not know 
this.”131
Back in Germany, where the dog has somehow followed the family 
back, Ladivine’s daughter Annika is infuriated by its presence and con-
vinced that her mother had “willingly chosen to shelter herself in the 
skin of a dog, which, though it did little to protect her from the cold, 
suited her [lui convenait] better than the skin of a woman. [ . . . ] She 
saw no sorrow in the dog’s eyes, only a serene, stern resolve” (330/226). 
Ladivine Sylla, the grandmother, will in turn welcome “a big brown dog 
[with . . .] thin, trembling legs” into her home, convinced, as the last sen-
tence of the novel reads, that it is “bringing Malinka’s throbbing heart 
to them” (403/276). Before anyone had died or disappeared, Malinka/
Clarisse too had seemed to recognize (on the day her husband had left 
her) “a big red- brown dog, emaciated and ungainly, in the sunlight’s al-
most unbearable blaze[, . . .] sidling toward her, watching her with one 
eye, its ugly head half turned away.” Shouting “‘No, absolutely not, not 
yet!’” she had locked herself in her house, only to then change her mind 
and exit again (but the dog is gone), for “what did she care now, what 
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could she care about anything now? What could possibly deserve her 
fear now?” and, a few lines later, as if making the connection with the 
mother in law’s warning about dogs, “Had she not made of the servant’s 
life a bitter bread?” (98/64).
The possibility that it is the same dog that is seen (and/or been?) 
at various moments by Ladivine I, Clarisse, Ladivine II, and Annika— 
however fantastically and/or even if only in name and kind (“dog”)— 
makes it the only element connecting the (multiply alienated) women of 
the four generations, and Ladivine decidedly NDiaye’s dog novel that 
does less to resolve than to turn into an ever- more- maddening enigma 
the question of the dog. Secretly and magically empowering matrilineal 
totem or ultimate fl ight from/defeat by the world and deathly loss of 
power and place? In the fi nal analysis is the dog a friend or an enemy to 
NDiaye’s women, to her novels, to the novel? To offer interpretations 
of NDiaye’s oeuvre, as Asibong’s brave book makes clear, is to stake 
one’s own self, for it is to make repeated decisions regarding the pessi-
mal conditions under which a human life is still a meaningful life. Or 
should I have taken things less “seriously” myself and observed rather 
the imperturbable wisdom of Jacques Rancière for whom “new fi ction 
[ . . . ] must have an ending, but it is perhaps doomed to never be the 
right ending”?132

Returning time and time again, gathering in unexpected places, the 
dog— “But was a dog the same thing as the dog?” / “a fortiori were 
several dogs the same thing as the dog?”— seems to have waited, re-
peatedly, in NDiaye’s novels, for a decision to be made about who or 
what it is. What will the ratiocinating protagonist make of it, what sense 
or latitude will the narrative decide to assign it? The decision must be 
made each time (in each story) anew, as if “the dog” were something 
each novel was assigned (like a coordinate, or a quantity) equally, but 
whose reality or extent of knowing or being each novel had to speculate 
on anew, almost as a matter of risk. In this regard the dog is arguably 
like anything and everything (dog, human, tall, heap, love, life, all vague 
entities unless invested from the inside and bound from the outside). 
Besides, what is a dog so abstract and intent that it displays no “need 
to eat or drink, urinate or defecate” (136)? This is the case with the 
dog— so Bobby- like— who follows Ladivine and ultimately subsumes 
her— a vanishing dog indeed, if we remember that the dog exists histor-
ically and on an everyday basis by virtue of its drawing of sustenance 
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from our (the human) world (and its excreting into it, if it must be said). 
What unearthly dog is this?
If we work our way further back still, Ladivine’s fi rst mention of 
dogs had occurred immediately after Malinka/Clarisse (on meeting her 
future husband) had renamed herself and claimed her parents dead, the 
fi rst fl ight from self— though, it should be asked whether there was ever 
really in this novel, whether there is ever really in NDiaye’s world, a 
fi rst fl ight, a fi rst untruth or concealment. Have these not been tales, 
rather, about an “originary” seriousness, in the Sartrean sense, that leads 
the self to impute infl exible, essentialized, transcendent truth to what it 
believes things “are” and therefore to what it believes it “is”?133 Cats 
dozing in the shadows near Richard’s house remind Malinka/Clarisse 
of a childhood courtyard and “her mother’s inexplicable fear of them 
[cats], almost as deep as her fear of dogs, on the subject of which she’d 
one day let slip that beneath their skin they contained human beings 
stricken with a terrible curse. How could anyone believe such a thing?” 
(43). Note how the dogs, who strictly had no business here, slip into 
the picture through weak, borrowed, feebly opportunistic means, pre-
saging indeed how all dogs in this story and in this oeuvre will seem to 
Figure 3.3. Street dog II, Bangalore, photograph by the author.
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appear— unaccountably, as if, like thought prey to unrigorous associa-
tions, the world could not supply enough of a reason for dogs.134
But there is another way to see this, which would be to say that this 
aspect of NDiaye’s dogs— this calling for a decision, a wager almost 
philosophical— does have something to do with real dogs, which Hearne 
describes inimitably when she suggests that to work (as a trainer or han-
dler) with the rationality of a dog is “to be willing, in Stanley Cavell’s 
words, to let [one’s] knowledge come to an end.”135 In a search for a 
missing person, for clues on a crime scene, or a way out of a dangerous 
situation, the dog’s extraordinary sense of scent takes over where hu-
man capacities end. Yelling out “Find it!,” the human in such situations 
must somehow be able “to mean what she says without knowing what 
she reaches toward with her words” (81). We do not know in such sit-
uations what we are asking the dog to fi nd, while wanting very badly 
for the dog to fi nd it. “It is possible to feel quite foolish and uncertain 
indeed, pointing at nothing as though you knew it were something” 
(81; my emphasis), the human impulse being to avoid such a sensation. 
“More often than not,” Hearne writes, quoting dog trainer and author 
L. Wilson Davis, “it is the handler [by needing to signify his intellectual 
superiority over the dog] who defeats the dog, rather than the diffi culty 
of the trail” (81). Find it: For as long as the tracking dog believes that 
you believe in the “it,” even as “the ‘it’ has nothing that the logician in us 
would recognize as a referent” (81), the dog will try to fi nd it, and will 
thereby expand what language does, not to say expand the conditions 
under which language can be effective and truthful: here, in designating 
with decisive consequence something that does not yet exist for lan-
guage, for reference, but only (in belief, eventually in scent) for the dog. 
In these places “pointing” and “retrieving” concern the quasi- mystical, 
inhuman, outermost boundary of our world, where what is unname-
able and unknowable may perhaps still be “pointed at,” “retrieved,” 
and may thus enter the world of the named and the known, through 
uncanny extensions (reference- scent; I- not I), even if this event, till it 
occurs, is logically impossible. Hearne writes powerfully of her “ques-
tions about language” as being “questions that located the boundaries 
of language in regions often understood to be remote from language” 
(16). A dog, because it believes intently, can take language— which in 
Hearne’s hands means the world as structured by language, the world as 
meaningful, the world of meanings— more seriously than we ourselves 
do. “Our words carry further than we can see,” says Hearne, so that we 
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often ourselves fail to obey (to honor, to mean, to know what we mean). 
At such times it is only other creatures (whether human or nonhuman, 
but often with humans, she suggests, this is more diffi cult to achieve) 
“who can take us back to the origin of our own words so that we can 
fi nd out what has happened. In tracking, it is only in the dog’s answer-
ing illuminations that you know whether you have said anything at all, 
or what you have said, and if the dog doesn’t answer, then that is that, 
for the moment at least, for language” (106).
Do we know what we say when we say “dog”? But the other side of 
his question is unquestionably, to my mind, this: do we know what we 
mean when we say “I”? Perhaps it is a question of pointing at nothing 
as though you knew it were something. If that is so one could say that 
the dog in NDiaye, which from most points of view does not quite 
add up (no, it doesn’t, so there), from another point of view is the too- 
literalized fi gure for the wager we make when we say I, for the wager of 
what that word carries and implies without/before our knowing it, or 
what we pretend we still do not (or do not yet) know it means or does. 
So as “Ladivine set[s] off running again,” it is as if, in the face of the 
compromised space of the narrative and the besieged and gnarled state 
of its language, the novel has— giddily or shamefully, desperately or ex-
travagantly (all- powerfully)— played its fi nal card and moved the seat 
of its consciousness to its furthest and riskiest, most beloved and most 
equivocal (entre chien et loup) outpost. It is an emergency measure (nar-
rative government in exile) or a hack. Or it doesn’t really matter which 
(placebo?), the point is to get the meaning across, somehow. (“On the 
internet, nobody knows you’re a dog,”136 but what about in a novel?)
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Chapter 4
Barely a Hedgehog, Strictly Speaking
Marie Darrieussecq, with Ponge, Kafka, 
Carroll, Deleuze, Derrida
The mower  stalled, twice; kneeling, I found
A hedgehog jammed up against the blades,
Killed. It had been in the long grass.
I had seen it before, and even fed it, once.
Now I had mauled its unobtrusive world
Unmendably.
— Philip Larkin
Of the Cheshire Cat there remains only the Smile.
Of the dream there remains only a memory trace.
Of the molecule there remains only the electromagnetic trace.
Of the real there remains only virtual reality.
Of the other there remains only a spectral form.
— Jean Baudrillard
It all started with a remarkable passage in Marie Darrieussecq’s Le mal 
de mer, a short, abstract novel, only her third, published in 1999, about 
a runaway mother and daughter, vanishing, migraines, and the sea:
Le sable s’est tassé au bout de ses baskets, des boules dures 
entre les orteils, râpeuses, qui travaillent à décoller l’ongle, 
patiemment, minutieusement. De petites griffes poilues se 
sont accrochées aux lacets, des graines, des débuts d’insectes, 
des bouts de hérissons.1
One day in class I attempted a spontaneous translation:
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The sand has collected at the ends of her sneakers, hard balls 
between the toes, rough, working to separate the nail, pa-
tiently, precisely. Small hairy claws have clutched on to the 
laces, seedlings, beginnings of insects, bits of hedgehogs.
Do you see? I asked. The strangeness. The beauty. My students were 
laughing. I reconsidered the passage. “On second thoughts I think it 
should be bits of hedgehog . . . in the singular. English counts differently. 
Takes the plural more seriously. For some reason with hedgehogs partic-
ularly . . .” I was struggling, at pains to understand what it was exactly 
here that was both absurd and unnerving. “C’est mieux en français? 
[It works better in French?],” one of them ventured helpfully. I thought 
back to this episode later, when I read Linda Coverdale’s translation of 
the novel, titled Undercurrents. I defi nitely preferred her treatment of 
the passage to my own, in view of meaning but also idiom, syntactic 
consistency, and rhythm:
Sand has clumped in the tips of her sneakers: hard, gritty 
balls between her toes, that work patiently, meticulously, to 
pry off the nails. Hairy little tendrils have latched on to the 
laces, along with seeds, insect parts, burrs.2
Incidentally, the British edition, published by Faber and Faber in the 
same year (less than three months later), also based on Coverdale’s 
translation, presents minute differences, themselves fascinating, for re-
vealing that this very brief account of a body losing its contours may 
itself have labile edges:
Sand has impacted in the toes of her trainers: hard, gritty 
balls between her toes, that work patiently, meticulously, 
prising off the nails. Hairy little tendrils have latched on the 
laces, along with seeds, bits of insects, burs.3
Yet beyond this play of differences, the passage is in both its versions 
the unassuming scene of a disappearance. For where was the hedgehog? 
Hairy claws had given way to “tendrils,” bits of hedgehog had been 
spirited away, leaving only “burrs” (or “burs,” but this did not resolve 
matters now, did it?). A slippage had turned the animal into the vegetal, 
and the hedgehog, like a fi gure for the untranslatable itself, had appar-
ently crawled away through the cracks. As a mere metaphor, evoked 
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itself only in part, it was easily replaced by a plantly correlate, those 
seeds bearing hooks or teeth with which they can cling fast onto passing 
creatures. But was the “bouts de hérissons” a metaphor to begin with— 
whose work could just as well be done by burrs? Did “bouts” mean 
ends in the sense of extremities such as spines which, as the hedgehog 
rolled itself up, stood up on end, fuzzily, looking a lot like burrs? Or did 
the “bouts” convey, rather, ends in the sense of odds and ends, or bits as 
in bits and pieces? Why not even endings of hedgehog(s), stray temporal 
or narrative extensions, in homology with the beginnings of insects that 
immediately precede (des débuts d’insectes, des bouts de hérissons)? But 
how should we understand the beginning of an insect, and what on 
earth is an ending or end or bit of a hedgehog? Are bits of hedgehog 
too tenuous, too tender to survive translation? These ones had last been 
seen dangerously close to the sea. Was it that the English text of Le mal 
de mer was indelibly marked by its fi rst instantiation on American soil, 
where there are no hedgehogs in the wild? Or are bits of hedgehog, on 
the contrary, so resistant as to survive under any other form or name 
(burrs, say)? And if it turned out that this were not their original form 
or name at all, that they had no original form or name, what is the limit 
to the forms and names under which they may survive? Where are they, 
and where are they not? Would we recognize them? And what are we 
to make of them?
The truth is I was not particularly interested in hedgehogs, and would 
have wished for this last chapter to have an object less elusive. Yet as 
I followed certain threads through the work of Marie Darrieussecq, as 
they led in and out of Lewis Carroll, Chevillard, Deleuze, Kafka, Ponge, 
and others, bits of hedgehog clung to me.4
World without Rupture
Animals have long teemed in the oeuvre of Darrieussecq; with my bits 
of hedgehog I shall merely hug the edges. There was the sow- woman of 
Truismes (1996; Pig Tales), a seamy allegory of female objectifi cation. 
If animal metamorphosis in that fi rst novel signifi ed abjection, it more 
interestingly invited, as Anat Pick has perceptively noted, a rethinking 
of “the trembling space between the human and the animal— as the 
space of the human.”5 The next novel, Naissance des fantômes (1998; 
My Phantom Husband), a sort of female Nausea, centers on the expe-
rience of a woman as her undistinguished, bourgeois, “normal” world 
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comes apart at the seams. “My husband has disappeared”: prose and 
fl esh slowly rearrange themselves around the vexing leitmotif and gap-
ing void. Animal motifs, including circling swifts, overfed and ankylosed 
sea lions, a beached shark, repulsive sea creatures, and zoo monkeys 
mad with fury proliferate as so many fi gures of entrapment, condi-
tionedness, and/or distress, seeming to mirror the narrator’s sense of 
her own fate. But more deeply, this book so aptly titled (literally, Birth 
of Ghosts) marks the birth of a singular logic of volatilization in Dar-
rieussecq’s writing, a move to a subtler phenomenology, wherein liv-
ing entities start to appear as bits and parts and potentialities rather 
than as wholes. This lessening is borne emblematically by the circling 
swifts, noted precisely in the hours following the husband’s vanishing: 
their “signature” turns quickly, as night begins to fall, into “two hollow 
wings around a cry.”6 A few pages later, wings alone, sloughing off the 
birds, become the eerie appendage of a dissolving self: “I said bonsoir 
into the silence and the word folded into itself like two black wings, I 
heard the echo of my footsteps” (21/12; trans. modifi ed). A wing reap-
pears shortly thereafter to mark the fl uttering difference separating the 
unspeakable words (“my husband has disappeared”) from the impossi-
bility of their silencing: “In their place I heard, responding to the uncer-
tain silence on the line, something like the beating of a faltering wing, 
something that was fl eeing and clumsily found a way to take fl ight” 
(28/18– 19). It transpires later that it was the mother- in- law’s dawning 
suspicion (of the ghastly truth) as she heard the narrator’s silence on 
the phone that had produced the sound of wings: “She had an intuition 
of his disappearance, that gasping intuition whose wings I had heard 
fl apping like a feeble partridge [une perdrix abattue]” (51/41– 42). Ev-
idently, this is no longer a situation of stable— Deleuze and Guattari 
would have called it molar— metaphoricity; as in Truismes, where a 
woman’s transformation into a sow was (“truistically”) motivated by 
the fact that in her treatment at the hands of male clients and consumer 
society she was somehow like a sow. It is smaller, less interpretable, 
more incorporeal units here— words, sounds, intuitions— that are found 
slipping along fl eshly inclines. A wing again fl aps toward the end of the 
novel as evidence of a molecular visitation from the husband: “A rus-
tling [chuintement] reached me, the fl utter of a wing already scattered” 
(149/141). Chuintement is literally “hoot” or “hooting” (from chuinter), 
by analogy a whistling or whooshing (or hissing) as of a liquid or gas 
through a narrow passage, so that the logic is complete: the dissolving 
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tenor (the husband) not so much carried by as dragging after it (toward 
the same vanishing) an equally tenuous vehicle, an unrealized owl, just 
about inferred from its cry and its dispersed wing. Something about the 
evanescence of these moments (rarely exceeding the sentence) allows 
such fi gures not to develop further (the wing stopping short, somehow, 
of implying a bird), raising the question— as would soon thereafter 
for me the “bouts de hérissons”— as to whether these are still fi gures 
at all.
Indeed, Naissance des fantômes could be said to formalize several 
sorts of decisions by Darrieussecq that would be determining for her 
oeuvre as a whole. One could say that it is not simply anecdotally that 
male characters— and in fact all characters— are more likeable in the 
works that follow. As Darrieussecq’s narrators develop a greater famil-
iarity with ghosts, a confi dence that disarms the paternalistic rationality 
her early fi ction associates with males and adults (“My husband chased 
the shadows away simply by his conviction that he was an adult” 
[44/34]), animal motifs come to be enlisted no longer as allegorical fall-
out of an order imposed from the outside but rather in an increasingly 
reliteralized capacity, as possibilities and presences fi lling the cracks of 
the real. By the same logic of molting (like the wings that discard the 
bird, the ghost too leaves the vanished husband as if he were no longer 
needed, too fi gurative or realist an alibi), ghostliness becomes a more 
generalized character of beings and things, their way of being both more 
and less than themselves. And most signifi cantly— this is where the an-
imal and the ghost are no doubt most intimately intertwined— wholes 
increasingly give way to parts, beings to potentials of being, so that the 
space between presence and absence is revealed to be alive with brim-
mings and burgeonings. Certainly, this particular phenomenology starts 
to fi nd its coordinates in Naissance des fantômes, and perhaps nowhere 
more compellingly than in the sea— that backdrop that would become 
so remarkably recurrent through Darrieussecq’s oeuvre (as if every story 
were being drawn from churning watery depths).7 After the unseemly 
sight of the obese sea lions and a brief vision of her husband’s corpse in 
the gurgling viscera of a shark amid water fi lled with hideous creatures, 
the narrator seems to break through to a different plane of marino- 
ontological consistency: “Every arching wave, as it broke, expelled as 
if between plates of whale baleen a breath of mingled spray and mist. 
Bit by bit the sea lions disappeared. I glimpsed a back swallowed up by 
the waves, half a chest that twisted away before plunging beneath the 
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rest of the body into the black furnace of the surf. The criss- crossing of 
moving sea foam that clung to the shoulders of the swell was further 
undone at every new cycle, each intersection of the network growing 
fi ner and more diffuse amid other little pulverized points” (68/59). In 
this inextricable indeterminacy of parts— as the waves roll through an 
unseen whale’s baleen and on shoulders carried over from sea lions— 
are momentarily indistinguishable the no longer and the not yet, forms 
extinguished from forms yet unfi nished. The foaming sea, a veritable 
chora, reveals “the bodies of nothing at all struggling to be born into 
our three dimensions, trying to escape from the pulverization of space 
but succeeding only in burning out in intuitive glimmers, rolled and 
crushed beneath the disaster of the waves” (71/62).
Initially dismayed by the lack of solidity of a world from which 
something as reliable (or so she had thought) as a husband could simply 
vanish, the narrator of Naissance des fantômes is gradually initiated to 
a realm in which, between interludes of apparent identity, forms swirl 
indecisively, continually coalescing and coming apart. Beneath the iden-
tities fi xed by gaze, name, or concept, the world pulsates with gestating 
energies: “The table is transformed into a haze of table, only to rema-
terialize immediately as soon as you bring your gaze to bear on it, as 
soon as you touch it with a fi nger. [ . . . ] Even when named, touched, 
or crossed through [traversés], ghosts lose none of their power or indul-
gence” (95– 96/87). Unsurprisingly, the most striking description of this 
realm of potentialities returns us to the sea, where a roving “you [vous]” 
travels the slippery threads of a web of being: “The universe, without 
you, is acquainted with certain embryonic states, mists of nonexistent 
things to which your gaze would give form; you are the fi sherman be-
side the sea, or maybe the sea is you, or maybe you are the potentiality 
of fi sh in the sea, but until the fi sherman has snagged it the fi sh does not 
exist” (95/86). Darrieussecq’s imagery evinces here an uncanny affi nity 
with that of Henri Michaux, whose prose poem “Encore des change-
ments” had featured this dizzying sequence:
It’s a lot of trouble to pass from a truncated pyramid to a 
whale; you must know immediately how to dive, to breathe, 
and then the water is cold, and then you fi nd yourself face to 
face with the harpooners, but I, as soon as I saw men, fl ed. 
But it so happened that I was suddenly changed into a har-
pooner, then I had just as long a distance to go over again. At 
last I succeeded in overtaking the whale, I quickly launched 
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a well- sharpened and solid harpoon (after having fi rst made 
fast and checked the rope); the harpoon darted, penetrated 
far into the fl esh, making an enormous wound. I realized 
then that I was the whale, I had changed into it again, there 
was a new opportunity to suffer, and I am not one to get 
used to suffering.8
Darrieussecq’s subsequent writings would consistently confi rm her in-
tuitive affi liation with a poetics of ontological continuity and becoming 
that one associates precisely with Michaux and Deleuze. Bref séjour 
chez les vivants (2001; A Brief Stay with the Living) imagines a micro-
scopically enhanced “constant seamless view of the world [monde sans 
rupture],” where one might behold uninterruptedly the minute compo-
nents of organic life— “all the drops of water the particles the troughs 
in your skin and all the creepy- crawlies, germs, fl ies, spiders, their hon-
eycombed eyes”— and where it might be possible to “see the world as 
fl ies, spiders, cows and platypuses do.”9 Rapport de police (2010; Police 
Report), an impressive meditation on the power and the vulnerability— 
and the very particular sort of truth— of fi ctional imagination, makes 
of this world without rupture a veritable theory of writing. In this lucid 
work, Darrieussecq describes “a becoming- writer, which has as much 
to do with water, the curves of the earth, cries, murder, the multitude of 
languages and books, the way that fl ies or whales see, and the knowl-
edge that forests have of us— as with family or grammar trees.”10 To 
write, she ventures, is nothing less than a metamorphosis, an “alchemy 
of transformation” (247), an “unhitching [décrochement] from oneself” 
(376), “protean and using all persons” (381; i.e., fi rst, second, third, 
singular, plural), an inhabitation, both desirous and anxiogenic, of an 
open, rippling fi eld traversed by a multiplicity of modes of being and 
seeing. By this time she has read Woolf and Deleuze, or as she puts it 
more interestingly in a passage that evokes the deep affi nities and un-
known ancestries that can connect similar writerly imaginations across 
time and space:
How many times have people cited Virginia Woolf re: Le 
Mal de Mer, when I had not yet read her? And when I discov-
ered Deleuze (every new reader is a discoverer)— becoming- 
animal, deterritorialization, the body without organs, folds 
and rhizomes— I realized not so much that I was a Deleuzian 
writer, but that Deleuze had read me before I even knew how 
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to write, that Deleuze had written me before my birth, for 
neither Derrida nor Foucault nor Barthes had theorized so 
well and so early what my imaginary would be! (Spinoza, 
says my father- in- law. Spinoza was the fi rst to understand 
your work.) (Rapport de police, 180– 81)
Stéphanie Posthumus is perhaps even closer to understanding Darrieus-
secq’s work when she suggests, in French ‘Écocritique’, that these novels 
be read alongside the “ecosophy” of Félix Guattari, exploring as they 
do new kinds of subjectivity— ecological, relational, (new) materialist— 
that the philosopher’s later texts such as Trois Écologies (1989) and 
Chaosmos (1992) had precisely called for.11 Certainly, Darrieussecq’s 
characters, of “leaky, porous boundaries” (50), wonder repeatedly what 
it is like “to breathe with other lungs. To fi nd paths under the bark, 
through the grass, through other becomings.”12 To hear the rustlings 
of space, muses the writer of Le pays (2005), “she would have needed 
ears formed differently from her own, the ears of cats, bears or aliens 
to experience them fully. Her own world had only three dimensions, 
and she knew only fragments of them” (37). A Brief Stay with the Liv-
ing, Dar rieussecq’s fi fth book, with its sci- fi  conceit of narrator as tele-
pathic agent trained to inhabit others’ thoughts, attempts in this sense 
a thematizing of a certain conception of narrative consciousness, as 
something that would reel shuttle- like between different locations, fol-
lowing unseen slippery bridges and tunnels (Darrieussecq likes to say 
“passerelles”) of being. In a striking instance, the prose, turning frenetic 
and discontinuous, in brief spurts of interest and distraction, espouses 
the fi tful point of view of a dog. There is a gravity in such switches 
(where it is impossible to forget Michaux’s harpooner and whale, linked 
by the fateful cable as by an umbilical cord), in the limitlessness of iden-
tifi cations, as if eyes and pores, once opened, could no longer be shut, 
nor any fate assumed to be beyond the realm of the knowable. In a 
particularly awful passage at the end of the novel, narrative conscious-
ness has to follow the narrator’s sister Jeanne into the depths of the 
sea where she slowly drowns in her locked car, her thoughts scattering, 
knowing that she will be last seen (and eaten) by fi sh. My favorite is a 
passage near the end of Le mal de mer recording the last moments of 
a hungry basking shark as its directional systems fail and it veers off 
course. It is the only passage in the novel to focus on this creature, and 
on a consciousness not human. Because as a species the basking shark 
(the second- largest living fi sh) is “almost blind, like most sharks, and 
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endowed with sensory equipment that is in fact quite sophisticated” 
(128/105), the passage written from its point of view is itself a veering 
of narration, toward an estranging of habitual coordinates of percep-
tion. I wish I could cite the entirety of it here:
L’océan est devenu la mer, avec des remous, un courant qui 
se précise en houle vers la côte. Les signaux d’alerte se font 
de plus en plus violents, la chair bat sous l’alarme, l’eau gicle 
plus vite sous les larges ouïes. Le corps monte et descend, la 
terre fait son bruit, casse l’eau, gronde, ronfl e, énorme et arrê-
tée comme un prédateur. Maintenant, sa caudale s’arquerait- 
elle au maximum, le large est devenu inaccessible. L’alarme 
se tait, tout est silencieux dans le grand mouvement des va-
gues. La fatigue a remplacé la faim. Le vide ouvert sous ses 
fanons usés semble s’être clos peu à peu, la mer ne le tra-
verse plus, elle rencontre un obstacle au fond du ventre, un 
calme. [ . . . ] Sa ligne de contact frémit légèrement, perçoit, 
du côté d’une dépression de sable, la présence ténue des hu-
mains, la chaleur de ces phoques nus. [  . . .  ] Ses latérales 
prennent un dernier appui, la plage est évitée. La falaise est 
très proche maintenant, elle renvoie de front les émissions 
radars: une masse argileuse, émergée, travaillée d’eau, de 
grottes, d’écroulements, de failles, de masses magnétiques et 
de métal tombé du ciel. [ . . . ] Les sonars échouent désormais 
à reconnaître le haut du bas, le Nord du Sud. Un rocher lui 
incise profondément le cuir. Ses fl ancs heurtent le sable, les 
vagues se retirent; le poids des muscles, lentement, l’étouffe, 
les ouïes s’affaissent sous leur propre ampleur. La terre est 
rude, impérieuse, enfoncée sous le ventre; le sol vire, sous un 
soleil fi xe. (114– 16)
The ocean has become the sea, with eddies, a current that 
forms a swell near the coast. Warning signs become more 
and more violent, fl esh thrashes in alarm, water spurts more 
quickly beneath the broad gills. The body rises and falls, 
the land makes its noise, breaks the water, growls, roars, ly-
ing in wait like a huge predator. Now, even if its caudal fi n 
were curved as much as possible, open water has become 
inaccessible. The alarm falls silent, all is quiet in the mas-
sive movement of the waves. Fatigue has replaced hunger. 
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The hollow beneath its worn baleen seems gradually to have 
closed; the sea no longer fl ows through it, meeting an ob-
stacle now, a stillness, deep in the belly. [  . . .  ] The lateral 
lines quiver slightly, sensing, off toward a sandy depression, 
the faint presence of humans, the heat of those naked seals. 
[  . . .  ] Taking one last reading with its laterals, the beach 
is avoided. The cliff is quite close now, refl ecting its sound 
waves straight back: a clayey mass, primordial, weathered 
by water, scarred by grottoes, runoff, faults, magnetic con-
glomerations, and metal fallen from the sky. [  . . .  ] From 
now on its sonar can no longer distinguish between up and 
down, north and south. A boulder slices deeply into its skin. 
Its fl anks strike the sand amid retreating waves; it suffocates 
slowly beneath the weight of its muscles while its gills col-
lapse from their own volume. The land is harsh, imperious, 
sunken beneath its belly; the ground slues about under a mo-
tionless sun. (102– 4; translation slightly modifi ed)
Certainly it is an unusual passage, where a shark’s fatal disorientation 
is rendered on the level of the narration through a straining of refer-
ential bearings. The effects are more radical in French, as the body 
fl ailing in the water seems initially to borrow its life (its very means 
of appearing here awhile as a living sensing body) from an overall 
homology (verging on a verbal camoufl age) with the (equally dense) 
accounts of the little girl’s swimming lesson and the mother’s surfi ng 
lesson that immediately precede (where, as is the case throughout the 
novel, neither is named but goes simply, indistinguishably, by “elle”). 
Here too there are swirling waves, tense fl esh, and water and body 
parts carried by secretive defi nite articles and equivocal possessives 
(sa, ses— agreeing in French with the object, and therefore betraying 
nothing of the subject— is it still an “elle”?). The “ouïes”— gills, but 
also, when in the singular, “hearing”— may pass in a distracted read-
ing as somehow metaphorical; “sa caudale” (its/her caudal or tail fi n) 
suggests a fi sh more unambiguously, but there too, since the word is 
not common, might simultaneously conceal it— same with “ligne de 
contact” and “latérales” (lateral lines) designating a sense organ unique 
to sharks. Eventually “ses fanons usés” (its/her worn baleen) and the 
cumulative effect of the string of terms bring the marine body into 
greater focus, and the intriguing “signaux d’alerte” (warning signs), 
“alarme” (alarm), and “émissions radar” (sound waves) cohere, with 
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some delay, as aspects of the great fi sh’s dysfunctioning navigational 
systems. In this lapse narration has effectively loosened itself from hu-
man perspective to accompany the large, enfeebled creature on its last 
(and otherwise unwitnessed) journey. It is as if language were momen-
tarily occupied, word by word, by that heaving body, as if narrative 
consciousness (narrative life) had taken up abode for those two pages 
in a deep- sea body and could not help but undergo and express its loss 
of bearings. Narration in Darrieussecq is always gravitating toward 
such otherings, such breaches and holes (rabbit holes, one might say) 
where it may slough off its human skin and register the vividness of 
living and dying through other kinds of seeing and sensing. But such 
becomings seem to suggest equally in her hands that stories have never 
been only human, that narration is rather a sweeping (as of a powerful 
all- seeing beam, or a forceful current) that has always picked up other 
bodies and predicaments along the way— like unsought sharks caught 
in fi shing nets, or bits of hedgehog latched onto shoelaces.
Something Rather Than Nothing
Naissance des fantômes carries as epigraph a short passage from Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland:
She was looking about for some way of escape, and wonder-
ing whether she could get away without being seen, when 
she noticed a curious appearance in the air: it puzzled her 
very much at fi rst, but after watching it a minute or two 
she made it out to be a grin, and she said to herself, “It’s the 
Cheshire- Cat: now I shall have somebody to talk to.”
This moment in Lewis Carroll’s story— when the appearance of the 
Cheshire Cat rescues Alice from the boredom of the Queen’s game of 
croquet (featuring as it does live fl amingoes and  . . . hedgehogs!)— is 
explicitly referenced halfway through Darrieussecq’s novel to describe 
the narrator herself as, from the depths of anguish, she musters a wan, 
derealized smile: “I forced myself to give a smile that I hoped was lov-
ing, attentive, and as convincing as possible, but that must (against my 
will) have seemed a physical manifestation as strange as the coquetries 
of the Cheshire cat when Alice sees in the branches only his teeth and 
the beginnings of whiskers, with nothing else around them” (78– 79/69). 
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A few pages later, it appears that one of the effects of her husband’s 
disappearance is that the narrator’s own presence in the world is in-
creasingly insubstantial: “A solid atmosphere lay heavy on my cheeks, 
arms, legs; a slowly petrifying layer of ash, growing thicker all the time, 
made a cast around me, enclosed me, stole my fi ngerprints in order— 
once I, in turn, had been dissolved by gastric juices— to preserve me 
in a museum of absences like the hollow bodies of Pompeii” (87/78). 
The House of the Dead of Le pays, where the Yuoangui may visit (and 
with their memories further fi ll out) hollow, hologrammatic simulacra 
of deceased family members takes this becoming- fossil even further. 
Bodily evaporation likewise characterizes the mother character in Le 
mal de mer, whose vanishing vies with her body as if sharing the straps 
of its dress.
But such becomings- ghost do not quite account for the reassuring 
reference to Carroll’s Cheshire Cat. The latter’s grin offers in fact a 
more precise, somehow more technical key to what becomes possible 
in Naissance des fantômes, and continues thereafter to animate Dar-
rieussecq’s fi ction. Indeed, the “beginnings of whiskers [début de mous-
tache]” of the Cheshire cat is of a piece with several other burgeonings 
in Naissance des fantômes, from the “tiny incipience of my husband [un 
tout petit début de mon mari]” (27/17) that the narrator hopes to fi nd 
by answering the phone, to the “possibility [ . . . ] of my disconcerting 
husband” (78/69) she anticipates in the silences of a conversation with 
a friend, to a hallucinatory vision of “an incipient skin [un début de 
peau]” (107/99) and the imagined discovery inside a teddy bear of “little 
budding teeth and a tongue ready to speak” (97/89). At its most literal 
such a logic of incipience— or, seen in the other direction, of lessening 
(or lessness, as Beckett might have said)13— the very one that would lead 
(the following year) to the “bouts de hérisson” of Le mal de mer, invites 
us to imagine behind or beside every body that the text carries whole, 
other bodies that are incomplete, unfi nished— unviable “bits” of life, 
by which, precisely, life is suggested not to be in a relationship of com-
plete unfoldedness and effi cient coextensiveness to itself. It is as if a fi rst 
vanishing in Naissance des fantômes had rendered henceforth percep-
tible, scattering the conventional divide between manifest presence and 
manifest absence, a continuum of bodily appearance/disappearance, a 
sliding, fl uctuating metrics of creaturely being. Persons (the husband 
of Naissance des fantômes, the brother Paul in Le pays, and the son in 
Tom est mort [Tom Is Dead]) disappear along the same slippery conduit 
along which others are born (the babies of Le pays and Le bébé), and in 
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both directions, provisional, inchoate states of being fi nd their emblems 
in distilled forms and embryonic animals. The newborn at the end of 
Le pays would develop not unlike the way the Cheshire Cat remateri-
alizes around its toothy grin: “Each [baby] has a face, that is what’s so 
extraordinary; a face clenched like a fi st and ready to open, to smile, if 
given time. / Wet the origami in water and the paper unfolds, insect, ani-
mal, or fl ower” (181; my translation).14 The baby of Le bébé (The Baby) 
is a continuous unfolding, as is even more intensely the disquieting ani-
mal of a short story titled “Zoo,” initially found “clasped to the curtain, 
folded [replié] beneath its wings,” “hanging head down in a fold of the 
fabric [dans un pli du tissu], paws gathered together, eyes closed, still,” 
its face “folded [plissé] like that of a newborn” (149). The creature 
eventually pulls itself away from the curtain (as if from the inner lining 
of the text itself), gains enough shape and consistency to move around 
the apartment, to eat at the kitchen sink, and eventually, to earn its own 
litter box and food.15 Its sudden appearance had interrupted the com-
pletion of a major writing project— so that it is the space of the story 
(and the notion of what constitutes a story) that is also led to “unfold”: 
the intruder is welcomed within a writing substantively redefi ned, the 
parasite turns guest, the unclenched creature an unlikely mascot for the 
unaccountable life- bearing properties of a home and a text. The last 
lines of the story read: “I called her Clémence. It was a girl, evidently, 
and she was getting stronger with each day” (153).
Through all of this, one is struck by the close affi nity Darrieus-
secq’s folding- unfolding, enveloping- developing ontology shares with 
Deleuze’s Leibnizian imaginary in The Fold, after whose publication, 
incidentally, as Deleuze remarks in L’abécédaire, he had received the 
most meaningful letters (“Your story of the fold— it’s us, its us”; “We 
are the fold”) from two categories of persons: paper folders (practi-
tioners of origami) and surfers, whose knowledge too proves richly 
relevant to Darrieussecq— portraitist of the sea and author of a short 
text, Précisions sur les vagues (2008; Specifi cations on Waves), that de-
scribed different kinds of waves as so many distinct types of folds.16 The 
Baroque imaginary, which The Fold revisits as a brief (and splendid) 
interlude during which “Some Thing [wa]s kept rather than nothing 
(92/68), was premised on a law of continuity: one could not say “where 
the sensible ends and the intelligible begins” (88/66). The problem of 
soul versus matter, human versus animal, world versus individual, inside 
versus outside was resolved by an intricate understanding of things be-
ing distinguished not by essence but rather, and only, by degree, manner, 
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dimension, that is, by extent/intensity of folding. The world, for Leibniz 
and the Baroques, was contained and mirrored in the monad or individ-
ual subject, its folded forms of being anticipated and actualized in ideas: 
“Ideas are so folded [pliées] in the soul that we can’t always unfold or 
develop them, just as things themselves are inextricably wrapped up 
[pliées] in nature” (66/49). The soul through its inner “pleats [déplis; 
translator Tom Conley would elsewhere write “unfolds”]” thus rep-
resents to itself the forms of the world (32/23). Foldedness, describing 
how the subject perceives and mirrors the world, is also understood by 
the Baroque imagination as an objective property of organic formation:
The organism is defi ned by its ability to fold its own parts 
and to unfold them, not to infi nity, but to a degree of de-
velopment assigned to each species. Thus an organism is 
enveloped by organisms, one with another (interlocking of 
germinal matter), like Russian dolls. The fi rst fl y contains 
the seeds of all fl ies to come, each being called in its turn to 
unfold its own parts at the right time. And when an organ-
ism dies, it does not really vanish, but folds in upon itself, 
abruptly involuting into the again newly dormant seed by 
skipping all intermediate stages. The simplest way of stating 
the point is by saying that to unfold is to increase, to grow; 
whereas to fold is to diminish, to reduce, “to withdraw into 
the recesses of a world.” (13/8– 9; the last words quote a 
1687 letter from Leibniz to Arnauld)
Some of these notions (the fi rst fl y containing within it all the fl ies to 
come, for instance)17 had already informed Deleuze’s concept of repeti-
tion in Difference and Repetition, written two decades earlier (1968), 
and others would continue to crucially underpin A Thousand Plateaus, 
where an extraordinary page described organic life as a vast “plane of 
plication” (255); but it is interesting to consider what essential impe-
tus the notion of becoming- animal would owe to the encounter with 
Leibniz. The Fold recalls that what distinguished the organic from the 
inorganic in Baroque thought was that while the inorganic repeats itself 
from outside to inside as it were, each repetition distinguished from the 
last only in dimension, the property of the organic, which repeats itself 
from inside to outside, is to contain within it— necessarily— other kinds 
of living organisms: thus Leibniz wrote in Monadology: “The limbs of 
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a living body are full of other living beings, plants, animals [les mem-
bres d’un corps vivant sont pleins d’autres vivants, plantes, animaux]” 
(quoted in Le pli, 13– 14; left out in the English translation, 9). The fur-
thest consequence of this is one that positions Leibniz the Baroque phi-
losopher as exactly antipodean to Descartes, for the human as organism 
too is thus revealed to contain within itself multiple other species:
With the union of the soul and the body, the other who now 
springs forth amid my belongings [mes appartenances]— in 
order to throw them topsy- turvy— is the animal, and fi rst of 
all the little animals inseparable from the fl uid parts of my 
body, insofar as they become as foreign to me as they had 
formerly been. “[  . . .  ] our body is a type of world full of 
an infi nity of creatures that are also worthy of life” [quote 
from a letter from Leibniz to Lady Masham in 1704]. The 
animals that I meet outdoors are nothing but an enlargement 
of the latter. [ . . . ] what my sphere of belongings essentially 
reveals to me are inverted, temporary or provisional belong-
ings (even as a body always belongs to me). In fact it is very 
diffi cult for every one of us to make a list of our own belong-
ings. (146/109; translation modifi ed).
This passage (the last sentence of which I quoted in the last chap-
ter), possibly the most visionary of Le pli, offers to my mind a the-
ory of the animal even more richly poetic than the becoming- animal 
of A Thousand Plateaus, in whose blocks and intensities and zones de 
voisinage the animal would become in fact more estranged, less real, 
than the Leibnizian animal. With “the animal in me as a concrete being” 
(146/109; my emphasis), Baroque philosophy is deconstructive avant la 
lettre, substituting Having for Being (147/109) even as it ruins the idea 
of something “proper to” the human: “To have or to possess is to fold, 
in other words, to express what one contains ‘to a certain power/with 
a certain potentiality [dans une certaine puissance].’ If the Baroque has 
often been associated with capitalism, it is because the Baroque is linked 
to a crisis of property, a crisis that appears at once with the growth of 
new machines in the social fi eld and the discovery of new living beings 
in the organism” (148/110; translation modifi ed).
Darrieussecq proves most rigorously Leibnizian, one could say, when 
Jeanne in A Brief Stay with the Living discovers a new animal, the platy-
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pus: “Then, a box opened, with the typical ‘pop’ of bubble- wrap when 
pinched between two fi ngers: two neurones linked up, a synapse along 
which the platypus, l’ornithorynque, slid, duly labelled bilingually, rec-
ognized, opening out on to no other reality than what was there, vi-
brantly there, before her eyes. A new branch on the tree of animals in 
Jeanne’s forest of representations. She clearly felt a bump forming on 
her brain, then sinking inside, assimilated at once. Thus do boxes in 
brains open” (151/108). The same could be said of the red dragon lizard 
of Australia in Tom est mort (“like a dragon from the Middle Ages, as if 
our myths had sensed the existence on the planet of such creatures”),18 
seen for the fi rst time in the world while at the same time remembered 
and recognized in an inner, even innate, theater of representations. But 
going further, one could see Darrieussecq’s embryonic, ill- formed, par-
tially glimpsed creatures as exemplarily Baroque outgrowths and in-
growths, remembered and forgotten like phantom limbs.19 A claw, a 
wing, teeth, a bit of an animal signifi es, at the very least, a refusal of 
nothingness, at most, a real potentiality, the irreducible, prosthetic im-
propriety of a self whose parts add up to more than the whole. A dream 
in Brief Stay with the Living, in relating “inverted, temporary or pro-
visional belongings” (The Fold, 146/109), offers a possible encrypted 
(or encysted? certainly baleened and barnacled) key to the workings 
of the waking diegesis: “Her thigh [ . . . ], when examined, turns out to 
be red and infl amed, covered with nodules, spots or jellyfi sh blisters, a 
whale’s forehead pushing through just there and about to burst open, 
whalebones, fl esh gnawed by parasites. [ . . . ]— if, in dreams, we’re all 
the characters, then she’s [ . . . ] everything all at the same time, herself, 
this body, and the atolls and arms and the whale’s forehead, the animal 
forming a cyst in her leg” (51/32; translation modifi ed). In Le mal de 
mer a subtle slippage has the little girl grow eight legs and merge in-
distinguishably with the insects burrowing under the sand: “Spiders, 
coleoptera, stag beetles, and earwigs are everywhere; the sand is so fl uid 
you need only dig between two roots, let the warm grains shower down 
on you, and mingle your six or eight legs with the six or eight legs of 
your nest mates, in order to doze off lazily, conscious only— sweetly, 
erratically— that all the wing sheaths have begun to stir, without your 
knowing anymore whether it’s you or one of your neighbors whirring 
like that, fast asleep” (24/16). Might one imagine that, in different con-
ditions, the hedgehog of Le mal de mer would not have melted back 
into language but materialized in the sand? What is lost, what is gained, 
in these miscarried bodies?
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Detour 1:  Writing with Hedgehog
Faced with the mystery of the missing hedgehog, I was left looking 
(following the usual method and rigor) to other hedgehogs for clues. 
Three years after Darrieussecq’s bitsy specimen, Éric Chevillard’s Du 
hérisson (2002) famously made of a hedgehog’s intrusion the generative 
principle in a monumental exercise of constrained writing. The “naïve 
and globulous” intruder appears out of the blue on the desk of the 
narrator, also a writer, at the very moment at which he is preparing to 
embark on his magnum opus, an autobiographical work woven from 
childhood memories, sexual confessions, and morsels of ars poetica, to 
which, from the sound of it, we might well ascribe the words Darrieus-
secq’s narrator used to describe her own just- completed project: “this 
enormous work [  . . .  ] where I was settling my accounts with every-
one, the living, the dead, sex, writing.”20 In both cases there is a writing 
project intended to account exhaustively for everything and in both an 
incongruous creature appears, as if it were what that projected economy 
had precisely left out. Here too, as with Darrieussecq’s “Clémence,” the 
inconvenient creature appears to embody the tight inextricability of the 
word and thing. Cited in every paragraph of the novel along with its dy-
adic epithet, the “hérisson naïf et globuleux” as fl eshly obstacle and idée 
fi xe constrains the movements of the writing hand as much as it waylays 
the content of the prose: “I am not writing what I had been planning to 
write. However shapeless it may be, this naïve and globulous hedgehog 
is insinuating itself into every one of my thoughts. People will end up 
believing I am taking interest in it. A terrible misunderstanding.”21 The 
misunderstanding will last as conceit the length of the novel, occupied 
and preoccupied as the text is till the end by the intruder, albeit with 
fl uctuating intensity and in variable registers— realist, epic, trivial, nat-
uralist, ecological, speculative, (il)logical, nebulous . . . In fact, this vari-
ance itself becomes the game, as the hedgehog repeatedly moves in and 
out of focus: from minimal satisfactions of the constraint (one hérisson 
per paragraph, at whatever cost) to verbose monographic elaborations 
on the species’ popular history, behavior, or anatomy. And while the 
content, as always with Chevillard, is playfully generated and inter-
nally self- annulling, the play nonetheless produces a sort of hedgehog, 
a self- appointed now- inalienable (albeit apocryphal) element of the still 
life commemorating the millennial scene of writing— “on my table, in 
the midst of my writing in progress and my desk furnishings” (31– 32), 
“huddled in that spot where in the olden days the writer would deli-
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cately place a scoured white skull” (114)— and which will no longer go 
away. So that there is something in the diffi culty of writing away this 
remainder that recalls the limit- objects of Francis Ponge: Chevillard’s 
attempt to exhaust “le hérisson naïf et globuleux” as thing and as word 
could just as well have been titled Notes prises pour un hérisson (Notes 
Taken for a Hedgehog) or Le hérisson placé en abîme (The Hedgehog 
Placed in Abyss / en Abyme).22 In The Table, Ponge wrote: “The table, 
I just have the table to write to be absolutely done with it. The table 
[ . . . ] which enabled me to write my work, remains (very diffi cult to 
write) that which remains to write to be done with it [pour en fi nir].”23 
The diffi culty (of being done with it) is demonstrated on one occasion 
when the writing hand knocks the creature off the edge of the table. 
The narrator picks it up and places it back on the table, only to then 
wonder why he did so. Would it not have been cleverer to observe the 
route it took to escape— likely the same as the one that it had taken 
into the room— and to block that passage? Or at least to be able to con-
clude fi rmly, if it didn’t fi nd a way out, that it had not entered the room 
through its own agency? The question of where the hedgehog could 
have come from and what porousness of boundaries such an infi ltration 
might imply is a source of disquiet through the novel. But the path of 
the animal into the workspace and the text proves impossible to distin-
guish from the traces of writing itself. Examining a leg of the table for 
traces of the hedgehog’s passage, so as to determine how it might have 
climbed up it if it did, the narrator does fi nd fi ne scratches— but which 
he cannot be sure he did not make himself (with his foot): “In sum, it is 
impossible to tell which of us, the naïve and globulous hedgehog or I, 
left those marks while climbing the table” (95).
I expect that if Chevillard were to be asked about the hedgehog he 
would characterize it as he has certain other nebulous entities in his 
works (Palafox, Crab, the orangutan), as one of a class of “new per-
sonal pronouns that parasite language and profi t from its extraordinary 
resources, from its terrible effi cacy, to develop their own laws.”24 But 
as with the orangutan, here too, one should say, the particularity of 
the animal, even if initially incidental, or quaint, just a game, comes to 
accrue meaningfulness through the writing, so that retrospectively the 
novel is in content and form simply indissociable from the hedgehog (it 
is a veritable hedgehog machine), and no other animal could have done 
the job. So why a hedgehog? Because of how neatly and strikingly this 
species presents that primary enigma— the relation of inside to outside, 
of content to form, of (apparent) inanimateness to expression (and one 
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could add: of having to being, of matter to time, of nothing to some-
thing . . .)— as ceaselessly dramatized and resolved by its own body, in 
the way it rolls up. “My naïve and globulous hedgehog rolls up in a ball. 
It retracts as much as it can” (109), writes the writer, and, further on: 
“I anticipate the moment when, rolling up ever more tightly onto itself, 
it will disappear” (139). The observation leads to a startling conjecture, 
namely that the hedgehog might have been there from the beginning, 
“in a spot on my desk, so self- enfolded [replié sur lui- même] (or should 
one say self- absorbed?) that I didn’t notice its presence. Reassured by 
the apparent innocuousness of my activities and warmed little by little 
by the comforting heat of the hearth, it would have lowered its guard, 
and unfolded itself, relaxed, decompressed, suddenly entering the realm 
of the visible precisely within my fi eld of view” (140). A hypothesis that 
elicits in turn the suspicion that there are countless hedgehogs invisibly 
inhabiting in precisely this way the cracks of the world, “imperceptible, 
bundled up in their anguish, that have made themselves so small that 
they have well and truly disappeared. Only conditions that would be 
particularly clement and rarely achieved in this world can incite them 
to reappear” (141). Might writing be what produces the rare and clem-
ent conditions that invite a hedgehog to unfold and emerge into view? 
We are led momentarily back to Ponge here, for whom the passion of 
the table was not unrelated to the fact that as a foundation and base 
for everything else, it could not itself be perceived and represented till 
everything else had been cleared and the right kind of conditions were 
thus met for it to emerge into view. So Ponge had decided his table was 
an “invisible table [table sympathique],” “the way one says invisible ink 
[comme on dit l’encre sympathique]” (916/11), that is, like invisible or 
disappearing ink, which reappears when exposed to a developer chem-
ical or temperature or light that favorably interacts with it. So revealed 
by a thinking and writing that await and invoke it, Ponge’s table returns 
to view from obscured recesses of the seen/said world (“it comes [elle 
souvient] to my elbow and the same time its notion comes to my mind” 
[915/9]). So it is with the animal wandering in, naively and globulously, 
as if plying the blind sympathetic paths opened up by narrative or lan-
guage (which is why it may seem to appear unaccountably). Chevillard’s 
and Darrieussecq’s word “clément/ce” is something similar it would 
seem, not so much a property as an affective relation; as the former 
asks it of the world, the latter imputes it to the animal that wanders 
in (“I called it/her Clémence”). And it makes sense that if sympathy/
clemency names a continuum between visibility and vanishing, with the 
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animal traveling the length of that line, that in both Darrieussecq’s and 
Chevillard’s cases the animal should appear as something tentative, a 
clenched bundle of word and form, whose precise parameters remain 
undrawn, withdrawn. Undeveloped, inexplicable: that is, such animals 
may appear without completely unfolding, at least not to view nor to 
language, so that it is not inconceivable that before being fi gures for 
what irrupts or interrupts they are fi gures for what may be interrupted 
by our sight and speech. “In sum, they show themselves only when they 
have the assurance that no one is there to see them” (Du hérisson, 141).
In a 2006 Guardian essay titled “Where Have All Our Hedgehogs 
Gone?,” the British novelist Adam Nicolson lamented the imminent 
disappearance of the “quiet, discreet and dignifi ed” hedgehog, the very 
embodiment of Englishness, according to Nicolson, and moreover a val-
ued ecological indicator: its “patient unobtrusiveness,” the “generalism” 
of its feeding habits, “its happy existence at the bottom of hedges and 
in people’s back gardens, [ . . . ] its fondness for the private, the scruffy 
and the marginal— all make it a measure of the state of the landscape’s 
health as a whole.”25 The hedgehog, Nicolson concedes, is neither a 
modern beast nor a clever one: countless hedgehogs are found dead in 
tennis nets, in polystyrene cups, or “with yoghurt [ . . . ] or ice- cream 
containers clamped to their faces,” knowing how to get into things only 
to fi nd their spines getting treacherously caught when they try to get out. 
From Nicolson’s piece transpires the hypothesis that the hedgehog is an 
indicator and casualty of another sort, that is, of the way space is carved 
up and apportioned, of the management of the relationship between 
discreteness and continuity, place and space, or even what Deleuze and 
Guattari would have called the plane of representation (or composition) 
and the plane of consistency (or fl ight). Specifi cally: because hedgehogs 
hug the hedges, their livelihood is threatened on the one hand by the 
tightness of closed- off enclosures with no gaps and on the other by 
increasingly large “chemically denuded” fi elds with no hedges. A com-
munity ecologist quoted in Nicolson’s feature, recalling that “hedge-
hogs love the interstices [and] the rough brambly places, where they 
can hide,” suggests that humans, if they want to save hedgehogs, “need 
to defragment the cities for these animals, leave more of the mess for 
them.” The hedgehog’s particular way of moving through and hiding in 
our spaces thus traces an alternate geography to our own, expressing 
(to no one in particular) the blind supplementary life- sustaining prop-
erties of human space. The word “unobtrusive” that Nicolson uses to 
describe the hedgehog comes from a 1979 Philip Larkin poem (cited in 
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this chapter’s epigraph) where a hedgehog is found “jammed up against 
the blades of a lawnmower.” “It had been in the long grass,” writes the 
poet, “I had seen it before, and even fed it, once. / Now I had mauled its 
unobtrusive world / Unmendably.”
Rolled Up in a Ball
Then there was Derrida’s hedgehog. Ten years before Le mal de mer, 
the philosopher had been invited by the Italian journal Poesia to write 
a few words in response to the question “Che cos’è la poesia?” (What 
is poetry?). Aware that his text would appear in Italian, he took the op-
portunity to refl ect both on the nature of poetry and on the problem of 
translation, and he produced something between a poem and a hedge-
hog. Derrida’s poem as hedgehog/hedgehog as poem is a wild thing that, 
attempting to prevent its own unraveling, folds in on itself. Yet, in seek-
ing to hide, by bearing its bundled, bristling back in blind defense of 
its inside, it surrenders itself further to passivity and chance, as if only 
able to relate to the anticipated distress of its own accident (where it 
will be read, or missed, or misread) by precipitating it: “Rolled up in 
a ball, prickly with spines, vulnerable and dangerous, calculating and 
ill- adapted (because it makes itself into a ball, sensing the danger on the 
autoroute, it exposes itself to an accident). No poem without accident, 
no poem that does not open itself like a wound, but no poem that is not 
also just as wounding.”26 Curled up in a prickly ball on the highway, 
the hedgehog becomes the name for a specifi c relation between body 
and letter (i.e., a poem), that which protects itself only by “turn[ing] its 
pointed signs toward the outside” (299), that which cannot relate back 
to itself, that which can only be dictated by another, and never signed, 
but only learned by heart, and there too only as an initiation to the dis-
possession of heart: “That is the distress of the hérisson” (295).
If Derrida’s essay was undoubtedly partly (mostly?) a provocation— 
where the name “hérisson,” as the last page of the essay suggests, was 
chosen “for example” and, what is more, “arbitrarily” (237)— its inex-
haustibility as a possible answer to what poetry is comes from its own 
poetic unity. One could say that it reproduces in its own way, in its 
vulnerable, retractile, bristling form, exactly what it describes (namely, 
“the poem as a hedgehog trying to cross the road”),27 to the point of 
serving as its own best (and only, but irreducible) example. What I for 
one am inclined to take away from this diffi cult piece is this: that if a 
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poem is like a hedgehog, it is because a hedgehog, like a poem, is a little 
like a Möbius strip, in that its outside and inside are continuous with 
each other, thing and name, fl esh and language, life and meaning, and in 
that what separates them is a difference not of nature but of time and of 
reading, which are an unfolding. (I will return to this point.)
As was customary with every issue of Poesia, this one featured, as 
a last response to the assigned question, a text by a deceased writer 
(whose identity was withheld from the contributors till publication). As 
it happens— through an obscurely traced path where, like Chevillard’s 
narrator, I am at pains to distinguish the marks of the hedgehog from 
my own remarks— it was in this case Kafka’s “Cares of a Family Man,” 
featuring, as we know, a most peculiar creature: “At fi rst glance [this 
creature] looks like a fl at star- shaped spool for thread, and indeed it 
does seem to have thread wound upon it; to be sure, they are only old, 
broken- off bits of thread, knotted and tangled together, of the most var-
ied sorts and colors. But it is not only a spool, for a small wooden cross-
bar sticks out of the middle of the star, and another small rod is joined 
to that at a right angle. By means of this latter rod on one side and one 
of the points of the star on the other, the whole thing can stand upright 
as if on two legs.”28 Further on the troubled narrator adds, “The whole 
thing looks senseless enough, but in its own way perfectly fi nished. In 
any case, closer scrutiny is impossible, since Odradek is extraordinarily 
nimble and can never be laid hold of” (428). The very short story’s 
haunting closing line reads: “[Odradek] does no harm to anyone that 
one can see; but the idea that he is likely to survive me I fi nd most pain-
ful” (429).
Odradek has posed almost as much of a challenge to readers as Der-
rida’s “Che cos’è la poesia?”— certainly a lovely essay by Joseph Lavery 
deems them “equally incomprehensible.”29 For Lavery, “Odradek is the 
gremlin in the house that disrupts its ability to be a home, but he is also 
the animot in language which mimics the postures of its epistemologies, 
razzes at its disavowals, purrs at its ignorance” (128). Bringing to an 
already substantial history of readings of Odradek dazzling turns of his 
own, Lavery is most careful to observe the critical externality to self of 
“the rebel- pet” (127) of “indeterminate address” (133) whose impropri-
ety comes precisely from the fact that in him language and body refuse 
to be “deictically peg[ged].” “By allowing this other into our family, into 
our home,” he writes ominously, “we have rendered irreversible a fl aw 
that might have otherwise naturally eroded: there is an odradek looking 
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at us in the home of our language” (133). Guided by the Derridean wa-
ger “to read Odradek as a hedgehog- poem” (130), and even a “hedge-
hog learned by heart” (140), Lavery considers Odradek as an “outward 
form [that] carries threads, lines of questioning that must be pursued 
into the object- creature’s guts; to fi nd his heart” (136). But these threads 
continually lead further out, it would seem, toward a shifting archive 
of ancient and new names, dead and live metaphors, a heart of “prior 
textuality.” Ultimately, Lavery highlights Odradek’s status as a decon-
structive, queer, arabesque body in which “Kafka calls into question the 
limits of the domestic and inside, and pulls exteriority ever closer to the 
centre of being” (135).30
As if foretold by the opening of Kafka’s story, where scholars struggle 
to decrypt the puzzle of his name— “Some say the word Odradek is of 
Slavonic origin [ . . . ]. Others believe it to be of German origin, only 
infl uenced by Slavonic [  . . .  ] neither of them provides an intelligent 
meaning of the word”— much has been written on Odradek.31 Eleanor 
Helms has proposed that this weird creature, as well as the “curious 
animal, half kitten, half lamb” from the story “A Crossbreed,”32 are 
fi gures for a Kierkegaardian anxiety about continuity and isolation, and 
that “by having neither individuality nor history,” they “each make con-
spicuous what is missing in a whole self” (90). Esther Bauer, reviewing 
German scholarship on Odradek, distinguishes those critics who see the 
creature as an intruder from the outside having infi ltrated the domestic, 
familiar sphere and those who see him/it, rather, as the repressed forc-
ing its way back from the unconscious (157– 58). Of course, a Derrid-
ean reading such as Lavery’s easily resolves this apparent dichotomy: 
Odradek would be the name for where the deepest inside connects di-
rectly with the outside, its gaps as if patched up with bits and pieces of 
outside. Still, I am interested in the uncertainty of direction, because it 
has consequences also for narrative/organic development or unfolding: 
Is a bit a whole on its way out or in? Is it the fi rst fragment or the last? 
Here too Lavery offers an answer: taking issue with the Muirs’ inser-
tion of a “remnant” in the text where there isn’t one, he nonetheless 
argues compellingly at the close of his essay for a Derridean sort of 
remnant, one that would not necessarily be the remnant of something 
with prior presence or wholeness (140). No doubt it is a consequence 
of this paradox that “his invisibility is no defi nite proof that he is not 
present.”33 For indeed, “often for months on end he is not to be seen; 
then he has presumably moved into other houses; but he always comes 
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faithfully back to our house again” (“Odradek,” 428). There is, in a 
word, a sympathetic principle at work here, in the French and Pongian 
sense of the word (“comme on dit l’encre sympathique”). Odradek is a 
sympathetic creature in that his appearances and disappearances in the 
nooks and crannies of diegetic space (“He lurks by turns in the garret, 
the stairway, the lobbies, the entrance hall”) can seem to depend on 
inscrutable revelators and inhibitors of which the story is not itself cog-
nizant. It is precisely because Odradek so fl uidly inhabits that sympathy 
between presence and absence that there can never be “defi nite proof 
that he is not present” (whence the likelihood that he will outlive us all). 
But then, conversely, it is fair to wonder whether there is ever any sure 
evidence that he is not absent. Might this riddle bring us a step closer 
to Darrieussecq’s bits of hedgehog? In Odradek is a parable of an entity 
behind whose hollow forms one may fi nd nothing, yet in whose trace, 
once registered, can appear the trace of everything: “No one, of course, 
would occupy himself with such studies if there were not a creature 
called Odradek” (428).
Yet such inscriptions must owe their fragility to the fact that sym-
pathy (understood in the sense proposed) as a theory for stories’ or 
language’s occasional porousness to animals may have to contend with 
recognition/misrecognition as its limit or peril. Palafox, that seemingly 
invincible metamorphic force of Chevillard’s earlier novel, ultimately 
meets the fate of a common cockroach, crushed by a guest’s slipper.34 
For Michaux too, the fi xing of species identity was in those texts of the 
1930s (“Encore des changements,” “Naissance”) equated with capture 
or destruction, so that freedom was in continuous fl ight from form. One 
might remember, on the other hand, Borges’s words on animals that 
escape recognizable form in an essay where he cites among possible pre-
cursors to Kafka an apologue by ninth- century Chinese writer Han Yu:
Even children and village women know that the unicorn 
constitutes a favorable presage. But this animal does not fi g-
ure among the domestic beasts, it is not always easy to fi nd, 
it does not lend itself to classifi cation. It is not like the horse 
or the bull, the wolf or the deer. In such conditions, we could 
be face to face with a unicorn and not know for certain what 
it w as. We know that such and such an animal with a mane 
is a horse and that such and such an animal with horns is a 
bull. But we do not know what the unicorn is like.35
Barely a Hedgehog, Strictly Speaking ❘ 175
Borges adds in a footnote to this quote: “Non- recognition of the sa-
cred animal and its opprobrious or accidental death at the hands of the 
people are traditional themes in Chinese literature.” In other words, an 
animal’s life in a text may be ensured only for as long as it can succeed 
in not being recognized (which is always misrecognized, if real animal 
life, as Heraclitus had known, is to hide and to fl ee).36
This knot of threads should lead us back to the Derridean hedge-
hog, as an emblem of the complicity between visibility and withdrawal, 
the tenuousness of a “sympathetic” relation preserved between name 
and thing. In a fascinating twist, Lavery notes that the “istrice” Derrida 
plays with in “Che cos’è la poesia?” (which appeared fi rst, remember, in 
Italian) carries with it not only resonant paronomastic value (distress, 
restriction) but also a problem of translation. For “istrice” in Italian 
names a genus (the Hystrix cristata, or crested porcupine, i.e., not a 
hedgehog at all) quite different to the hedgehogs native to France (At-
elerix algirus, literally the Algerian hedgehog, and oh, is there not here 
yet another fascinating expropriation?) and to Britain (Erinaceus euro-
paeus, that embodiment of Englishness as established above), so that 
“the recognition of the animal is fi rst and foremost, then, a misrecogni-
tion” (130). In this important sense too, then, the hedgehog cannot be 
identifi ed once and for all with itself but is always beside itself, exempt-
ing itself from its holdings and unfoldings. Even Derrida would admit in 
a later interview, invoking the Grimm brothers’ tale “The Hare and the 
Hedgehog” (where a hare, believing itself to be racing against a single 
hedgehog, is defeated by a second— the fi rst’s wife which, through a 
mistake of number and gender, it cannot distinguish from the fi rst), that 
his own hedgehog in “Che cos’è la poesia?” was quite possibly more 
than one, indeed that it carried traces of others (that is, the hedgehogs of 
Grimm, Heidegger, and Schlegel, to which I shall return).37 So it seems 
increasingly clear that to track bits of hedgehog, and yet to resist round-
ing them up or rounding them off, is to read with an eye not only to 
what the text carries but also to what it carries over or under its legible, 
signifying charge. A method if not a malady: since I fi rst translated that 
Darrieussecq passage I have been reading for bits of hedgehog (divining 
their presence along edges or in cracks, sometimes, like Jean Rolin and 
his stray dogs,38 with the sense that I have found a place where bits of 
hedgehog should have been and are somehow missing). The question 
remains as to what kind of conception of narrative, life, or meaning may 
accommodate, or arise from, these bits of hedgehog.
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Detour 2:  The Mollusk and the Hermit Crab
Darrieussecq’s seamless world or world “sans rupture” conceives of be-
ing as a continuum between inside and outside, self and other, human 
and animal, whole and part, so that it is a very particular sort of folding 
that is implied. In a moment of aroused somnolence, the narrator of A 
Brief Stay with the Living experiences a “luminous reassurance— her 
insides are also her outside. A continuity you can follow like a Möbius 
strip. Down a slide [Dans un glissement de toboggan]. She exists con-
stantly, without a break [sans rupture] or gaps” (49/31). Le pays recalls 
the Native American origins of “toboggan,” the name the Algonquin 
Indians of Canada give to their snow sleds (41). But Darrieussecq plau-
sibly uses the word in the modern French sense of one of those elabo-
rately twisting roller- coaster- like slides in an amusement park, which 
can be shaped very much like a Möbius strip.39 The curious property of 
the Möbius strip— easily modeled with a long, thin strip of paper that 
you half- twist in one place before joining its ends— is that it has not two 
edges but a single surface which slides inside and outside alternately (so 
that to return to its starting point, once it has started following the length 
of the strip, a pencil— or an ant, as per the usual explanation— must 
travel a distance that is double the length of the strip itself). Like the cir-
cle, there is no end to the Möbius strip (an eternal march could not get 
the ant off the strip), but its poignancy— for which it was resorted to by 
Lacan during his “surface period” to describe the relationship between 
consciousness and the unconscious40— lies in its capacity to represent 
the paradoxical continuity of certain structures where, as it were, there 
is no inside and outside, only a single continual edge whose length time 
itself must stretch, and double up on itself, to measure. In this sense it is 
a topological paradox resolved only phenomenologically: commenting 
on Lacan’s envers- endroit model, Jeanne Lafont thus makes clear that 
“the unconscious is not separated from the conscious except by the time 
it takes to go there.”41 The provocation of such a structure is in allowing 
that realms supposed discontinuous, separated by a bar— in the subject 
of psychoanalysis, the bar of repression; in theories of language, that of 
words and things— be in fact, by virtue of an irreducible fold, connected 
in perplexing but seamless continuity.
An intuition regarding just such a congruency between words and 
things in the works of Ponge had moved Gérard Genette to write, in 
Mimologics, that the poem “14 juillet,” offering a motivating reading 
of its own title, in fact “loops the loop and joins the signifying with the 
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signifi ed face of language in a Möbius strip.”42 I would contend that 
one could say this about most if not all of Ponge’s poems. Everywhere 
in Ponge the thing is revealed to be inseparable, inextricable from the 
word that names it, thus dramatizing the single inexhaustible boundary 
of signifi cation itself. Thus is experienced structurally a certain “always 
already” paradox of human time, which is that there is no access to a 
world before language. In the words of Émile Benveniste, “We can never 
get back to man separated from language and we shall never see him 
inventing it.”43 Every thing is, conversely, a thing of language, a leçon de 
chose (object lesson). If we remember that Saussure had offered, by way 
of illustration for the double structure of the sign, the analogy of a sheet 
of paper (where signifi er and signifi ed would respectively form each 
side), Ponge’s PPC = CTM poetics (Parti pris des choses = Compte tenu 
des mots / taking sides with things = taking account of words) turns the 
sheet of paper into something more like a strip,44 half- twisted before 
joining back onto itself— a Möbius strip.
This in turn would explain why Ponge’s pieces, even the shortest, 
most- fi nished pieces of Le parti pris des choses, are always, on some 
level, about writing itself, patiently, not to say obsessively, concerned 
with the surplus, in writing, that reveals each of its objects to be, in 
turn, inexhaustible. But also, in each object is sought a specifi c answer 
to the riddle of how whole and parts, function and expression, being 
and denomination are welded, in what sort of assemblage, and how 
this solution might mirror back to the human the secret of its own for-
mative compact with language. Is this what Derrida meant— Derrida, 
who had read Ponge so closely— when he said “no poem that does not 
open itself like a wound, but no poem that is not also just as wound-
ing”? In Signéponge, he would note that in Ponge causing to sign and 
to signify (faire signer et se signifi er; “it is the other, the thing as other, 
that signs”) was never all that far from a causing to bleed (faire saigner; 
recall the violence of “L’orange” or “L’huître”).45 Derrida’s interest in 
Ponge’s signature unlocks a meditation on his poem- objects as para-
doxical bodies that try to absorb their own outer border, to fold in their 
outside (“the signature is both inside and outside, it overfl ows, fl ows 
over itself” [114– 15]). In these texts that are so many mises en abyme, 
texts about their own writing, the abyssal invagination of a thing striv-
ing to account entirely for itself produces an ever- receding supplement, 
an unclosable gap between a presenting and a representing, a marking 
and a re- marking, the presence/absence of a ghostly signatory who, be-
fore being the writer, is nature, which, as Ponge never forgot (spelling it 
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sometimes gnature), derives its name from the past participle of nascere, 
Latin for “to be born.” Modeling his remark on what Ponge had said 
of the “éponge” or sponge— that it had “every quality, and hence one 
quality the more [plus une]: that of having them all” (72– 73), Derrida 
described Ponge’s poems as “texts which explain themselves very well, 
and in such a way that everything can be found there, in addition to that 
remainder [plus ce reste] which prevents an explanatory discourse from 
ever attaining saturation” (30– 31).
Given all this, Ponge really should have written some notes for a 
hedgehog. Instead, the closest animal he wrote on was the mollusk, 
about which Elissa Marder has written insightfully in pages that argued 
far ahead of their time for the productive and critical work of nonhu-
man fi gures at the heart of concepts of the human.46 I will be leaning 
heavily here on her reading of this poem; Marder is quite clear early 
on that “Le mollusque” (“The Mollusk”) of Le parti pris des choses, 
which Bernard Beugnot has since deemed the heart and the hinge of 
the volume,47 presents as its crucial proposition “the impossibility of 
distinguishing between creature/mollusk and poem/mollusk” (1:114) 
and that for such exemplarity (as a fi gure for the relationship between 
being and expression, and even of [ironized] authorship) it could well 
have carried the title “Poem” (recall that Ponge’s “Fable” had through 
precisely such a logic inspired Derrida’s Signéponge [116; 125]). To con-
sider for a moment the poem in its entirety:
Le mollusque est un être— presque une— qualité. Il n’a pas be-
soin de charpente mais seulement d’un rempart, quelque chose 
comme la couleur dans le tube.
La nature renonce ici à la présentation du plasma en 
forme. Elle montre seulement qu’elle y tient en l’abritant soi-
gneusement, dans un écrin dont la face intérieure est la plus 
belle.
Ce n’est donc pas un simple crachat, mais une réalité des 
plus précieuses.
Le mollusque est doué d’une énergie puissante à se renfer-
mer. Ce n’est à vrai dire qu’un muscle, un gond, un blount 
et sa porte.
Le blount ayant sécrété la porte. Deux portes légèrement 
concaves constituent sa demeure entière.
Première et dernière demeure. Il y loge jusqu’après sa 
mort.
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Rien à faire pour l’en tirer vivant.
La moindre cellule du corps de l’homme tient ainsi, et 
avec cette force, à la parole,— et réciproquement.
Mais parfois un autre être vient violer ce tombeau, lors-
qu’il est bien fait, et s’y fi xer à la place du constructeur 
défunt.
C’est le cas du pagure. (24)
The mollusk is a being— almost a quality. It doesn’t need a skel-
eton, just a rampart; something like paint in a tube.
Nature has abandoned all hope here of shaping plasma. 
She merely shows her attachment by carefully sheltering it in 
a jewel case, more beautiful inside than out.
So it’s not just a gob of spit; but a truly precious reality.
The mollusk is endowed with terrifi c energy for self- 
closure. Strictly speaking it’s nothing but a muscle, a hinge, a 
door- closer and its door.
A door- closer that has secreted the door. Two slightly con-
cave doors constitute its entire dwelling.
The fi rst and last dwelling. It stays on even after it dies.
No getting it out alive.
The slightest cell in the human body clings just as tightly 
to language— and vice- versa.
But sometimes another being violates the tomb, if it’s 
well- made, and takes the place of the deceased builder.
As is the case of the hermit crab.48
Ponge’s mollusk- poem indeed forms a remarkable poem- mollusk. As 
Marder puts it, the mollusk “survives by means of its self- expression,” 
“materially cling[ing] to its speech” in a reversal of the usual priority of 
inside and outside— for it is not here a case of an outer form refl ecting 
an inner essence; rather, the shell, secreted over time by the amorphous 
creature, lends it “both form and fi gure,” without which it is “unimag-
inable, unrepresentable,” arguably unviable (121– 22). The shell in turn 
outlives the creature as its death mask and “perfect autobiography.”49 
Marder shows that “Le mollusque” is an exemplary instance of Ponge 
attempting to arrive at things “at the impossible point at which the thing 
and the word that expresses that thing cling together inseparably and 
without ‘meaning’” (140). It is not diffi cult to see why the perfect model 
for the poem then (and for the ideal, essential adequation between the 
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human and its expression for which the poem in turn serves as emblem), 
just as for Derrida it was the hedgehog (assuming we are to take that 
seriously), for Ponge must be the mollusk. The manner and force with 
which the mollusk remains beyond its death in its shell, its fi rst abode 
and its last, in a Möbius- strip- like invagination of putative inside and 
outside, fl esh and verb, would seem to illustrate with drama and pathos 
the tenacity with which the human inhabits language like an insepara-
ble outer skin. An intriguing chiasmaticity, whereby “the slightest cell in 
the human body clings just as tightly to language— and vice- versa” sug-
gests a topology in which the two are originarily tethered together: No 
body without language, and by the same logic, viewed from the other 
“infl ection” of the strip, no language without body. Hence, perhaps, 
Derrida’s no- poem- unlike- a- wound/- wounding. So many of Ponge’s po-
ems (one thinks here notably of the fragrant passion of “L’orange” [The 
Orange] and of the opinionatedly clammed- up and fi nally prized- open 
oyster of “L’huître” [The Oyster]) are about openings, that is, opening a 
thing, a thing opening, ex- pressed, pressed out of itself, unfolding pro-
gressively, to bare its innermost inviolable material/verbal fold (“that 
remainder which prevents an explanatory discourse from ever attaining 
saturation,” as Derrida wrote), like a mollusk steadfastly refusing to 
leave its shell, like a human joined to language as by cartilage to its own 
outer shell.
Yet the last word of the last line of the poem- mollusk names a crea-
ture quite different, a posthumous interloper, and in a way so startling 
(“another being” violating the mollusk’s abode and sepulture that is this 
text) as to recall Lewis Carroll’s absurd “For the Snark was a Boojum, 
you see.”50 The pagure, more commonly known as the bernard l’her-
mite, or hermit crab, does not secrete its own shell like the mollusk but, 
rather, takes over the salvaged gastropod shell of other creatures, often 
sea snails, but also marine mollusks. I will have reason (yes) to return 
to the particular behavior of this species. The case of the pagure here 
(“As is the case of the hermit crab”), signifying as it does the end of the 
mollusk in both word and fl esh, owes its supplementary disquiet to the 
fact that it annexes the careful analogy drawn between mollusk and 
man. For what human secretes its own language- armor like the mollusk 
its shell- doors? Once one starts to wonder whether the fi gure for the hu-
man in Ponge’s intricate metaphor is not the hermit crab rather than the 
mollusk, the poem opens itself to a more suspicious reading. For is it not, 
well before the end, retroactively occupied, its meanings parasitically re-
routed to the advantage of the pagure? Is it not the stubborn survival 
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of the occupier in its borrowed abode (rather than that of the original 
mollusk in its secreted one) that inspires the evocation of the way ev-
ery cell of the human body clutches onto language? In Marder’s lucid 
words, “the viability of the mollusk’s speech is confi rmed only when this 
speech is violated— quoted and translated— by another. Perversely, the 
mollusk’s self- expression comes to speak perfectly for another” (126). 
The model is in fact one of “expropriation,” by which “speech is neither 
proper nor property” but always appropriation, usurpation, citation, 
of dead material which, reanimated, in turn can bestow life (127). The 
“perver[ted]” model certainly offers a more rigorous (Derridean avant 
la lettre) description of the human relationship to language, so that one 
must ask whether in the end the mollusk as original inhabitant is not 
quite a mythical entity. Not that there are no such things as mollusks 
(this would be a dreadful prospect for a hermit crab), but Ponge pres-
ents his amorphous object from the outset as something as hidden and 
inaccessible in the poem as in nature itself: “Nature has abandoned all 
hope here of shaping plasma. She merely shows her attachment by care-
fully sheltering it.” To still be able to speak of “the mollusk” (as “paint 
in a tube”) accordingly implies that the hermetic exteriority it presents 
in nature has been violated, that one has arrived at it, as per the natural 
law the poem itself cites (“No getting it out alive”), after its death, not 
to say as its death: “Authorship is merely the voice of death.”51
Another text of the same period as “Le mollusque” confi rms the 
terms of the captured analogy. In “Notes pour un coquillage” (“Notes 
toward a Shellfi sh”) Ponge deems of writers and composers of measure 
and proportion (Bach, Rameau, Malherbe, Horace, Mallarmé . . .) that 
“their monument is made of the human mollusk’s true secretion, the 
thing best proportioned and adapted to his body, and yet as different in 
form as one can conceive: I mean language.”52 But immediately after 
these lines Ponge looks far beyond the human to that time and place 
where “la parole” (language) might be discovered and inhabited by 
other tenants: “Oh Louvre of language!— that may one day, after we’re 
extinct, perhaps have other inhabitants, some kind of ape, for exam-
ple, or bird, or a higher being, just as crustaceans, like the hermit crab, 
assume the place of the mollusk in the miter- shell.” Marder’s posthu-
manist reading of Ponge fi nds here its deepest reach.53 Yet one might 
wonder whether ultimately there is not an irresolvable instability to the 
location of the human in all of this; almost as if Ponge couldn’t quite 
decide which one, mollusk or hermit crab, human or posthuman carried 
the fi nal truth regarding language and life. By this token the “case of 
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the hermit crab” would seem to be a case of what Derrida would have 
called an originary supplementarity, that is, a ruining of unity and self- 
identity from the very beginning. From the moment that the “pagure” 
enters and makes the departed mollusk’s shell its own, or more dramat-
ically still, from the moment that this becomes possible (which is the 
very beginning, if there is such a thing), ownness or ownership itself is 
ousted from its usual place. In the end the one- to- one correspondence 
between mollusk and shell or human and language is preyed upon not 
so much temporally and from the outside by a third term (the hermit 
crab) as conceptually and internally by an openness that must always 
expose life to what in it outlives it and utterance to the “empty place” at 
its heart that can always be reoccupied.54 Thus the poem on the mollusk 
attains its innermost material- verbal fold and place of truth only by 
substituting itself for the mollusk (and ink for the “paint in the tube”). 
And the poet writing his way into the mollusk’s shell himself assumes 
the metaphorical features of a “pagure” that writhes into it. But my 
prose is parasited again by Lewis Carroll (to whom it is now time to 
turn), whose Mock Turtle, in Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, fondly 
recalls his early lessons in “Reeling and Writhing” . . . 
Grin without a Cat
If all this makes for a “plane of plication” generally favorable to the 
grin of a Cheshire Cat, one dimension— or unfold— of this grin remains 
to be considered, and this has to do with words and things in Dar-
rieussecq, and what animals have exactly to do with that relation, if 
anything. (But a converted Baroque myself now, I will be seeking some-
thing rather than nothing— and perhaps this is what is meant, in the 
end, by bits of hedgehog.) For this last movement I shall draw from the 
Deleuze not of The Fold but of Logic of Sense, where he turns to Stoic 
thought through the prism of the works of Lewis Carroll. Meaning, for 
the Stoics, writes Deleuze, in an early “series” of this work (“Sense”), 
is “the thin fi lm at the limit of things and words,” something that is 
independent of a given proposition, in fact its “neutralized double,” its 
dry “phantom, and a phantasm without thickness.”55 Such a fantomatic 
immobilizing is the only way to resolve a double aporia concerning 
each of the series of terms (words and things, or metalanguage and 
object language)— “my impotence to state the sense of what I say, to 
say at the same time something and its meaning; but also the infi nite 
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power of language to speak about words” (41/29). Meaning, thus un-
derstood as the “evanescent double” of the proposition, is deemed, at 
this point, “[exactly] Carroll’s smile without the cat” (45/32, though 
Deleuze’s “exactement” vanishes in the English). And this grin as mean-
ing, in turn, is “exactly the boundary between propositions and things,” 
which by “turn[ing] one side towards things and one side toward prop-
ositions” (34/22) assures neither separation nor reunion but the “artic-
ulation of their difference,” like a juncture or hinge (la charnière, writes 
Deleuze here— Ponge of “The Mollusk” called it le gond or le blount) 
between body and language (37/24). Meaning, then, is “this aliquid at 
once extra- Being and inherence [insistance], that is, this minimum of 
being which befi ts inherences” (34/22). It is fantomatic, both less than 
body and more than word, because indifferent to qualities, to contra-
diction, to possibility/impossibility. Its existence is inferred from the 
Stoics’ observation that every proposition is caught between an “im-
plies” and a “therefore,” thus always gesturing toward something that 
it cannot itself contain (27/16; one cannot help remembering here Der-
rida’s reading of Ponge and of what cannot ever attain saturation). But 
because things/body and word/language are separate, discontinuous 
series, and because meaning can be located in neither one, it is accessed 
only “by breaking open the circle, as in the case of the Möbius strip, by 
unfolding and untwisting it,” in brief, by undoing the half- fold of the 
Möbius strip connecting along a single side words and things (31/20). 
In the Möbius strip is a fi gure for what Deleuze considers to be Lewis 
Carroll’s lesson: that depth is an illusion, in fact produced by extending 
or following a surface to the place where it turns and becomes its own 
other side. Thus, commenting on the bipartite character of Carroll’s 
Alice books, where the verticality of meaning sought in the fi rst gives 
way to horizontality and surface in the second, he described a Möbius- 
like structure, this time centered on the motif of a curtain (we remem-
ber here the curtain where Darrieussecq’s “thing” had appeared in the 
short story of Zoo): “If there is nothing to see behind the curtain, it is 
because everything that is visible, or rather all possible knowledge is 
along the length of the curtain. It suffi ces to follow it far enough, pre-
cisely enough, and superfi cially enough, in order to reverse sides and to 
make the right become the left or vice versa. It is not therefore a ques-
tion of the adventures of Alice, but of Alice’s adventure: her climb to the 
surface, her disavowal of false depth and her discovery that everything 
happens at the border” (19/9; translation modifi ed). It is worth noting 
here that the narrator of Naissance des fantômes, halfway through the 
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novel, sensing that her husband was “necessarily somewhere, vaporous 
perhaps and on the verge of exiting the universe, but necessarily some-
where, leaning over the edge (whatever edge we must suppose there is),” 
wondered if he might be lurking “behind doors” or “in a breath of air 
against the curtains on a perfectly still day” (96/87– 88). And that, two 
pages earlier, remembering how, as a child, looking at one’s refl ection 
in two mirrors facing each other, “(you laugh in terror at seeing your-
self multiplied; you are in the process of understanding that you will 
go no farther, and indeed your understanding of your whole life will 
go no further, you will do nothing but glimpse the absence of edges in 
the world)” (94/85– 86). One of the “decisions” shaping Darrieussecq’s 
work is indeed in the move from My Phantom Husband, still lured by 
the hope of recovering what is behind or beneath the surface, to Le mal 
de mer, whose fascination is directed largely toward the border itself, 
the “jointure du monde” (78/66)— where the world joins or the world’s 
joint— between water and land (a place of folds and concealed organic 
life), the matricial fi gure for a border constitutive of and ceaselessly 
animating phenomenal reality. Whence the “bouts de hérissons”: the 
boundary is no longer the shore nor the curtain but the more intimate 
one of skin and nails, sites of incrustation fl eshly and poetic by crea-
tures no longer really inner or outer vis- à- vis the self but laterally con-
tiguous, coterminous, as if aligned along the same border— the single 
seam— of being.
But let me return to The Logic of Sense. In the sixth series, titled 
“Serialization,” Deleuze notes the perpetual slippage and imbalance be-
tween the series of the signifi er and the signifi ed, the fact that the signi-
fying series is always in excess relative to that of the signifi ed. Recalling 
Lacan’s famous analysis of Poe’s Purloined Letter, he calls the letter, 
by which Lacan assures the meaningful articulation of the two series, 
“a very special and paradoxical [entity],” which ceaselessly circulates 
between the two series, thereby enabling them to communicate: “It is 
a two- sided entity, equally present in the signifying and the signifi ed 
series. It is the mirror. Thus it is at once word and thing, name and 
object, sense and denotatum, expression and designation, etc. It guar-
antees, therefore, the convergence of the two series which it traverses, 
but precisely on the condition that it makes them endlessly diverge. It 
has the property of being always displaced in relation to itself” (55/40). 
“We must say,” adds Deleuze here, “that the paradoxical entity is never 
where we look for it, and conversely that we never fi nd it where it is. 
As Lacan says, it fails to observe its place (elle manque à sa place)”— so 
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that Deleuze proposes to baptize the paradox “Lacan’s paradox” (55/41, 
see 55/338n6: “A Carrollian inspiration is often in evidence in Lacan’s 
writings”). It will become clear in the progression of Logic of Sense that 
the “paradoxical entity” is nothing other than the very condition of 
production of meaning (88/70, 91/73). As what articulates together the 
signifying and signifi ed series, the “paradoxical element” is constitutive 
of meaning, perhaps indistinguishable from the fantomatic production 
and effect of meaning (99/81). But its terrible paradoxicality lies in what 
appears to be, again, a Möbius- strip- like property, the fact that while it 
theoretically has two sides, each is always missing the other, yet insep-
arable from it: “Its excess always refers to its own lack, and conversely, 
its lack always refers to its excess. But even these determinations are 
still relative. For that which is in excess in one case is nothing but an 
extremely mobile empty place; and that which is lacking in another case 
is a rapidly moving object, an occupant without a place, always super-
numerary and [always] displaced” (56/41).
This paradox is illustrated easily by the episode in the sheep’s shop 
in Through the Looking- Glass, wherein Alice is faced with “the com-
plementarity of ‘the empty shelf’ and of the ‘bright thing always in the 
shelf next above,’” a noncongruency of excess and lack which in the 
fi nal analysis must ruin the calculus— “the thing” ends up passing right 
“through the ceiling” (56/41). But it is also something at work through 
all of language; as such it is renamed “Robinson’s paradox” in the 
eighth series (“Structure”). The signifying series in Robinson Crusoe’s 
case is the totality of laws, rules, and terms that he gives himself in a sin-
gle move, even though they may not yet all have corresponding objects 
in the signifi ed series formed by the things and possible relations on his 
island. The “paradoxical element” is here the gap between the totalness 
of the signifi er on the one hand, and the incompleteness of the signifi ed 
on the other. Deleuze quotes Lévi- Strauss: “‘The Universe signifi ed long 
before we began to know what it was signifying . . . Man, since his ori-
gin, has had at his disposal a completeness of signifi er which he is [hard 
pressed to allocate] to a signifi ed, given as such without being any better 
known. There is always an inadequacy between the two’” (63/48). It is 
as if, in the relationship between language and world, seen as two dis-
continuous, heteronomous series, there were always a continually mov-
ing empty place and a continually fl oating placeless element and that 
the possibility of meaning were always premised on the fact that the 
two are never joined, so that “whatever totalizations knowledge may 
perform, they remain asymptotic to the virtual totality of language.” 
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The asymptote was notably also Lacan’s word, in his description of the 
mirror stage as a model for the constitution of the subject, for the re-
lationship between the self— as uncoordinated inchoate body— and its 
unifi ed, signifying, even “fi ctional” image— as refl ected in the mirror.56 
The gap between thing/body and its symbolization is precisely what is 
at stake here, so that one could be forgiven for imagining, when reading 
these moments of Deleuze’s demonstration in Logic of Sense, that some-
thing like an incomplete creature, or maybe something like creaturely 
incompleteness, stands at this place of variance— as a leftover of that 
peculiar enfoldedness of excess (of signifi er) and poverty (of signifi ed) 
otherwise known as meaning.
Or is it just that the grin without a cat, as it moves through Logic 
of Sense as a “paradoxical element,” seems to have to imply on some 
irrecoverable other— or same, single, unotherable— side a cat without 
a grin? By the time we reach the thirty- third series (“of Alice’s adven-
tures”) Deleuze is distractedly calling Carroll’s cat “le chat de Chester” 
(duly corrected in the English by Lester) and equating it with “the good 
penis” and the idealized “voice of the heights” (274/235). The equation 
makes some sense in the case of Naissance des fantômes, and is one to 
which, given her knowledge of Lacan, Darrieussecq would moreover 
likely not object altogether.57 The Chester cat, says Deleuze, requires of 
Alice that she choose between being a child and being a pig (the Duch-
ess’s baby having turned into a pig, as Alice reports to the cat), and more 
generally, between depth and height. Choosing correctly, she succeeds 
in learning the lesson of surface, and in Through the Looking- Glass, 
will no longer need the identifi cation with cats (on which she will look 
down rather patronizingly). Even if Deleuze goes on to qualify such a 
reading, noting that there is little profi t in reading Oedipally and that 
in any case the interest of the Alice adventures is that psychic regression 
is supplanted by speculative investment (279), it seems likely that— as 
Derrida suggests in passing in one of the seminars of La bête et le sou-
verain II (regarding specifi cally Deleuze’s text on Michel Tournier’s Ven-
dredi ou les limbes du Pacifi que)— Deleuze was at this time excessively 
infl uenced by Lacan.58 As for me, I will confess to being more intrigued 
by the Cheshire Cat than by its reterritorialized Chester version (Ches-
ter is a city in Cheshire county but it is not mentioned in Alice) and 
rather inclined to take seriously the work a bit of animal could do in 
all those places where Lacan gave paradoxical elements another name: 
letter, penis (good or bad), Real or objet petit a (unless of course this 
secretly stands for petit objet animal . . .).
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You Can’t Be Certain That I  Haven’t Done It
In a interview following the publication of “Che cos’è la poesia?,”59 
Derrida confessed to a curious anamnesis— the ghostly return, behind 
his singular hedgehog, of other possible hedgehogs:
In “Che cos’è la poesia?” the fi gure of [the hedgehog] seems 
to herald, as if in silence, something about the “by heart” 
and memory. Well, quite a bit later after publishing this text, 
I had to give in to a strange certainty: if this hedgehog had 
appeared to rise up before me, unique, young as on the fi rst 
day of creation, but also given secretly for the fi rst time, an 
incomparable present, in truth I must have come across it at 
least two times before. In two texts that mean a lot to me. 
But I didn’t recall this for a single instant at the moment of 
writing. I didn’t even have the distant feeling of other pos-
sible hedgehogs— in my memory or in literature. Before the 
depth of this forgetting, which effaced even the support of 
the message, I wonder if I even noticed during my reading, 
which was perhaps distracted, the two other hedgehogs that 
now come back like ghosts, or if instead an operation of 
effective censoring had not already imposed in me the acci-
dent that that text talks about. It little matters. And it is true 
that although they have the same name, these two hedgehogs 
don’t have much relation to “mine”; they don’t belong to the 
same family, the same species, or the same genre, even though 
this non- relation says something about a deep genealogical 
affi nity, but in antagonism, in counter- genealogy. Compared 
to these two hedgehogs, which turn out to be German hedge-
hogs, bearing therefore a German name (Igel), the one that 
occurred to me is a solitary counter- hedgehog, fi rst of all 
Italian [istrice] or French [hérisson]. (Points 311/301– 2)
The German hedgehogs in question, Derrida would go on to tell Maur-
izio Ferraris, were hedgehogs invoked by German philosophers, in both 
instances as emblems for things quite different, not to say inimical, to 
what Derrida himself had in mind with his “counter- hedgehog.” First 
there was Schlegel’s famous fragment 206, which Derrida had “read 
or reread” in Philippe Lacoue- Labarthe and Jean- Luc Nancy’s The Lit-
erary Absolute: “Like a little work of art, a fragment must be totally 
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detached from the surrounding world and closed on itself like a hedge-
hog.” Lacoue- Labarthe and Nancy had drawn from this axiom a logic of 
“fragmentary totality” which they baptized “the logic of the hedgehog”: 
“Each fragment is valid for itself and for that from which it is detached” 
(quoted on 302). In the interview, Derrida is loathe to locate such indi-
vidualized integrity or integrality, or even any “logic” in his “counter- 
hedgehog.” Produced by “the chance of a language and of signifi ers that 
play the role of temporary proper name”— istrice, hérisson— his is a 
“‘catachrestic’ hérisson,” he insists, “neither a concept nor a thing”; 
also, “it has no relation to itself— that is, no totalizing individuality— 
that does not expose it even more to death and to being- torn- apart. 
Another logic. Or rather: this very young hedgehog is older than ‘logic.’ 
The ‘logic of the hedgehog’ is one of the possible traps in the adventure 
of this other hedgehog, of its name and of its dispatch” (303). Indeed, at 
the end of “Che cos’è la poesia?” he had written clearly: “‘What is . . . 
[Qu’est- ce que . . .]?’ laments the disappearance of the poem— another 
catastrophe. By announcing that which is just as it is, a question salutes 
the birth of prose” (298/299). In a sense the unreadability— and the 
obscure drama— of that piece had been precisely this: that you could 
say what a hedgehog/poem was only by saying how it was not what it 
was and thereby abolishing it. The “accident” being something like this 
twist in the road, in the ribbon of thinking or being (a Möbius strip), 
which has the hedgehog continually walking toward its own vanishing. 
Derrida makes clear that there is nothing destinal, sacrifi cial, or subli-
matable about such an accident; it is something far more humble. Yet 
such accidents are regularly given magnifi ed meanings, and that is when 
they become disastrous, catastrophic, and the hedgehog is frozen, on 
its way to its humble disappearance, into a logic. This is what occurs 
also in the second case, a passage at the end of Heidegger’s Identity 
and Difference, where “the silhouette of an Igel [“hedgehog” in Ger-
man] passes by still more quickly.” Heidegger there had formulated a 
possible objection to his thinking on the difference between Being and 
being, as being a distance or an arriving that only pretends to be one: 
“It is as in Grimm’s fairytale ‘The Hedgehog and the Hare’: ‘I’m here 
already’” (quoted on 303). The Grimm (if certainly not grim) Hedgehog 
had won the race against the Hare by “send[ing] his female hedgehog 
ahead to the fi nish line”— so that “the concept, the fi gure, the sense of 
the hedgehog, in this case, whatever its language may be and whatever 
its name may be, mean the ‘always- already- there,’ the structure or the 
logic of the ‘always already’ (303).60 First inserting within this structure 
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the unresolvable uncertainty of who it is that in fact calls out the “I’m 
here already” or “Ick bünn all hier/da” (using the German word for 
both gender and genus, he asks, “What is the Geschlecht of this trium-
phal voice?”), Derrida goes on to except his hedgehog from this fable 
too: “The istrice that came to me can barely say ‘Ich’ and certainly not 
‘bünn,’ still less ‘hier’ and ‘da.’ It is still waiting and is not assured of 
any ‘always already.’ [ . . . ] It is barely a hedgehog, strictly speaking; it 
is neither a work, nor poetry, nor truth, only a letter and a few syllables 
destined to die by accident” (304). Still, later in the interview Derrida 
would concede a little ominously: “But it’s true, it is truth itself, that one 
can always bring this hedgehog back into the Heideggerian logic. As we 
have already seen, this can always happen to it as one of its accidents. 
As its loss. Its salvation is its loss. There is no longer anything fortuitous 
about this and the consequences of this strange proposition remain to 
be drawn” (325).
There are several terms and turns of phrase in the interview that 
merit more puzzling through, not least, in what I have just quoted, the 
“it is the truth itself” and the “there is no longer anything fortuitous 
about this.” For these are places where the hedgehog itself “turns,” one 
might say, from a creature humble, aleatory, stubbornly insignifi cant 
into a fi gure for the event of deconstruction itself. Thus in a response to 
a question from Ferraris about the politics of his philosophical prefer-
ences (hedgehog over phoenix, writing over voice, history’s rejects over 
its victors . . .), Derrida describes his concern always to reach for “that 
point at which a formalization [and especially one given as a couple 
or binary] remains necessarily incomplete, open to what may come.” 
Here he says simply: “A hedgehog may always arrive, it may always 
be given to me. There is something non- formalizable and the concern 
comes from there, precisely,” “perhaps an ‘ethical’ concern, in fact.” Ul-
timately, he grants, this nonformalizable something or possible arrival 
of a hedgehog is the “very thing” that preoccupies him, as a “place that 
no longer belongs either to the couple or to the circle” (323). But if we 
have learned anything from Derrida, it is that an object of such unob-
trusiveness and modesty (what may arrive/happen pared down to the 
size of a little hedgehog) is no place of transparency or rest— quite the 
contrary, for in this unassuming creature the world itself stands to be 
faced with its non- self- identity (and Western thinking with its inconsis-
tency), and to unravel. In fact, the unraveling power of the hedgehog 
(as of anything that might have been in its place— this being the point) 
reveals itself to be overdetermined— or as Derrida might have said, orig-
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inarily complicated. First, it is an entity which stands before (or rolls 
into) itself in a relationship of non- self- sameness. This is in turn more 
complicated than it seems: the hedgehog’s rolling up into a ball is itself 
only a metaphor for the fact that the hedgehog is catachrestic; and that 
it is a catachresis (sometimes called a dead metaphor) because, like a 
catachresis, it “borrows” part or even most of its being from another 
realm, but in this case that other realm is language tout court, for which 
there is no other, and the borrowed part is its name, without which there 
would be nothing to think it by, perhaps because that is all there is to 
it.61 Which is why Derrida likens the hedgehog to the “aleatory factor” 
of the mark or the trace (305), and why he is pointedly reluctant to 
“re- semanticize this letter,” insisting that “it must remain of little mean-
ing. Without secret but sealed. It is also better not to stuff polysemic 
vitamins down the throat of a humble little mammal. Let’s not entrust 
it with any message” (311). Because it is “barely a hedgehog, strictly 
speaking [c’est à peine un hérisson, à proprement parler]” (314/304), 
and precisely in this “barely,” in this trace that it registers, (at least) three 
important disrupting or resignifying capacities are encrypted, or rather, 
left delicately unforeclosed. The fi rst is that as a living creature, “even 
if it is a catachrestic one,” this hedgehog introduces a humble note of 
unsettlement in the Heideggerian “dominant discourse” that the animal 
is poor in world and that being- for- death— and therefore Being accessed 
“as such” (that term by which the animal is repeatedly denied Being in 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics)— is reserved for humans (311). 
For, on the one hand, if the hedgehog is not aware of the possibility of 
death “as such,” it is no easier to claim that the human Dasein can stand 
in such a relation to its own death (“What is the ‘as such’ in the case of 
death?”); besides, the hedgehog’s rolling up into a ball constitutes a sign 
of an apprehension of death, if ill seen and ill said (312). On the other 
hand, if “the hedgehog is poor in world since it is very low, close to the 
earth,” well, “so is man,” who is “also more or less rich, thus more or 
less poor in world” (325). We thus see here well in place, rolled up in 
Derrida’s humble hedgehog, all the moves, soundly rehearsed in part VII 
of De l’esprit (1987) that had fi rst addressed some of “the diffi culties 
[Heidegger] encounters with animality,” that would lead more than a 
decade later to the critique of Western philosophy’s historical occlusion 
of the animal in L’animal que donc je suis.
The second way in which Derrida’s hedgehog is infi nitely more than 
itself is one that I shall derive less directly from what Derrida says and 
more from some of the fascinating perspectives suggested by Ferraris 
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as a close reader of the philosopher’s work (who at times, it is true, 
speaks at such great length that the interviewee is left uncharacteris-
tically speechless). At various points in the conversation, Derrida has 
made it clear that his hedgehog is catachrestic also because it “doesn’t 
belong to the species or the genre” (302), that it is “indissolubly linked” 
to a tentative, temporary assemblage of letters, perhaps secretly to that 
“dead letter come from the other; before any living act, and even before 
any position of the cogito” (320). Ferraris in turn receives Derrida’s in-
sistence on the letter as confi rmation of a historical difference between 
German and Romanic philosophical thinking, where the former, idealist 
and classical in its thrust, has traditionally treated the letter as subordi-
nate to the spirit which gathers, resolves, and transcends it (316), while 
the latter has tended to privilege the work “of ‘close reading’ and of 
faithfulness to the letter” (315). The hypothesis concerns not national 
essences or inclinations, but rather an epochal German investment in 
a Classical Greek scene (as described by Plato), where “the living and 
still current spirit” is eternally young and vitally and seriously pres-
ent to itself, whereas “a repetition of letters, citations and elements not 
present to spirit”— as in the case of Egyptian/Oriental civilization and 
later Roman (and then Italian and French), where “everything is written 
down”— would weigh the spirit down and deprive it of its actuality 
(317– 18). Ferraris, continually responding through this elaboration to 
Derrida’s own work (on Heidegger, Husserl, De Man, etc.), states that 
“the paradigm of the classical and the metaphysical [in which he quickly 
bunches together Plato, Heidegger, Husserl and even Nietzsche in spite 
of Derrida’s note of caution] is consciousness present to itself, monolog-
ically self- conscious, which nothing— neither letters, traditions, indexes, 
nor lists, that is, anything that is of the order of the letter written on pa-
per and not on the soul— can carry away from itself” (318). The animal, 
Ferraris notes at this point, plays here “a non- peripheral role,” for “in 
Greece, the animal is infi nitely inferior to self- conscious man, which was 
not the case in Egypt, where it made no difference whether one buried 
an ox or a sovereign in a pyramid” (319). In other words, the history 
of Western philosophy according to Ferraris- reading- Derrida- reading- 
Western- philosophers can be recounted pithily as “the formation of two 
series: on the one side, there is spirit, youth, humanity, life, Greece; on 
the other, there is letter, old age, animality, death, and Egypt as realm of 
death” (319).
All of this is thoroughly fascinating (the animal- letter adjacency 
particularly would merit fruitful refl ection),62 and I do not infer from 
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Derrida’s very terse response (“But let’s be careful. Let’s not construct 
between us a Franco- Italian axis or a southern highway . . .” [319]) that 
he was in substantive disagreement with it. Rather, I should think, he 
abstained from further comment at this point both because in pursu-
ing that path further lay yet another risk of turning the hedgehog into 
a logic, into an element in a couple (the two series, German/French, 
Classical/Oriental, spirit/letter), and because the scene Ferraris had de-
scribed was no doubt precisely the reason (or one way of describing the 
reason) for the hedgehog and for why it had to be catachrestic, “barely 
a hedgehog”— so that it could straddle the epistemic divide between life 
and letter, human and animal, or continually confound it. So that Fer-
raris was perhaps not even expecting a response but simply providing 
what he saw as being (in its most ambitious scope) the backstory, a foot-
note to the hedgehog. It is a very rich moment especially, then, because it 
illustrates the sense in which nothing less than the most comprehensive 
or dramatized account of the history of Western thought is at stake in 
the footnote to the sudden, unaccountable arrival of what is barely a 
hedgehog. And that this is also, even more dizzyingly, why Derrida’s 
hedgehog is an über- catachresis, because it is without intrinsic content 
or life but, once named, can come to carry inexhaustible traces of lan-
guage, philosophy, history, of other possible hedgehogs, and because 
without these letters— without this endless work of the letter, of reading 
and writing— it dissolves into nothing. The second limitless property of 
Derrida’s hedgehog, then, is this: once named (so it “arrives”), it pre-
vents any possible closing off of the distribution of matter and letter, 
human and animal, “I” and “it,” because it keeps excepting itself from 
each accounting, which therefore is never an accounting of everything. 
As Derrida would say a little further, in describing his “‘ethical’ con-
cern”: “none of the names would be apt any longer, writing no more 
than the voice, Egypt no more than Greece” (323).
The third abyssal property of the hedgehog arrives with delay. Just 
as two other possible hedgehogs return as ghosts soon after “Che cos’è 
la poesia?,” the shadow of yet other hedgehogs would pass many years 
later, distinguished equally by ellipsis or belatedness, or, rather, indisso-
ciable from the suggestion that there was not time enough to fold ev-
erything back into a hedgehog as with infi nite time one might or should 
have done. It is toward the beginning of the fi rst seminar of L’animal 
que donc je suis, when Derrida is still distinguishing his cat from other 
cats— Baudelaire’s, Montaigne’s, Alice’s (Carla Freccero has tracked this 
cat community richly):63 “‘My’ pussycat [“ma” chatte] (but a pussycat 
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never belongs) is not even the one who speaks in Alice in Wonderland” 
(23/7). It is a movement riddled with citation, digression, false leads, 
ambiguities, equivocation (the sure signs of catachrestic labor, we now 
understand) as Derrida both yields to and resists the seduction of liter-
ary cats: he cannot forbid us, for instance, from reading in his insistence 
on the realness of his cat a citation from the penultimate one- line chap-
ter (titled “Waking”) of Through the Looking- Glass, “— and it really 
was a kitten after all” (quoted in L’animal que donc je suis, 23/7). Then, 
after quoting this line both in English and in two different French trans-
lations (to no apparent ends; but there is fascination at work here with 
the letter, with the cat as letter, with the letter as cat), Derrida says the 
following, worth quoting at some length:
Although I don’t have time to do so, I would of course have 
liked to inscribe my whole talk within a reading of Lewis 
Carroll. In fact you can’t be certain that I am not doing that, 
for better or for worse, silently, unconsciously, or without 
your knowing. You can’t be certain that I didn’t already do 
it one day when, ten years ago, I let speak or let pass a lit-
tle hedgehog, a suckling hedgehog [un nourisson hérisson] 
perhaps, before the question “What is Poetry?” For thinking 
concerning the animal, if there is such a thing, derives from 
poetry. There you have a thesis: it is what philosophy has, es-
sentially, had to deprive itself of. It is the difference between 
philosophical knowledge and poetic thinking. The hedgehog 
of “What is Poetry?” not only inherited a piece of my name 
[Le hérisson de “Qu’est- ce que la poésie?” n’héritait pas 
seulement d’un morceau de mon nom] but also responded, 
in its own way, to the appeal [appel ] of Alice’s hedgehog. 
Remember the croquet ground where the “balls were live 
hedgehogs” (“The Queen’s Croquet Ground”). Alice wanted 
to give the hedgehog a blow with the head of the fl amingo 
she held under her arm, and it would “twist itself round and 
look up in her face,” until she burst out laughing.
How can an animal look you in the face? That will be one 
of our concerns. Alice noticed next that “the hedgehog had 
unrolled itself and was in the act of crawling away: besides 
all this, there was generally a ridge or a furrow in the way 
wherever she wanted to send the hedgehog to.” It was a fi eld 
on which “the players all played at once, without waiting for 
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turns, quarreling all the while, and fi ghting for the hedge-
hogs” [s’arrachaient les hérissons]. (23– 24/7)
It is a passage critics turn to often, especially— not to say exclusively— 
for the critical pronouncement on literature and philosophy’s respective 
relations to the animal. But what of Carroll and the hedgehogs amid 
which these lines are nestled? Derrida does not comment as such on 
the hedgehogs, limiting himself to the strict speech of quotes and para-
phrase. In what follows immediately, he would express astonishment at 
Alice’s humanistic credulity, that is, her conviction on waking that a cat 
doesn’t ever respond or speak (but only purrs undifferentiatedly), imply-
ing, conversely, that it is possible to distinguish in humans between yes 
and no. If this particular move seems a bit easy (for surely there are texts 
far more guilty than Carroll’s of precluding animals from speech and 
thought), Derrida goes on to quickly correct Alice’s humanist bias from 
the inside of her own story by recalling the Cheshire Cat’s proclamation 
that everyone is mad, and the polemic it provokes on the meanings of 
words and ultimately on what the word “word” means: “‘Call it what 
you like,’ the Cat ends up saying about the difference between growling 
and purring, before announcing that he will be present at the Queen’s 
croquet game, where my poor hedgehogs will be badly treated [là où 
mes pauvres hérissons seront mis à mal]” (26/9). Catachresis: Derrida 
is moving here in and out of Carroll’s text, proceeding seamlessly from 
the Cheshire Cat’s dismantling of the signifi cation of purring (and by 
implication of the decidability of human signifi ers) to the croquet game 
featuring “my poor hedgehogs,” in a move which, pretending to be in-
tradiegetic and proleptic (“before announcing . . . where . . .”), is in fact 
on another level analeptic, not to say metaleptic, for it is a move to a 
moment in Alice already invoked by Derrida and invested in (“my poor 
hedgehogs”) as seminal, abstracted out of diegetic time, and perhaps 
precisely because (or with the result that) no amount of deconstructing 
of words and meanings by the Cheshire Cat “before” the croquet game 
can have the power to save the hedgehogs (whence their poorness) from 
being “badly treated.” Yet one may also note that “badly treated [mis 
à mal]” seems excessive, since everyone is equally buffeted about in 
“The Queen’s Croquet Ground” (chapter 8 of Alice), and if anything the 
hedgehogs have not too bad a time, in the last instances fi ghting each 
other and running away before they can be croqueted (“By the time 
she had caught the fl amingo and brought it back, the fi ght was over, 
and both the hedgehogs were out of sight” [54]); and also that Derrida 
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having said just a few paragraphs earlier that one should not say “‘my’ 
pussycat [ma chatte]” (“a pussycat never belongs” [23/7]), the “my poor 
hedgehogs” without emphasis nor further comment (and so doleful as 
to hardly mount a protest against Heidegger’s thesis that animals are 
poor in world) is a possible sign that these are in fact barely hedgehogs, 
but rather things so bristlingly intertextual— responding to each other 
from text to text (Grimm, Heidegger, Schlegel, Lacoue- Labarthe/Nancy, 
Carroll, Derrida)— that even within the same text they seem to only 
cite and echo each other to no end. And if this is the last we will hear 
really of the hedgehogs of Alice (indeed, Derrida would not do much 
more at all with Carroll in the seminars, which is itself curiouser and 
curiouser), it is because the effect of the hedgehog as tracked letter— 
but also as a sort of crawling, not to say a sort of rolling up onto itself, 
of the text itself— at this moment is to make the end of the passage 
simply feed back into the beginning (“where my poor hedgehogs [that 
is: the very ones I started out with, hence now mine; already “poor” 
because I know how this ends] will be badly treated”). Hedgehogs as 
signals and (moving!) signposts then, between Carroll and Derrida, of 
the way a text is exceeded, preceded, blindsided by its reading and re-
membering, an “iterability” (whose secret indifference to direction the 
ant on the half- twisted strip knows) that is not a surface effect but a 
foldedness (“without secret but sealed”) which the text would carry 
close to its heart or as its heart, like its fi rst graft. If this is in keeping 
with the paradox of every signature so often addressed by Derrida, here 
it so happens that the hedgehog carries at/as its heart a very particular 
signature. For as we learn in passing in L’animal (although it easily 
escapes notice in the earlier essay and interview), the hérisson had also 
been from the very beginning (like the éponge for Ponge in Signéponge, 
only even more subtly, in a prising apart of the syllables) an encrypted 
bit of the name of Derrida : “Le hérisson de ‘Qu’est- ce que la poésie?’ 
n’héritait pas seulement d’un morceau de mon nom [The hérisson of 
“What Is Poetry?” not only inherited a piece of my name].” So subtle a 
bit- of- name (eri) hardly risked being detected, even less in Italian, where 
it was to be encrypted beyond recognition (istrice). It is also this secret 
signature (barely a secret, barely a signature) that is sealed, that disap-
pears to view when the hérisson rolls up in a ball, or crawls away, and 
which may account for a certain pudeur in Derrida when he insisted to 
Ferraris in 1989: “But I must not overburden this letter on the letter in 
istrice with too much signifi cance: it must remain elliptical, just barely 
serious, poematic in some respects, in the manner of the poem about 
196 ❘ Chapter 4
which it converses with itself, by means of which it maintains itself [dont 
elle s’entretient d’elle- même], that is to say, blindly (like the hedgehog 
that Homer recalls), deprived of meaning and responsibility” (304).
Of the two hedgehogs that escape the croquet ground (note that the 
end of this chapter 8 sees also the last appearance of the Cheshire Cat), 
one would walk into Derrida’s text (“You can’t be certain that I didn’t 
already do it [inscribe my whole talk in a reading of Lewis Carroll] one 
day when, ten years ago, I let speak or let pass a little hedgehog, a suck-
ling hedgehog [un nourisson hérisson] perhaps . . .”). It is not clear to 
me at what point Derrida in fact “read or reread” Alice, whether he was 
already quite familiar with it before reading Logic of Sense on its publi-
cation in 1969, or whether it was Deleuze’s book that prompted him to 
(re)turn to the Carroll classic— assuming he did. In any case it is L’ani-
mal que donc je suis that to my knowledge carries the only explicit ref-
erence within Derrida’s writings to the Alice books, and the retroactive, 
spectral, doubly disinhibited return of “Alice’s hedgehog,” so that it ap-
pears in L’animal only by preceding itself there, is precisely the third in-
exhaustible property of Derrida’s hedgehog (“You can’t be certain that I 
didn’t already do it”— one is reminded of Odradrek, whose “invisibility 
is no defi nite proof that he is not present” [Bauer 160]). Not through a 
Heideggerian always- already- there, but rather— its ghostly inverse?— by 
the supplementary work of a return of what was never provably there in 
the fi rst place (a never- there- to- begin- with), because the fi rst hedgehog 
had been neither Grimm/Heidegger’s nor Schlegel/Lacoue- Labarthe/
Nancy’s nor Carroll’s nor any other (even as Darrieussecq might like 
to claim it as hers) but a trace, a catachresis, just about enough of a 
hedgehog to stand in and make visible an empty fi rst place, itself barely 
a place, strictly speaking. (This is of course also the paradox of the “fi rst 
time” of the signature . . .) Early on in the “Che cos’è la poesia?” piece, 
Derrida had admitted his discomfort with whole, countable hedgehogs, 
as fi gures of integrity or cunning: “Whether in Schlegel or Heidegger, it 
is always a matter of this gathering together, of this being- one with one-
self, in all these stories of the hedgehog, of indivisible individuality or of 
being always already with oneself, from the origin or the fi nish line of 
some Bestimmung [destination/determination— the reference is clearly 
to the race in the Grimms’ fairy tale]” (305). Taking up some of Heideg-
ger’s key terms, he then presented the hedgehog as what remains when 
all is spoken for: “There where the Versammlung [gathering] doesn’t 
win out, where the force, the Verwalten [governance, administering] of 
the Versammlung doesn’t win out, there is some hedgehog [il y a du 
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hérisson] and a solitary hedgehog that no longer belongs to Grimms’, 
Schlegel’s, or Heidegger’s family.”
The Cat and the Hedgehog
All this to say that it is worth being attentive to what is barely a hedge-
hog, strictly speaking, and which, no less than a cat’s grin, may mark 
what falls out of the usual count of bodies within a gathering, a story, 
or a life. Precisely such a property links the hedgehogs and the Cheshire 
Cat in Alice: for both seem disinclined to stay in place or in shape, or 
should I say, more simply, disinclined to stay. Of course the Cheshire 
Cat’s technique of materializing and dematerializing gradually around 
its grin is a considered concession to Alice, who at the end of chapter 6 
requests that it “wouldn’t keep appearing and vanishing so suddenly,” 
for it was making her “quite giddy” (41). This micro– plot element mat-
ters, for not only does the Cat’s slower modulation of its visibility— 
from the grin slowly outward, over several minutes— receive thereby 
its motivation (and supposedly young readers’ affection, rather than 
fright), but it is also specifi cally what produces the grin, as the fi rst and 
last feature, itself paradoxical, perhaps untenable (a gap, a gaping, this 
grin “from ear to ear,” a tear, a hole): “She noticed a curious appear-
ance in the air: it puzzled her very much at fi rst, but after watching 
it a minute or two she made it out to be a grin” (53). (What did this 
grin— and, even more puzzlingly, the pre- grin— look like?) Alice’s fi rst 
encounter with her hedgehog on the croquet ground is likewise some-
thing “provoking”: the creature has “unrolled itself” from the ball it 
was supposed to be, and is already “in the act of crawling away” (52). 
The Queen’s hedgehog, which Alice is about to croquet, is the next to 
run away (54); soon thereafter, having secured her fl amingo mallet, she 
fi nds that “both the hedgehogs were out of sight.” By the end of chapter 
8, the hedgehogs and the Cheshire Cat are both decidedly out of sight; 
they have fallen out of the story, in which they will no more appear. 
Of course, there is nothing so very peculiar about that, in this episod-
ically structured tale through which so many animal characters pass. 
This said, these two occupy rather particular positions within Alice’s 
bestiary. The Cat, because it is knowledgeable, a master of paradox but 
also a friend, and present in two nonconsecutive chapters (this being a 
rare distinction), clearly enjoys the most privileged place among them. 
Conversely, the hedgehogs (along with the fl amingos, admittedly, but 
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the latter’s size [originally they were ostriches], wings, and speed make 
them particularly unsuited to use, and less able to disappear) are the 
apparently least privileged— mute, turned into croquet balls, without 
any other known home or purpose. Does the Cat stand in a secret cor-
respondence and even respondence or response to the hedgehogs? Does 
it arrive to somehow compensate for them, to distract from them or to 
watch over them? Henri Bué, the very fi rst French translator of Carroll, 
in 1869 seemed to insinuate as much, by renaming the Cheshire Cat 
“Grimaçon” (whose American equivalent today might be Grimacello 
or Grinnola— though for my point to work here it would have to be 
Grin- hog), thus pressing it into phonemic and syllabic homology with 
“hérisson” (“‘Pourquoi votre chat grimace ainsi?’ / ‘C’est un Grimaçon,’ 
dit la Duchese, ‘voilà pourquoi.’ [‘Why does your cat grimace/grin like 
that?’ / ‘It’s a Grimacello/Grinnola/Grin- hog,’ said the Duchess, ‘that is 
why.’]”).64 We do know that the Cheshire Cat, the most memorable of 
the characters in Alice, was added to the book a posteriori, not featured 
Figure 4.1. John Tenniel, Alice and the Cheshire Cat, illustration from the orig-
inal edition of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Lewis Carroll, 1865).
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in the original edition. It is a supplementary cat (possibly the projected/
phantasmatic double of a real cat), and therefore its place— where it 
performs its apparent prescience or omniscience, its way of hovering, 
perhaps presiding, its friendship, its grin— in some ways is not a place, 
or is not its place at fi rst (for it wasn’t there in the fi rst place). Perhaps 
this is why it must repeatedly vanish and reappear, and not at all always 
in the same place (41). And why it appears and vanishes around its grin, 
which is not a solid material form or a place but an emptiness. So its 
possible link with the hedgehogs is that it too, like the hedgehogs, folds 
and unfolds around nothing, “without secret but sealed.” Both the cat 
and the hedgehogs mark thus in different ways the vanishing points of 
the story, points where the text gathers together and disperses around 
a temporary arrangement of sorts— between a place that is repeatedly 
deserted by its creature and a creature that repeatedly disappears as if 
its place were being pulled from under it. And what better name than 
“catachresis” for such paradoxical elements, for those things named 
poorly, barely, yet which can be named in no other way, and always risk 
being mistaken for something else: the hedgehog for a ball or a burr, the 
Cheshire Cat for a Chester Cat or a “Grimaçon,” its grin for a passing 
thickness in the sky.
And perhaps this obscure complicity accounts for why Derrida 
seemed to slide secretly in his signatory sympathies between the hedge-
hog and the cat, and why while he announced his thinking on the an-
imal to be a response to the “poor hedgehogs” of Alice and a reading 
of Lewis Carroll, it is not about hedgehogs that he speaks in this last 
seminar, nor about Carroll, really, but about a cat— which in turn is not 
the Cheshire Cat and not even or not only his own cat but also a cata-
chresis of a cat, a ghostly signature. Jean- Luc Nancy, in À plus d’un titre, 
a posthumous tribute, recalls a note Derrida had intended for reading 
at his funeral: “I smile at you from wherever I am [Je vous souris d’où 
que je sois].”65 Musing on these words, Nancy asks: “(Would he have 
withdrawn like Alice’s cat, that vanishes slowly from her sight, its face 
erasing itself bit by bit, leaving in the end only its smile, its only feature 
still remaining, pending the last erasure? [ . . . ])” (37; emphasis in orig-
inal; my translation). For Nancy, this was Derrida’s way of imagining 
“a completely other survival [une survie tout autre] [ . . . ] which would 
survive survival itself, a survivance [une survivance] which he would 
fi nally inscribe like a smile [un sourire], in a smile appearing from no-
where” (36– 37; emphasis in original). In “Survivre, sourire” (survive/
smile— playing on the literal breakdown “over- live” and “under- laugh”) 
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Nancy notes a fi eld of complicity and tension both in sound and in 
meaning: “a very fi ne difference/notch just over or just under, just above 
life and just under laughter [au- dessus de la vie et au- dessous du rire]” 
(38). Marie- Dominique Garnier, at the end of an inspired essay that 
tracks the work of animal phonemes (or “faunemes”) k and che through 
Derrida’s prose, by which a network of key words constellate around 
the cat— que, donc, pharmakon, cas, cache, chasse, castration, and let 
me add catachrèse— notes in counterpoint that “built into the melan-
choly of the sentence” Je vous souris d’où que je sois (I smile at you 
from wherever I am), Derrida’s surviving words, between the je and 
the a of the outer ends of the name of Jacques Derrida, hides a possible 
“souris,” an undeclared or feigned mouse (une souris), which is also 
Hamlet’s “not- a- mouse [stirring].”66 It is a neat and devastating prop-
osition, and the sort of thing Derrida would have favored: a mouse 
hidden within the grinning riddle/riddled grin of a cat. Still, stubbornly, 
I will maintain, because this has from the beginning been all I have been 
counting, and because when present they are always apt to disappear, 
Figure 4.2. John Tenniel, Alice and the fl amingo (and hedgehog), illustration 
from the original edition of Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (Lewis Carroll, 
1865).
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and because even when recognized they barely seem to fi t the place or 
the argument, that yes, this time too, if we were to count or speak im-
properly, we should rather fi nd a hedgehog.
Carroll is without a doubt important to Darrieussecq— remember the 
Cheshire Cat grin moment in My Phantom Husband. The narrator of Le 
pays, a writer, when forced to decide what essential books to take with 
her on a big move, is very defi nite about taking “all of [ . . . ] Carroll” 
(33). So perhaps, to conclude, I could offer three tentative Carroll- like 
riddles to account for the hedgehog lost in translation in Le mal de mer. 
The fi rst we could call the Chester Cat effect. For it turns out that Der-
rida too, like Deleuze, had consulted, plausibly among other translations, 
that of Jacques Papy in 1961, where the Cheshire Cat is called “le chat 
du Comté de Chester.”67 Chester is indeed the main town of Cheshire 
county, archaically called the County Palatine of Chester but not, as far 
as I understand, since 1830. So that Jacques Papy’s preference for Chester 
over Cheshire in 1961, if justifi ed by phonetic convenience, has the odd 
consequence of dislocating the referential axis of Alice’s adventures from 
the Northwest of England to Pennsylvania, where indeed there is still 
today a Chester County, and where, as in the rest of America, there are 
no native hedgehogs in the wild. The Chester Cat hypothesis then is one 
that foretells the disappearance of hedgehogs by the work of the letter.
The second riddle may be of interest to scholars of Derrida. It pro-
ceeds from the observation that the only other place where Derrida 
mentions Carroll, albeit very briefl y (as part of a list of writers/subjects 
that Deleuze had treated), is in an obituary he wrote in Libération three 
days after the death of Deleuze in November 1995, and republished in 
The Work of Mourning. In this piece, he writes of the deep agreement 
that had united them, and starts the fi nal paragraph with the lines: “I 
am going to continue— or begin again— to read Gilles Deleuze in order 
to learn, and I’m going to have to wander all alone in that long discus-
sion that we should have had together.”68 And so it is just possible that 
when in Cerisy in 1997, in the seminar that would come to be later 
known as L’animal que donc je suis, Derrida retroactively puts Alice’s 
hedgehogs back into the “Che cos’è . . . ?” piece of 1990, in a second 
supplement to it (the fi rst being the interview Istrice 2), what is in fact 
happening is that he is rereading Carroll, and that perhaps it is reread-
ing Deleuze that led him there, and that perhaps it is this particular 
mourning and this particular wandering alone that is at work in this 
rereading that is also a writing. One may imagine Derrida in this way 
being led to chapter 8 of Alice, that croquet ground in whose hedgehogs 
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he would have recognized— or invested— his own trace, for Deleuze to 
fi nd, had he returned to the scene like a Cheshire Cat. For would this 
not explain why Derrida so strongly suggests that he might have been 
speaking of Alice’s hedgehogs and of Carroll all the while, even when 
he was not? The croquet ground forms a phantasmatic ground, where 
hedgehogs are both mistreated (mis à mal) and run away, where they 
continually appear and disappear, marking the ground with their criss-
crossing traces, as the secret scene of all symbolic transactions, and the 
place which Derrida would in turn come to haunt from the other side 
as a grinning cat.
The third riddle presents itself in the hedgehog census method used in 
the United Kingdom some years ago and which Adam Nicolson deems 
paradoxical: essentially, one counts the number of dead hedgehogs 
found per twenty miles of motorway. What is thereby measured, he 
notes, is not “how many hedgehogs have been killed by cars but how 
many hedgehogs there are for cars to kill. The more dead hedgehogs 
on the roads, the better the health of the hedgehog population.” Now 
this sounds like something the Cheshire Cat would say to Alice, logic 
taken to its provocative limit. But it is precisely at its nonsensical limit 
that logic is truly logical, and the secretly scandalous relationship be-
tween things (or between words and things) becomes legible. In Derri-
da’s words, “The poematic hedgehog crosses the highway at the risk of 
being run over by a great discourse that it cannot resist . . .” (Points, 312). 
The U.K. census was compiled over four years by coordinating “reports 
of many thousands of drivers who ha[d] been looking out for squashed 
hedgehogs,” and it was found that the population had dropped by 50 
percent in fi fteen years. Imagine a world measured in terms of hedgehog 
miles (i.e., the distance that must be traveled before fi nding a dead hedge-
hog)— it is this distance that is getting longer and longer, according to the 
census, which predicts that by 2025 the hedgehog will have altogether 
disappeared from Britain. Yet if there is a lesson to learn from Carroll, 
teacher of Darrieussecq, Deleuze, and Derrida, it is that there is no such 
thing as nothing, for something always remains. Take the hedgehog from 
a story or from the world, what remains? Remains the hedgehog, as the 
name for a missing hedgehog, or for the length of the story or of the 
world itself, that is, as the distance that would have to be exhaustively 
traveled before fi nding or losing the next hedgehog. Just as a hedgehog 
“may always arrive,” the word “hedgehog” may always name one that is 
no longer there or not yet there, or one which, as in a Möbius strip, may 
always be walking on (what is and is not) the other side.
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Epilogue: The Case 
of the Hermit Crab
Darrieussecq would offer her own singular illustration of the paradox 
of the place sans occupant and the occupant sans place (or of the dis-
continuity of the series) which, in Deleuze’s account of the Carrollian/
Stoic theory of meaning, generally conditions symbolic structures (65– 
66). Here is her “cas du pagure,” or case of the hermit crab:
The story about the hermit crab who grows and grows, un-
til its shell is too small, then the other crabs, lobsters and 
creepy things with feet, claws and snappers are on the look-
out: he’ll be out soon, just has to be, he’s a smothered, soft, 
transparent little thing, I’d have liked to see one bare [ . . . ] 
[We the Johnson daughters were] haunted by a hermit crab 
suffocating in its shell but refusing to come out, no way . . . 
[ . . . ] The hermit- crab knight without his helmet, lying pa-
thetically at the bottom of the pool. Soft, defenceless and 
pitiful. We tried to pull them out of their shells, but they [ça] 
resisted, preferring to let themselves get torn in two rather 
than give up, disgusting, translucent, soft fl esh  . . . (Brief 
Stay, 59– 61/39– 40)
The bernard- l’ermite here manifestly clasps as tenaciously onto its bor-
rowed shell as Ponge’s more rightful mollusk. But then since there is no 
poem on le pagure, which can only appear as shadowy interloper at the 
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end of “Le mollusque,” Ponge does not dwell on what happens when 
the hermit crab has grown too large for its scavenged shell and must in 
turn abandon it for another.1 Darrieussecq, for her part, is haunted by 
that moment, which in the life of a hermit crab cannot be avoided but 
conceptually, as intermittent vacation from place and form, can hardly 
bear thinking. In fact, the hermit crab, evoked in at least three of her 
novels, seems to be invested with a rare symbolic charge— a sort of 
threshold function— whenever it appears, so that it may just exceed the 
texts’ explicit “knowledge.”2
So what does the hermit crab do when it has overgrown its shell? 
Filmmaker Jean Painlevé in a short 1930 documentary on the species 
“experimental[ly]” called this chapter “Housing Crisis” and presents us 
with hermit crabs fi ghting over available shells,3 and, even once a new 
shell has been secured, acting all the more wary of their lurking, shell- 
less, defense- less brethren. In another instance we see “A Hermit Crab 
in a Tight Spot,” a crab grown too large for its shell and trying another, 
which proves to be too heavy to haul. “Return to reason and to the 
small shell.” Eventually it fi nds a shell of the right size and weight and 
slips in, “saluting in its own way” (with a slap of its tail). Darrieussecq 
presents an almost identical scenario in Le pays, wedged in perfect non 
sequitur fashion within a stream of consciousness:
The hermit crab out of its shell, naked, was looking for a 
new abode. The fi rst shell was so large that its back legs 
could not get a grip in it, and the front legs couldn’t drag it. 
The second shell was so small that none of its legs, front or 
rear, could fi t in it. The third shell was perfectly sized for the 
front and back legs, and the hermit crab slid inside happily. 
(Le pays, 183; my translation)
Four years earlier, this Tale of the Three Shells had seen a more elabo-
rate telling in A Brief Stay with the Living, in fact therein lie the roots of 
the imperfect tense of the scene in Le pays— for it is a story remembered 
from childhood in Brief Stay, told often by the three sisters’ mother, and 
what is more (if one reads carefully!— the clues are scattered wide) the 
favorite story of Jeanne, whose death in Buenos Aires (itself split open 
by the Buenos Aires / Paris time difference) frames the novel (52/33):
When we were little, the hermit crab out of his shell look-
ing for a new one. The fi rst shell (a font as resonant as a 
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church) was as heavy as a stone and so huge that its rear legs 
couldn’t get a purchase on it, nor its front legs drag it across 
the sand. The second one (a winkle in which nothing could 
be heard) was so narrow that, once inside, it couldn’t move 
its feelers and its feet, a real corset. The third one (a lovely 
shine, as spotted as a sea leopard) was the right side for both 
its front and its back feet. Inside, you hear the sea . . . 
There were wanderings between these three shells, whose 
names varied according to Mum’s conchological vocabu-
lary . . . The struggle with the crab, the storm, man overboard, 
the equinoctial tide and the little naked foot . . . Which be-
longed, according to the maternal mood, to Jeanne, to Anne 
and later to Nore . . . Nonore . . . Ronron . . . Momo . . . And 
her unbearable tickles and her fi ts of euphoria as hard to put 
up with as her fi ts of rage, or her silence . . . (214/155)
Here too, as in Le pays, the hermit crab story arrives as if unintended, 
unauthored, an orphan tale rising from some subterranean place; it is 
an involuntary memory as Anne of the roving consciousness drinks her-
self to a stupor in a bar. Animal subplots consistently appear to well 
up from somewhere else in Darrieussecq’s oeuvre, though this exogeny 
takes different forms: most often it is a television documentary sequence 
(or something gleaned from another educational or informational 
source) that is remembered or which through some other mediation in-
fi ltrates the prose, often not as content alone (the behavior of elephants 
in mourning, the particularity of giraffe births, the symbiotic arrange-
ment between hippopotamuses and ibises, etc.) but also as a block of 
text composed in a perceptibly different narrative style, verb tense, or 
sometimes even font. It is as if a vast mass of prose were submerged— a 
buried dimension, everything that is not human and that most novels 
wall out— and were resurfacing (in bits) from time to time. I would go 
so far as to say that this animal “memory,” or this animal “outside” 
as it were, is what uniquely haunts Darrieussecq’s world, pressing in 
at its borders and in the gaps, hallucinatory knowledge of lives in the 
wild swarming just beneath the skin of the text. Occasionally, from one 
novel to the next, a “bit” of this material reappears in slightly modifi ed 
form, as if to confi rm the sense of a submerged archive that the text can 
at any time “dip” into. This is technically the case of the hermit crab 
story, except that its fairy- tale- or game- like character distinguishes it 
from virtually all others and lends it foundational qualities: it is in truth 
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a story about how certain fi rst notions— about what it means to have 
a body, to be alive, and to die— had from the very beginning been bor-
rowed seamlessly (before being perceiv- ed/- able as trans- species analogy 
or allegory) from an animal phenomenology. As children the sisters had 
themselves “played” the hermit crab seeking its shell (this projection ac-
counting in turn for some of the enunciatory/point- of- view strangeness 
of the passage), they had intimately reanimated the “scene,” fi lling it out 
with their own emotions and their own protruding feet. True, the her-
mit crab may not be the most common mascot among children, or an 
animal one generally knows a great deal about; it is rare, even on TV, to 
see a hermit crab ponderously trying to decide between three shells; and 
no doubt for the very reason that preoccupies Darrieussecq: because a 
hermit crab out of its shell is an extremely vulnerable thing. Its exposure 
can mean its death. Hence its fast clinging to its shell when under pres-
sure— a fact corroborated in Pongian tones by Painlevé: “No getting a 
hermit crab out of its shell without tearing it [the shell] apart, given the 
way it rolls itself up.” Painlevé’s signature microcinematography fi nds 
in “le Bernard” (as he keeps calling it) its worthy subject, one might say, 
for even as such technology exploits the fantasy of seeing what (because 
too small or submerged too deep) had thus far eluded human vision, 
the hermit crab with its leery, tenacious hedgehog- like behavior (coiled 
up and fastened fast to “its” shell) by defi nition strives not to be seen. 
In fact, Painlevé so much wants to see with what “manner and force” 
(to use Ponge’s terms) the creature clings to the inside of the shell that 
at one point he effects a cross section of the shell, which he presents in 
characteristic elision of the slicer- scholar: “The shell sectioned longi-
tudinally offers several openings. The Bernard enters and thinks itself 
safe. One can see how its body rolls up. If one pulls the Bernard, one 
only makes it press its body harder against the shell.” Alas, this is not 
where the interventions end, as just moments earlier, in support of the 
theory that the hermit crab is guided principally by the tactile sense, we 
are shown a specimen “whose eyes have been removed.” As an early an-
imal documentary and because it appears riveted to this very particular 
drama of hermit crab life— the equation (which turns into a paradox 
only once a camera or an eye enters the scene) of aliveness with success-
ful coiled- up- ness and retreat from view— Painlevé’s short fi lm antici-
pates Darrieussecq (and accompanies Ponge— who was writing about 
his hermit crabs at exactly the same time) quaintly and richly. Still, its 
occasional aquarium trick limits its capacity as poetic (not to speak of 
scientifi c) truth about “le cas du pagure.” In a particularly astonishing 
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moment at the end, hermit crabs seem to be playing football (the pitch is 
set up neatly and apparently “the umpire’s decision is non- negotiable”). 
They play with a closed spherical ball, which we see them turn over and 
over again, manifestly perplexed, as the voice- over intones (it is the last 
line of the fi lm): “This ball represents for them a shell without an open-
ing, a baffl ing matter, of course . . .”
Current- day research on the question of what a hermit crab does 
between shells can seem in some ways no less improbable (or deserving 
of a musical score) than Painlevé’s scenarios.4 If we are to believe recent 
studies, shell redistribution among this species is performed collectively, 
following the principle of a vacancy chain:
Several hermit crab species, both terrestrial and marine, use 
vacancy chains to fi nd new shells. When an individual crab 
fi nds a new empty shell it will leave its own shell and inspect 
the vacant shell for size. If the shell is found to be too large, 
the crab goes back to its own shell and then waits by the 
vacant shell for anything up to 8 hours. As new crabs arrive 
they also inspect the shell and, if it is too big, wait with the 
others, forming a group of up to 20 individuals, holding onto 
each other in a line from the largest to the smallest crab. As 
soon as a crab arrives that is the right size for the vacant 
shell and claims it, leaving its old shell vacant, then all the 
crabs in the queue swiftly exchange shells in sequence, each 
one moving up to the next size. Hermit crabs often “gang 
up” on one of their species with what they perceive to be a 
better shell, and pry its shell away from it before competing 
for it until one takes it over.5
I quote here in fact the Wikipedia entry, where a hyperlink to “vacancy 
chain” leads to a description, in the language of labor and sociology, of 
a dynamic structure for distribution of resources: “In a vacancy chain, 
a new resource unit that arrives into a population is taken by the fi rst 
individual in line, who then leaves his/her old unit behind, this old unit 
is taken by a second individual, leaving his/her old unit behind, and so 
forth.”6 A few lines later the page offers examples of what a vacancy 
chain would mean in concrete social terms:
Vacancy chains are started when an initial vacancy enters 
a population, such as when a new house is built, a new car 
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is manufactured, or a new job is created. It can also begin 
when an existing unit is vacated by someone leaving the sys-
tem under consideration, such as an employee retiring, or 
a home owner goes to a nursing home. Eventually a chain 
will come to an end, usually with a new entrant into the sys-
tem or when the last unit in a chain is abandoned, merged, 
or destroyed. This can involve a new employee recruit or a 
housing unit on market for the fi rst time, or when a house in 
the chain is torn down, left empty, or the duties of a vacant 
job are distributed among other employees. A vacancy chain 
is simply the sequence of moves that a vacancy makes from 
initial entry into a system to fi nal termination.
The vacancy chain, in other words, is about how a system of circula-
tion processes its outermost terms— newness and obsolescence, entries 
and exits, births and deaths. Behind the dry technical term is in fact a 
drama that every structure articulating two discontinuous and mobile 
series of properties/positions and occupants must reckon with, at those 
points where it joins the gestational and mortal reality of the world— 
its points of making and unmaking. Darrieussecq’s fascination with the 
hermit crab forced to leave its shell, an occupant glimpsed in the brief 
placelessness between places, if not in a fi nal loss of place, is thus in 
line with a thinking about vulnerability and the idea/body threshold 
that underpins all her fi ction. In this matter too My Phantom Hus-
band carried an anticipatory imprint of what was to follow, for it is 
in this novel that, as the narrator reels from the disappearance of her 
husband and yields with emotion to the embrace of her friend Jacque-
line, she fi rst resorts to a hermit crab– inspired “image of ourselves”: “If 
we consider physical love to break through some of these dams [skin, 
muscles, membranes . . .] until it succeeds [ . . . ] in coaxing the hermit 
crab out of its shell a tiny bit, to go with its little elytra or whatever 
they’re called, feeling its way forward toward the tip of the antennae 
of the beloved hermit crab across the way, then something comparable 
happens when a friend [ . . . ] takes you in her arms” (80– 81/71). If the 
Tale of the Three Shells three years later in A Brief Stay with the Living 
fi lls out in more detail the components and essential drama of hermit 
crab survival (which would then loom again briefl y in Le pays), it more 
gravely links the species with a scene or a logic (compared in passing to 
that of Goldilocks and the three bears; we may also think of the glass 
slipper tried on in Cinderella by the three sisters) involving fewer spots 
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to fi ll than contenders to fi ll them, thus giving its cruelest explanation 
for the death of the protagonist’s young brother (214– 15/155), even 
while foreshadowing that of the sister. But the soft pink transparency of 
the exposed crab, that “defenceless and pitiful” fl esh,” is in its furthest 
threshold function an intolerable approximation of what happens to 
life as it is forced out of representation: “the inside of [the] brain colo-
nized by hermit crabs, thoughts snapping their tiny pincers and, more 
stubborn than ever, panicking (so they say) at the moment of death” 
(Bref séjour chez les vivants, 65/43; translation modifi ed). The direction 
of the severance here is in fact undecidable: it is as much life evicted 
from representation as it is representation that is forced to quit life. Per-
haps this is why Ponge had insisted in “Le mollusque” on the chiasmic 
reversibility of the relation (“The slightest cell in the human body clings 
just as tightly to language— and vice- versa”), each of the terms having 
no reality without the other. But to account for all this— the pact of life 
and representation, body and thinking, things and words— by way of 
the vacancy chain is to consider that the two “series” can be articulated 
(or “engaged,” in the mechanistic sense) together dynamically only be-
cause there is a two- sided vacancy (a missing place on the one hand, 
a missing occupant on the other) that continually exacts its work at 
either end of the chain, and that this vacancy stands, on the one hand, 
for all that in life exceeds representation, and on the other, for all that 
in representation exceeds life. An odd two- faced “paradoxical element” 
which the system can hardly tolerate but which in fact founds it as its 
working principle. I should think that this bifi d vacancy quite precisely 
accounts for the ghost/animal pair in Darrieussecq. Both gather on 
the edges of these stories, half- glimpsed or half- realized forms, below 
or beyond whole representation, continual reminders of what is yet 
nameless and of which names name nothing, and if the two are some-
times blurred into indistinction (or correspondence), these are perhaps 
merely two ways (viewed in inseparable alternation, as in a Möbius 
strip: catless grin and grinless cat) of saying the same thing, that the 
joint between the two spheres is a place of continuous production of 
excesses and remainders and missings— a secretly devastating asymme-
try cleaving shells away from crabs: “My mother believed in the inad-
equacy of language. There was on one side the realm of words, on the 
other the realm of things. Their correspondence was impossible. Since 
words were not things, they were necessarily disappointing and inap-
propriate. At their joint, too much meaning leaked/escaped [fuyait]” 
(Le pays, 239).
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For the Bits of Hedgehog Were 
Bits of Hermit Crab, You See
Perhaps we should not be surprised that the bits of hedgehog vanish 
when examined too closely in Breathing Underwater (nor that the 
hedgehog has largely disappeared from my own meditations here). Dar-
rieussecq presents a case, in sum, for a hermit crab theory of what fi ction 
is, and more essentially of what conscious life is, its most diffi cult- to- 
bear proposition being that a shell is not occupied by the occupant one 
thinks— or, to formulate it as the paradox it is: the shell is not occupied 
by who/what the occupant might think they are. In A Brief Stay with 
the Living which, as I have said, attempts the furthest putting- to- test of 
a certain conviction regarding the power of narration as metamorpho-
sis and self- expropriation, Anne the telepath makes sense of her para-
sitic mission— inhabiting a succession of “cranial boxes”— via a fl eeting 
analogy with the hermit crab: “to slip into the shell of the world like 
a hermit crab or, rather, given that [this] space isn’t empty, to slip over 
from one consciousness to another, like an egret ridding a hippopot-
amus of its parasites, and thus, in hopping along with them, helping 
them in their work” (30/17; translation modifi ed). The hasty revising of 
the hermit crab analogy here seems a red herring; it too easily assures 
us of the existence, “before” any interloping occurs, of a legitimate or-
der of correspondence between places and occupants, and that the her-
mit crab can only enter a shell once it is empty. True, there are several 
empty shells scattered through and even structuring these novels, and 
they are more often than not linked to death. We may remember most 
vividly the “empty shell” of the dead child in Tom Is Dead (an image 
whose species rigor is then immediately compromised: “A slough like 
animals leave behind, that you fi nd curled up on a path or clinging 
to trees, useless, translucid, a little disgusting” [74/50]) and the more 
complicated, ghoulish way that marine death turns the corpse of the 
child brother in A Brief Stay into both shell and mollusk- fl esh of itself: 
“He smelt of the sea, one side of his head was a huge mollusc, his own 
fl esh transformed by the sea into a shell of himself . . . / An incrusted 
red tumour, black stripes, exactly like the limpets which you know have 
soft pink skins beneath the shells, clinging on to the rock, burnt in the 
sun . . .” (161/115). It is true also that many motifs conspire to suggest 
that this oeuvre’s deepest imaginational impulse follows two obscurely 
connected (and usually censored) pathways: the ability to think one’s 
way into animal livingness is possible and even irrepressible in the same 
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way that the possible/unavoidable sliding into the vacated conscious-
ness of a corpse is: “If they transplant dead people’s eyes, what do we 
then see, what ghosts, what waking dreams?” (Brief Stay, 40/24). And 
that this may have to do with the fact that a certain sort of afterlife of 
the human— as what happens after death to the place (our skulls, our 
fl esh) that our consciousness once fi lled— is imagined most realistically 
in fact in the terms of the sort of processes— incrustation, parasitism, 
molting, scavenging, necrophilic growths— that have long been under-
stood as productive facts about animal lives or the scientifi c/proverbial 
“cycle of life,” but less easily admitted as facts coproducing the human 
real. Still, it seems to me that such macabre lignes de fuite only exploit 
what is a more vital poetico- ontological principle embedded in all these 
works, and most explicitly thematized in A Brief Stay with the Liv-
ing, which is the disquiet intrinsic to the occupation of one’s place, the 
murky fact that this uncontested occupation may not entirely resolve a 
larger or older question of “who” or “what” it is that sees and thinks 
and speaks in and from one’s place. In Tom Is Dead, it is suggested that 
the dead may be thinking and speaking through those who mourn them 
(171/123). In Brief Stay, a recurrent preoccupation with what one might 
see on the brink of death culminates in what is both a troubling onto-
logical question and what one might call an inescapable narratological 
conundrum: “And if your entire life does pass before your eyes, what do 
you see? An objective, panoramic overview? Or a rewind of everything 
you’ve seen? Who does the choosing? Who’s the narrator?” (238/173). I 
should add that pregnancy as a theme in some of these works (Le pays, 
Le bébé, more negatively Naissance des fantômes through the theme of 
miscarriages) supplies in turn a structuring metaphor for how one can 
carry something that is other than oneself, where it is unclear where one 
ends and the other begins: “A continuity you can follow like a Möbius 
strip. Down a slide. She exists constantly, without a break or gaps. And 
if a child was growing inside her and multiplying, she would be nursing 
a being outside her straight from the start [un être dès l’origine hors 
d’elle] . . .” (Brief Stay, 49/31).
And what if the mollusk were a myth? Darrieussecq’s most provoca-
tive claim is not the license to be the hermit crab to others’ mollusks but 
rather that we are all hermit crabs. Suit (or fi t) ourselves as we might, 
our relationship to what we see, think, speak, write, is infected with a 
lingering bit of outside(r)ness or besideness (or anteriority or posterity) 
to self, a lag, a disquiet that won’t go away, the sense that there was or 
is or could be/have been perhaps someone or something else where one 
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stands. Perhaps another way to say that there is a sense of borrowedness 
to it all, a title of ownership claimable only on the condition of sus-
pending deeper scrutiny of what “own” means. Certain pages of Robert 
Harvey’s Witnessness offer as searing a theorization as one is likely ever 
to fi nd of this sort of conception of self and irreducible other. Such is 
the tightening fi eld in which all the motifs here have been circling that 
I am not altogether surprised to fi nd Harvey’s account too resorting 
early on to images of the hermit crab (11, 31), a fi gure not of imposter 
or interloper but of “a consciousness that decided one day to call itself 
‘I’ and dwell in my head” (46)— the shortest and uncanniest defi nition 
of the I (or, shall I say, of the j/e) since Benveniste. Through a grammar 
and a scene intimately dictated by Beckett’s late text Worstward Ho, 
Harvey assembles a grave model of subject responsibility predicated 
on what is most paradoxical about the event: that one is not present at 
it, that it is precisely what happens to one in one’s absence: “When the 
event befalls you, your wits fail you. [ . . . ] But when things calm down, 
[ . . . ] you work with the martyr within you, from now on perceiving 
the world through those jaded, haggard eyes” (49). This may be a de-
scription of one’s relationship to one’s birth or one’s early childhood as 
events at which one was absent, which one has “forgotten before forget-
ting exists”; or it can be an ethics of how to live and bear witness to the 
trauma or destruction that has affected another who may or may not 
have been oneself. Beckett’s insight (but also Dante’s and Primo Levi’s), 
in Harvey’s devastating reading, is that of “a vicariousness intrinsic 
to one’s consciousness” (50), so that thinking is a “feel[ing] one’s way 
around” (90) “the skull of another, occupied by me” (26). We could say 
that the hermit crab emerges by force of such metaphorics, produced 
irrepressibly by (and for) the empty shell the skull comes to resemble 
and which it must share (as metaphoric vehicle) with the corpse. Inter-
esting to fi nd Harvey recalling, here, Primo Levi’s initial speculation, 
in “poignant blind[ness] to the obvious connection of Muslim to Jew,” 
that Musselman meant shell- man or shell of a man (68). Harvey notes 
the fact twice— such is the metaphoric force, indeed, exerted by empty 
shells. The fi rst time he follows it with a concession: “As absurd as that 
origin is, however, there is some poignant truth- value in the image of 
entering another as if he were hollow” (32)— and for Harvey this “as 
if” describes the operation of witnessness, a reimagining of life against 
the inescapable odds of death, and the self on the model of the (dead, 
forever dying) other. It is also a theory of the imagination, which must 
continually supplement what in the event happened to another who 
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was excessively present at it (that is, did not survive it)— or what in the 
event did not fully take place because one was insuffi ciently present at 
it (that is, blind to it or not in full presence of mind) because it was in-
tolerable. In the end the two amount to the same, and we are faced with 
the gravest version of the Möbius- strip duo of occupant sans place and 
the place sans occupant, an arithmetic, conceptual, cruel riddle that can 
be resolved only (and is resolved continually) in fl esh and in time, and 
in “poignant truth- value,” here signifi ed, it is only right, by a nervous 
hermit crab: “Activating the - ness of witness requires the unmitigated 
re- affi rmation that nothing escapes the ‘sights’ of the skull, the full mo-
bilization of the skull’s skills when it is full of life, even if blindness 
affects the hermit crab occupying the dwelling” (11).
The gravity of Harvey’s material (Purgatory, the concentration 
camps, trauma theory) is only apparently at thematic or tonal odds 
with Darrieussecq. In fact, one fi nds in Rapport de police, the extraor-
dinary work that charges of plagiarism seemed to force out of her in 
2010, a crystalline theory of subjecthood assimilating Lacanian psy-
choanalysis, poststructuralist theory, and certain somber lessons of 
literary- political history, wherein the slightest “bits” of her fi ction are 
raised to their potentially most serious theoretical (metafi ctional) co-
herence and stakes. The book happens to offer a singularly powerful 
and refi ned conceptualization of literary imagination as a freedom and 
as an ethics; had this not been so one might be saddened to see Darrie-
ussecq having to slough off the multiple, experimental, masked voices 
of fi ction for the earnest, “serious,” naked language of scholarship and 
critical commentary— indeed, not unlike a hermit crab forced to leave 
its shell.7 In truth it is Rapport de police which gives its deepest coher-
ence and “poignant truth- value” to the hermit crab motif, and takes it 
even further— through a supplementary conceptual fold— than where 
common naturalist faith in a metaphor might lead. “What thinks, in 
our cranial boxes?,” Darrieussecq writes, “What thinks, at mouth- level, 
perched between my two ears, between my beating temples, what thinks 
when I think that I think?” (238/239). Where by now even you may 
be prepared to fi nd the hermit crab— perched, watchful, its antennae 
groping— is an “emptiness that thinks,” an essential nothingness prior 
to identity for which Darrieussecq fi nds names in the works of many 
writers and thinkers, from Lacan to Mandelstam:
At the heart of writing there is an empty place [axe], where 
the world gives way [s’engouffre]. To fi nd the path toward 
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this absence that gives access to worlds: this is how I con-
ceive of the process of writing. There is much to be known 
in the emptiness that is neither nothingness nor death. In 
that place, there is no one. Naming/proclaiming oneself in/
at the place of this emptiness [Se nommer à la place de ce 
vide] is ridiculous. Rather, one can accept its dizziness, with-
out names, without prayers, without glory [sacre]. And turn 
oneself into a chamber of echos and metamorphoses. (378)
We have arrived at the (empty) heart of the matter, and the reason why 
even mollusks are only hermit crabs with shells— because not even a 
mollusk ever perfectly replaces or erases that originary void, the shell’s 
true fi rst occupant (yet who was never there in the fi rst place, only 
[emerging retrospectively and theoretically] in its superseding). To name 
oneself in that place is ridiculous . . . and yet that is perhaps the only 
sort of naming there is.
It is not a problem as much as it is a curious solution: at an unde-
termined place, shall we say, of the reading of the hermit crab— as a 
rigorous, ethical fi gure for consciousness and for the “I”— it may imper-
ceptibly twist like a Möbius strip to lead us to what is in fact a “béance” 
or gap(ing) (238) that precedes and survives the I— but is given so seam-
lessly the name and properties of the hermit crab as to be indistinguish-
able from it (as Darrieussecq keeps making clear in Brief Stay with the 
Living, it is very very hard to think of nothing). Of course, this means 
that “nothing” can never be named completely nor once and for all, 
for it is precisely its property to continually subtract itself from what 
is thought and named, so that naming it “hermit crab” may be said 
to have only the rueful consequence of producing more hermit crabs. 
Nonetheless, such a conjuring of hermit crabs is the closest one gets to 
thinking nothing,8 and that— nothing— is a serious question, ultimately 
the most serious question, the most diffi cult to think, as Darrieussecq 
knows, for it risks undoing the very thinker:
I knew: the forest, the continents, the sea, could’ve done with-
out humans. The air would’ve been breathed only by animal 
gills and lungs, the ground trodden only by paws, the sea 
would’ve been traversed only by fl ippers, the sky by feathers. 
Or nothing. An empty planet. Nothing to breathe it. Nothing 
to roam over it. Thought about by nobody. Whirling alone, 
absurd, absurd anyway. (Tom Is Dead, 213/154– 55)
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It is Jean Baudrillard in Impossible Exchange who to my mind best 
succeeds in thinking “nothing” in its scandal and its paradox, as what 
ruins every economy precisely because it forms the fi rst truth about 
everything— that is, the fact that even as within our inhabitable real-
ity everything is exchangeable, reality itself can be exchanged only for 
nothing, given that the only equivalent of (or alternative to) the world, 
life, consciousness, is, simply, nothing. This is impossible exchange, a 
radical uncertainty that haunts the reality principle, and whose result is 
that “behind the exchange of Something, we have, then, always, the ex-
change of the Nothing,”9 a place where the production of meaning and 
value must implode, for it reaches its outside. This nothing is both pre-
historic— in the sense of there actually being a vacuum (pre– Big Bang, 
prehuman, or prelanguage) that frames (precedes and perhaps follows) 
reality— and (it is an inextricable alternative, a sort of and/or, a Möbius 
strip) what is produced (as a prehistory effect) by the fact of something. 
Whence its ambiguous, doubly negative or always- disappearing quality: 
“The Nothing does not cease to exist as soon as there is something. 
The Nothing continues (not) to exist [continue de (ne pas) exister] just 
beneath the surface of things” (17/8). According to Baudrillard, human 
economies and systems share as their ultimate drive the hunt to exter-
minate this Nothing— which he also calls the Inhuman (26/16)— but 
it is indelible, like the very shadow of the real. In fact it is a logical 
postulate that cannot be done away with, only pushed further back 
into a receding theoretical time- space, for if we concede, as we must, 
that reality starts/started somewhere, at some place and time, then we 
must by the same move grant that there was/is a place and time (words 
failing here, for the nothing names something preexisting even space 
and time) where there was/is nothing, and the shadow is also the ab-
sence of a shadow, for there is nothing for reality to cast its shadow on. 
Baudrillard thus speaks of the suddenness of the world’s emergence, like 
language or the cosmos, following the sorts of paradoxes theorized by 
Gosse and Russell: “This emergence out of the void, this non- anteriority 
of things to themselves continue[s] to affect the event of the world at the 
very heart of its historical unfolding” (20/10; my emphasis).
The last short section of Impossible Exchange, titled “Shadowing the 
World,” offers an arresting, riddle- like summary of what it means to be 
human, that is to say, to stand in an essential relation with such noth-
ingness: “The world lacks nothing before being thought, but, thereafter, 
it can be explained only on that basis. It is something like that ‘nothing’ 
which theory simultaneously reveals and supplants, an absence that it 
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both makes visible and masks. One may say also that the world indeed 
lacks ‘nothing’ [le monde manque effectivement de “rien”], and that 
thought is the shadow cast by that Nothing on the surface of the real 
world” (187/150).
In the course of writing this book I came to think of animals as 
marking gaps, thresholds, tricks, twists, vanishing points that stories or 
thought might usually cover up or leave unthought, not because animals 
stood there but, I like to think, with the consequence that animals ap-
peared there. Placeholders for bits of thought and life diffi cult to think, 
they were perhaps fi gures for our relationship with nothing, and, by 
that impossible measure, with everything.
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has evoked the most ungraspable human destinies and uncovered the life- world 
of the occupation.” See NobelPrize.org, accessed August 18, 2019, https://www
.nobelprize.org/prizes/literature/2014/summary/.
3. Francis Bacon, The Brutality of Fact: Interviews with Francis Bacon, ed. 
David Sylvester (Oxford: Alden, 1975), 23.
4. And from literary memory, where they so regularly featured alongside men 
in war narratives. Here we might think of Claude Simon’s work, most notably 
La route des Flandres (Paris: Minuit, 1982) / The Flanders Road, trans. Richard 
Howard (New York: George Braziller, 1961), which features a haunting sub-
text involving horses, “the long line of horses that had apparently been walk-
ing forever extended interminably [  . . .  ] those shadows advancing since the 
night of time” (35/36– 37); see also the reference to “the sound, the monotonous 
and multiple hammering of the hoofs on the road increasing (hundreds, thou-
sands of hoofs now)” (28/29), “animal and armor united, combined” (29/30), 
the “interminable horse ride [chevauchée]” (39/41, translation modifi ed), and 
the “ghostly cavalcade” (125/133). Another obvious intertext here is Louis- 
Ferdinand Céline’s Voyage au bout de la nuit (Paris: Gallimard, 1962) / Journey 
to the End of the Night, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: New Directions, 
2006), featuring allusions both to warhorses and, as in Simon’s novel, to horse 
racing as the war’s prehistory: “But up ahead of us there was nothing we could 
be sure of but the echo that came and went, the echo of our horses’ hoof beats, 
a horrendous sound you wanted so bad not to hear that it stopped your breath. 
Those horses seemed to be trotting to high heaven, to be calling everybody on 
earth to come and massacre us” (29/20). Modiano’s story would seem to com-
plete this fatal march, whereby horses are led beyond the frame of the story. On 
the historic and poetic end of horses, see Tiphaine Samoyault’s essay “Achever 
le cheval” (http://www.crlc.paris- sorbonne.fr/colsem/pdf/Tiphaine- Samoyault- 
Achever_cheval.pdf).
Notes to Chapter 1 ❘ 219
5. Jean- Louis Aragon, “Le cheval, un patrimoine,” Le Monde, May 13, 2010; 
my translation here and below.
6. Étienne Souriau, “L’univers fi lmique et l’art animalier,” Revue internatio-
nale de fi lmologie 7, no. 25 (January– March 1956): 51– 62; my translation. I 
shall return to why the coincidence of the development of cinema and the dis-
appearance of horses is particularly noteworthy.
7. John Berger, “Why Look at Animals?,” in On Looking (New York: Pan-
theon, 1980), 12.
8. Akira Mizuta Lippit, Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 187.
9. Rebecca Solnit, Motion Studies: Time, Space and Eadweard Muybridge 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2004), 22– 24.
10. For Raymond Bellour (see more below), Lippit considers the animal “al-
ways already dead” (436). For Nicole Shukin, Lippit’s “brilliant recapitulation 
of discourses of the ‘undying’ animal in Western philosophical, psychoanalytic, 
and technological discourses” is at the cost of “idealistically speculating in the 
animal as a rhetorical currency transcending its material body” (41). As long as 
animals are treated as specters, Shukin cautions, they are “never fully subject 
to histories of violence and exploitation” (37). Her Animal Capital is to date 
the most powerful complement and counterpoint to Electric Animal as well as 
to Bellour’s study, arguing as it does (by means of a rigorous material- cultural 
history of the abattoir and of gelatin) for the historical contingency of automo-
bility and cinema on mass animal slaughter. Shukin’s analysis faces us with the 
astounding extent to which technological and aesthetic modernity, even as it 
speculated in animals’ spectrality, was from the beginning critically implicated 
in a mass “rendering” of animal fl esh— that is to say, their industrial death and 
disassembly. (See chapter 2, “Automobility: The Animal Capital of Cars, Films, 
and Abattoirs,” 87– 130).
11. Raymond Bellour, Le corps du cinéma: Hypnoses, émotions, animalités 
(Paris: POL, 2009), 34; translations are my own.
12. Eadweard Muybridge, Animals in Motion, ed. Lewis S. Brown (New 
York: Dover, 1957), 13.
13. And these do not seem to refl ect the shortest exposures, which at Palo 
Alto reached “the one six- thousandth part of a second,” as Muybridge specifi es 
in the introduction to Animals in Motion (23).
14. The unnamed artist may have been Jean- Louis- Ernest Meissonier. This 
prominent academic painter, who specialized in battlefi elds, historical scenes, 
and horses, seems to have been driven to despair by the results of the Stanford- 
Muybridge experiments: “After thirty years of absorbing and concentrated 
study, I fi nd I have been wrong. Never again shall I touch a brush!” (quoted in 
Solnit, Motion Studies, 197).
15. Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida, trans. Richard Howard (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 1981), 5– 6.
16. Henri Michaux, Passages (1937– 1950) (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), 54– 55; 
my translation.
17. A logic no doubt taken to its furthest point by Werner Herzog’s fi lm 
Grizzly Man (2005).
18. I transcribe these terms from the table of contents.
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19. Excerpted here from the back cover of Jean- Philippe Toussaint, La vérité 
sur Marie (Paris: Minuit, 2009); my translation.
20. Toussaint, La vérité sur Marie, 77 / The Truth about Marie, trans. Mat-
thew B. Smith (Champaign, Ill.: Dalkey Archive, 2011), 61. Here and through-
out, whenever possible, quotations from primary texts are followed by two page 
numbers. The fi rst refers to the original French text, and the second to the En-
glish translation (when there is one).
21. Presumably historians with a better understanding of horse breeding and 
racing concerns— and of the horse’s place (technological and symbolic) in the 
history of an unprecedented shift in speed and scale at the end of the nineteenth 
century— would not fi nd this connection as mysterious as I do. Solnit, for in-
stance, writes that “understanding the gaits of a horse in a mechanical way 
enhanced the possibility of tinkering with it, through breeding, training, and 
other forms of management. For Stanford, the experiment would allow him to 
further shift the essence of the horse from the mysteries of nature to the man-
ageable mechanics of industrialism” (Motion Studies, 183). Later she writes of 
the divergent legacies of Muybridge’s motion studies: “[Stanford] expected the 
pictures to be useful in breeding and training horses, in managing them yet more 
precisely for yet faster results. Almost the fi rst use of watches that recorded 
fractions of seconds was horse racing, and though racing was a sport, not an in-
dustry, it came to have many affi nities with the development of industrial work 
in the late nineteenth century [e.g. Taylorism]” (211).
22. Jean- Louis Aragon of Le Monde notes that horses’ nerves are much 
harder than bovines’, so that a horse slaughtered for meat must be systemati-
cally denerved (“Le cheval, un patrimoine”). An unseemly detail to recall here, 
but it serves to account for the specifi city of this body in the text (its “nervosité” 
denoting its resistance within a human narrative), and helps us not lose sight of 
the troubling intersections of representations at which an animal must stand.
23. Jorge Luis Borges, Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: 
Penguin, 1998), 242– 49.
24. André Bazin, “Ontology of the Photographic Image,” in What Is Cinema?, 
vol. 1, trans. Hugh Gray (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 9.
25. It memorably becomes Zidane’s paradox in Toussaint’s La mélancolie de 
Zidane [The melancholy of Zidane] (Paris: Minuit, 2006).
26. Worth pursuing here are the associations, signifi cant or fl eeting, sug-
gested in contemporary literature and fi lm between animals and certain vehi-
cles, whether, like in The Truth about Marie, to portray a mighty animal inside 
a vehicle navigating a milieu utterly unnatural to it— Yann Martel’s Life of Pi 
(2001) does something analogous by placing a Bengal tiger in a boat adrift at 
sea— or to feature an animal galloping parallel to a motorized vehicle: Claire 
Denis favors such “subliminal” scenes, both in 35 Rhums (2009), where the 
train driver protagonist imagines for an instant his daughter on a black horse 
moving in the same direction as his suburban train, and in White Material 
(2010), where, before Maria’s son jumps off a truck to madness, a dog is seen 
fl eetingly running in the forest parallel to said truck. A similar scene fi gures in 
Jacques Audiard’s Un prophète [A prophet] (2009), where the only instance of 
prophesy, as it were, is preceded by the fl ash sighting of a small herd of deer 
running on the road in front of a car (and, like a caption in a dream, the pres-
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ence of a road sign with an icon warning of deer). Jean- Christophe Bailly opens 
his beautiful book Le versant animal (Paris: Bayard, 2007) with a scene very 
much like the one in A Prophet, but set at night. The vision of the back of a deer 
running on the road, illuminated by the car’s headlights, allows Bailly to build 
his ensuing refl ection on a chance intersection of his and the animal’s nights. A 
short fi lm in Iranian director Narzieh Meshkini’s triptych The Day I Became 
a Woman (2000) includes incredible footage of men on horses trying to catch 
up with a group of women on bicycles. Such scenes are effective in capturing 
animal movement as phantasmatically, phantomatically written over by, and 
folded into the interstices of, enhanced human locomotion.
27. I claim improbable support for this confi guration from a chapter titled 
“The Intertwining— the Chiasm” in Maurice Merleau- Ponty’s The Visible and 
the Invisible, where an author’s insertion (presented as a footnote by the editor) 
reads: “One can say that we perceive the things themselves, that we are the 
world that thinks itself— or that the world is at the heart of our fl esh. In any 
case, once a body- world relationship is recognized, there is a ramifi cation of my 
body and a ramifi cation of the world.” Le visible et l’invisible, ed. Claude Lefort 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 177 / The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 136.
28. Jean- Philippe Toussaint, “Zidane’s Melancholy,” trans. Timothy Bewes 
and Thangam Ravindranathan, in Best European Fiction 2010, ed. Aleksan-
dar Hemon (Champaign, Ill.: Dalkey Archive, 2010), 35. I should note that 
the vomiting scene is discussed at some length by Toussaint and Pierre Bayard 
in a dialogue that accompanies the second edition of The Truth About Marie. 
Bayard, ever the literary sleuth, suggests that the vomiting may indicate that 
the narrator is autonomous (and jealous) enough to have poisoned the horse 
without the author’s knowing; Toussaint, defending the innocence of his nar-
rator, grants at most that it is a metaleptic moment wherein he as author may 
have done the “poisoning.” He admits then that the horse vomiting in the Boe-
ing aloft in the dark sky was the original image that had inspired the whole 
novel, and that its violation of earthly laws— and the realist pact— ultimately 
only served to further demonstrate “that we are not in a plane in fl ight, but in 
literature” (“L’auteur, le narrateur et le pur- sang. Une enquête de Pierre Bayard 
et Jean- Philippe Toussaint,” La vérité sur Marie (Paris : Minuit, 2013) 207– 19; 
my translation).
29. See on this point the beautiful introduction to Laurent Jenny’s L’expéri-
ence de la chute: De Montaigne à Michaux (Paris: PUF, 1997).
30. Incidentally, Souriau attributes the privileged presence of animals in 
cinema in part to their extraordinary “cinetic” properties, that is, the specifi c 
movements they introduce into fi lmic “language.” He evokes a documentary 
on deep sea life where a shark, entering the screen from the top left, moved 
downward and to the right in a curved and irregular movement (“en boomer-
ang”) to fi nally exit the screen at the top in the second third of the frame, to 
then comment on it as something without precedent: “And from a fi lmological 
point of view one simply had to note that such an eloquent, beautifully traced, 
‘musical’ arabesque of movement [arabesque cinétique] had never featured on a 
screen before the fi lmic study of marine fauna” (Souriau, “L’univers fi lmique et 
l’art animalier,” 58– 59; my translation).
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31. See, notably, Marey’s chronophotographic and fi lmic work on birds in 
fl ight from the late 1880s and 1890s.
32. The other end of this vertical unconscious brings us to the depth of 
the sea, another region that has fascinated cinema from its very beginnings— 
witness the numerous “microscopic” fi lms Jean Painlevé devoted to deep sea 
creatures: La pieuvre [The octopus] (1928), Les oursins [The sea urchins] 
(1929), L’œuf d’épinoche [The stickleback’s egg] (1929), Hyas et stenorinques 
[Hyas and Stenorrynchus] (1929), La daphnie [The daphnia] (1929), Les cra-
bes [Crabs] (1930), Bernard- l’hermite [The hermit crab] (1930), L’hippocampe 
[The seahorse] (1934), etc. More recently, Perrin and Cluzaud, the makers 
of Winged Migration, likewise followed the verticality downward in Océans 
(2009).
33. I do fi nd this idea most beautifully melancholic and would myself have 
opted for it.
34. Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1982), 3.
35. Years before his horse motion studies, Muybridge had achieved some 
measure of fame traveling through San Francisco, in the 1860s and into the 
1870s, with a horse- drawn darkroom on wheels that could capture 360- degree 
panoramic views of the city. Unaccountably, he had named this contraption He-
lios Flying Studio. I cannot help seeing in this fact confi rmation of Muybridge’s 
long fascination with the theme of the fl ying horse and in its association with 
Helios (or the sun) a prophesy of the trembling line, seen here, between Pegasus 
and Icarus.
36. The coincidence carries more weight, naturally, in the French. See Franz 
Kafka, La métamorphose, trans. Marthe Robert, in Oeuvres complètes (Paris: 
Cercle du Livre Précieux, 1963), 65.
37. Marina Warner, Fantastic Metamorphoses, Other Worlds: Ways of Tell-
ing the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 115.
Chapter 2
1. Éric Chevillard, Sans l’orang- outan (Paris: Minuit, 2007), 31 for the pre-
ceding quote. All translations from this text are my own.
2. “Remarkable dysfunctionings, the chain of links is severed, the bucket no 
longer arrives at the fi re, the fi ancée awaits her ring, we search everywhere for 
the sponge and the salt that are not in the kitchen yet no longer in the sea. We 
are going to pay a high price for our fl ippancy, I anticipate deep upheavals. // 
For instance, we observe this already, the length of the meter has changed. It is 
increasing. Forgotten, the formidable span of the orangutan that moved among 
the trees by brachiation, making sure of its next grasp before releasing the fi rst, 
then throwing itself into the void hanging from the hooks of its fi ngers, no more, 
that prodigious locomotion among the heights” (Chevillard 16– 17).
3. Recall the character Crab in La nébuleuse du crabe [The crab nebula] 
(1993) and Un fantôme [A ghost] (1995), along with the logic of Palafox 
(1990), Du hérisson [The hedgehog] (2002), Démolir Nisard [Demolishing Nis-
ard] (2006), and Dino Egger (2011), all published by Minuit, Paris.
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4. Marc Escola, Lupus in fabula: Six façons d’affabuler La Fontaine (Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 2003), chap. 1, “Brèves histoires de loups.” 
In this section I summarize and sometimes translate the terms of Escola’s 
analysis. 
5. See here, among other essays where Paul de Man has written on allegory, 
irony, and their crossed temporal operations, “Pascal’s Allegory of Persuasion,” 
in Allegory and Representation, ed. Stephen Greenblatt (Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press, 1969).
6. Susan McHugh, “Literary Animal Agents,” PMLA 124, no. 2 (2009): 488.
7. Thomas Keenan, Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments 
in Ethics and Politics (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997).
8. Indeed, Butler in these seminars, revisiting Adorno, Laplanche, Althusser, 
Lacan, Lévinas, etc., proceeds very much from and in line with Keenan’s insights 
regarding the “fabulous” structure by which the “I” cannot tell the story of its 
own emergence, even if citations are rare. See Judith Butler, Giving an Account 
of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005).
9. David Wills, Dorsality: Thinking Back through Technology and Politics 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). The seriousness with which 
Wills follows Derrida in understanding the human as technological, prosthetic, 
from the beginning, not to say preceded by the technological (whence the “tech-
nological turn,” which he calls “dorsality”), means that Dorsality fi nds many 
ways to suggest that “the ethical relation may not be a human relation at all but 
a relation to the nonhuman other” (54). In complicating human self- coincidence 
on every level— revealing all the places of long- supposed identity (body, home, 
friendship, country, etc.) to be affected by exile, exteriority, expropriation— 
Wills is powerfully pursuing Derrida’s work in deconstructing a long history 
of deep- seated notions of le propre de l’humain. If this necessarily clears a cru-
cial space for the animal, Wills seems more often than not reluctant to give it 
this (only) name. Perhaps because the notion of “animal” is burdened with too 
much, risks exerting its own properties or propriety. His interest seems to be, 
rather, in locations at which animality might be indistinguishable from technol-
ogy. Still, even “clandestinely” present, the animal seems to be almost breathing 
in this strange and beautiful work.
10. Depuis le temps: This adverbial locution serves in L’animal que donc je 
suis to mark the time of the animal, its existence not just since time immemorial, 
so to speak, but since time itself, that is, ever since such a thing like time came 
to be (an event that, for Derrida in the fi rst seminar, fi nds its fable in the book of 
Genesis). The leitmotiv inscribes the complicity of time itself— historical, human 
time— in obscuring the view of the animal, and thus makes somehow readable 
(as something unreadable, as it were) the irony by which time was precisely, 
among other things, this work of obscuring. The expropriating structure to 
which the phrase points (implying a time somehow outside time, thus ruining 
the wholeness/closure of the latter while at the same time conferring on the 
former the character of a shadow, a specter) is that of a series of fundamental 
moves in Derrida’s work, indeed it describes the very movement of the famous 
supplement. This, by way of an attempt to explain why it is extremely diffi cult, 
in fact, to distinguish or extricate the question of the animal, in Derrida’s writ-
224 ❘ Notes to Chapter 2
ing, from the movement of deconstruction itself. In his later years, remarks sug-
gesting that his work had from the beginning been, in an important sense, about 
the animal (see, for example, the fi rst seminar of The Beast and the Sovereign: 
La bête et le souverain I (2001– 2002), ed. Michel Lisse, Marie- Louise Mallet, 
and Ginette Michaud [Paris: Galilée, 2008] / The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. 
1, trans. Geoffrey Bennington [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009]), 
both confi rm what has since become increasingly clear in rereadings and make 
one wonder whether Derrida himself, analyst of unregulatable economies, could 
control the extent to which deconstruction in deconstructing the human along 
various fault lines was, one could say, following the work of the animal (fol-
lowing, in the exactly complicated sense of the “suis”— both follow and be, and 
in following, both precede and succeed— as per the polysemy so important to 
the seminar. L’animal que donc je suis, ed. Marie- Louise Mallet (Paris: Galilée, 
2006) / The Animal That Therefore I Am, trans. David Wills (New York: Ford-
ham University Press, 2008). Hélène Cixous says as much when she notes that 
“with the fi rst trace of the thinking of the trace in Of Grammatology, the whole 
machine that tends to replace the word ‘writing’ in the ordinary sense by ‘trace’ 
or the word ‘speech’ by trace had as its fi nal purpose that writing, speech, trace 
are not the proper characteristic of the human. There is animal trace, animals 
write.” “Jacques Derrida: Co- Responding Voix You,” in Derrida and the Time 
of the Political, ed. Pheng Cheah and Suzanne Guerlac (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 2009), 43.
11. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infi nity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. 
Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), 131– 32.
12. See “Le bestiaire des fables de La Fontaine (1668– 1694),” in Les Ani-
maux célèbres, ed. Michel Pastoureau (Paris: Arléa, 2008), 204– 11.
13. Emmanuel Levinas, “Nom d’un chien ou le droit naturel,” in Diffi cile 
liberté (Paris: Albin Michel, 1976), 231– 35. See chapter 3 for a detailed discus-
sion of that essay.
14. See Derrida, La bête et le souverain I, 316– 17 / The Beast and the Sov-
ereign, 1:237; see also L’animal que donc je suis, 148– 49 / The Animal That 
Therefore I Am, 107– 9.
15. Derrida would comment at length on the open- ended infi nity, through 
history, of this boundary, made of a continuing addition of properties that the 
human in ascribing to itself in the same movement deprives the animal of (see 
fi rst seminar of The Animal That Therefore I Am); Giorgio Agamben, in show-
ing this boundary to be a “mobile border” passing “within” the human, ac-
counts with poignant simplicity for both the politics and the anxiety continually 
accompanying its various locatings. See Agamben, The Open: Man and Animal, 
trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002), 15.
16. I refer here to Gilles Deleuze’s The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. 
Tom Conley (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), where the dif-
ferently vectored double- fold is quite clearly suggested to be a formal solution, 
in the Baroque imagination, to the problem of the relation between the human 
and the animal. Making thinkable moreover a formation wherein “justly what 
is expressed does not exist outside of its expressions” (35), the Baroque fold is 
certainly, if uncannily, infl ecting a certain poststructuralist thinking of the sub-
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ject (Derrida, de Man, Keenan, Wills) engaged with here. I engage more directly 
with Deleuze’s thinking in chapters 3 and 4. In the meantime, I take liberal 
license in playing, in my thinking of the animal, on the etymology of duplicity, 
complicity, multiplicity, complicate, etc., all derived from the Latin plicare, “to 
fold”— indeed, an extraordinary page of A Thousand Plateaus presents crea-
turely life as a vast plane of “plication.” Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 255.
17. “The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” in The Portable Edgar Allan Poe, ed. 
J. Gerald Kennedy (New York: Penguin, 2006), 239.
18. Nietzsche famously considered “the doer” to be “merely a fi ction added 
to the deed.” The Birth of Tragedy / The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Francis 
Golffi ng (New York: Anchor Books, 1956), 179. If Dupin here appears dis-
tinctly un- Nietzschean, my proposition with this reading is that Poe’s text may 
itself, strictly and red herrings aside, be retaining a measure of skepticism vis- à- 
vis such retroactive subject effects. That this should not strike most readers, nor 
be architextually receivable (i.e., a genre and a whole epistemology stand to be 
threatened), then works as a paradox not dissimilar to that of Poe’s “The Pur-
loined Letter,” as analyzed by Lacan, Derrida, Johnson, and others: too obvious, 
too depthless a surface, to behold. But more anon . . . 
19. Manifestly because they suggest the work of nonopposable thumbs, 
though this is an error, we now know, in Poe’s understanding of the anatomy of 
the orangutan, genetically even closer to the human than he thought.
20. For a refl ection on the ways in which the animal is here a site of pos-
sible displacement of the fi gure of the Black slave, I refer to Christopher Pe-
terson’s extraordinarily insightful essay “The Aping Apes of Poe and Wright: 
Race, Animality, and Mimicry in ‘Murders in the Rue Morgue’ and Native Son,” 
New Literary History 41, no. 1 (Winter 2010): 151– 71. In dialogue with La-
can, Derrida, and Steve Baker on the animal, Peterson argues in highly nuanced 
terms that while such a displacement (slave to animal) can be imputed to such 
a text, recovering it as the text’s stable truth (as a critic such as Ed White does) 
risks performing a more dangerous displacement yet, and one endemic to lit-
erary interpretation, where the animal is reduced to a “transparent signifi er” 
of the human, and the ultimate referential logic of dehumanization of certain 
humans— which operates precisely and crucially via subtextual historical dis-
courses and representational treatments of the animal— is lost to view. By at-
tending to the “fabulist” logic of Poe’s story here, I have chosen not to assume 
that dehumanizing or animalizing is itself a simple or stable operation.
21. Thus merging with the ape in the human, we might add; for Agamben, 
who notes the signifi cance of Linnaeus’s decision to ascribe to the human 
the classifi cation Anthropomorpha, or “manlike,” the human’s relationship to 
itself was that of a “lack of a face of his own,” the difference of degree (“his 
being always more or less than himself”), then, rescued by the “anthropolog-
ical machine” that converted resemblance to self- recognition (see The Open, 
29– 30).
22. And here the orangutan’s movement arguably mimes that of the oikos 
itself, to quote Wills as he discusses, precisely, Homer’s Odyssey: “There is no 
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undisturbed domestic space from which to set out and to which to return [ . . . ]. 
There cannot be any direct route back to a space of the proper or the contained, 
the native or the natural” (Dorsality, 73).
23. See Akira Mizuta Lippit, Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of Wildlife 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), chaps. 2– 4; quote on 127. 
Lippit in fact discusses Poe’s story in the fi rst few pages of his fi rst chapter, but 
focusing ultimately on the orangutan’s inarticulate cry that had so troubled its 
witnesses, uses it to frame the question of the animal in terms of its complicated 
position vis- à- vis the logos. Reviewing quickly the positions of Aristotle, Rous-
seau, and Derrida on this question, he summarizes at the close of this section: 
“The phantasm of a primordial unity continues to haunt the dialectics of logos 
and zoon, writing and speech, human and animal being, even as the proximity 
of speech to its other, the affective cry of the animal, establishes the spaces 
and temporalities that regulate the opening of worlds— the human and animal 
worlds that form apart from one another” (33).
24. Here too the text— Homer’s— does not literally make a mystery of this 
question, ascribing words to the song, and here too this proves a fi ner point, the 
going beyond of which proves more interesting. E. V. Rieu’s translation of the 
passage reads as follows: “‘Draw near,’ they sang, ‘illustrious Odysseus, fl ower 
of Achaean chivalry, and bring your ship to rest so that you may hear our voices. 
No seaman ever sailed his black ship past this spot without listening to the sweet 
tones that fl ow from our lips, and none that listened has not been delighted and 
gone on a wiser man. For we know all that the Argives and Trojans suffered on 
the broad plain of Troy by the will of the gods, and we have foreknowledge of 
all that is going to happen on this fruitful earth.’” Homer, The Odyssey, trans. 
E. V. Rieu (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1946), 194.
25. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 
trans. John Cumming (London: Verso, 1997), 58.
26. Quoted from The Sirens’ Song: Selected Essays by Maurice Blanchot, ed. 
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Mondes de Marie NDiaye, 105– 6.
103. César Aira, The Musical Brain and Other Stories, trans. Chris Andrews 
(New York: New Directions, 2015), 46.
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Moudileno and Motte, Marie NDiaye’s Worlds / Mondes de Marie NDiaye, 
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novel see also Lydie Moudileno’s most interesting analyses in “Marie NDiaye’s 
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drew Asibong and Shirley Jordan (Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du 
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120. See opening of “What Is an Author?,” where Foucault quotes those lines 
and then notes: “In this indifference [of who is speaking] appears one of the 
fundamental ethical principles of contemporary writing.” The Foucault Reader, 
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téressée) and no doubt shaped “the vacation” in Ladivine, the core scene around 
which the whole novel had been composed (NDiaye, “J’aime cette période de 
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to eat the food she prepared [ . . . ]. She alone, Clarisse Rivière, for the bitterness 
passed through her without swelling inside her” (22/12).
127. Ladivine, as Asibong has noted, presents an ambitiously condensed and 
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2. Marie Darrieussecq, Undercurrents: A Novel, trans. Linda Coverdale (New 
York: New Press, 2001), 28. For the rest of this chapter I refer to this American 
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don: Faber and Faber, 2001), 29.
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6. Marie Darrieussecq, Naissance des fantômes (Paris: Gallimard, 1998), 16 / 
My Phantom Husband, trans. Esther Allen (New York: New Press, 1999), 6.
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“Marie Darrieussecq’s Ghost,” Symposium 69, no. 4 (Oct– Dec 2015), 190– 
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rieussecq, see among others Catherine Rodgers, “Marie Darrieussecq: écrivaine 
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Studies 2009, 105– 17.
8. Henri Michaux, Selected Writings: The Space Within, trans. Richard Ell-
man (New York: New Directions, 1951), 43. Michaux had also titled a poem 
“Naissance” [Birth], an account of the successive and frenetic births of a certain 
Pon. Darrieussecq, when I spoke with her, was not familiar with these writings 
by Michaux. But in my opinion Michaux had read Darrieussecq. (This chrono-
logically untenable claim will make more sense later in the chapter.)
9. Marie Darrieussecq, Bref séjour chez les vivants (Paris: POL, 2001), 24, 
153 / A Brief Stay with the Living, trans. Ian Monk (London: Faber and Faber, 
2003), 12, 109; translation modifi ed.
10. Marie Darrieussecq, Rapport de police (Paris: POL, 2010), 87; transla-
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11. Stéphanie Posthumus, French ‘Écocritique’: Reading Contemporary French 
Theory and Fiction Ecologically (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017); 
see notably chapter 1, “Ecological Subjectivity: Guattari and Darrieussecq.”
12. Marie Darrieussecq, Le pays [The country] (Paris: POL, 2005), 64; trans-
lations are mine.
13. For a beautiful refl ection on lessness and other “- nesses” in Beckett, see 
Robert Harvey, Witnessness: Beckett, Dante, Levi and the Foundations of Re-
sponsibility (New York: Continuum, 2010), which I turn to briefl y and in rela-
tion to other questions later in the chapter.
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ment all the fl owers in our garden and in M. Swann’s park, and the water- 
lilies on the Vivonne and the good folk of the village and their little dwellings 
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all fl ies to come.) Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
18. Marie Darrieussecq, Tom est mort (Paris: POL, 2007), 108 / Tom Is 
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(Paris: Gallimard, 2002), 941 / The Table, trans. Colombina Zamponi (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Wakefi eld, 2017), 76.
24. Mathieu Larnaudie, “Des crabes, des anges et des monstres” (interview 
with Éric Chevillard), in Devenirs du roman, ed. François Bégaudeau et al. 
(Paris: Inculte/Naïve, 2007), 97– 98; my translation. On Chevillard’s Du héris-
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Romestaing, Pierre Schoentjes, and Anne Simon, special issue, Revue Critique 
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Pierre Bayard et al. (Paris: Minuit, 2014), 37– 58.
25. Adam Nicolson, “Where Have All Our Hedgehogs Gone?,” The Guard-
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g2.ruralaffairs.
26. Jacques Derrida, “Che cos’è la poesia?,” in Points . . . Interviews, 1974– 
1994, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 
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estar: Animal Affections in Vallejo’s Poetry,” in Politics, Poetics, Affect: Re- 
visioning César Vallejo, ed. Stephen M. Hart (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 
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28. Franz Kafka, The Complete Stories, 428.
29. Joseph Lavery, “Deconstruction and Petting: Untamed Animots in Der-
rida and Kafka,” in Demenageries: Thinking (of) Animals after Derrida, ed. 
Anne E. Berger and Marta Segarra (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), 129.
30. In an inspired passage, Lavery puts Odradek in relation with the reel and 
thread of Hans of Freudian fort/da fame, to note that these two “moments of 
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33. Bauer, “The Power of the Look,” 160.
34. Éric Chevillard, Palafox (Paris: Minuit, 2003).
35. Jorge Luis Borges, Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings (New 
York: New Directions, 1964), 199– 200. Borges is quoting the Han Yu apologue 
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Le parti pris des animaux (Paris: Christian Bourgois, 2013), 25– 33.
37. Jacques Derrida, “Istrice 2. Ick bünn all hier,” in Points de suspension: 
Entretiens, ed. Elisabeth Weber (Paris: Galilée, 1992), 309– 36 / “Istrice 2: Ick 
bünn all hier,” in Points de suspension, 300– 326; see 319– 22. I am grateful to 
Michelle Clayton for alerting me to this lead. See her more cogent summary of 
the hedgehog sequel in “Animalestar,” 122.
38. See chapter 3 in this book.
39. “No interruption,” she writes a couple of pages earlier to describe the at-
tempt to achieve a thinking about nothing: “To think about not thinking is to al-
ready be thinking: fi rst mental loop, carousels and swings” (37; my translation).
40. See Jeanne Lafont, “Topology and Effi ciency,” in Lacan: Topologically 
Speaking, ed. Ellie Ragland and Dragan Milovanovic (New York: Other Press, 
2004), 3– 27.
41. Lafont, “Topology and Effi ciency,” 6.
42. Gérard Genette, Mimologics, trans. Thaïs E. Morgan (Lincoln: Univer-
sity of Nebraska Press, 1995), 300.
43. Émile Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics, trans. Mary Elizabeth 
Meek (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1971), 224.
44. As cited and translated in Genette, Mimologics, 297.
45. Jacques Derrida, Signsponge/Signéponge (bilingual edition), trans. Rich-
ard Rand (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 54– 55, 92– 93.
46. I refer here to the crystalline pages on Ponge in Marder’s Ph.D. disserta-
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ings in Literature, Psychoanalysis and Film” (Yale University, 1989); see chapter 
4, “What Speaks: Reading Ponge’s Smile” (106– 28), and chapter 5, “Successive 
Failures in Ponge” (129– 84).
47. See the notes to Ponge, Œuvres complètes, 1:906.
48. Francis Ponge, Selected Poems, trans. C. K. Williams, John Montague, 
and Margaret Guiton, ed. Margaret Guiton (Winston- Salem, N.C.: Wake Forest 
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University Press, 1994), 37. The poems I quote are translated by C. K. Williams 
unless stated otherwise.
49. Marder, “Human, None Too Human,” 125. In Words of Light: Theses on 
the Photography of History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 
Eduardo Cadava also calls the mollusk “the perfect autobiographical form” in 
that “it registers, inscribes and imprints every moment of the process whereby 
what is living is petrifi ed” and thus “names a kind of rhythm of the transit 
between life and death” (122). Cadava offers his meditation on the mollusk 
by way of commentary on Walter Benjamin’s account in Berlin Childhood of a 
childhood visit to a photography studio: “I dwelt in the nineteenth century as 
a mollusk dwells in its shell, and the century now lies hollow before me like an 
empty shell. I hold it to my ear” (quoted in Words of Light, 109). Cadava evoc-
atively unravels the thread that allows the mollusk to serve as a potent analogon 
for a photographic conception of subjecthood: “Like a slow- motion, time lapse 
camera [the shell] in fact records every second of the mollusk’s life” (121). The 
poignancy of the relation in both cases is that a likeness (of shell to mollusk, 
of image to self) at a certain point turns into— or is revealed as— difference, 
leading to the truth that there is no representation of self without a disappear-
ance (and doubling) of self. “In the exposure of self that is the photograph, the 
intimacy of being is traversed by exteriority” (115). A note on page 152 makes 
clear that Cadava has discussed fruitfully with Marder mollusks as well as the 
Ponge connection.
50. In this closing line of Carroll’s “nonsense” poem “The Hunting of the 
Snark,” the Snark (an auspicious prey animal and the intended object of the 
long chase), once found, turns out to be, unfortunately, the Boojum (for some 
Snarks are Boojums), a frightful being whose encounter causes the hunter to 
“softly and suddenly vanish away.” Lewis Carroll, The Complete Illustrated 
Works (New York: Gramercy Books, 1995), 206.
51. Marder, “Human, None Too Human,” 127.
52. Ponge, Œuvres complètes, 1:40 / Selected Poems, 67; translation modifi ed.
53. “Speech speaks,” writes Marder. “It is not our property but our means of 
survival. We do not survive as ourselves, but as that unknown race we are yet to 
become. And if we speak well, we can be spoken by it” (128). And it is true that 
Ponge in the last lines of “Notes pour un coquillage” writes the most unequiv-
ocally about a world that will outlive the human: “Then, after all the animals 
have died out, air and little grains of sand will slowly penetrate it, while it still 
shines and erodes upon the ground and gradually disaggregates into sparkles: 
oh sterile, impalpable dust, oh brilliant residue, though endlessly churned and 
kneaded between the millstones of air and sea there will come an at last! No 
one’s there any longer [L’on n’est plus là] to make anything anything more, even 
glass, out of sand, and it’s all over!” (Ponge, Œuvres complètes, 1:40– 41 / 
Selected Poems, 67).
54. See Benveniste’s well- known analysis of the pronouns “I” and “you”: 
“Language wards off th[e] danger [of intersubjective communication requiring 
a unique self- identifying word— and by extension a unique language— for every 
speaker] by insituting a unique but mobile sign, I, which can be assumed by 
each speaker on the condition that he refers each time only to the instance of 
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his own discourse [un ensemble de signes ‘vides,’ non référentiels par rapport 
à la ‘réalité,’ toujours disponibles, et qui deviennent ‘pleins’ dès qu’un locuteur 
les assume dans chaque instance de son discours]”; “the indicators I and You 
cannot exist as potentialities; they exist only insofar as they are actualized in 
the instance of discourse, in which, by each of their own instances, they mark 
the process of appropriation by the speaker.” Émile Benveniste, Problèmes de 
linguistique générale (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 1:254– 55 / Problems in General 
Linguistics, 220.
55. Gilles Deleuze, Logique du sens (Paris: Minuit, 1969), 44 / Logic of 
Sense, trans. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1990), 31.
56. “This form situates the agency of the ego [l’instance du moi], before its 
social determination, in a fi ctional direction [dans une ligne de fi ction] that will 
always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will only 
rejoin the coming- into- being [le devenir] of the subject asymptotically, whatever 
the success of the dialectical syntheses by which he must resolve as I his discor-
dance with his own reality.” Jacques Lacan, Écrits (Paris: Seuil, 1999), 93 / Écrits: 
A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (Bristol, U.K.: Tavistock/Routledge, 1989), 2.
57. Darrieussecq cites Lacan in several places in Rapport de police, including 
in these few lines that reveal the extent to which her fascination with the “I” 
owes something to the psychoanalyst: “I is another [Je est un autre]: a scissoring 
that opens the I, and fi lls it with this thinking emptiness [ce vide qui pense]. Who 
is thinking when I am thinking? Where is it thinking? [Où est- ce que ça pense?] 
‘I think where I am not, and I am where I think not,’ famous formula by Lacan 
to describe the unconscious” (240; my translation).
58. Jacques Derrida, Séminaire: La bête et le souverain, vol. 2: 2002– 2003 
(Paris: Galilée, 2010), 54– 55 / The Beast and the Sovereign, vol. 2, trans. Geof-
frey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 26– 27.
59. The interview with Maurizio Ferraris (with questions translated from 
Italian to French by Charles Alunni) was originally published in Aut aut 235 
(January– February 1990), shortly after the publication of Derrida’s response to 
Che cos’è la poesia?
60. If one looks more closely at Heidegger’s text, it appears that what Der-
rida remembers as a mimicked objection is in fact offered as an account in 
Heidegger’s own voice of the perplexing fact that difference is not something 
that the thinker brings to Being/beings, inserting it between them, but rather 
that it is precisely by virtue of difference that Being presents itself as beings, and 
can be accessed in no other way, that is, can never not present itself in differ-
ence. And that therefore thinking would be deluded to think that it contributes 
something— difference— to Being/beings. In other words, far from claiming to 
himself be making such a contribution (which is how Derrida remembers it), 
Heidegger is rather telling us that difference is resolutely not of the order of 
representation but of the order of actualized ontology. Arguably, this does not 
fundamentally alter the association of the hedgehog with the logic of what can 
have arrived before it has completed its journey, and in a sense before it has even 
left— unless it is to say that the Grimm tale is an even more fundamental and 
sincere “hypotext” for Heidegger than Derrida remembered, and that perhaps 
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in certain key passages is a continual replay of the effects of a hedgehog “trick”: 
“Being does not leave its own place and go over to beings, as though beings 
were fi rst without Being and could be approached by Being subsequently. Being 
transits (that), comes unconcealingly over (that) which arrives as something of 
itself unconcealed only by that coming- over [Überkommnis]. Arrival means: to 
keep concealed in unconcealedness— to abide present in this keeping— to be a 
being.” Martin Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 64.
61. Catachresis in this sense is central to Derrida’s thinking. See his “My-
thologie blanche: La métaphore dans le texte philosophique,” in Marges de la 
philosophie (Paris: Minuit, 1972) / “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of 
Philosophy,” trans. F. C. T. Moore, in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1982).
62. Of course, there could be other ways of telling the story of the fate of 
animals in Western thought— for example, by considering Foucault’s account 
in Les mots et les choses (The Order of Things) of the passage from the order 
of natural history to that of biology, where animals go from being living things 
sharing the space of representation with language (and thus as frankly visible as 
they were describable) to being grave embodiments of life and death, their es-
sence submerged in the unseen depths of the material realm, as if on the far side 
of language. And in a deep sense, the two accounts (Foucault’s and Ferraris’s) 
might not be incompatible, given that both place the animal on the side of death 
and provide a telling of how an idea of man emerged in the place of and against 
the animal. But the question of where the animal stands vis- à- vis the letter (even 
in the effort to map the points of contact between the two accounts) proves 
more diffi cult (and ultimately richer) a question— precisely one that literature 
stages and responds to over and over again, if never defi nitively (“For thinking 
concerning the animal, if there is such a thing, derives from poetry”: see below).
63. Carla Freccero, “Chercher la chatte: Derrida’s Queer Feminine Animal-
ity,” in French Thinking about Animals, ed. Louisa Mackenzie and Stephanie 
Posthumus (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2015), 105– 20.
64. Lewis Carroll, Aventures d’Alice au pays des merveilles, trans. Henri Bué 
(New York: Dover, 1972), 84. The English translation is mine.
65. Jean- Luc Nancy, À plus d’un titre: Jacques Derrida. Sur un portrait de 
Valerio Adami (Paris: Galilée, 2007), 37; emphasis in original; my translation. 
Alain David, discussing Levinas in “Cynesthèse,” also refers to the cat’s grin (as 
a hypallage— a quality emancipated from the object— and) as a paradigm for 
thinking the mode of presence of the dead: “Comment sourient les morts? Ce 
sourire ne peut que s’extraire d’une chaire absente pour apparaître seul, pareil 
au sourire du chat du Cheshire, dans Alice au pays des merveilles.” Alain David, 
“Cynesthèse: Autoportrait au chien,” in L’animal autobiographique: Autour de 
Jacques Derrida, ed. Marie- Louise Mallet (Paris: Galilée, 1999), 307.
66. Marie- Dominique Garnier, “Animal Writes: Derrida’s Que Donc and 
Other Tails,” in Demenageries, ed. Anne- Emmanuelle Berger and Marta Segarra 
(Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011), 33– 38.
67. Thus I retraced this parasitical element. See Lewis Carroll, Alice au pays 
des merveilles et Ce qu’Alice trouva de l’autre côté du miroir, trans. Jacques 
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Papy (Paris: Jean- Jacques Pauvert, 1961), 91, 98, 134– 38. It remains intriguing 
that the philosophers would carry it over at all, since Derrida quotes system-
atically from the English original, and since Denise Paul “Fanny” Granjouan, 
Deleuze’s wife and close cothinker, was an Anglicist.
68. Jacques Derrida, The Work of Mourning, ed. Michael Naas and Pascale- 
Anne Brault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 195. Thanks to Da-
vid Wills for helping me verify that this was indeed the only other reference to 
Carroll in Derrida’s work.
Epilogue
1. The lack of a hermit crab poem per se should be nuanced to some ex-
tent, as the hermit crab receives rather glorious mention in Ponge’s “Notes to-
ward a Shellfi sh”: “Quand le seigneur sort de sa demeure il fait certes moins 
d’impression que lorsque le bernard- l’hermite laisse apercevoir sa monstrueuse 
pince à l’embouchure du superbe cornet qui l’héberge.” / “A lord emerging from 
his manor is a far less impressive sight than the monstrous claw of a hermit 
crab glimpsed at the mouthpiece of the magnifi cent corner which shelters him.” 
Ponge, “Notes pour un coquillage,” in Œuvres complètes, ed. Bernard Beugnot 
(Paris: Gallimard, 2002), 1:39 / “Notes toward a Shellfi sh,” in Selected Poems, 
trans. C. K. Williams, John Montague, and Margaret Guiton, ed. Margaret Gui-
ton (Winston- Salem, N.C.: Wake Forest University Press, 1994), 65.
2. For Darrieussecq novels that mention hermit crabs, see Bref séjour chez 
les vivants (Paris: POL, 2001), 30, 52– 53, 59– 61, 65, 214 / A Brief Stay with the 
Living, trans. Ian Monk (London: Faber and Faber, 2003), 17, 33, 39– 40, 43, 
155; Le pays [The country] (Paris: POL, 2005), 183; Naissance des fantômes 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1998), 80 / My Phantom Husband, trans. Esther Allen (New 
York: New Press, 1999), 71. And there could well be more that when I last 
checked had retracted momentarily from view.
3. Le bernard l’ermite, crustacé marin: Un documentaire de Jean Painlevé, 
1930; “experimental[ly]” because, as the voice- over makes clear, “In the sea 
there are a lot of shells, and many more shells than hermit crabs. This housing 
crisis is therefore purely experimental.” All translations from Painlevé are my 
own.
4. The most dramatic sequences of Le bernard l’ermite feature indeed beau-
tiful symphonic scores composed by Vincenzo Bellini.
5. The Wikipedia entry on the hermit crab (accessed January 3, 2018) in 
turn cites as its references the following publications: Randi D. Rotjan, Jeffrey 
R. Chabot, and Sara M. Lewis, “Social Context of Shell Acquisition in Coeno-
bita clypeatus Hermit Crabs,” Behavioral Ecology 21, no. 3 (2010): 639– 46, 
doi:10.1093/beheco/arq027; Ferris Jabr, “On a Tiny Caribbean Island, Hermit 
Crabs Form Sophisticated Social Networks,” Scientifi c American, June 5, 2012; 
and Robert Sanders, “Hermit Crabs Socialize to Evict Their Neighbors,” Octo-
ber 26, 2012, University of California, Berkeley.
6. Wikipedia again (accessed January 3, 2018). Excerpts from the “Vacancy 
Chain” article quoted here cite Lawrence Pinfi eld, The Operation of Internal 
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Labor Markets (New York: Plenum Press and Chase, 1995); Ivan D., “Vacancy 
Chains,” Annual Review of Sociology 17 (1991): 133– 54.
7. Darrieussecq had been determined not to publish her dissertation and in 
the introduction to Rapport de police vows that this is the only nonfi ctional 
essay she will ever publish. See Rapport de police (Paris: POL, 2010), 27). That 
a writer so committed to exorbitant expropriating understandings of self, who 
in Le pays had evoked a “thinking without a subject” (35) and even proposed 
a cleft j/e as the truest cipher- pronoun, should have been charged by another 
with “singerie” (apeing) and with laying her eggs in another bird’s nest is highly 
ironic— indeed, a misrecognition of species as well as a misrecognition of stakes. 
Shouldn’t it have been obvious that Darrieussecq’s j/e is not a monkey nor a 
cuckoo but a (radical) hermit crab?
8. At this point it should be clear that even if hermit crabs are singularly 
suited to revealing the structure in question, every thing has this obscure, thank-
less function or fantasy of partly providing a name for “nothing.”
9. Jean Baudrillard, L’échange impossible (Paris: Galilée, 1999), 16 / Impos-
sible Exchange, trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2001), 7.
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